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ABSTRACT 
Ethnic Nationalism, the Great Powers and 
the Question of Albanian Independence, 
1912-21 
Nicola C. Guy 
Based primarily on British policy and perceptions, this thesis aims to provide a 
detailed analysis of the question of Albanian independence (1912-21) and the 
delimitation of its frontiers (1912-26). It considers the Albanian question with 
particular regard to perceptions of ethnicity and national identity prevailing 
1912-21, and consideration of the position of small states in the international 
system at the time. The first three chapters consider the period before the First 
World War when the concept of an independent Albania first emerged. Chapter 
One considers the rapid development of the Albanian nationalist movement in 
1912. Chapter Two explores the Albanian question during the Ambassadorial 
Conference in London and boundary commissions (1912-14). Chapter Three 
considers some of the practical issues involved in establishing a new state. 
Chapters Four and Five focus on the First World War, when the experiment of 
an independent Albanian state was undone. Chapter Four considers offers of 
Albanian territory by the Entente powers to neutral states as inducements to 
enter the war. Chapter Five explores domestic Albanian developments, 
including the revival of an Albanian nationalist movement by 1918. The last four 
chapters explore the post-war period, when the Albanians struggled once more 
to have Albania recognised as an independent and sovereign state. Chapters 
Six and Seven examine the Albanian problem during the Paris Peace 
Conference (1919-20) - when issues of central importance to the thesis (geo- 
political interests versus ethnic self-determination) came to the forefront of 
international diplomacy. Chapter Eight details developments inside Albania, in 
particular Albanian initiatives to remove foreign forces. Chapter Nine 
investigates the Albanian question within the League of Nations and 
Ambassadorial Conference in Paris. The thesis will show the importance of both 
`national' and `international' forces in the recognition of Albania as an 
independent state by 1921, and that neither theories of nationalism, nor 
international relations offer adequate explanations. 
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A NOTE ON SPELLINGS 
There are alternative and sometimes historical, national and political differences 
and other considerations in the spellings of Balkan and Albanian names. I have 
followed those most generally used by officials in the British Foreign Office at 
the time of my study (1912-21), except where common usage dictates 
something else, for example Serbia has been used instead of Servia. 
Alternative forms of the most commonly used place names can be found in a 
`Glossary of Terms' (pp. 377-80). Alternative forms of people's names can be 
found in the `A Selective Who's Who' (pp. 381-401), together with a short 
biography of them. 
A special exception to this is my use of both `Kosovo' and `Kosova' in the text. 
Kosovo will be used to refer to the former Ottoman vilayet of Kosovo, being 
how the term was understood at the start of the twentieth century, despite 
having only being created as recently as 1877. Kosova will be used to refer to 
the present day self-proclaimed and quasi-independent statelet of Kosova, 
which was United Nations controlled from 1999, and created after 1945 as the 
former Yugoslav autonomous province known as Kosovo and Metohija or 
Kosmet. As Appendix A illustrates today's Kosova is only about one quarter of 
the size of the Kosovo that existed under Ottoman rule. ' 
1 Before 1877 `Kosovo' vilayet was divided among several Ottoman administrative districts and 
only used as a geographical term (of Serbian origin), centred on Kosovo Polje (the 
Kosovan 
plain). For a discussion of the different meanings and uses of the term Kosovo, Kosova, 
Kosove 
etc. see N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London, 1998), pp. xxii and xlix, 3-4. 
13 
INTRODUCTION 
`Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in powers, 
while the strong do what they can the weak suffer what they must. '2 
In March 2007, the UN mediator, Martti Ahtisaari, recommended that the United 
Nations-controlled province of Kosova should become independent under 
international supervision, but with provision for self-government by the Serbian 
minority. 3 In so doing, he determined that there would be no alteration to the 
province's boundaries, no return to Serbian control, no partition (between Serbs 
and Albanians) and no union with another country (be it Albania, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro or Serbia). On 17 February 2008 
Hashim Thaci, the Prime Minister, finally proclaimed the independence of 
Kosova, but the statelet still remains unrecognised by most states, including 
Serbia and Russia, and a number of European Union ones including Greece. 4 
The issues involved in these difficult decisions were remarkably similar to those 
1912 to 1921, when Kosovo and other areas with an Albanian-speaking majority 
population became part of Serbia and Montenegro (later Yugoslavia) or Greece. 
As the influential American diplomat and historian George Kennan has written, 
in commenting on the parallels between the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and those 
of the 1990s, these issues have the potential to `illuminate the same Balkan 
world' with which we are familiar today. 5 Essentially, these issues are the bases 
on which Balkan states should be formed: where their frontiers should be 
drawn; the respective roles of ethnicity and geopolitical considerations in 
2 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, V, 17. 
3 The Times, London, 27 March 2007. For an explanation of the use of the place names 
`Kosovo' and `Kosova' in this thesis, see the Note on Spellings, p. 13. 
4 The Sunday Times, London, 17 February 2008; The Times, London, 18 February 2008. 
5 G. Kennan, `Introduction' to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the 
International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars 
(Washington DC, republ. 1993, of original of 1914). 
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determining those frontiers; and, not least, the implications of such decisions for 
the longer-term stability of the region. This thesis addresses these issues in the 
formative and central decade from the Balkan wars of 1912-13 to the 
establishment of the `new Europe' at the end of the Peace Conference of Paris, 
after the First World War. 
Tiovo Raun has shown that, since the 1990s and the emergence of new ethnic 
states in eastern Europe, there has been a resurgence of interest in what 
determined the creation of new nation states there. 6 Since 1999, there has been 
much debate within the international community on what the future status of the 
autonomous province of Kosova should be. However, there seems to have 
been little consideration as to why Kosovo (the Ottoman vilayet) and the other 
majority Albanian-speaking areas (parts of Montenegro, western Macedonia 
and Chameria, in north-west Greece) did not become either independent or part 
of an independent Albanian state, despite the legacy of these decisions. Tom 
Winnifrith observed the need for a scholarly and impartial account of the 
formation of independent Albania in 2002, whilst Basil Kondis earlier noted that 
there was no recent, and comprehensive, English study of Albanian 
independence. In a seminal early work (1906) on the ethnic complexities of 
Macedonia, the radical English journalist H. N. Brailsford, champion of the rights 
of small nations and critic of great-power imperialism, observed that Europe had 
a `deplorable habit of ignoring the claims of the Mohammedan inhabitants of 
European Turkey'. 7 This comment, contrary to the pro-Slav tendency of 
traditional liberal opinion, was of course particularly applicable to the inhabitants 
6 T. U. Raun, `Nineteenth and early twentieth-century Estonian nationalism revisited', Nations 
and Nationalism, 9 (2003), pp. 129-147, at pp. 129-30. 
H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia, its Races and their Future (London, 1906), p. 280; T. Winnifrith, 
Badlands-Borderlands: A History of Southern Albania/ Northern Epirus (London, 2002), p. 11; B. 
Kondis, Greece and Albania, 1908-1914 (Thessaloniki, 1976), p. 12. 
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of `Albania', whose cause had yet to attract support in Britain; and it remains 
largely applicable today. This thesis aims to meet the need for a thorough and 
systematic analysis of the processes of Albanian independence, with particular 
regard to contemporary considerations of ethnicity and national identity. At the 
same time, it seeks to place the question of Albanian independence within the 
context of power-political relationships, and the framework of the great-power 
system, within which it would have to be achieved, if it was to be achieved at all. 
Historiographical Overview 
There have been a number of studies of the question of Albanian 
independence. The most accurate, comprehensive and dispassionate studies in 
English remain those by Edith Stickney (1926) and Joseph Swire (1929). 8 
These works, however, require updating with a wider range of primary sources, 
and a consideration of the Albanian question in terms of current theories of 
nationalism and international relations. More recent studies have not developed 
significantly upon these early accounts. For instance, in 2003 Owen Pearson 
included extensive factual details on the question of Albanian independence in 
his three-volume work Albania in the Twentieth Century. However, his strictly 
chronological (day-by-day) approach made his study seem fragmentary and 
lacking in analytical depth. 9 As Kondis maintains, Albania remains probably the 
least studied and understood country in Europe. 10 Unlike the study of other 
European countries, including Balkan ones, historical writing on Albania, 
including in particular the independence question, has not undergone extensive 
revisionism. Most recent work on the independence question has therefore 
8 J. Swire, Albania, the Rise of a Kingdom (London, 1929); E. P. Stickney, Southern Albania or 
Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1912-1923 (Stanford, 1926): the latter only 
focusing on issues affecting the southern half of Albania. 
9 0. Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century, 3 vols. (London, 2003), I, pp. 23-184. 
10 Kondis, Greece and Albania, p. 12. 
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tended to be rather unscholarly, submerged in general studies, vitiated by 
partisanship (being especially pro-socialist and pro-Greek) or focusing on a 
particular aspect or personality. " 
Studies also seem to offer only a partial consideration of the Albanian question, 
and most discussions end too soon, in either 1912 or 1913. This thesis intends 
to illustrate that the settlement of the Albanian question was a more complicated 
and drawn-out process, with 1912-21 being what Noel Malcolm describes as 
the `crucial period'. 12 Despite the proclamation of independence (28 November 
1912) by Albanian nationalists, and confirmation of this by the great powers 
(1913), Albania's position as an independent state remained precarious. During 
and after the First World War, it was highly probable that an independent 
sovereign state of Albania would cease to exist, even during the Paris Peace 
Conference (1919-20), which supposedly supported national self-determination 
and the rights of small states to statehood. 13 
This thesis identifies three distinct but inter-related phases in the process of the 
question of Albanian independence. In the first phase, in the period before the 
11 Examples include: P. Pipinelis, Europe and the Albanian Question (Chicago, 2nd ed. 1963) 
(pro-Greek); A. B. Sula, Albania's Struggle for Independence (New York, 1967) (pro-Zog and 
pro-Albanian); S. Polio and A. Puto, (Wiseman, C. and Hole, G. (trans. )), The History of Albania: 
from its Origins to the Present Day (London, Boston and Henley, 1981) (pro-socialist and pro- 
Albanian); A. Puto, L'Independance Albanaise et la Diplomatic des Grande Puissances, 1912- 
1914 (Tirana, 1982) (pro-socialist and pro-Albanian); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: a 
History of Kosovo (New York, 1998) (pro-Albanian); M. Cami, Fundamental Aspects of the 
Albanian National and Democratic Movement in the Years 1913-1920: National Conference 
Dedicated to the 70t" Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence November 19,1982 
(Tirana, 1983) (pro-Albanian); State University of Tirana, Historia e Shgiperise 11: 1909-1919 
(The History of Albania 11: 1909-1919) (Tirana, 1965) (pro-Albanian); J. Tomes, King Zog: Self- 
made Monarch of Albania (Stroud, 2003) (limited to study of Ahmet Zogu). 
12 N. Malcolm, `Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the 
Works of Albanian Writers in the Early Twentieth Century', in S. Schwandner-Sievers and B. J. 
Fischer (eds. ), Albanian Identities: Myth and History (London, 2002), pp. 70-90, at pp. 70-1. 
13 Indeed a number of Wilson's fourteen points can be viewed as diametrically opposed to 
Albanian nationalism, above all Serbia's right to access to the Adriatic which primarily meant 
territory in northern Albania (Appendix E). 
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First World War, the Albanian question emerged as an issue of concern first for 
the Albanians, and then for the concert of great-power states. In the second 
phase, during the First World War, the idea of an independent Albanian state 
was abandoned by many Albanians, and subsumed into wartime realpolitik for 
the great powers, which instead sought to divide the territory. In the third phase, 
in the period after the First World War, the question of Albanian independence 
was revived, but was not viewed analogously to other independence questions 
under consideration at the time. When the great powers decided that self- 
determination did not apply to the Albanians, Albanian nationalists had to seek 
alternative strategies to secure independence for their state. 14 As few studies 
have considered this entire time period, it is more useful to consider the three 
phrases separately. 
For the first phase, there is a good and growing literature on the origins and 
formation of an Albanian identity, and on the Albanian national movement up to 
1912.15 The main focus of this thesis is therefore on the period from 1912 
onwards. There is also a good literature on the Balkan wars (1912-13) and 
London conferences (1912-13), although most studies concentrate on other 
Balkan states or their relevance to the First World War, rather than the Albanian 
question. 16 Richard Crampton's excellent book, The Hollow Detente (1979), 
14 For similar ideas see Malcolm, `Myths of Albanian National Identity', pp. 70-1. 
15 See for example: S. Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1967); S. Skendi, `Albanian Political Thought and Revolutionary Activity, 1881-1912' 
Südost-Forschungen, 13 (1954), pp. 159-99; S. Skendi, `Beginnings of Albanian Nationalist and 
Autonomous Trends: the Albanian League, 1878-1881', American Slavic and East European 
Review, 12 (1953), pp. 219-32; G. W. Gawrych, The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, 
Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913 (London and New York, 2006); G. Fishta, (trans. R. Elsie 
and J. Mathie-Heck), The Highland Lute (Lahuta e Malcis): The Albanian National Epic (London, 
2005); A. Doya, `Confraternal Religion: From Liberation Theology to Political Reversal', History 
and Anthropology, 14 (2003), pp. 349-81. 
16 Examples include: E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938); E. C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 
(University Park, Pennsylvania, 1965); R. C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the 
First World War (London, 2000). 
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does explore the Albanian question, but it is primarily concerned with Anglo- 
German relations. " In July 2005, the first book on `post-independent' Albania 
during the reign of Prince Wilhelm of Wied (March-September 1914) was 
published. 18 It was based on the diary and memoirs of Captain Duncan Heaton- 
Armstrong, the Irish private secretary of the new prince, and it provided intimate 
and interesting insights into this little known regime. However, there remains no 
comprehensive, serious, scholarly study of this kingdom and the provisional 
government that preceded it. Overall, events before the First World War need 
reconsideration, in the light of later developments and theoretical contributions. 
The special issue of the delimitation of Albanian boundaries must also be 
explained. 
During the First World War phase, there are two main areas for consideration: 
international developments, and internal or domestic ones. Entente diplomacy 
in the Balkans, including in particular a consideration of the Albanian question, 
has received relatively little attention by scholars, in comparison with several 
studies of its diplomacy elsewhere. 19 There is a good literature on the reasons 
for which the Italian government decided on co-belligerency with the Entente 
powers, as opposed to the central powers, with whom it had pre-war alliances, 
17 R. J. Crampton, The Hollow Detente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911-1914 
cLondon, 1979) 
8 D. Heaton-Armstrong (G. Belfield and B. Destani (eds. )), The Six Month Kingdom: Albania 
1914 (London, 2005); Wilhelm Furst von Albanien, Prinz zu Wied, Denkschrift uber Albanien 
(Berlin, 1917): In 1917 Wilhelm privately printed and published this account of his time in 
Albania but it was not widely circulated so I consider Heaton Armstrong's the first real book. 
19 In addition to more general works on the Paris Peace Conference that include sections on 
war entry, some examples of studies in English of Balkan diplomacy in the First World War 
include: L. H. Curtwright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan States 
August 1914 to the inception of the Dardanelles Campaign (Thessaloniki, 1986); A. Dallin et al, 
Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914-1917 (New York, 1963); D. Dutton, The Politics 
of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War (London and New York, 
1998); C. J. Lowe, 'The Failure of British Diplomacy in the Balkans, 1914-1916', Canadian 
Journal of History, 4 (1969), pp. 73-101; W. A. Renzi, 'Great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 
1914-1915, Journal of Modern History, 42 (1970), pp. 1-20; and, K. G. Robbins, 'British 
Diplomacy and Bulgaria, 1914-1915, Slavonic and East European Review, 49 (1971), pp. 560- 
85. 
19 
but these discussions explore the Albanian question only partially. 20 The 
literature on the domestic Albanian situation is very limited, and the period is 
considered only briefly in general surveys of Albanian history, or in studies on 
other topics. 21 
The period 1919-21 is the least well-researched phase of the Albanian question, 
despite the prominence of many small state independence movements in the 
international arena at the time, and the voluminous literature on the Paris Peace 
Conference, including President Woodrow Wilson and self-determination. 
Michael Dockrill and Douglas Goold's valuable Peace without Promise, 
although a very useful analysis of the proceedings at Paris, is primarily 
concerned with other issues, such as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. 22 
The best account of the Albanian question in Paris is an unpublished doctoral 
dissertation by Robert Woodall (1978). 23 Woodall makes extensive use of 
archival material from all the great power states, but he does not fully place his 
arguments in the context of wider developments or of the theoretical 
contributions on nationalism and international relations. There is equally little on 
discussions regarding the question of Albanian independence in the important 
years 1920-21, when the question was finally determined, and in particular on 
20 Useful accounts in English include: C. J. Lowe, `Britain and the Italian Intervention, 1914- 
1915', The Historical Journal, 12 (1969), pp. 533-48; W. A. Renzi, `The Russian Foreign Office 
and Italy's Entrance into the Great War, 1914-15: A Study in Wartime Diplomacy', The Historian, 
28 (1966), pp. 648-68; W. A. Renzi, 'Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War: A Re- 
examination', American Historical Review, 73 (1968), pp. 1414-32; P. du Quenoy, 'With Allies 
Like These, Who Needs Enemies?: Russia and the Problem of Italian Entry into World War I', 
Canadian Slavonic Papers, 45 (2003), pp. 409-40; A. Salandra, Italy and the Great War: from 
Neutrality to intervention (London, 1932); R. Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace 
Conference (New York, 1938), pp. 1-34; M. B. Petrovich, 'The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary 
Question, 1914-1915' in Dallin, Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, pp. 162-93; and, W. 
W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London, 1957). 
21 See for example Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 78-117 passim and B. J. Fischer, King Zog and the 
Struggle for Stability in Albania (Boulder, 1984), pp. 1-23. 
22 M. L. Dockrill and J. D. Gould, Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 
1919-23 (London, 1981). 
23 R. Woodall, 'The Albanian Problem during the Peacemaking, 1919-20' (PhD Thesis, Memphis 
State University, 1978). 
20 
Albania's admittance as an independent and sovereign state of the League of 
Nations (17 December 1920). As the major decisions, especially at an 
international level, had been made by 1921, this date marks the end of this 
study. 
Source Material 
As the main focus of the thesis is on British and also, from 1917 onwards, 
American policy and perceptions, my main areas of research have been in the 
primary and printed archives of these great powers. My archival sources include 
principally those of the British Foreign Office, other government departments, 
and personal papers located in the National Archives, Kew, and the House of 
Lords' Records Office, both in London. The Foreign Office papers include the 
official records of the London conferences (1912-13), and of the Albanian 
boundary commissions (1913-14), which do not appear to have been utilised 
elsewhere. On American policy, I have used the Department of State records, 
located in the National Archives College Park, Maryland. In addition, I have 
explored the collections of the papers of Sir Aubrey Herbert, MP for Somerset 
South and President of the Anglo-Albanian Society (1912-23), in the Somerset 
Record Office. These include a large number of documents written by and to 
prominent Albanians. This archival research has been supported by the study of 
some documents available in print in English, Russian, Italian and French, of 
which there are extensive collections. 24 Relevant documentary collections on 
24 The most commonly used collections include: G. P. Gooch, and H. Temperley (eds. ), British 
Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914,11 vols. (London 1926-38) [hereafter cited as 
BD]; B. de Siebert (ed. ), Entente Diplomacy and the World, 3 vols. (New York and London, 
1921) [Hereafter cited as EDWJ; U. S. Department of State (ed. ), Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States of America 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, 13 vols. 
(Washington, D. C., 1942-47) [hereafter cited as FRUS PPC]; E. L. Woodward and, R. Butler 
(eds. ), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 1,21 Vols. (London, 1947-78) 
[Hereafter cited as DBFP]; V. V. Adoratsky, V. V. Maksakov, and M. N. Pokrovsky (eds. ), 
KpacHbIü Apxue (Krasnyi Arkhiv) 106 vols. (Moscow, 1922-41) [hereafter cited as KA]; A. P. 
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Albanian affairs, principally in English and French, were also consulted. 25 A 
small number of selected Albanian and German language documents were 
translated and provided pertinent examples at particular points. 26 The 
secondary literature used is primarily that in English, but with the addition of 
some literature in French, Italian, Russian, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian and 
Albanian, plus Albanian in translation into both English and French. 
There is therefore, and intentionally, a clear English language and British focus 
to the study: no Greek or Turkish language material has been considered, and 
the study of other language sources, especially Albanian ones, is limited. 
However, the amount of available `Albanian' material is less extensive than 
might be supposed and I am sceptical that a more detailed examination would 
have been very productive. There was no codified Albanian language until 1908 
(with the Monastir Alphabet Congress), and much continued to be written in 
English, French or Turkish. My preliminary investigations indicated that very 
little documentation from this period survived in the Albanian archives, whereas 
the Herbert papers, in particular, include a number of sources written by 
Bol'shemennikov, A. S. Erusalimskii, A. A. Mogilevich, and R. A. Rotschein (eds. ), 
Mex«3yHapoöHb! e OmHOLUeHUA 6 3nOXy UMnepuanu3Ma: ,1 OKyMeHmbl U3 
apxue gapcKoao u 
epeMeHHOeo npaeumenbcme 1878-1917 as (International Affairs in the period of imperialism: 
Documents from the Archive of the Tsar and Provisional Government), Series 2,21 vols. and 
Series 3,10 vols. (Moscow, 1931-1940) [hereafter cited as MOEI]; Ministero Degli Affari Esteri 
(Commissione per la pubblicazione dei documenti diplomatici), / Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 
Series 4: 1908-1914,12 vols. (Roma, 1952-64), Series 5: 1914-1918,10 vols. (Roma, 1954- 
56), Series 6: 1918-1922,2 vols. (Roma, 1956), and Series 7: 1922-1935,10 vols. (Roma, 
1953-1990) [hereafter cited as DDI]; Documents Diplomatiques Frangais, 1871-1914, Series 3, 
1911-1914,11 vols. (Paris, 1929) [hereafter cited as DDF]. 
25 B. D. Destani (ed. ), Albania and Kosovo: Political and Ethnic Boundaries 1867-1946,2 vols. 
(London, 1999); B. D. Destani (ed. ), Edith Durham - Albania and the Albanians: Selected 
Articles and Letters, 1903-1944 (London, 2001); B. D. Destani (ed. ), Faik Konitza: Selected 
Correspondence 1896-1942 (London, 2000). 
26 For example in Albanian K. Nuro and N. Bato (eds. ), Hasan Prishtina: permbledhje 
dokumentesh, 1908 - 1934 (Hasan Prishtina: published documents, 1908-1934) (Tirana, 1982) 
[trans. by J. Azemi], and in German F. R. Bridge (ed. ), Austro-Hungarian Documents Relating to 
the Macedonian Struggle, 1896-1912, (Thessaloniki, 1976) [trans. by A. Guy]. 
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Albanians, and these have been utilised wherever possible, especially as they 
have not been used in any study of this type before. 
Theoretical and Comparative Framework: ethnic nationalism and 
international relations 
In their work on nationalisms in eastern Europe during and after the First World 
War, No Banac and Katherine Verdery identified three key issues for any elite 
seeking to deploy a national independence programme: building the newly 
emergent state; establishing the state's participation in the international 
community; and defining the `nation's' identity, which usually took a `collectivist' 
vision and therefore placed it in opposition to other national or ethnic groups. 27 
In all these three areas, the new state has the potential to have an impact on 
the international system, and to be affected by the international system within 
which it operates. Moreover, as Fredrik Barth first showed, nationalism and 
identity formation is not purely about self-ascription. 28 Of at least equal 
importance is the acceptance of such an identity by others, which traditionally 
means the international community at the time. Such acceptance is particularly 
important in the validation of a nation's sovereignty and boundaries, and also for 
small states in ethnically mixed regions, where territory is contested and the 
small state is likely to need great power endorsement and protection to 
establish and then maintain its frontiers. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical literature on small-state nationalism in a great 
power system, the type of international system that operated at 
the start of the 
27 K. Verdery, `Introduction' to I. Banac and K. Verdery (eds. ) National Character and National 
Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe (New Haven, Connecticut, 1995), p. xiv. 
28 F. Barth (ed. ), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Cultural Difference 
(Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1969), p. 11. 
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twentieth century, is underdeveloped in relation to the voluminous literature on 
both nationalism and international relations. A number of studies from various 
disciplines have set out to explore these issues for different national questions, 
but the bulk of their discussion is in discrete chapters. This allows for little direct 
consideration of the inter-relationship and inter-reaction between nationalism 
and the international system. 29 A major theme of this study is to explore this 
inter-reaction, using the question of Albanian independence as a case study. 
Although the literature is under-developed, there appears a clear correlation 
between these two forces, especially in `national' questions, where two or more 
ethnicities or `nationalities' overlap, and are competing for control of the same 
territory. Notable examples include Israel/Palestine and Kashmir and, 
specifically in the Balkans, Macedonia and Kosovo/a. This oversight seems 
particularly surprising in studies of the era of the First World War, when issues 
surrounding the viability and independence of various small states were at the 
forefront of European diplomacy, and were most cogently articulated by 
President Wilson as self-determination. 
It appears that the interplay of nationalist and international forces may vary from 
being reinforcing or supportive to contradictory or opposing. In the simplest 
sense, nationalism has the ability to upset or impact upon the international 
system, especially when perceived in balance-of-power terms, as it brings about 
the prospect of new states, and a shifting of the relative strength of those 
already in existence. In reverse, the international system can influence a 
29 E. Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford, 1994); M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999: 
Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London, 1999); F. H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the 
International System (London, 1973), pp. 139-72: Hinsley leaves it until his conclusion to 
compare the two directly. 
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national movement in a variety of ways. It may be restrictive or prohibitive, by 
refusing to recognise a nationality as sufficiently distinct from another, or 
sufficiently stable to maintain a separate existence. Alternatively, it may be 
positive, principally through sponsorship or endorsement of a national 
programme. In Kosova today, all these impacts can be clearly identified. The 
clash between Serbian and `Kosovan' nationalism, and the feared impact on 
international stability, prompted NATO's involvement in 1999. The delay in 
settlement of the Kosovan question has primarily been caused by the 
international community's concern of the impact that `final status' would have on 
the Balkan balance of power. Hence the refusal to allow Kosovan-Albanians to 
join their co-ethnics in other parts of the Balkans, and the delay in advocating 
Kosovan independence, for fear of inducing retaliation and instability within 
Serbia by such an announcement. 
Ethnic Nationalism and Small States in South-eastern Europe 
Eric Hobsbawm has maintained that there are problems in applying theories of 
nationalism to small states, because there is a lower limit of population that is 
capable of maintaining modern linguistic cultures at all levels, and because of 
the inability of small states to determine their own fate. 30 By contrast, Miroslav 
Hroch has developed a theory of nationalism that aims to elucidate the 
experience of small national and ethnic groups in Europe, although the 
Albanians are not included within his modelling. Hroch considers that small 
national groups go through three phrases of national awakening. In phase A, 
the said nationality attempts to develop its national culture, language and 
ethnography. In phase B, the nationality attempts to increase the amount of 
30 E. C. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth and reality 
(Cambridge, 1992), pp. 165,171; Raun, 'Estonian nationalism revisited', p. 131. 
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patriotic agitation, or the growth of patriotic agitation, in the population. In the 
final phase C, these develop into a national movement. 31 However, his model 
focuses solely on national factors, and provides no role for the international 
factors that this study intends to consider. Rather than ignoring small 
nationalities, as Hobsbawm does, or ignoring international factors, as both 
Hroch and Hobsbawm do, it is necessary to focus on these `other factors' and to 
0 
determine the roles they play, and their importance. As more traditional theories 
of nationalism focus on the `national' factors, the intention of this thesis is to 
focus on the `international' ones, and also to show how they fit in with the more 
traditional `national' influences. In this way, the thesis hopes to illustrate the 
benefits of `internationalising' `national' questions, similar to the way in which 
many international historians have been seeking to `internationalise' 
`international' history, by expanding their studies to include the consultation of 
archives and collections from more than one state. 32 
Since 1945, there has been considerable debate in various disciplines 
(anthropology, political science, history, sociology, etc. ) on the bases of nations 
and nationalism, especially the upsurge of so-called ethnic or primordial 
nationalist movements in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe. These 
focus almost exclusively on the internal and national causes and origins, and 
therefore, although they are important, they are of only limited use for this study. 
In these debates, the modernist school has tended to predominate: it has 
viewed nation-states as modern constructions based on `invented traditions' or 
`imagined communities', to cite two of the more popular dictums, in order to 
31 M. Hroch, Social Preconditions for National Revival in Europe (New York, 2000), pp. 22-3; 
See also M. Hroch, `National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective', Canadian 
Slavonic Papers, 37 (1995), pp. 283-99. 
32 See for example Z. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 
(New York, 2005). 
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serve present-day political purposes. In this approach, a past regime, such as 
Ancient Rome for the Italians, was used to legitimate the nationalist goals of the 
present. Modernists therefore tended to be critical of the arguments that 
national movements had longer histories. Hobsbawm is particularly critical of 
the many fissiparous, small-scale, ethno-linguistic nationalisms that proliferated 
in central and eastern Europe between 1870 and 1914, and of which the 
Albanians can be considered a late example. 33 
By contrast, perennialists, led by Adrian Hastings, concede that, although the 
nationalist movements (both large and small) of the period were themselves 
new, the communities upon which they were based were genuine, older and 
rooted in ethnic foundations. 34 A third grouping, often referred to as pre- 
modernists, has meanwhile drawn a distinction between `old continuous nations' 
in western Europe, and the `more recent' and `imitation' ones in eastern Europe 
and Asia, including the Serbs, Croats and Romanians. 35 Perennialists and pre- 
modernists tend to criticise modernist historiography because, amongst other 
things, they consider it pays too little attention to the importance of myths, 
traditions and shared memories amongst socio-cultural groups, which hint 
towards more ancient and `ethnic' foundations. Modernists, Hobsbawm, in 
particular, rejects these because he deems them either a fabrication or 
33 A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and 
nationalism (London, 1998), pp. 42,120,122,132-3; E. J. Hobsbawm and D. J. Kertzer, 
`Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today', Anthropology Today, 8 (1992), pp. 3-8, at p. 3; B. 
Arnold, `The Contested Past', Anthropology Today, 15 (1999), pp. 1-4, at p. 1; Hobsbawm, 
`Introduction' in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1990), p. 
1; A. D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism 
(Hanover, New Hampshire, 2000), p. 32; Hobsbawrn, Nations and Nationalism, esp. chps. 4 
and 6; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and the spread of 
nationalism (London, 1983), pp. 11-12. 
34 Smith, Nation in History, p. 37; A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, 
Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1997), esp. pp. 173-77, and on the South Slavs, pp. 125- 
46. 
35 Smith, Nation in History, p. 34-5; A. D. Smith Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford, 
1999), pp. 39-40. 
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irrelevant to the nationalisms of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Europe. Indeed, Ernest Gellner's comment that the `cultural shreds and patches 
used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions'36 is perhaps 
nowhere more true than in the Balkans, especially in multi-coveted regions like 
Kosovo and Macedonia, where protagonists will use any piece of evidence, 
however small or tenuous, to support their claim. The other schools maintain 
that, regardless of their authenticity, and especially in regions such as the 
Balkans, reference to golden ages, holy lands and past heroes has played an 
important role in sustaining oral traditions, and developed effective myths and 
legends that could be utilised for political nationalist purposes. 37 
In the Balkan peninsula, most nineteenth-century nationalisms (for instance, the 
Serb, Bulgarian and Greek) fit more closely with the perennial school. These 
nationalisms tended to centre on what Anthony Smith calls an `ancient ethnic 
core' that centred on both `history' and 'landscape'. 38 In the Balkans, this tended 
to include two main features: a common religion, specifically Christianity 
(Orthodoxy), and the rebirth or resurrection of a past culture, centred on a 
glorious age (Ancient Athens for the Greeks), holy land (Kosovo for the Serbs) 
or past hero (Lazarus for the Serbs; Alexander for the Greeks). In simplistic 
terms, it has been argued that these respective cultures and `nations' were 
sustained through an oral tradition, and then developed by nineteenth-century 
nationalists, to fit their political objectives. Modernists may argue that these 
ethnic origins were manufactured, distorted or even invented versions of the 
past, but, nevertheless, at the time they proved effective vehicles for promoting 
36 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past (Oxford, 1983), p. 56. 
37 Smith, Modernism and Nationalism, p. 127. 
35 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), p. 200; E. Kedourie, Nationalism 
(London, 1993), p. 112; M. Rady, `Encounters with Nationalism Review', Slovo, 8 (1995), pp. 
109-15, at p. 110. 
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and sustaining their national movements, in a similar manner to that described 
by Hroch. 39 
The basis of the late nineteenth-century Albanian national movement was more 
complicated, yet firmly grounded in ethnicity. It fits none of the traditional 
theories of state formation, or the experiences of its neighbouring Balkan states. 
Instead of emphasising a glorious national past and common religion as the two 
prime (ethnic) markers of their identity, the Albanians determined a very 
different basis for their ethnic or national identity: a common Albanian spoken 
language. In using such a limiting definition of Albanian nationality, Albanian 
nationalism differs from perennial theories, which highlight the importance of a 
written vernacular. 40 Once this definition was settled, Albanian national efforts 
focused on having it accepted and supported by the great powers. 
Histories written under Albanian regimes since independence, especially those 
under King Zog (1925-39) and Enver Hoxha (1945-85), have attempted to 
present Albanian nationalism in terms similar to those used in other Balkan 
state. 41 They referred to the Illyrian origins of the Albanian people, and to the 
medieval hero Skanderbeg (Georgi Castrioti), who had defied the Ottoman 
Turks in the early fifteenth century, and lived in semi-independence. In reality, 
during the `national awakening', most Albanian nationalists were realistic 
enough to recognise that such an ethnic understanding of Albanian identity 
39Smith, Ethnic Origins, p. 191; Smith, Modernism and Nationalism, p. 137; For further details of 
other small state Balkan nationalisms of the period see for example: B. and C. Jelavich, 
Establishment of Balkan National States 1804-1920 (Seattle and London, 1977); L. S. 
Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 1958), pp. 215-592; S. K. Pavlowitch, A History 
of the Balkans 1804-1945 (London, 1999). 
40 Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, pp. 11,185-206; Smith, Nation in History, pp. 37-9. 
41 See for example: Sula, Albania's Struggle for Independence; Pollo and Puto, History of 
Albania: Qami, Fundamental Aspects. For Albanian accounts written before 1925 of Albanian 
Illyrian origins see for example C. A. Chekrezi, Albania Past and Present (New York, 1919) and 
C. A. Dako, Albania: The Master Key to the Near East (Boston, Massachusetts, 1919). 
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would not be very successful. Unlike the other Balkan `nations', no Albanian 
state had existed before 1912, either in its own right or under a different name. 
More problematically, such a `historic nation' clashed with the various other 
Balkan `nations', and most obviously with Serbian claims to Kosovo. 42 
The issue of religion would have proven even more divisive and was likewise 
avoided. The Albanians were divided on the basis of four religions: Sunni 
Muslims, Bektashi Muslims (a liberal Shiite sect), who together constituted 
about seventy percent of the population, Orthodox Christians (at this point 
primarily Greek Orthodox until the separation of the Albanian church in 1923), 
who made up about twenty percent, and Roman Catholics, who constituted 
about ten percent. 43 However, these faiths were somewhat inter-changeable. It 
appears to have been common practice, especially in the Scutari and Monastir 
vilayets, and between Catholics and Muslims, for the inter-marrying of faiths 
and for two faiths to be practiced regularly within one household (often Islam in 
public and Christianity in private). 44 Early in the nineteenth century, John Cam 
Hobhouse, friend of Lord Byron, radical in politics and fellow-Philhellene, 
travelled with him through Greece and Ottoman Empire; Hobhouse observed, 
unusually but perhaps presciently, that `Only the Albanians are conscious of 
nationality; all the other peoples of the Empire are grouped according to 
religion. '45 As indeed, under the millet system, they were; and this has generally 
42 N. Malcolm, 'Myths of Albanian National Identity', p. 73; For a good study of Albanian ethnic 
origins see E. E. Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the 
Present (Jefferson, North Carolina, 1995). 
43 See for example Gawrych, Crescent and Eagle, p. 21. 
44 See for instance G. W. Gawrych, Tolerant Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in the Ottoman 
Empire: The Albanian Community, 1800-1912', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15 
(1983), pp. 519-36; B. Fischer, `Albanian highland tribal society and family structure in the 
process of twentieth-century transformation', East European Quarterly, 33 (1999), pp. 281-301. 
a5 J. C. Hobhouse cited by Turkhan Pasha, Council of Ten minutes, 24 Feb 1919, FRUS PPC, 
IV, p. 114; See also P. Vasa, La verite sur I'Albania et les Albania (Paris, 1879) and R. Elsie, 
History of Albanian Literature, 2 vols. (New York, 1995), pp. 263-7. 
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been taken to have inhibited the development of a national consciousness 
among the Albanians, since they were so divided in religion. Under the millet 
system of the Ottoman Empire, people were categorised by religion. Both 
Serbian and Bulgarian nationalisms were assisted by this categorisation, but the 
millet hindered the development of an Albanian national conscious. For 
instance, until 1877 and the reorganisation of provincial boundaries, Albanians 
in Kosovo were divided between several Ottoman districts. 46 By the late 
nineteenth century, religion was giving way to the German conception of nations 
in eastern Europe, based on linguistic foundations. However, in the Balkans, 
religion remained an important marker of identity far longer than elsewhere. 
Only when the millet system broke down did the Albanians emerge, professing 
a distinct ethnicity or nationality based on the German model. 47 
Hastings contends that Judo-Christianity was the `constructor' of nineteenth- 
century nationalism, and Islam its `restrainer'. 48 It will be shown that Hastings' 
views were only partially accurate for the Albanian question, and that both 
Muslims and Christians were heavily involved in the Albanian movement. 49 The 
role of Christianity was also markedly different, both to that described by 
46 Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. xxii, xlix, 3-4: The political version of Kosovo was therefore a very 
recent creation. The vilayet of Kosovo only came into existence in 1877 and the vilayet of 
Prizrend in 1868. Before that Kosovo was only used as a geographical term, centred on Kosovo 
Polje (the Kosovan plain) but which eventually spread to cover the rest of the territory. The 
understanding of the term Kosovo at the beginning of the twentieth century was however very 
different to that today. The current definition (Kosova in this thesis) is based on the boundaries 
of the quasi-independent former Yugoslav autonomous province, officially known as Kosovo 
and Metohija or Kosmet and which only dates back to 1945 and is about one quarter of the size 
of the former Ottoman vilayet. This difference is illustrated in Appendix A. 
47 G. Duijzings, Religion and Politics in the Identity of Kosovo (London, 2000), pp. 7-8,27-8; 
Malcolm, Kosovo, p. xxix. 
48Smith, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 25-6; Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, pp. 165-6, 
184-6: However, Hastings also cites the 'unique' example of Tanzania where nationalism was 
based on language but the religious divide (Christianity-Islam) has not yet undermined it. 
49 For a view which suggests a more extensive role for religion, especially Bektashism, see for 
example Doya, `Confraternal Religion', pp. 349-81 and A. Doya, `The Politics of Religion in the 
Reconstruction of Identities: The Albanian situation', Critique of Anthropology, 20 (2000), pp. 
421-38; for a different perspective see N. Clayer, `Bektachisme et nationalisme albanais', Revue 
des Etudes Islamiques, 60 (1992), pp. 271-300. 
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Hastings and from that experienced in other Balkan nationalisms. Only a small 
number of prominent bishops (most obviously Bishops Fan Noli and Luigi 
Bumci) were involved in the Albanian movement, and this seems to have been 
for reasons other than confessional issues. The absence of an autonomous 
Albanian Orthodox church also prevented religion having a role similar to that in 
other states. Hastings' views, that the nationalism of this period is a purely 
Christian phenomenon, clearly fits the Albanian case no better than do the 
modernist predictions. 
In addition to the ethnic basis of small-state nationalism, a second common 
feature of small-state national movements is the centrality of a common danger. 
Anthony Smith has shown that this `defensive nationalism' materialised only 
under threat, often in periods of protracted warfare, when a national sentiment, 
as distinct from genuine nationalism, emerged for a relatively short period. 50 
The smaller and weaker the state, the more susceptible it was likely to be to 
such encroachments on its sovereignty. Maria Todorova and L. L. Farrar Jr. 
have shown, of other Balkan nationalisms, that national sentiment tended to 
have weak roots, was imported and was often `foisted' on the people, the bulk 
of whom were illiterate peasants. 51 In this respect, the Albanian experience 
displays a closer fit to other south-eastern European nationalisms of the period. 
Albanian nationalism was actively pursued by a very small vanguard of 
Albanian nationalists, although admittedly from all four faiths, from Albania and 
from colonies abroad. It was not a mass movement, and it proved popular only 
in times of crisis, such as protracted warfare, or when other options appeared to 
50 Smith, Nations and Nationalism, p. 26; Tilly in Smith, Nation in History, p. 35. 
51 L. L. Farrar Jr., 'Aggression versus Apathy: The Limits of Nationalism during the Balkan Wars, 
1912-1913', East European Quarterly, 37 (2003), pp. 257-80, at pp. 259,262; M. Todorova 
(ed. ), Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory (London, 2000), p. 291. 
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have failed. Outside such crisis points, support waned and the promotion of an 
independent Albania often depended much more on phil-Albanian 
organisations, such as the Anglo-Albanian Society, and the policies of great 
power representatives. This again emphasises the importance of considering 
these external or international influences. 
Small States in the Great Power S stem 
Numerous problems arise when considering the position of small states in any 
international system and applying international relations (IR) theories to them, 
not least because most IR theory is overwhelmingly focused on the great 
powers. 52 The role of small and fledgling states in the international system, and 
their effect on the policies of the great powers, has been insufficiently 
articulated in the literature, and needs further study. This is particularly true of 
the so-called great-power system. This system operated from about 1815 until 
1945, in which between four and six great powers, typically the strongest and 
largest states (economically, politically, geographically and in population terms) 
dominated the international system. The problems of applying IR theories are 
particularly pronounced in the case of an independence question, in which the 
`state' concerned is merely aspiring to statehood, is not recognised for much of 
the period under consideration and has no formal place within the system. 
There are also problems regarding the definition of small states, but typically 
they are deemed to include a number of common features: small in population, 
small in geographical area, often located in marginal geographical areas, weak 
economically and often lacking political stability. Typically, therefore, they hold a 
52 See for example M. Rendell, `Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe', Review of 
International Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 523-40, at p. 525. 
33 
weak or uninfluential position in the international system in which they operate. 
It is argued that there is a strong correlation between a state's `indicators of 
vulnerability' and its actual vulnerability, and its ability, therefore, to impact upon 
the international system or its relations with the great powers. 53 However, even 
a small state can improve its own chances of survival. As various writers have 
shown, small states have in practice more power than IR theorists project. 54 As 
Michael Handel has maintained, although small states are `vulnerable' they are 
`not helpless,. 55 For Handel, the key variable in the interaction of small states 
and great powers is the small state's ability to mobilise the support of others. 
Robert Rothstein meanwhile contends that a small state can have a more direct 
impact, by altering great power expectations about its position and its likely 
response in different situations. 56 However, this thesis will also illustrate how it 
was possible, at certain points, for a small state, even one operating in the great 
power system, to make considerable gains in its national aspirations without 
support from the great powers. 
In relations with great-power states, a small state's success in its independence 
question appears to be heavily dependent on a variety of factors. 57 Size was a 
particularly important factor in the weakness of small states. Although small size 
53 P. Salmon, Scandinavia and the great powers 1890-1940 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. xv, 8; D. 
Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford, 
1967), pp. 7-9; D. Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/ Great Power 
Conflict (London, 1971), pp. 2-10 
54 See for example R. MacGinty, `War Cause and Peace Aim? Small States and the First World 
War', European History Quarterly, 27 (1997), pp. 41-56, at p. 41; P. Schroeder, `Historical 
Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory', International Security, 19 (1994), pp. 108-48, esp. pp. 115-6, 
129-31,147-8. 
55 M. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London, 1981), p. 257; Also at Salmon, 
Scandinavia, p. 4. 
56 Handel, Weak States, pp. 257-8; R. L. Rothstein, Alliances and the Small States (New York, 
5 
1968), pp. 194-5; Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 14; Vital, Inequality of States, pp. 183-4. 
For an extensive list of the factors that can influence the strength of small states during 
wartime see A. Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War 
11 (London, 
1959), pp. 183-5; On how a small state can increase its strength relative to a great power see 
for example, Vital, Survival of Small States, p. 129. 
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is usually considered a disadvantage because it may make a state weak, 
dependent upon other stronger state(s) for support or patronage, and allows 
only a small margin of error for policy makers in external relations, small size 
might also be an advantage. It could help foster national spirit and unity, avoid 
the difficulties of the large bureaucracies needed to run larger states, or the 
problems associated with gaining too much territory and, in the process, large 
numbers of ethnic minorities. 58 
A second important factor for small states is their geographic position and 
perceived strategic value to other states. Many of the weakest states in 
nineteenth-century Europe were located at its periphery (the Balkans, 
Scandinavia, Iberia). By contrast, an important geographical position, for 
instance, located on an important trade route, having access to a coastline that 
sustained good ports, having good natural resources or being located in a zone 
where the interests of two or more powers merged, could help make even 
`small' states stronger. For instance Patrick Salmon has shown the importance 
of geography in enabling the Scandinavian states to achieve a `certain 
remoteness from international confrontation' in the twentieth century. 59 
However, for a newly aspiring state, its location could also be a drawback, as 
other stronger states might seek to retain or gain such a strategic position for 
themselves, or their allies. Other states also feared the potential of a new state 
that might be unstable, or susceptible to outside influence from rival powers. 
A third factor was the differing perspectives of a great power and a small state 
in relation to the national question, as referred to in Sven Holtsmark's 
58 Vital, Inequality of States, pp. 3-4; Salmon, Scandinavia, pp. 12-4; Handel, Weak States, p. 3. 
59 Vital, Inequality of States, p. 5; Salmon, Scandinavia, esp. p. 2. 
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`asymmetry of expectations' thesis. For instance, within the small state, policy 
will usually be determined by leading politicians (such as the prime minister or 
foreign minister), whereas within the great power, this responsibility will often be 
delegated to much more junior-ranking officials. This imbalance in the 
relationship usually means that the small state affords greater priority to the 
negotiations, whilst the great power enjoys far greater flexibility in its 
relationship and policy. 60 If a small state can succeed in reducing such 
disparities and secure a more balanced relationship, the small state usually 
proves more successful in merging or incorporating its own national interests 
with that of the great power and, in turn, in harnessing great power support for 
its national programme. 
The fourth crucial component is the particular point in the international relations 
cycle and the type of international system. The great-power system rested on 
the balance of power between its leading members. When this balance was 
relatively stable, small states generally found it difficult to advance their national 
programme (with notable exceptions such as Belgium (1830-31)). However, 
during and following periods of crisis and conflict (such as 1853-56,1875-78, 
and 1912-18 in the Balkans), small states were able to make considerable 
advances in their national programmes. As the balance upon which the system 
rested was disrupted, and a new balance was being sought, the system was in 
a state of flux from which the new and aspiring small (and great) states could 
benefit. The small states were themselves often responsible for provoking these 
crisis points, and deliberately aiming to shift the balance to their benefit. 
61 
60 Holtsmark cited in Salmon, Scandinavia, pp. 15-6; Vital, Survival of Small States, pp. 127-8. 
61 Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, pp. 191-212 passim; Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 15. 
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Aims and Objectives 
Several international historians have written of the serious limitations of 
attempting to employ a political-science approach to the study of individual 
historical events. 62 Such ideas are particularly pertinent when considering a 
small-state national question that does not readily fit such theories. The 
historian of international relations, and of small-state nationalism within the 
great-power system, will prefer to consider the case according to the criteria of 
ethnicity and international relations prevailing at the time, rather than late 
twentieth-century theories. It is not the purpose of this study to determine the 
validity or otherwise of the Albanian national identity as it was defined at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Instead, this thesis aims to illustrate the 
degree of success the Albanian nationalists had in having such an identity 
accepted in `Albania', and by great-power policy makers. Also, in reverse, it 
intends to explore how great-power policy makers defined `Albania', and the 
impact this had on the construction of an Albanian identity and an independent 
entity. In so doing, the thesis sets out to produce a more synthetic view of the 
pivotal years in achieving an independent Albania. The thesis is intended as a 
case study that focuses on the question of Albanian independence in the period 
1912-21, rather than a comparative study with other states, or with the Albanian 
experience in other time periods. 63 
The thesis has four objectives: 
(i) To establish and explain the processes by which an independent state 
62 See for example: P. Schroeder, `Historical Reality', pp. 108-48; G. Roberts, `History, theory 
and the narrative turn in IR', Review of International Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 703-14; J. Levy, 
`The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System', International 
History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 715-44, at pp. 715,742-3. 
63 For an indication of why the Kosovan and Bosnian questions should not be compared in this 
way see for example Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. xlviii-I. 
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of Albania was established; 
(ii) To explain the geographical limits of independent Albania, and 
establish the reasons behind the decisions made about its frontiers; 
(iii) To explore the relative importance of external and international 
influences upon these processes, as compared with internal and 
national factors, and to assess their interaction; 
(iv) To provide an account of the criteria of statehood current in this 
period, the degree to which they were actually applied by the 
international community in the case of Albania, and the role of 
language and linguistic perceptions in shaping the views held about 
its ethnic or `national' frontiers. 
My approach will be broadly chronological, empirical and narrative, in common 
with most international history, because of the rapid variability of events, and in 
spite of the criticisms of this approach by practitioners of other disciplines. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
National Ambitions and Linguistic Nationalism: 
the emergence of an Albanian identity in 1912 
On 28 November 1912, a congress of Albanian notables in Valona proclaimed 
the independence of what it called `ethnic' or `ethnographic' Albania. This 
encompassed the Ottoman vilayets of Scutari and Janina, the sanjaks of 
Prizrend, Novi Bazar, Prishtina and Ipek, the kaza of Kalkadelen from the 
vilayet of Kosovo, and the sanjaks of Koritza, Elbasan and Dibra from the 
vilayet of Monastir (Appendix A). In the light of the impending defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire by the Balkan League (a confederation of the Balkan states of 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro), Albanian nationalists announced 
their independence, because they no longer viewed Ottoman suzerainty as a 
sufficient guarantee to protect their rights, customs and interests. This was the 
opposite of what the League states had intended: one of the League's 
motivations in the war had been to prevent the successful establishment of an 
autonomous or independent Albanian state, which would have obstructed the 
League's opportunities to intervene and claim this territory for its members. 64 As 
early as 1906, H. N. Brailsford had recorded that Albanian nationalists had 
claimed: `Our programme is Albania for the Albanians, and we do no intend to 
submit to any foreign domination, and certainly not to the Slavs '. 65 In reality, 
this chapter will illustrate that even as late as November 1912, the majority of 
Albanian nationalists were still demanding, at most, autonomy within the 
64 Barclay to Grey, 14 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 614; Paget to Grey, 26 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 
659. 
65 Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 273. 
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Ottoman Empire. Only the prospect of Ottoman defeat prompted a small band 
of nationalists to proclaim independence. 
This chapter will begin by briefly considering the development of an Albanian 
identity, and the position of the Albanian question from 1878 until 1912, and 
thus set the framework within which the developments in 1912 will be located. 
The main focus of the chapter is to explore the reasons for, and the impacts of, 
the rapid development of an Albanian identity in 1912. To do this, the national 
and other ambitions to `Albanian' or `Macedonian' territory of the various Balkan 
ethnic groups will be introduced. The role of Albanian nationalism in fomenting 
the first Balkan war and the impact of that war on Albanian nationalism will be 
elucidated. Finally, the response of the great-power representatives will be 
explored, above all their decision to consider the Albanian national question by 
December 1912. The chapter will show that both `national' and `international' 
factors were immensely important in these developments. 
The Great Powers and the Foundations of Albanian Nationalist Activities 
(1878-1912) 
At the Congress of Berlin of 1878, the great powers agreed to establish an 
autonomous Bulgaria nominally within the Ottoman Empire, agreed to enlarge 
and recognise Serbia as independent, envisaged the enlargement of Greece, 
and afforded international recognition to an enlarged, independent Montenegro. 
This established the international framework within which the relations and 
conflicts between the nascent Balkan states would be conducted 
for the next 
thirty-five years. The first international problem for any aspiring Albanian 
national movement was therefore to secure recognition from the great powers, 
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and acceptance by its Balkan neighbours, that there was any separate Albanian 
identity at all, distinct from that of the surrounding Slav, Greek and Muslim 
populations. Under the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, which 
the Congress was summoned by the great powers to renegotiate, the Russians 
had imposed the establishment of a large Russian-protected Bulgaria on a 
weakened Ottoman government: its frontiers were established according to 
ostensibly ethnographic criteria, embracing practically the whole of Ottoman 
`Macedonia', and were pushed so far to the west as to incorporate Monastir, 
and extended even to the west of Lake Ochrida. Thus they included extensive 
areas with undeniably Albanian-speaking populations. Furthermore, in this 
treaty, and at the subsequent Congress itself, it was proposed to provide 
compensating territorial gains, at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, to Serbia, 
Montenegro and Greece, again incorporating areas with Albanian-speaking 
populations, including Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics. The Albanian national 
movement therefore first became active in the international arena at the time of 
the Congress of Berlin of 1878, as the Albanian League or `League of Prizrend' 
(1878-81). The League resolved to forestall the allocation of areas of the 
western Balkans with Albanian-speaking populations to one or more of the 
neighbouring Orthodox Christian states. They referred to themselves as 
`Albanians', but they did not seek establishment of an independent `Albania'. 
They merely sought the retention of areas of Albanian-speaking people within 
the Ottoman Empire, because they identified themselves as distinct from the 
neighbouring Slavs, Greeks and Ottoman Turks. However, the success of this 
proto-national programme depended on the representatives of the great powers 
assembled in Congress accepting the Albanian claim to the status of a 
recognised nation or nationality. In the event, however, they ruled that there 
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was no such entity as an Albanian `nation', rather that the `Albanians' or 
Albanian-speaking people were merely the inhabitants of a geographical area 
loosely known as `Albania'. Although `Macedonia' was restored to Ottoman rule, 
the powers assigned some areas of territory with a majority Albanian-speaking 
population to other states: specifically, Antivari, Hoti, Gruda, Triopchi, Kichi, 
Podgoritza, Plava and Gusinje to Montenegro and part of southern Epirus, 
between the Gulf of Preveza and the Kalamas River, to Greece. The Albanians 
were isolated and enjoyed little support, except for some Austrian sympathy for 
the Catholic minority, and some assistance from the Ottoman Turks, which was 
designed to merely limit Ottoman territorial losses. When the boundary 
commissions of the Congress arrived to delimit the frontier, the Prizrend League 
opposed by force the handing over of these territories and managed to retain 
control of Plava, Gusinje, Hoti and Gruda. Montenegro was given the port of 
Dulcigne as compensation, whilst the Greek frontier was instead fixed at the 
Arta River. When the commissions had finished their work, the League of 
Prizrend was suppressed by the Ottoman authorities. 66 
Thus, on the first occasion that the governments of the great powers had been 
confronted with the question of a distinct Albanian ethnicity, and after they had 
actively promoted the claims of Slav-Christian national groups, defined 
according to current ethnographic criteria, they specifically declined to 
recognise an equivalent Albanian ethnicity. Furthermore, even contemporary 
sympathisers with the Albanian cause questioned whether the Albanians were 
66 Turkhan Pasha, Council of Ten minutes, FRUS PPC, IV, pp. 111-16; Skendi, `Albanian 
Political Thought', pp. 159-61; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 31-110 passim; On the 
Congress of Berlin, see in general W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: a 
diplomatic history of the Near East settlement, 1878-1880 (London, 1938); on the ethnographic 
considerations see particularly W. L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 
(2"d edn., New York, 1960), pp. 59-166 passim, and the ethnographic maps printed facing pp. 
106,138,140,154). 
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`ethnologically 
... really a single stock', given 
the tribal and religious differences, 
which made it difficult to establish an accurate definition of the Albanian 
`nation'. 67 As well as the diversity of religion already mentioned, there were 
marked divergences with some areas, especially in the north, that were isolated 
and in winter inaccessible, and there were also major cultural and traditional 
differences, particularly the contrast between the seasonally migratory tribal 
groups in the north (Ghegs) and the more settled populations in the south 
(Tosks). There is indeed evidence that the division between the Ghegs and 
Tosks did create problems in the forging of a common identity, despite the 
criticism of those who have belittled this distinction as over-simplistic. 68 And, as 
its experience at the Congress of Berlin showed, the Albanian movement 
suffered from the serious disability that it had no great-power patron or 
protector. As long as the Ottoman Empire remained a viable suzerain power, 
Albanian interests might for the time being be adequately protected if a 
satisfactory autonomous state within it could be secured; but once that viability 
was compromised, it became essential for the Albanians to secure a great- 
power patron, for which role the least unpromising (though scarcely 
disinterested) candidate looked likely to be Austria-Hungary, if only because of 
its determination to prevent Serbia securing access to the Adriatic through 
Albanian territory. 
67 Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 229. 
68 I. Blumi, `Contesting the edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking Ethnic and Sectarian 
boundaries in the Malesore, 1878-1912', Middle East Studies, 35 (2003), pp. 237-56; Gawrych, 
Crescent and the Eagle, esp. pp. 22-3: Isa Blumi has argued that there are not any substantial 
differences between the two dialectic groups. But, Gawrych has shown that differences were 
perceived to be so great that it was more common for the two groups to be called 
Ghegmen and 
Toskmen. 
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Cultural Awakenings and Historical Traditions (1878-1908) 
In the light of these major problems, in the thirty years after the Congress of 
Berlin the small Albanian national movement, while not giving up the search for 
great-power support, set about the task of forging a national identity based on 
establishing and deepening national traditions and common bonds. As Stavros 
Skendi has shown, this focused on three main fronts: the pseudo-historical in 
the legend of Skanderbeg, the literary and cultural, and the linguistic. 69 In truth, 
these three initiatives went hand in hand, as literary and cultural works sought 
to promote the Skanderbeg legend and the use of a distinct Albanian written 
language. Skanderbeg was indicative of the Albanian resistive tradition. He 
encompassed many of the `virtues' that commonly marked the `heroic origins' 
model (martial valour, generosity, temperance, self-sacrifice, endurance, loyalty 
and, above all, patriotism), 70 that had proven so successful in the nationalism of 
the Orthodox Christian states. It was therefore hoped that Skanderbeg could be 
used as a `historical' example of why the Albanian people deserved the right to 
their own state, and should not become part of others. For instance, Gelcu 
Maksutovici considers that the Skanderbeg legend proved an effective vehicle 
for the promotion of Albanian nationalism, and emphasised the work Istori e 
Skenderbeut (The History of Skanderbeg) by Nairn Frasheri, in disseminating 
this message to educated Albanians .7 
However, he tends to over-emphasise 
the Skanderbeg legend. Admittedly, when independence was proclaimed, the 
hero's flag (the black double-headed eagle on a red background) was 
ceremoniously unfurled after nearly five hundred years, and would become the 
Albanian national flag. However, Skanderbeg had never lived in or sought an 
69 Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 300-405. 
70 Smith, Ethnic Origins, p. 199. 
71 G. Maksutovici, `L' Albanie' in V. Moisuc and I. Calafeteanu (eds. ), Assertion of Unitary, 
Independent National States in Central and Southeast Europe (1821-1923) (Bucharest, 1980), 
pp. 170-89, at pp. 170-1. 
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independent or autonomous state, and instead achieved simply an informal 
linking of Albanian princes, but not of their territories. After Skanderbeg's death, 
his descendants and followers soon emigrated to Italy, or once more became 
loyal Ottoman subjects. Moreover, literacy rates amongst Albanians were very 
low, and the book was read primarily by Albanians living abroad, whilst many 
initiatives in 1912 started within Albania. 72 As Benedict Anderson has shown of 
elsewhere in south-eastern Europe, national print vernaculars (including 
national histories, grammars and dictionaries) aimed at instilling the population 
with a national consciousness were not very effective vehicles in promoting 
national consciousness. 73 According to Faik Konitza, the Albanian-American 
who was influential at the Monastir Alphabet Congress (1908) in getting a 
unified Albanian script adopted, few Albanians before 1877 could even imagine 
that their language could be written. Even after the adoption of the codified 
written vernacular, when the Latin script was adopted and thirty-six characters 
created, intellectuals tended to write in Turkish, Greek or French. There were 
also practical problems in the formation of the common written, and also 
spoken, language. For instance, isa Blumi records that, by 1900, there were 
only two Albanian-language schools, and that, by 1914, in Mirdita, a 
predominantly Catholic region in north-western `Albania', only three individuals 
were able to read in 'Albanian'. 74 When the cabinet of the newly created 
Albanian state met between March and September 1914, they conducted their 
meetings in Turkish because the `Albanians' could not understand one another, 
72 I. Blumi, `The Role of Education in the Formation of Albanian Identity and Myths', in 
Schwander-Sievers and Fischer, Albanian Identities, pp. 49-59, at p. 52. 
73 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 66. 
74 Blumi, `Role of Education', pp. 51-2; T. Hocevar, 'The Albanian Economy, 1912-1944', 
Journal of European Economic History, 16 (1987), pp. 561-8, at p. 565: Hocevar illustrates that 
by 1939 eighty percent of the population were still illiterate and that only 5.8 percent were in 
education. 
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and some members did not even speak Albanian. 75 In the thirty-year period 
after the Congress of Berlin, there does not seem to have been much 
advancement of the Albanian national programme, except for a small educated 
intelligentsia, who tended to live outside Albania. Active colonies included those 
in Bucharest, Lausanne, Boston, Massachusetts, and Constantinople. Many 
divisions remained amongst the Albanian people, and a national or autonomous 
programme was of little interest to the bulk of the Albanian people, who were 
relatively content with their life within the Ottoman Empire. The majority Muslims 
did not want to jeopardise the important privileges they received as Muslims. 
The mountainous terrain in eastern and northern `Albania', especially, and the 
distance from Constantinople, meant that the Ottoman regime was very light, 
especially in comparison to those Balkan regions nearer Constantinople. Even 
Christian Albanians endured little interference with their local customs, traditions 
and practices, and they saw no significant reason to upset the established 
system. 76 Nevertheless, the Albanian spoken language would soon become the 
defining feature of identity and of the national movement. 
The Young Turk Revolution and Threats to Albanian Identity (1908-12) 
In 1908, Albanian lifestyles and customs were disrupted by the Young Turk 
revolution, headed by the Committee of Union and Progress in Constantinople, 
and carried out by the officer corps of the Ottoman army in Macedonia. " The 
Committee, which pursued a nationalising agenda of modernisation and 
centralisation, was received with much alarm by the Albanians. In 1908, a 
number of prominent Muslim Albanians (such as Hasan bey Prishtina and 
75 Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, p. 27. 
76 I. Blumi, 'Thwarting the Ottoman Empire: Smuggling Through the Empire's New Frontiers in 
Yemen and Albania, 1878-1920', International Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 (2003), pp. 251-70. 
" For further details of the Young Turk revolution see Stavrianos, Balkans since 1453, pp. 524- 
28 
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Nexhib Draga) from across the four vilayets, had been elected as Young Turk 
deputies. However, these men soon became distanced from the centralising 
policies of their party because of the impact on Albanian customs and practices. 
Many would go on to become leading members of the Albanian national 
movement. From 1909 onwards, there were continual revolts in `Albania', some 
led by these `politicians' for the protection of local rights, especially regarding 
local conscription and taxation privileges. However, the movements remained 
small-scale, unorganised and localised, with no central plan or co-ordination, 
although gradually some of the groups started to work together to promote their 
claims more effectively, including those representing different faiths. Perhaps 
most importantly, although no body attempted to co-ordinate the various 
uprisings, some understanding of what it meant to be `Albanian' emerged, and 
played a part in the protests to the Porte in Constantinople. By 1912, it had 
been confirmed, for instance by the Gerche memorandum (June 1911), the 
Cepo resolutions (July 1911) and the Valona petition (July 1912), that the idea 
of a unified Albania, which had been proposed during the Congress of Berlin, 
and was based on territory where Albanian was the majority spoken language 
and on Ottoman provincial boundaries, was generally accepted. Nevertheless, 
Albanians were still calling for at most autonomy (and many not even for that), 
and the majority remained loyal subjects of the Sultan. Albanian divisions and 
rivalries were also prevalent, and uprisings were as much against other 
`Albanians' as they were against the Young Turk policies. For instance, in one 
typical incident in Zadrima, a village located near the town of Scutari, the 
inhabitants insisted upon receiving from the Porte the same exemption 
privileges as their neighbours, despite never having had such privileges before. 
Such demands placed the Ottoman Government in a difficult position. If they 
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denied the demands, the inhabitants of Zadrima would continue to revolt; if they 
granted them, their neighbours would interpret it as a loss of privilege and seek 
redress themselves. 78 
By the start of 1912, Stavro Skendi has identified three main groupings of 
Albanian nationalists. He contended that they were divided geographically, 
tribally and to a certain extent religiously. Only one of these groupings 
considered itself in anything resembling `nationalistic' terms. The first group, the 
Hamidists, were strong in Kosovo, primarily Muslim, and wanted a return to the 
pre-1908 constitutional conditions under Sultan Abdul Hamid. The second 
group, the itiläfists (or followers of `Liberty and Entente') were also strong in 
Kosovo, central and southern Albania, were both Orthodox and Muslim, and 
sought autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Their programme was based 
upon the earlier constitution agreed by the Sultan, and later satisfied by the 
offer of the Young Turks in July 1912. The third group were known as the 
`enlightened intellectuals'. They came mainly from southern Albania and the 
diaspora, but they also included Hasan bey Prishtina, an influential tribal 
chieftain from Kosovo who had served in the Ottoman parliament from 1908-12. 
The group included Orthodox Christians and Muslims, especially a number of 
prominent Bektashis. They were influenced by the enlightenment, western and 
diasporic liberalism, and were similar in many ways to the intelligentsia in other 
European states. The enlightened intellectuals advocated autonomy within the 
Ottoman Empire (on the basis of the Gerche memorandum), but, in comparison 
78 Lowther to Grey, 6 Sept. 1910, BD, IX. i, no. 181; Grey to de Salis, 26 June 1911, BD, Xi, no. 
498; Bax-Ironside to Grey, 28 Aug. 1911, BD, IX. i, no. 517; Cartwright to Grey, 29 July 1911, 
BD, IX. i, no. 513; Lowther to Grey, 2 July 1911, BD, IX. i, no. 504; de Salis to Grey, 27 June 
1911, BD, IX. i, no. 500; Enclosure in Lowther to Grey, 31 Jan. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 524; Lamb to 
Lowther, 28 Dec. 1911, The National Archives [TNA]: The Public Record Office [PRO], FO 
421/279, no. 38 [hereafter cited as FO]; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 411-52; 
Gawrych, Crescent and Eagle, pp. 140-69. 
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to the itiläfists, they appear to have referred to themselves as 'nationalists', and 
sought things on behalf of all `Albanians'. Those Albanians who had been 
involved in the literary and cultural initiatives in the preceding decades tended to 
affiliate to this group. 79 
The Italo-Turkish war (1911-12) prompted the next development. It brought 
about significant changes in Albanian ideas and tactics. Albanian patriots 
correctly appreciated that the neighbouring states were unlikely to remain 
inactive. Their intentions were clearly illustrated by the activities of the Serbian 
government, which helped Christian and Muslim guerrilla bands in Kosovo, 
especially those led by the patriot isa bey Boletin, and by Montenegrin links with 
some of the northern Catholic tribes. The problems arising from having no 
great-power protector remained as great as before. As inhabitants of a majority 
Muslim region, most Europeans considered the Albanians as Turks, and the 
Ottomans did nothing to dispel these assumptions. Being inhabitants of the 
Ottoman Empire also made it more difficult to present Albanian claims at the 
international level. Based on their experiences during the Berlin Congress, a 
number of prominent and educated Albanians determined that it was necessary 
to secure international support for their autonomous movement. It was hoped 
that pressure from the great powers would assist in persuading the Porte to 
implement the administrative reforms that many Albanians were demanding. 
Ismail Kemal bey Mora has often been cited as the main advocate of the pursuit 
of great-power recognition of Albanian national interests, but British sources 
seem to imply an equally extensive role for Hasan Prishtina, albeit in close 
association with Ismail Kemal. Ismail Kemal was a prominent Albanian from the 
79Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 430-6; Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 
p. 45. 
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coastal town of Valona (Vlora in Albanian) in southern Albania. He served as a 
deputy in the Ottoman parliament, where in 1910 he had first raised the 
question of a unified and integral Albania. Both men appear to have been 
amongst the most far-sighted Albanian patriots at the time. They appreciated 
the value of `national' efforts for the preservation of `Albania', but they realised 
that these were unlikely to be successful unless they had the support of great- 
power statements. Therefore they considered that the preservation of `Albania' 
would depend as much upon the `support and rivalry of the great powers' as on 
Albanian efforts. This was because they recognised that the Albanians had 
many internal divisions, and were weaker militarily than the neighbouring 
Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. Given Austrian interest in the Albanian 
littoral and eastern Adriatic, it was decided that the Ballhausplatz (the Austrian 
Foreign Ministry) was likely to be the most receptive to Albanian claims. To the 
Ballhausplatz, Ismail Kemal stressed the urgency of the recognition of the 
Albanians as an `ethnographic entity', and invited it to use its useful links with 
the Porte to press for the `recognition of the existence of an Albanian nation '. 80 
These two men were also involved in seeking to `nationalise' the uprisings in 
Albania, in order to give greater weight to their negotiations with the great 
powers, and also to put pressure on the Ottoman authorities to grant the 
administrative and other concessions that `Albanians' had demanded in 
previous revolts. The most significant initiative appears to have begun 
in 
December 1911. At a meeting of prominent Albanians, in Constantinople, 
organised by Ismail Kemal and Hasan Prishtina, they devised plans 
to facilitate 
a general Albanian insurrection the following year. This would start 
in Kosovo, 
80 Lowther to Grey, 29 Apr. 1912, FO 421/281, no. 26; Lowther to Grey, 27 May 1912, FO 
421/281, no. 129; Crampton, Hollow Detente, p. 50; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 
438-44. 
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where Prishtina had considerable influence and supplies, and then spread to 
the other Albanian-speaking areas. Prishtina was therefore assigned 
responsibility for organising the preparations in Kosovo, whereas Ismail Kemal 
resolved to secure funds and 15,000 guns from governments `friendly' to the 
Albanian movement, which presumably meant the Austrians. Despite this 
central plan, when the revolt broke out it was obvious that the problems 
experienced in the 1911 uprisings still existed: there were no unifying ideas, 
motives or leadership. Nevertheless, by 23 July 1912, the Ottoman government 
had signed an armistice with the Albanians, in order to concentrate on the war 
with Italy. This did not satisfy the Albanians, who, according to Sir Edward Grey, 
British Foreign Secretary, were finally of `one mind and they were quite 
determined to see the thing through'. He highlighted in particular the 
cooperation of Muslim and Christian Albanians. 81 More significantly, a vision of 
what constituted an `ethnic Albania' had definitely emerged. Other aims differed, 
but the definition of `Albania' and its boundaries was the same in all the petitions 
submitted to the Porte (for example from the Albanian Central Committee in 
Constantinople on 28 July 1912, and from the southern Albanian chiefs on 29 
July 1912). The one concession granted by the Porte (dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire within twenty-four hours) satisfied only the itiläfists. The rebel 
groups from central and southern Albanian continued to resist, and to call for full 
implementation of their demands, above all autonomy for the four vilayets of 
'Albania'. 82 
In July and August 1912, the majority of `nationalist leaders' appear to have 
eventually been persuaded that their claims were likely to prove more 
81 Grey to Paget, 15 July 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 591; Historia e Shgiperise, II, pp. 43-5; Also at 
Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 427. 
82 Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 433-4. 
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successful if they worked with each other, rather than independently, and that it 
was therefore necessary to reduce the differences between them. They would 
then be able to show a united front and appear stronger, which they considered 
would both apply greater pressure on the Ottoman authorities, and impress the 
great-power representatives. The Hamidists, led by Isa Boletin, and the 
`enlightened intellectuals', led by Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, who, like 
Prishtina, was from an influential Albanian family and had served as a deputy in 
the Ottoman parliament, developed a compromise arrangement, which is 
usually referred to as the `Fourteen Points of Hasan Prishtina'. It was presented 
on 9 August 1912.83 This agreement was crucial for the fledgling Albanian 
nationalist movement, in a number of respects. Most significantly, it represented 
an alliance between the two Albanian `nationalistic' groupings that were most 
antagonistic towards one another, and had the greatest ideological differences. 
It called for the recognition of local customs and the carrying of arms, to satisfy 
the Hamidists, and for school rights and a national programme, in line with the 
aspirations of the intellectuals. The memorandum was also presented on behalf 
of all Albanians, and it made clear that it was not aiming for the preservation of 
the rights of a particularly locality, village or clan, but of those of all Albanian- 
speaking people. The majority of the demands were accepted by the Ottoman 
government, largely because Albanian forces had advanced as far east as 
Uskub, but they were not implemented in full. The Porte granted some 
customary laws in the four vilayets, but not the demands for regional service or 
any form of autonomy. It claimed that it was unable to consider the autonomy 
question because there were problems in defining the geographical limitations 
of `Albania'. It therefore made no reference to the `Albania' defined in the 
83 Marling to Grey, 27 July 1912, FO 421/282, no. 173; Marling to Grey, 8 Aug. 1912, FO 
421/282, no. 203; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 434-5; Gawrych, Crescent and the 
Eagle, pp. 194-5,211. 
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petition or to any of the other versions that had been mooted. The Albanians 
had not succeeded in securing an acceptance of the definition of `Albania' that 
had first been proposed internationally in 1878. $4 
Interestingly, it was the intellectuals who persuaded the Hamidists to accept the 
Ottoman proposal, although the main intellectual goals had not been agreed to. 
The intellectuals, especially Prishtina, appear to have been willing to accept this 
more limited offer because they did not want to lose the valuable other 
concessions it granted. 85 These goals were at least as important, possibly more 
important, than the `national' ambitions. Seeking autonomy within the Ottoman 
Empire was only one means of achieving them. If they could be achieved and 
secured through other means, and ones that more ordinary Albanians could 
relate to, then this would also be acceptable. It would then not even be 
necessary to secure autonomy. An independent Albanian state was an even 
more remote possibility. Most individual Albanian nationalists were fairly 
moderate or conservative. Their protests began as the protection and 
preservation of existing rights that they perceived to be under threat. In this 
way, Albanian nationalism fits with the ideas of defensive nationalism. The 
promotion of an Albanian identity based on their oral ethno-linguistic 
foundations materialised not for itself, but in an attempt to protect other older 
and more established privileges and rights. That they all (supposedly) spoke 
Albanian was the key unifier, although in other areas there were many 
differences. Language thus provided a basis on which to define the areas that 
they deemed should be granted autonomy, and it coincided fairly neatly with the 
84 Marling to Grey, 13 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 613; Grey to Marling, 21 Aug. 1912, BD, IX., no. 
646; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 437. 
85 Marling to Grey, 13 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 613; Grey to Marling, 21 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 
646; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 437. 
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reorganisation of Ottoman boundaries in 1877. It was therefore plausible that, in 
claiming provincial boundaries that were already established, their proposal 
might be more effective. The Albanians framed their `Albania' in the language of 
the day ('ethnographical limits'), that which fitted their case (language as 
opposed to religion), and gave it a political basis (a definition based on the 
vilayets) in an attempt to appear reasonable and moderate, and to gain support 
from the Porte and the great powers. 86 Significantly, although they now called 
for reform on behalf of all Albanians, they still wanted reform within the 
framework of the Ottoman Empire, because this afforded protection from the 
ambitions of the neighbouring small states. However, in response to the 
activities of those states in the Balkan League, Albanian claims would become 
radicalised, and favour independence. 
Balkan Wars (1912-13): the accelerator for independence 
The Balkan League was formed by a series of treaties and agreements 
between March and October 1912. In accordance with those treaties, on 8 
October 1912, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and the other 
three states followed suit ten days later. In line with their national aspirations, 
and usually defined as part of their `historic nations', the leaders of the other 
Balkan states had different and contradictory understandings of the disputed 
territory, but they agreed that none of them considered it `Albania'. One clerk in 
the British Foreign Office summed up these problems by asking `who can say 
where "Albania" ends and "Macedonia" begins? And in Macedonia itself, what 
are the boundaries between Serbs, Bulgars and Kutso-Vlachs? '87 None of the 
86 For an indication of the importance of Albanians only aiming to secure territory within its 
`ethnographical limits' see for example, M. Konitza, The Albanian Question (London, 1918), FO 
371/3570/4540- 
87 Norman minute, 3 Sept. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 658. 
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treaties made any specific reference to `Albania', although the Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty (13 March 1912) allowed for the possibility of Serbia gaining territory in 
Albania as a means of acquiring an outlet on the Adriatic; and the secret annex 
to that treaty envisaged that `Albania' was to be divided between Serbia, 
Montenegro and Greece. 88 This meant that, to fulfil the Balkan League's 
ambitions, the great powers would have to agree to a division of `Albania', and 
to the division of the `Albanians' between the various Orthodox small states. 
Balkan National Ambitions and the Albanian' Question 
The formation of these alliances and the motivations of the parties involved 
have been well explored and documented. 89 For the purpose of this study, it is 
necessary to focus on those ambitions to `Albanian' territory, and on the rivalries 
between the states, that had an impact upon the Albanian question. Some 
studies have considered the importance of Albanian activities in promoting the 
formation of the League, but usually as the trigger, or as an accelerant in the 
later stages. In reality, Albanian activities seem to have played a more 
influential role. The Albanians may not have been calling for independence, or 
even very forcefully for autonomy, but the suggestion of either goal was viewed 
with much anxiety by the governments of the other Balkan small states. The 
governments of all the League states appear to have been perturbed by 
Albanian claims for autonomy, out of fear that this would be detrimental to their 
irredentist ambitions and historic claims in the area that the Albanians were now 
claiming as `Albania'. Nascent divisions between the Serbs and the Albanians 
88 'Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Kingdom of Bulgarian and the Kingdom of 
Serbia' and 'Secret Annex to the Treaty of Friendship and alliance between the Kingdom of 
Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia' in I. E. Gueshov, The Balkan League (London, 1915), pp. 
19,112,115-6. 
89 See for example: Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars; Thaden, Russia and the Balkan 
Alliance; Hall, Balkan Wars. 
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appear to have been accentuated by the rise in Albanian national activities, and 
by the Serbian response to secure their own national ambitions in these areas, 
especially Kosovo. Meanwhile, as early as September 1911 (at least), officials 
in Sofia articulated to the Russian government their concerns about the 
significance of a future Albanian revolt. They feared that it would prove a major 
block to Bulgarian ambitions, especially if it resulted in autonomy 
(independence was not considered) for those Albanians living in the Kosovo 
and Monastir vilayets. Typically, the four Balkan League governments resented 
any privileges being given to the majority Muslim population that were not 
likewise afforded to the Christians. The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Gueshov, 
was under particular pressure to ensure that any such advantages were also 
accorded to the Christian populations. 90 But the League governments were 
even more concerned by the appeals by Christian Albanians for the protection 
of their rights. If these concessions were granted, this would negate the 
possibility of these states interfering themselves, or of persuading the great 
powers to do so, as had occurred in previous advancements in their respective 
nationalist programmes. The Serbs were particularly disturbed by references to 
`ethnic Albania', because this directly opposed their claims to `Old Serbia' and a 
coastline on the Adriatic. Bulgarian officials were anxious that portions of the 
Monastir vilayet should not be included within an `autonomous Albania', and 
even more anxious that the demand for reform in `Albania' might lead to 
corresponding disturbances in `Macedonia', and to the people there (the term 
Macedonians not being used) claiming similar concessions for themselves. 
British officials therefore predicted that there was every possibility that the 
90 Nekliudov to Sazonov, 29 Sept. 1911, KA, VIII, no. 1; Barclay to Grey, 14 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, 
no. 614; De Salis to Grey, 27 Dec. 1911, FO 421/279, no. 35; O'Beirne to 
Grey, 27 June 1912, 
FO 421/282, no. 9; Buchanan to Grey, 21 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 643; Barclay to Grey, 14 Aug. 
1912, BD, IX. i, no. 614. 
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continuing Albanian activities in 1912, especially their demands for autonomy, 
would lead to action by the other Balkan state governments to prevent it from 
materialising. 91 Thus the success of the Albanian national movement was 
clearly linked with the level of success of the other Balkan state national 
aspirations, which were designed to upset the system, and to prevent the 
realisation of Albanian national aspirations. The rapid radicalisation of Albanian 
activities in the summer of 1912, and the spread of the uprisings to the Vardar 
valley in Macedonia, confirmed the fears of the Balkan states. 92 They pleaded 
with the Russian government, as the protector of the Ottoman Empire's 
Orthodox population, to intervene and secure the same rights for the Empire's 
Christian populations as those being granted to the Christians and Muslims in 
Albania, but this remained a double-edged sword. 93 None of the Christian states 
wanted such concessions to be made. The Christian states accelerated the 
development of alliances between themselves, and resolved that they would act 
swiftly to prevent Albanian gains, rather than relinquish their own ambitions. 
They were confident that they would be successful, because the Italo-Turkish 
war had illustrated that the great powers no longer considered Ottoman territory 
as inviolable, and were prepared to accept an alteration of the territorial integrity 
of Ottoman territory, and of the balance of power in the region. 
All four League states had ambitions in the territory also claimed by the 
Albanians. As Farrar has shown, the ambitions of the Balkan states in 1912 
91 Hartwig to Sazonov, 1 Oct. 1911, KA, VIII, no. 3; Barclay to Grey, 14 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 
614; Paget to Grey, 26 Aug. 1912, BD, IX. i, no. 659. 
92 Nekliudov to Neratov, 12 Aug. 1912, MOEI, Series 2, XX. i, no. 456; Giers to Neratov, 12 Aug. 
1912, MOEI, Series 2, XX. i, no. 457; Holmsen to quarter master division of the general staff, 18 
Aug. 1912; MOEI, Series 2, XX. ii, no. 502: Also at Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance, p. 
106; Austrian Minister in Athens to Berchtold, 3 Aug. 1912, Austro-Hungarian Documents, no. 
450. 
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were generally a combination of nationalism, apathy and aggression. 94 In the 
simplest terms, the four states claimed parts of `Albania' for `national' reasons 
because this territory was considered part of their respective `historic nations'. 
Yet strategic and economic considerations were also important. They were all 
agreed that they needed to overcome the rivalry between themselves, because 
individually none of them was strong enough to defeat the Porte and realise any 
of their national and other ambitions. 
The Serbian claims were the most important for the Albanian question. The 
Serbs sought to acquire that territory in northern Albania that they considered 
ethnically and historically theirs, as part of `old Serbia'. On these grounds, they 
claimed territory as far south as the Drin river, and including the sanjak of Novi 
Bazar, the Kosovan plain and the vilayet of Scutari (all of which the Albanians 
considered part of northern `Albania'), and northern and western Macedonia. 
Economic motives were also crucial. Serbia sought to gain `Albanian territory' to 
obtain an Adriatic coastline, and to overcome the problems caused by its 
landlocked position, especially its economic dependency upon Austria-Hungary 
for trade. Serbian aspirations therefore stretched as far south as the town of 
Durazzo, which was considered the ideal location for a suitable Serbian port, or, 
alternatively, the ports of San Giovanni di Medua or Alessio, which were further 
north. Serbian officials were prepared to go to great lengths to secure Durazzo, 
which has been termed the `all or nothing port'. 95 When the war broke out, the 
94 Farrar, `Aggression versus Apathy', pp. 257-80, esp. pp 
Nationalism and War in the Near East (Oxford, 1915), p. 151. 
95 Ed. Note, EDW, p. 226; Grey to Paget, 6 Nov. 1912, 
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Serbian King Peter therefore proclaimed it a `Holy War to free our brethren and 
ensure a better future. '96 
Greek claims to Epirus were next in importance for the Albanian question, 
because they conflicted with Albanian claims in the Koritza and Monastir 
vilayets. The Greeks also sought gains in eastern Thrace, especially Salonika, 
and in southern Macedonia. In all three locations, religion, history, and 
economic and strategic considerations were important. 97 The `Albanian' areas 
claimed by the Greeks were home to the vast majority of Orthodox `Albanians'. 
The Greeks claimed, in line with their view that religion was synonymous with 
nationality, that, regardless of the language these people spoke, and even 
admitting that many spoke only Albanian, their religion (Orthodoxy) and Hellenic 
sentiment made them Greek. Greek claims largely complemented Serbian 
ones, in that they focused on `southern Albania', whereas Serbian claims 
centred on `northern Albania'. It was thus considered unnecessary to make a 
formal agreement. The Skumbi river, the traditional divide between the Gheg 
and Tosk regions, provided a sufficiently accurate division between the extent of 
the maximum claims of the two states in `Albania'. The Greek and Serbian 
governments, often in cooperation, worked actively to enhance their claims to 
this territory, and appear to have been equally determined to suppress an 
Albanian nationality, which was contrary to their ambitions. The Serbs used a 
two-pronged approach, deploying guerrilla warfare in northern Albania, but also 
making alliances with a number of prominent Albanian chieftains, most notably 
96 King Peter quoted in L. Freundlich, 'Albania's Golgotha: Indictment of the Exterminators of the 
Albanian People' (Vienna, 1913), in R. Elsie (ed. ) Kosovo in the Heart of the Powder Keg 
(Boulder, 1997), pp. 332-60, at p. 333. 
For further details on Greek ambitions and involvement in Albania see B. Kondis, 'The Role of 
the Albanian Factor upon Greek-Bulgarian Understanding of 1912', Balkan Studies, 25 (1984), 
pp. 377-87. 
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Isa Boletin, in an attempt to disrupt Albanian unity and nationalist-inspired 
initiatives. The Greeks, meanwhile, attempted to upset the Albanian national 
programme in the south by an ecclesiastical and educational policy designed to 
reinforce Christian and Muslim divisions. 98 
By contrast, the ambitions of both Serbia and Greece clashed with Bulgarian 
ones, especially in `Macedonia', and Serbian ambitions also conflicted with 
Montenegrin aspirations in `northern Albania'. These rivalries had seriously 
hindered the development of the League, and they would continue to be 
significant. 99 Montenegrin ambitions regarding Albanian territory were the third 
most important. Montenegrin ambitions centred on the town of Scutari, which 
had been the centre of the medieval Montenegrin kingdom, and also on the 
sanjak of Novi Bazar, possession of which it desired to provide a coterminous 
frontier with Serbia, and thus reduce its own isolation. The possibility of financial 
and military assistance was also attractive. As the smallest of the four League 
states, numerically fewer than the Albanians and with a less secure relationship 
with the great powers, including their Russian Slav patron, Montenegro was 
weaker than the other small Orthodox states. The largest Montenegrin problem 
arose because of the incompatibility of its claims with those of Serbia. Although 
the Serbs and Montenegrins were religiously and linguistically similar, their 
historical separation had produced many divisions, and their leaders were bitter 
98 A. Nicolson minute, 6 Apr. 1912 and Ed. Note, BD, IX. ii, Appendix II, pp. 1007,1018; Norman 
minute, 26 Mar. 1913, BD, IX. i, no. 755; Helmreich, Diplomacy and the Balkan Wars, p. 45. 
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October 1912) see Nekliudov to Neratov, 14 May 1912, KA, XV, no. 1; Elliot to Grey, 1 Dec. 
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Sazonov, 20 June 1912, EDW, no. 400; Popov quoted in L. S. Rubinchek (compiled, translated 
and annotated), A Digest of the Krasnyi Arkhiv. ' A Historical Journal of the Central Archive 
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rivals for the leadership of the Serbian `race'. 10° Their animosity was so great 
that the Russian government had warned against any form of Bulgaro- 
Montenegrin agreement. After such an agreement was signed, the Montenegrin 
and Bulgarian governments thought it necessary to keep it secret from officials 
in Belgrade. 101 
Bulgarian aspirations to Albanian territory were important for two reasons. 
Bulgarian ambitions focused on territory in Macedonia and Thrace, in pursuit of 
the restoration of the frontiers allocated to it at San Stefano, but Bulgaria also 
sought territory as far west as Lake Ochrida and including the important town of 
Monastir, which was claimed by the Albanians. These claims also clashed with 
Greek and Serbian claims. Although they did not give up their claims to this 
territory, Bulgarian officials hoped that, if they could focus Serbian and also 
Greek attention on `Albania', then they would be able to gain greater gains for 
Bulgaria in Macedonia as recompense. 102 This prospect was not very likely 
because the Greeks and Serbs were not willing to forgo their ethnic, historic and 
strategic claims to Macedonia in order to satisfy the Bulgarians. Greek- 
Bulgarian rivalry was so great that it was not possible to conclude a territorial 
agreement, except for Crete and the Aegean islands, where the Bulgarians had 
no ambitions. 
103 
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In the light of these rivalries and conflicting ambitions, the establishment of the 
League was a remarkable achievement. However, it proved possible to 
subsume these animosities temporarily, in an attempt to overcome the 
perceived greater threats posed by Albanian nationalism, and a possible 
strengthening of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, if Albanian autonomy within it, 
and concessions to the Christian minorities, were granted. At the outset of the 
first Balkan war, all four states, even the Montenegrins, had better prospects of 
securing their national goals than the Albanians. These states already had an 
established position within the great-power system, and therefore an outlet by 
which to elucidate their claims. More importantly, the Slav states retained the 
support of Russia, and the Greeks were supported by the French, and, 
increasingly, by the Germans. 104 
Implications for Albanian `Nationalism' 
In response to the outbreak of the first Balkan war, the Albanian nationalists 
reaffirmed the centrality of ethnicity to Albanian nationalism, and used both 
diplomatic and military force to back up their claims. It was observed that the 
threat posed by the Balkan League drew the Albanian Christians and Muslims 
closer together, in an effort to prevent partition. 
105 There was considerable 
confusion and disagreement amongst the Albanian nationalists concerning the 
most appropriate course of action necessary to achieve this. There was still no 
universally recognised authority strong enough to direct such an 
intricate policy, 
and to override independent local action. 
106 
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On the military side, the most significant initiative resulted from a meeting of a 
number of leading nationalists in Uskub, on 14 October 1912. A policy of 
neutrality seemed desirable, because the Albanians hoped that a `distinctive 
policy' would establish their `racial individuality', but this `distinctive policy' was 
not advocated or pursued. As Skendi has shown, the Albanians decided to 
pursue a policy that was distinctive not in itself, but in its motivation. It was 
decided that they would fight on the side of the Ottoman Empire, but would fight 
for themselves, not for the Porte. They considered this the only way in which 
they could successfully defend their territory and prevent the partition of `ethnic 
Albania' (the four vilayets). In October 1912, the Albanians had the inherent 
advantage of the possession of this territory, which they believed that they could 
maintain only through war. Their declaration was presented to the Porte and the 
great powers on 16 October 1912.107 lt had still proven impossible to achieve a 
single unified `Albanian' policy: for instance, many Kosovan Albanians, under 
Boletin, fought with the Serbs in Kosovo, whilst the Catholic Malissori 
tribesmen, after assurances from King Nikita that he had no designs on 
Albanian territory, and was solely determined to free his borders of Ottoman 
Turks, fought with Montenegrin forces. 108 The Porte responded by trying to 
exploit this co-operation, in the hope of inciting religious fanaticism amongst the 
Muslim populace. In response, the Uskub meeting appointed a delegation to 
detach the Catholic tribesmen from the Montenegrins, but such action proved 
unnecessary. The Malissori felt like pawns rather than allies, and had quickly 
abandoned the conflict and returned to their mountain homes. Most Albanian 
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patriots pursuing other tactics soon arrived at similar conclusions regarding the 
duplicity of the Greeks and Slavs, and agreed that the League states were more 
dangerous to Albanian aspirations than their Ottoman predecessors. 
Consequently, even those Albanians initially willing to work with the League 
soon came to resist its approaches. 
109 
Albanian fears regarding the first Balkan war were quickly realised when the 
League secured a series of sweeping victories. Despite ending the Italo-Turkish 
war, in order to concentrate on fighting in the Balkans, the Porte had proven 
unable to send troops from Tripoli, because of the Greek blockade. This 
resulted in only 320,000 Ottoman troops facing a combined League force of 
700,000.110 The Ottomans sued for peace, and at the beginning of December 
1912 an armistice was signed. The League had fulfilled all its ambitions, and 
surpassed many of them. The British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Fairfax 
Cartwright, wrote of the League's outstanding success: 
At the beginning of the war Servia [Serbia] hoped to secure merely the 
Vilayet of Kossovo [Kosovo]; after her first successes she claimed to 
retain Ueskueb [Uskub] and Monastir; now she talks of halving Albania 
with Greece; tomorrow she will want to annex Bosnia Herzegovina. 111 
When the armistice was signed, the League occupied all Ottoman territory in 
Europe, except for the four cities of Constantinople, Adrianople, Scutari and 
Janina. The last two were held by `Albanian' forces and were claimed by the 
Albanians as part of Albania. 
109 Durham, Balkan Tangle, pp. 244-5; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 452; Historia e 
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Albanian diplomatic initiatives, above all the efforts to gain great-power support, 
proved more significant than their valiant military efforts. As a smaller and 
weaker nationality in an ethnically contested zone, these military efforts needed 
the support of the bigger and stronger great powers, in order to increase the 
strength of the small nationality diplomatically, and possibly militarily too, 
relative to the League states. With the start of the war, and above all with the 
rapid success of the League, Ismail Kemal had intensified his efforts to secure 
great-power support for the Albanian national movement. To this end, on 5 
November 1912, he helped organise a meeting of the large Albanian colony in 
Bucharest, at which it was decided to establish an executive committee that 
would become responsible for governing their country. It was decided to send a 
commission to Europe to advocate the Albanian national cause. However, even 
this meeting fell short of specifying whether Albania would be autonomous or 
independent, because any such decision depended upon future developments, 
and upon the stance adopted by the great powers' representatives. 112 The 
Albanian representatives seemed unwilling to take the lead in their own national 
movement, and were instead willing to defer responsibility to the great powers, 
in accordance with their position in the concert system. They did this because 
they genuinely believed that the great powers would act honestly, both in the 
Albanian interest and on the merits of the case. They naively believed, 
therefore, that the powers would automatically support Albanian ethnic 
nationalism as the Albanian patriots had envisaged it, and would make the best 
choice for the Albanian people. Such an attitude is indicative of Paskal Milo's 
comments about the weaknesses of the Albanian political class in this period, 
112 Historia e Shgiperise, II, p. 357; Also at Kondis, Greece and Albania, p. 53. 
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and in particular their inexperience in external relations with the great powers. ' 13 
It took some time for most Albanian representatives to realise that the interests 
and aspirations of the two groups, even the so-called disinterested powers, 
were not necessarily the same as their own. 
However, Ismail Kemal succeeded in securing approval, from this section of the 
diaspora, of the importance of great-power support for Albania's future. He then 
proceeded to Vienna to plead his people's case. Disappointingly for Ismail 
Kemal, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna limited itself to no more than generalities, 
but in Budapest Ismail was received much more warmly, by Count Leopold 
Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister. Ismail Kemal stated that the Albanians 
were determined to maintain the integrity of their country, and that, along with 
other Albanian chieftains, he intended to produce a memorandum of aspirations 
to be sent to the great powers. Ismail Kemal later wrote that Berchtold approved 
of his views relating to the Albanian national question. ' 14 By the time Ismail 
Kemal arrived in Valona, on 26 November 1912, to take part in a national 
convention along with eighty-three delegates from across Albania, there had 
been a dramatic shift in Albanian nationalism in favour of a policy for 
independence. The convention opened two days later, with Ismail Kemal 
presiding. His proposals for the proclamation of an independent Albania, as the 
`only way for the salvation for the Albanians', were all enthusiastically accepted: 
they were the election of a senate to control and aid the government, the 
formation of a commission to be sent to the great-power capitals to defend 
Albanian rights and a provisional government under Ismail Kemal's presidency. 
113 P. Milo, `Albania and the Balkan Entente', Association International d'etudes du Sud-Est 
Europeen Bulletin, 30 (2001), pp. 39-66, esp. pp. 41-2. 
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The delegates hoisted the flag of Skanderbeg, and designated it the `national' 
flag. ' 15 
Before the first Balkan war, such a step would probably have been 
unnecessary, and at that time it was certainly desired by only a small minority of 
nationalists, primarily those living abroad, who had experienced more liberal 
and democratic institutions at first hand. The war had showed that the 
Albanians needed to seek a viable alternative to Ottoman protection, if a distinct 
and separate Albanian entity and identity were to survive. They opted for 
independence, but this meant, significantly, independence under the protection 
of the great powers. Despite their considerable and valiant resistance and 
resilience, it was obvious that they would be unable to withstand their larger, 
expansionist and predatory neighbours indefinitely. It seems that this 
recognition was the crucial factor that enabled Ismail Kemal to convince the 
national convention to decide, finally, on independence, rather than the earlier, 
albeit still recent, goal of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. 
Great-Power Responses 
Meanwhile, the great powers had also responded to League activities and the 
increase in Albanian nationalist activity, albeit somewhat slowly. On 8 October 
1912, the day that the first Balkan war started, Russia and Austria-Hungary, the 
two flanking Balkan powers, and those with the most extensive interests in the 
region, issued a statement that the League must not overturn the Berlin Treaty, 
and that the war must not result in any territorial changes. Reiterating 
Article 
Three, they urged the Porte to undertake reform of the administration of Turkey- 
115 Historia e Shgiperis6, II, p. 360; Also at Kondis, Greece and Albania, p. 91; Story, Memoirs 
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in-Europe, in the interests of the people living there. This stance was intended 
to resolve the claims of the Ottoman Empire's Christian subjects. The great 
powers understood that this would not infringe upon the Empire's territorial 
integrity. However, events had moved too quickly, and the declaration arrived 
too late to preserve the status quo. ' 16 The alternative French idea of a `protocle 
de desinteressement' was rejected because the Austrian, Russian and Italian 
governments were not prepared to accept a carte blanche change to Balkan 
frontiers in an area where they had paramount interests at stake. Above all, the 
Ballhausplatz feared Serbian pretensions to an Adriatic outlet there, and Sergei 
Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, was anxious about further joint action 
with the Austrians alone. '17 The powers agreed that the map of the Balkans, 
which the great powers had constructed at the Congress of Berlin, could be 
redrawn, but that the League would be permitted to do this themselves only in 
areas where the great powers had no pre-eminent interests. The Berlin 
Congress had established the principle that all future settlements must protect 
the rights of small nations and promote self-determination, but only to the extent 
that they did not contravene or interfere with great-power interests or the 
balance of power, as was the case in the Albanian littoral. Additionally, there 
were fears that the war, even if localised, might spread to Ottoman territory in 
Asia Minor, and result in the great powers being drawn into a scramble for 
Ottoman territory there, which British officials were especially anxious to avoid. 
Grey also wished to avoid exerting too much pressure on the new liberal 
government in Constantinople . 
"$ The great-power states therefore took control 
of consideration of the Albanian question. In the next twelve months, the role 
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played by Albanian representatives and those of the other small states would be 
much reduced. 
In reality, great-power involvement, especially by the Russians, had taken place 
much earlier. By contrast, French and British involvement was minimal. It 
appears that their Russian colleagues did not even bother to keep them 
informed about significant areas of negotiations. Sazonov played the role of 
power broker, and was far from stabilising or balancing the Balkan system. 119 
He had intended to use the rapprochement of the Balkan states to form a bloc 
that could be used to counter-balance the Ottoman Empire and to neutralise 
Austrian pretensions, following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908- 
09). This would strengthen Russia's position in the region, especially its designs 
on Constantinople, the Dardanelles Straits and a warm seaport in Europe, 
which its Entente partners (Britain and France) still refused to recognise. 120 
Sazonov claimed that he intended the alliance system to be defensive. He was 
concerned lest the conflict between the Porte and the Balkan states could not 
be localised, and that Austria might then be drawn in: the very scenario that 
occurred over Austrian interests in the Albanian question. Still smarting from the 
disaster against the smaller Japanese state (1904-05), and uneasy about the 
solidarity of the Entente, Sazonov did not feel sufficiently confident about 
Russian prospects in a major confrontation with the Austrians. 
121 Sazonov does 
not seem to have taken into account the alternative priorities and agendas of 
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either Russian officials or the Balkan governments, neither of which could be 
relied upon to be subservient to official Russian designs. 122 However, it can be 
questioned whether Sazonov's motives were as `defensive' as he claimed at the 
time, and they seemed more designed to appease the other great powers. 123 As 
one British official observed the Russians were unlikely to stand `idly by' and let 
Austrian forces `crush' their Slav proteges. 124 The policy of a great power can 
therefore be seen to be modified, even determined, by the actions and policies 
of smaller states, even when there is a disparity between them. Such a disparity 
might even make the smaller state stronger, if it was encouraged to be more 
assertive in its own national interests, rather than looking to the great power for 
guidance. In proclaiming independence, the Albanians likewise `forced the 
hand' of the Austrians. The great power then either needed to support them, or 
to relinquish its great-power ambitions. 
Austrian interests were to be decisive for the Albanian question. With the 
Balkan League besieging `Albanian' territory on all fronts, the Albanian 
nationalists determined that the fate of the Albanian question depended upon 
the great powers. On 21 November 1912, representatives from the Albanian 
colony in Constantinople had presented a petition, on behalf of all Albanians, 
Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic, to the `Great Powers to intervene and preserve 
the territorial status quo of Turkey-in-Europe as far as it affected the position of 
Albania'. 125 This eventually provided the necessary excuse for the great powers 
122See for example Neratov to Nekliudov, 15 Oct. 1911, KA, VIII, no. 18; Ed. Note, 
EDW, p. 23; 
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to intervene, although the indications were that such action would have been 
taken anyway. The extensive gains by the Balkan League had made it clear that 
the great powers would be unable to maintain the status quo, but the impact of 
these acquisitions on great-power interests was too great to be ignored. Without 
this intervention, an independent or even autonomous Albania could not have 
been created, for it would have been only a matter of time before the Albanian 
forces succumbed to the League's onslaught. Thanks largely to Austrian efforts, 
based mainly on self-interest, the Albanian appeal to have the matter settled by 
the European great-power concert was successful. Cartwright wrote that the 
Albanians were determined to maintain their country. They would fight to 
the bitter end rather than allow their country to be dismembered. If Servia 
is allowed to absorb a large portion of Northern Albania it will be followed 
by a continual state of unrest and insurrection until Austria and Italy are 
forced to intervene. 126 
The other great powers agreed to settle the Albanian question in concert 
between themselves, in order to prevent Austrian military action, which would 
also have resulted in Russian involvement, to protect its Slav proteges and its 
own Balkan interests. The prime mover in great-power thinking was concern for 
their respective great-power interests, and the desire to maintain the balance of 
power in the Balkans and the Adriatic, rather than any recognition of or support 
for Albanian national sentiment. Nevertheless, Albanian representatives had 
been influential in aligning the Albanian national question with these great- 
power interests, and thereby defeating the aspirations of the Balkan League 
states, which, although small themselves, were stronger than the Albanians, 
especially when acting collectively. 
126 Cartwright to Grey, 10 Nov. 1912, BD, IX. ii, no. 173. 
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On 16 December 1912, representatives from the League, the Ottoman Empire 
and Romania, along with an Albanian delegation, met at St. James' Palace in 
London to discuss peace terms. Fighting continued sporadically in the Balkans 
and the negotiations were slow and protracted, but eventually, under much 
great-power pressure, the Treaty of London was signed (30 May 1913). This left 
many parties dissatisfied, and helped precipitate the second Balkan war, at the 
centre of which was a Greco-Serbian partnership, supported by Montenegro, 
Romania and the Ottoman Empire, against Bulgaria. The Treaty of Bucharest 
(10 August 1913) concluded the war and produced a number of revisions- 
mostly to the detriment of the Bulgarians, and none affecting the Albanian 
question, which remained outside the remit of the small states. The ambitions of 
the Christian Balkan nation states had resulted in two major wars, Serbia had 
doubled in geographical size and its population had increased by fifty 
percent. 127 
Conclusions 
The success of the Albanians in their calls for autonomy had been a major 
consideration in the formation of the Balkan League, especially the League's 
decision to engage in war against the Ottoman Empire. The neighbouring 
Balkan states feared that, if the Albanians were successful in achieving their 
national programme, they would settle down and support the Ottoman regime. 
This would help stabilise the balance of power in the region, the opposite of 
what the Christian small states sought to secure their own national aspirations. 
More importantly, any Albanian success would prevent the Balkan League from 
127 Enclosures 1 and 2, BD, IX. ii, no. 583; Paget to Grey, 21 Dec. 1912, BD, IX. ii, no. 408; Elliot 
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intervening and claiming this territory for themselves. As Swire argues, the 
League states therefore desired to act to prevent the settlement of the Albanian 
problem, and to deny the possibility of concessions spreading to other parts of 
the Empire, especially Macedonia. 128 
In turn, the threat posed by the Balkan League, in the first Balkan war, to 
Albanian national and local interests had finally managed to weld together the 
disparate groupings. Ismail Kemal and Hasan Prishtina led the movement to 
gain great-power support for the Albanian national cause, especially amongst 
the Austrians. The war was the factor that finally pushed the Albanians to affirm 
the need for independence, and also to work together, irrespective of their other 
differences. Besides the external threats that advanced the national movement, 
the other key unifier was the Albanian spoken language, which was the one 
common bond between the various groups. That they spoke Albanian was what 
made them different to the Slavs, Greeks, Turks and other ethnic groups in the 
region, and this was the basis upon which they determined to base the 
independent state they proclaimed. To achieve this, they needed great-power 
support to defeat the ambitions of the Orthodox Christian small states, who 
already held an established, albeit low-level, position in the international 
system, had a great-power patron and were much stronger than they were. 
Cartwright was convinced that the activities of the Balkan League, and to an 
important but lesser extent those of the Young Turks before, did more to 
advance the Albanian national movement than the previous thirty years of 
cultural initiatives. As he maintained up to the outbreak of the first Balkan war, 
he could still write that, if the Young Turks changed their policies towards the 
128 Swire, Albania, p. 126. 
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Albanians, `the Albanians might become its staunchest supporters ... Their 
loyalty is unquestioned; they demand only the right to develop within the limits 
of the Ottoman Empire. '129 
129 Cartwright to Grey, 26 June 1912, FO 421/281, no. 241. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Great-Power Interests and Albanian Boundaries (1912-14) 
The Ambassadors' Conference in London (1912-13) was initially convened by 
the great powers, in an attempt to impose a settlement on the belligerents of the 
first Balkan war, and to prevent the conflict from escalating into a general 
European war. As part of this effort, the ambassadors had responsibility for 
determining whether Albania would be independent, and for delimiting Albanian 
boundaries. They decided to base their decisions on ethnography, which, in line 
with concurrent views on ethnicity corresponding to nationality, for them meant 
language, and specifically the mother tongue of the population or the language 
spoken within the family. 130 Any territory where Albanian was the majority 
spoken language was supposed to become part of a new Albanian state. 
However, the great powers were not entirely committed to these `ethnic' 
objectives, and they compromised them in the light of their own political 
interests, and espoused ethnographical arguments only when these supported 
or reinforced their own strategic ones. This chapter studies the discussions 
surrounding the establishment of an independent Albania, and particularly the 
decisions regarding Albanian boundaries during the Conference and the 
subsequent boundary commissions. It examines the interests involved, the 
arguments used, the problems faced and the reasons for the settlements. It 
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contends that these decisions promoted the objectives of the six European 
powers, as opposed to the ethnographic dimensions that they professed. 
Language Nationalism and Ethnic Boundaries 
The Ambassadors' Conference consisted of representatives of what were then 
the six European great powers: Russia, France and Britain, the so-called Triple 
Entente, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy (the Triple 
Alliance or Triplice), on the other. It declared that Albanian boundaries would be 
based on scientific principles or ethnography. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, European ethnographers worked for a systematic 
representation of peoples and their codification, according to their 
interpretations of `race' and ethnicity. This began with the cartographic mapping 
of ethnic and `racial' groups and characteristics, although maps showed huge 
variations. 131 With the advance of nationalism in eastern Europe, there was a 
need to trace such boundaries on the ground and on maps. Fredrik Barth and 
Katherine Verdery have considered the complex relationships between 
ethnicity, nationalism, nation-state formation and borders. 132 However, there are 
still few studies of the practicalities of defining ethnic boundaries in political 
terms. Boundary delimitation in the era before the First World War was closely 
linked to these contemporary concerns for `ethnic frontiers'. In 1913, the 
problem was how to define the `nation' or a nationality. 133 The western powers 
tended to follow the western liberal/civic tradition, which did not distinguish 
131 For examples in south-eastern Europe see for example H. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A 
Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool, 1951), pp. 316-7. 
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legacy of the First World War and the Peace Settlement', in S. Dunn and G. Fraser (eds. ), 
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between the concept of a person as a member of a `racial' group and as a 
citizen of a state. 134 However they realised that such a conception was never 
going to be practical in eastern Europe, given the ethnic mix there. Thus by 
1913 (and not 1919, as some studies have argued), the great power 
representatives had adopted a German, or ethnic primordial, view of national 
determination, based on factors such as `race', language, culture, religion, 
historical allegiance and geography. For the ambassadors in London in 1913, 
language became the favoured principle. There appears to have been a tacit 
assumption that the speakers of each language constituted a `race' and 
community, and therefore had the right to become a nation, separate from other 
communities or `races'. The great power representatives thought that language 
was an objective criterion, and one that would be relatively easy to determine. 
In south-eastern Europe, language was increasingly considered a self-evident 
marker. Seemingly unrelated languages (Albanian, Greek, Romanian and 
Slavonic languages) were viewed as clear cultural or ethnic boundaries that 
could be mapped to determine where the political frontiers should be. 135 
Albanian was recognised as an Indo-European language but, like Greek and 
Armenian, as one that formed its own branch and had no close links to any 
other. This view of language was especially important for the Albanians 
because of their religious and other divisions. 
Great Power Interests and Objectives 
The great powers, particularly Austria and Italy, strongly resisted such a large 
scale alteration of Balkan frontiers, as the Balkan victories described in Chapter 
134 Sharp, `Genie', p. 13; A. Sharp, `Britain and the Minorities at the Paris Peace Conference', in 
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One called for, especially because it would advantage Russia's Slav proteges. 
Yet considering the scale of the League's victory, changes to the frontiers were 
unavoidable. Therefore it was decided that the London ambassadors of the 
great powers would meet to discuss questions of interest: Serbian access to the 
Adriatic, Albanian independence, Albanian frontiers and the Aegean islands. 
The prime position of a future Albanian state, situated on the eastern Adriatic 
littoral, especially at Valona and the Otranto Straits (between Corfu and the 
eastern Adriatic coast, considered equivalent to Gibraltar for the 
Mediterranean), and less than sixty miles from the Italian coast, made Albania a 
vested Austro-Italian interest. Neither state wanted a Russian satellite 
entrenched on the eastern Adriatic, a view with which the British concurred. The 
other great powers agreed to an ambassadorial conference in order to avoid a 
probable war between them. They hoped that the meeting would speed up 
geopolitical discussions by minimising formality, misunderstandings and other 
complications. None of the representatives had any particular Albanian 
expertise. London was chosen because of objections to the other capitals. 
Throughout the Conference all the representatives remained in close contact 
with their respective foreign ministries, which largely directed the deliberations. 
By so doing, the powers had decided to resurrect the `concert of Europe', that 
traditional nineteenth-century means of diplomacy whereby representatives of 
each power met in one country to discuss and reach agreement on disputes, 
most notably in the 1815 (Vienna) and 1878 (Berlin) Congresses. Concert 
diplomacy had the advantage of enabling negotiations to be conducted more 
quickly, by reducing the inevitable complications, misunderstandings and 
delays 
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that arose in carrying out negotiations between capitals, particularly when 
dealing with a situation that might escalate at any moment. 136 
Of all the great powers, Austria-Hungary had most interests at stake at the 
Conference and in the Albanian question. This explains why the Ballhausplatz 
had taken the most active interest during the first Balkan war, had been the first 
power to realise that the status quo could not be maintained and had been so 
instrumental in establishing the Conference in the first place. Austria was the 
traditional protector of the minority Catholic population in the Balkans, 
particularly in northern Albania, and could consequently claim to be genuinely 
acting in the interests of nationality and ethnicity, which had been established 
as the basis for future settlements at the Berlin Congress. 137 National and 
moralist arguments were used only when it suited Austrian interests to do so. 
Strategic and economic concerns were more important. Economically, Austria 
was the largest exporter and importer to and from the western Balkans. 
Strategically, the Ballhausplatz advocated a small Albanian state because it 
was more interested in the northern coastal regions (Scutari) than on inland 
Kosovo or the southern areas conflicting with Greek ambitions. A smaller 
Albania could more easily be made dependent upon Austria. 138 
More significantly, the Habsburg Empire, like the Ottoman Empire, was a huge 
polyglot empire, encompassing at least eleven different nationalities. Austrian 
officials feared that the Ottoman fallout would spread to its territory, and incite 
136 Benckendorff to Sazonov 4 Dec. 1912, EDW, no. 504; Benckendorff to Sazonov 5 Dec. 
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the Serbs there to unite with `mother Serbia' to form `Greater Serbia'. 
Consequently, Austrian policy attempted to control the reallocation of Balkan 
territory, and to prevent the spread of Serbian or Slav nationalism into Austrian 
territory. As long as Serbia remained landlocked, this task was all the easier, 
because a substantial proportion of its trade had no alternative but to pass 
though Austrian-controlled territory. Austria's key objective was to prevent 
Serbian access to the Adriatic, hence the formal annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1908-09), and its pre-occupation with opposing Serbian claims to 
northern Albania. A Serbian Adriatic outlet would endanger not only Austria's 
economic and commercial interests but also its strategic ones: the Adriatic was 
Austria's only access to the Mediterranean. The Austrians already had to share 
the Adriatic with Italy but they did not want to share it with a third power that, 
through control of the Otranto Straits, would have the potential to close the 
Adriatic to Austrian vessels, both commercial and military. This was particularly 
worrying in the event that a Serbian port became a Russian naval base. 
139 
Therefore, by October 1912, the Ballhausplatz had resolved to prevent either a 
small state or a great power obtaining a foothold on the eastern side of the 
Adriatic. To further this policy, Austrian officials began calling for the creation of 
an independent Albanian state. 
At the end of 1912, the Balihausplatz took the decision to achieve its objectives 
through diplomacy and not war. This was for several reasons. The Austrians 
were not convinced that they would secure Italian support, but they were 
convinced that the Russians would secure French assistance. (This very 
situation materialised in July 1914. ) Even more worryingly, the Ballhausplatz 
139 Jelavich, Establishment of Balkan National States, p. 235; A. F. Pribram, Austrian Foreign 
Policy, 1908-1918 (London, 1923), pp. 38-9; Z. Zeman, A Diplomatic History of the First World 
War (London, 1971), p. 14. 
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was not convinced of German support. When Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
the German Chancellor, had announced the re-signing of the Triple Alliance 
Treaty (1912), he had declared that Germany must leave it to its Austrian ally to 
realise its Balkan aspirations alone. A further complication in this dynamic was 
that the Dual Monarchy had to take into account both Austrian and Hungarian 
sentiment: the former favoured conciliation, whilst the latter favoured force to 
deal with this `Slav problem'. 140 The Austrian great power therefore supported 
Albanian nationalism because the Ballhausplatz viewed it as a counterweight to 
the other Balkan small state nationalisms, especially the Slavs. The 
Ballhausplatz was prepared to work within the concert system because it 
needed the support of other great powers to defeat the threat posed to Austrian 
interests by the Balkan League small states. 
Italy was the only other directly interested power. The Consulta, the Italian 
Foreign Ministry, had for some years been attempting to expand into the 
Balkans, particularly economically and culturally. The Italian Foreign Minister, 
Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, had first-hand knowledge of Albania, and had 
written a book on the area. 141 After Austria, Italy was the principal importer and 
exporter in Albania, and accounted for twenty-five percent of goods leaving 
Scutari and thirty percent from southern Albania. The Servizi Maritime carried 
Albanian mail, the Puglia Line served northern Albanian ports, there were Italian 
financial houses in Durazzo and Valona, and in the latter the Societä 
Commerciale d'Oriente ranked as the official bank. There was a large Albanian 
diaspora in Italy, especially in Sicily, and a Chair of Albanian had been 
established at Naples University. In 1910, there were seven Albanian 
140 A. F. Pribram (trans. F. D. Morrow), Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914 (London, 
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communes in Sicily (50,000 people), and seventy-two in mainland Italy 
(152,000). 142 Italians had been instrumental in founding schools and missions in 
Albania. Although Italian expansion had focused predominantly upon southern 
Albania, it inevitably brought about some conflict with the Austrians, especially 
regarding control of the Otranto Straits. 143 As early as 1906, Brailsford had 
accurately predicted that this Austro-Italian rivalry was so great that 
either power would go to war to prevent the other acquiring so dangerous 
an advantage as the possession of the Albanian coast. One hopes that 
this rivalry may mean checkmate to the ambitions of both powers 
Autonomy has become a practical policy because the rivalries of the two 
great powers which aspire to its possession are acute and 
incompatible. 144 
This was particularly true for Italy, the weaker of the two powers. For the 
Italians, the old dictum held true: only two conditions, alliance or war, between 
Italy and Austria were possible. 145 At this point the Consulta chose alliance. Italy 
had only just completed a difficult war against the Ottoman Empire in Tripoli, 
and did not desire to become embroiled in another major conflict so soon 
afterwards, especially with Austria, whom the Italians considered more likely to 
gain German support. Even a conflict in which Italy fought alongside Austria, 
was likely to be to Austria's advantage and Italy's detriment. Albania was an 
area on which Italy and Austria could agree: they had signed an agreement 
regarding Albania in 1901, reaffirmed it in 1909 and, in 1912, incorporated 
it into 
Paz Albania, FO Handbook, FO 373/2/1, pp. 91,93-94,105-6; Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 283; J. 
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the Triplice. 146 Through these agreements, the Consulta sought to prevent 
another power acquiring control of the Albanian littoral on the eastern side of 
the Adriatic, less than forty miles from the Italian coast at the narrowest point. 
Perhaps, in the future the ultimate goal-Albanian territory divided into Austrian 
and Italian spheres-might be achieved, but in the meantime the Consulta was 
prepared and, indeed, willing to work with the Austrians for the creation of an 
independent Albania that touched the Adriatic. This was a much better option 
than it becoming Slav, Greek or Austrian. In 1912-13, the divergent interests of 
Austria and Italy could be ignored in the short term in order to oppose the 
Hellenic and Slav threat, which at that moment appeared more pressing. 147 
The German government was prepared to follow the line taken by its alliance 
partners, although with the further complication that it would then need to 
resolve any disagreements between Austria and Italy. Throughout the 
Conference, the Wilhelmstrasse's, German Foreign Office, main priority was to 
ensure that the divergent interests of its alliance partners were minimised, and 
that the Triplice remained intact. The latter was especially important because of 
press reports encouraging the Italian government to move toward the Entente, 
and the extensive Slav (and therefore Russian) gains made in the Balkan 
wars. 148 Herr Alfred Kiderlen-Wächter and, later, his replacement as Foreign 
Minister, Gottlieb von Jagow (on 31 December 1912, following Kiderlen's 
death), were therefore prepared to work with Grey, especially in the earliest 
stages of the concert, to help facilitate compromise. Officials were particularly 
146 `Article VII of the Fifth Treaty of Alliance between Austria-Hungary, the German Empire and 
Italy' and `Second Final Protocol concerning North Africa, Albania and Novi Bazar' in Pribram, 
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keen to follow a peaceful course following the Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges of 
3-4 December 1912, in which Grey had stated that Britain would support Russia 
in a military confrontation. The Wilhelmstrasse had responded with support for 
Austria. This resulted in the infamous war council meeting of 8 December 1912, 
at which the German general staff had concluded that two more years were 
needed before they would be ready for war. 149 
Of the three Entente powers, Russian interests were the most directly affected 
by the questions under discussion. Russian policy consistently had the objective 
of protecting and promoting the interests of fellow Slav nations in the Balkans, 
especially Serbia and, in so doing, furthering Russia's stature and interests and 
diminishing that of its Austrian rival. 150 The Bosnian annexation crisis had 
highlighted just how dangerous Austrian pretensions to hegemony in the 
Balkans could be. Sazonov sought to use Russia's proteges to counter this, 
hence Russia's patronage of the Balkan League. In the Ambassadors' 
Conference, this meant promoting Serbian interests. Sazonov consequently 
argued that the victorious Balkan states should be able to keep the spoils of 
their victories, and that this should outweigh any national sentiments. Sazonov 
was under immense pressure, both publicly and politically, to forward the `pan- 
Slavist' ideal, but he found that in reality his policy was compromised, for two 
reasons. Sazonov feared that if Russia held out for concessions for Serbia in 
northern Albania, and especially the Adriatic outlet, this might push Austria and 
Italy closer together, which he wished to avoid lest it lead to even greater 
Balkan problems. Secondly, he was very apprehensive about the position of 
149 K. M. Wilson, Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880s to the 
First World War (London, 1987), p. 147; C. M. Lichnowsky, My Mission to London (London, 
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fairer Albanian settlement and not been so prepared to back Austria-Hungary. 
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Britain. He felt secure of French support through the 1894 Franco-Russian 
Alliance. With Britain, despite Triplice fears about the Entente growing closer 
together, Sazonov considered Russia had `no tie of any kind', because the 
Entente related solely to their empires and colonies, and made no mention of 
Europe. Additionally, Russian policy underwent considerable revision during the 
period of the Conference. The expansion of Russia's proteges, both in territory 
and population, meant that they were not as insecure as they had been during 
the Bosnian crisis, and not so dependent upon Russia support. 151 
Consequently, Sazonov felt able to communicate to Belgrade that he would be 
unable to offer any active opposition to the creation of an Albanian state, 
despite this being contrary to Serbian interests152 and also to long-term Russian 
ones. 
French actions, despite there being no real threat to France, appeared even 
more pro-Slav than those of Russia, and explain further why there were no 
Russian fears of French opposition. Grey had accurately surmised that the 
French Ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, was not altogether happy with 
Grey's conduct, and was fearful that it might lead to a loss of Russian prestige, 
that it might impact unfavourably on the Triple Entente, and that Grey should 
have shown more partisanship. 153 The French were prepared to follow the lead 
taken by Russia in negotiations. On some questions, most specifically in 
southern Albania, where Russian interests were not as great and because of 
French interest in Greece, the French took the lead. The French attitude was 
summed up in a communication from Hartwig to Sazonov: 
151 Benckendorff to Sazonov, 29 Nov. 1912, EDW, no. 500; Sazonov, Fateful Years, p. 71. 
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France, in complete agreement with Russia, is ready to aid Serbia in 
realising her national aspirations. Paris ... is in deep sympathy with the 
Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance and sees in it a strong barrier against Austro- 
German encroachment. 
154 
Throughout the Ambassadorial Conference, and afterwards, Grey was 
frequently criticised by his Entente partners for not supporting them more. The 
Russians, in particular, were infuriated by their apparent inability to interest 
Grey in Serbian claims. Grey asserted that he felt Count Alexander 
Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, was satisfied with his policy as it was 
intended to get fair terms and secure peace, was not indifferent to Russian 
friendship and did not intend to enact a rapprochement with the central powers. 
In reality, Grey's actions were designed to pursue four key British objectives. 
Only on the surface did Grey appear to pursue a neutral line. Grey was 
motivated, firstly, by the desire to ensure a European peace, and for Grey this 
meant maintaining the balance of power. He wanted policies that Russia and 
Austria could agree upon, regardless of the technicalities, or merits, of the 
case. 155 Equally important, although in some respects contradictory, was the 
necessity to maintain and preserve the Entente. Whitehall had no direct 
interests in Albania. If able to pursue an independent policy, it would apparently 
have favoured the establishment of an independent Albania, as long as good 
government could be assured. This was not possible because Russian and 
French opinion had to be considered. Despite their appearance of being non- 
committal and of pursuing a neutral policy, Grey and Richard Haldane, the War 
154Hartwig to Sazonov, 23 Nov. 1911, KA, X, no. 51. 
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Minister, believed it was really necessary to commit Britain to the Entente. 156 
The fear was not so much that war would break out, but that Russia might leave 
the Entente and join the central powers, thus resurrecting the Dreikaiserbund 
(Three Emperors' Alliance) of Russia, Germany and Austria. Whitehall did not 
yet consider Britain ready for war. Hostilities needed to be avoided, or at least 
postponed. 157 British policy was also determined by a third further complicating 
factor: British actions in Albania, a predominantly Muslim country, were 
perceived as likely to have an impact on Muslims elsewhere in the British 
Empire, especially India, where Britain was trying to enlist Muslim help against 
disparate Hindu elements. Sazonov, in particular, cited this as the prime reason 
why he had failed to secure Grey's support for his plans to divide Albanian 
territory between Greece and Serbia. 158 In one further important respect, British 
interests were contrary to Russian. Whitehall was concerned lest the Serbian 
Adriatic outlet should in time become a warm-water Russian naval port, 
potentially endangering British naval supremacy, as the southern Russian fleet 
would then no longer be confined to the Black Sea. Grey was equally perturbed 
by the prospect of Italy gaining permanent possession of the islands in the 
Aegean, thus endangering British interests in the eastern Mediterranean and 
the Suez route. Events contrived to allow Grey to follow this policy. Once the 
concession of the Albanian state had been made and the urgency of the 
situation had been diffused, none of the countries wanted war. After the Agadir 
Crisis (1911), the German government was prepared to work to moderate 
Austrian opinion, the Russians did not want another humiliation after Japan 
(1904-05) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-09) and the France did not want 
156 Crowe and Grey minutes, 31 Dec. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 100; Grey, Twenty-five Years, 
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trouble over a Balkan dispute that was not its concern. Therefore Grey's role of 
mediator became consistent with maintenance of the Entente. Consequently, 
when a concession was made, it was not used as a diplomatic `score' but as a 
reason for urging the other side towards moderation and concession. Grey felt 
that he had secured the confidence of all the ambassadors, and even secured a 
strong personal relationship between himself and Sazonov, because the other 
states did not feel that he was trying to increase the prestige of British 
diplomacy. 159 In reality, Grey was not as disinterested as it first appeared, but 
rather worked consistently to safeguard British interests, especially the 
preservation of the Entente, British naval power and the balance of power. 
Ambassadors' Conference of 1912-13 
On 17 December 1912, with Grey in the chair, the first meeting of the 
Ambassadorial Conference took place, although much important work also 
occurred during informal discussions. The other powers were represented by 
their ambassadors in London: Count Alexander Benckendorff for Russia, Paul 
Cambon for France, Count Albert von Mensdorff for Austria, Prince Karl Marx 
Lichnowsky for Germany and Count Guglielmo Imperiali for Italy. They met 
officially sixty-six times, with the final meeting on 11 August 1913. The 
Conference was never officially closed. As Grey later commented, they just 
stopped meeting, having adjourned for the summer break. They did not 
reconvene because the urgent necessities that had first brought them together 
were no longer threatening European peace. Many things were left unsettled, 
but the relations between the great powers had been deprived of those 
dangerous elements that had so dominated late 1912.160 
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As early as the first meeting, an independent Albania was recognised as a new 
political entity, but, as Crampton argued, the principle had never really been in 
doubt. 161 Although the Albanians had declared independence, local events had 
only a limited impact on the great power discussions. That the powers were 
able to achieve consensus on this issue was due largely to the groundwork that 
had been laid in preliminary discussions. The Balihausplatz had been insistent 
that Albania should be created, and when the German and British governments 
also supported this course, the Russians acquiesced, not feeling the issue 
important enough to go to war over. As Benckendorff wrote to Sazonov in early 
November 1912, `the standpoint of the "Balkans for the Balkan peoples" will 
surely also be applied to the Albanians'. However, as early as 1897, the 
Austrian government had been assured of Russian support for an independent 
Albania. 162 By agreeing to Albanian independence, and diminishing its 
championship of Serbian and Montenegrin claims, Russian officials hoped to 
protect their geo-political position by preventing greater Austro-Italian co- 
operation. Therefore Hartwig was instructed to reduce Serbian enthusiasm for 
gains in northern Albania. 163 There was an acknowledgment, as Mensdorff 
argued, that unless Albania was made `autonomous and "viable": that is to say 
large enough to have a separate existence' it would easily succumb to its 
neighbour states. However, the ambassadors agreed that Albania was not to 
be 
fully independent but autonomous, under the sovereignty or suzerainty (still to 
be decided) of the Sultan, and the powers would commit themselves to a 
161 Crampton, Hollow Detente, p. 75. 
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neutral guarantee. These decisions were later revised to make Albania a fully 
independent state, with the Sultan being replaced by a separate prince. '64 
Meanwhile, at the first meeting, it was also agreed that Serbia would be denied 
access to Adriatic territory in northern Albania, despite this being one of 
Belgrade's major motivations. Instead Serbia would have access via rail links to 
a neutralised port, although the port was left unspecified, as the Austrians had 
ruled out Grey's suggestions of San Giovanni de Medua, or the decision being 
left to a commission. 165 From Grey's perspective, he had facilitated a 
satisfactory compromise and one that preserved Britain's paramount interests, 
above all naval ones. The same day he naively wrote to Cartwright that Serbian 
difficulties regarding an Adriatic outlet have `completely disappeared', 166 The 
solution satisfied nobody except Grey. The Austrians were dissatisfied that 
Serbia should have any access at all, although the grave threat of Russian use 
of the port had been removed, whilst Grey was forced to placate Sazonov by 
assuring him that, in future discussions regarding the northern Albanian 
boundary, Austria must yield. 167 Nevertheless, this decision produced severe 
delays in the ensuing conference proceedings, because it led the Russians 
persistently to reject compromises in other areas, whilst from 1913 onwards the 
Serbs would make a number of efforts to secure the port that had been denied 
them. 
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The issue of Albanian boundaries proved far more controversial from the outset, 
despite proclamations that they would be based on ethnography (mother 
tongue). At the first meeting, it was agreed that Albania would share borders 
with Montenegro in the north and Greece in the south, but it was not decided 
whether to leave the frontiers of Greece and Montenegro unchanged. 168 Three 
days later, Benckendorff and Mensdorff each first introduced their boundary 
proposals, which were significantly different (Appendix B). Mensdorff proposed 
an Albania based, he claimed, on ethnographical lines. However, the suggested 
territory was considerably smaller than the `ethnographic' state declared by the 
Albanians. Benckendorff, on the other hand, proposed only a truncated coastal 
strip to form a central Muslim Albania. He insisted that the territory north and 
east of the Skumbi River was predominantly Slav (Serb and Montenegrin) and 
that south of the river was Greek. 169 Clear power-political divisions emerged. 
Mensdorff, supported by his German and Italian colleagues, pursued Vienna's 
interests by advocating a pro-Albanian case, whilst Benckendorff, supported by 
his French associate, promoted the interests of Serbia and Montenegro. Grey 
was criticised by his Franco-Russian colleagues for never heeding their 
requests to co-ordinate Entente demands. For the most part, he seemed to 
perform his allotted role as mediator. 170 
Northern and North-Eastern Boundary 
The town of Scutari was the most contentious issue on the northern boundary. 
Mensdorff claimed it for Albania for economic reasons, arguing that it was the 
major market town, and crucial to the livelihood of farmers in northern Albania. 
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Ethnically, he claimed, Scutari was predominantly Catholic in religion and 
Albanian in spoken language and sentiment, and he cited in support the 
staunch defence of the city by Albanian forces (admittedly under Ottoman 
auspices) against Montenegrin assaults. 
171 Benckendorff countered that Russia 
had already compromised in other areas, most notably in agreeing to deny 
Serbian Adriatic access. He claimed Scutari for Montenegro for economic but, 
especially, historical reasons: Scutari had been the centre of the Montenegrin 
kingdom in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 172 Little progress was made 
until 22 January 1913. Grey, hoping to prevent a breach, attempted to facilitate 
a compromise by proposing to link Scutari with the other major northern towns 
of Ipek, Prizrend and Djakova. 
173 
Discussions remained exceedingly tense, but Berchtold, directing Austrian 
policy from Vienna, encouraged Mensdorff to moderate their position, as it 
seemed only a matter of time before the Montenegrin forces would enter 
Scutari. Throughout January and February 1913, Mensdorff offered the 
Kosovan plain, the Visoki Decani Orthodox monastery (despite claiming it was 
in a predominantly Muslim and Albanian speaking area), and a procession of 
northern towns, most notably Ipek, Dibra, and Prizrend, the place where 
Albanian nationalism had first emerged in 1878 (Prizrend League), in exchange 
for Scutari becoming Albanian. This was despite Berchtold's earlier assertions 
that no town with an Albanian-speaking majority would be excluded, and 
despite Vienna's long-term objective of keeping the Serbs and Montenegrins 
171 A. Nicolson to Buchanan, 31 Dec. 1912, BD, IX. ii, no. 428; Pribram, Austria-Hungary and 
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without a coterminous frontier in the sanjak of Novi Bazar. 174 Serbian officials 
consistently opposed Austrian claims that Djakova and other places were 
`Albanian', and claimed that the Albanians were `really' Serbs by origin, and had 
only converted to Islam for Ottoman protection (Arnautas thesis). 175 These 
`ethnographic' arguments proved unnecessary. The Kosovo decision was a 
relatively simple one for all the ambassadors. Without going to war, the great 
powers would not be able to remove the Serbian forces in possession of most 
of the Kosovan vilayet. At this stage, no great power was prepared to risk war 
with, or on behalf of, Serbia, especially for one of its most treasured gains in 
`Old Serbia'. 
Nevertheless, no agreement was reached because Benckendorff insisted on 
gaining Djakova for Serbia, which, as the Serbs claimed, was an integral part of 
`Old Serbia' because it had been the episcopal see of the famous Bishop 
Strossmeyer. 176 Eventually, on 21 March 1913, Mensdorff offered Djakova for 
Scutari. Not only did he consider Djakova essentially Albanian and Catholic, it 
was also the town in northern Albania where Albanian nationalism was 
strongest. Berchtold had instructed this changed position, arguing that 
humanitarian considerations, resulting from the sordid conditions in Scutari, now 
outweighed any political and ethnographical concerns. In reality, however, 
Berchtold had staked his own reputation and position on securing Scutari. He 
was under considerable domestic, political and public pressure to live up to his 
commitment to prevent the Slavs from gaining this key town. 177 
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The powers may have `compromised', but Montenegrin King Nikita had other 
ideas. On 23 April 1913, Montenegrin troops finally managed to secure Scutari, 
thus threatening to upset the settlement in London. Nikita was persuaded to 
withdraw his troops with promises of financial assistance and threats of military 
intervention. Once this crisis was over and the major `prizes' were determined, 
the ambassadors agreed to delimit the rest of the northern frontier by appointing 
a boundary commission consisting of experts from the region. Similar frontier 
disputes had been settled in much the same way (Eastern Rumelia 1880-1; 
Greco-Turkish frontier 1897; Bulgaro-Turkish frontier 1913). "$ Grey had initially 
proposed setting up an international commission to determine the frontier in 
November 1912. The following months of frustration and anxiety apparently 
confirmed his belief that such a commission would be the only possible way to 
settle the boundaries. 179 However, the pre-allocation of towns would inevitably 
hinder the commission's ability to produce an ethnographic frontier. 
Problems materialised before the commission began its work. Berchtold refused 
to allow the Austrian representative, Colonel Mietzl, to participate unless Scutari 
was unequivocally committed to Albania. This inadvertently had what Edith 
Durham, travel writer and Secretary of the Anglo-Albanian Society, called the 
`criminal effect' of giving the Serbs sufficient time to distort ethnography by 
clearing districts of Albanians to give them a Slav majority. 180 These activities 
also gave the Ballhausplatz sufficient excuse to intervene. Viennese officials 
grew increasingly disillusioned with the concert system, and sent an ultimatum 
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(couched in similar language to the more infamous one nine months later) to 
Belgrade on 18 October 1913, demanding Serbian withdrawal from the disputed 
areas within eight days, and warning that non-compliance would result in 
`necessary measures' to enforce it. 181 This unilateral act unsurprisingly 
generated much hostility, but none of the other great powers dared support the 
Serbs, believing that they would risk war with Vienna if they did. Lacking any 
potential support, Belgrade withdrew its troops from the disputed zone. 182 
Southern Boundary 
Meanwhile, contentious conference discussions regarding the southern 
Albanian frontier had also occurred. The alliances of the great powers 
determined once more their positions on the disputed points. As with the 
allocation of the Kosovan plain to Serbia, it had been quickly decided that the 
Greeks would gain southern Epirus, including the important town of Janina. 
Discussions therefore centred on whether the Greeks would also gain what they 
called northern Epirus, or whether this territory would instead become southern 
Albania. According to the official statistics of the Greek Government (1913), 
northern Epirus consisted of the former Turkish kazas of Koritza, Starovo, 
Kolonia, Argyrocastro, Khimara, Delvino, Telepeni, Premedi, Pogonio and 
Philiataes. 183 Imperiali led the Triplice's support for Albanian claims, supposedly 
because of more extensive Italian cultural and economic relations in southern 
Albania. Cambon led the representatives of the Entente in support of Greek 
interests. Cambon was instructed by the Quai d'Orsay (French Foreign Ministry) 
to do so because of French financial links with Athens and its classical heritage. 
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However, Cambon's diplomacy was also an attempt to curtail Berlin's attempts 
to exploit the German ancestry of the Greek King Constantine for its own 
advantage. This in itself complicated the German position, because they did not 
wish to offend Constantine. Benckendorff was apparently instructed to let 
Cambon take the lead, because the Russian government had only minimal 
interest in the non-Slav Greeks, and was keen to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the Consulta. The ultimate aim was to court Italy away from the Germanic 
powers. 
184 
Discussions started in March 1913. The most crucial disagreements proved to 
be over the important and strategic towns of Argyrocastro and Koritza, and the 
forty-mile coastline opposite Corfu that forms the Corfu Straits. Through control 
of the Corfu Straits it was possible to effectively close the Otranto Straits at the 
mouth of the Adriatic. 185 Possession of both sides of the Corfu channel would 
give a great strategic advantage, because of the narrow exits and the good 
shelter for all classes of vessels of a fleet watching the exit lanes. Cambon 
argued in favour of handing over territory as far north as Cape Kefalu (north of 
the northern-most point of Corfu) to Greece, thus giving Athens possession of 
both sides of the channel and, therefore, control of the Straits. He asserted that 
Koritza was a centre of Greek learning and that the educated people of the 
district were Hellenic in sympathy. However, even contemporary ethnographers 
sympathetic to Greek claims considered the town Albanian. 186 Cambon also 
argued that the Orthodox population should go to Greece, as it was unfair to 
leave them in a majority Muslim state. Again, strategic considerations were far 
more important. Greek officials felt that difficulties in communications between 
184 Crampton, Hollow Detente, pp. 125-6. 
185 War staff memo., 15 April 1913, FO 371/1801/17496. 
186 Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 238-9. 
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the territories of southern Epirus and Macedonia, over the Pindus mountains, 
which Greece had acquired after the Balkan wars, could only be overcome by a 
road that passed through Koritza. The Greeks claimed Argyrocastro on the 
basis of supposed ethnic reasons, considering the area Helllenophile, but 
strategic factors must certainly have been the principal determinants. 
Argyrocastro town was an important centre commanding the route from Janina 
to Valona, but, above all, possession of Argyrocastro would effectively shorten 
the Albanian frontier and give Greece control of the Corfu channel, although 
such realpolitik was not mentioned in the discussions. 187 
The Triplice ambassadors did not accept this. Mensdorff argued that cession to 
Greece would place Austrian vessels in jeopardy because all the Austrian ports 
were in the Adriatic. 188 Imperiali and Mensdorff instead proposed drawing the 
border twelve kilometers south of Santa Quaranta, at Cape Stylos in Phtelia 
Bay. This would have included Koritza, Argyrocastro, the road from 
Argyrocastro to Delvino and Santa Quaranta (the port that served Argyrocastro) 
within Albania. 189 Although Koritza had been an important centre of the 
Albanian cultural and literary movements in the nineteenth century, and had a 
number of Albanian schools, neither ambassador cited ethnographic arguments 
to any large extent. They insisted that the Corfu channel had to remain neutral 
with the mainland going to Albania, whilst Koritza had to be included in the new 
state in order to limit the coterminous frontier between Serbia and Greece. This 
187 Grey to Cartwright, 9 June 1913, BD, IX. ii, no. 1036; Grey to Bertie, 10 June 1913, BD, IX. ii, 
no. 1038; Grey to Elliot, 4 June 1913, BD, IX. ii, no. 1027; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 35-6; 
Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 238-9. 
188 Pribram, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, p. 198. 
189 Grey to Elliot, 4 June 1913, BD, IX. ii, no. 1027; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 35-6. 
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further perpetuated Serbian economic dependence and supported Austrian 
policy, which considered northern Albania a block to Serbian Adriatic access. 190 
Grey, once again, found himself in the role of mediator. He proposed delimiting 
southern Albania by a boundary commission, and compensating Greece for 
Albanian gains there with acquisitions in the Aegean islands, which were at that 
point under Italian occupation, following the Italo-Turkish war. 191 This provides 
an obvious example of how Grey used the Ambassadors' Conference to protect 
British interests: although he had little interest in the Albanian issue, Grey 
sought to use it to remove Italian control of the Aegean islands. He feared that 
the Italian-controlled islands threatened Britain's naval power in the eastern 
Mediterranean, especially given their proximity to the Dardanelles and the Suez 
Canal. Imperiali immediately rejected the Aegean part of the proposal, but 
agreed to the establishment of a commission, albeit with certain provisions 
designed to safeguard Triplice interests: Koritza, Cape Stylos, and the southern 
shore of Lake Ochrida were confirmed as parts of Albania. 192 Despite these 
provisions, the southern commission had far greater scope to produce an 
ethnographical settlement than the northern commission, because fewer 
southern disputed areas had been pre-determined in London. 
Albanian Boundary Commissions 1913-14 
The precise details of how the Albanian boundary commissions were 
constituted and operated remain vague. Each power selected its own delegate. 
The northern commission consisted exclusively of military officers, whilst both 
190 Buchanan to Grey, 21 June 1913, FO 371/1801/28493; Grey to Buchanan, 3 July 1913, FO 
371/1801/31232; Crampton, Hollow Detente, pp. 125-6. 
191 Enclosure in Grey to Carnegie and Buchanan, 3 July 1913, BD, IX. ii, no. 1104. 
192 Grey to Cartwright, 8 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1802/37169. 
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military and civil (consular) officials were members of the southern commission. 
The delegations that were most interested in the discussion of Albania's 
southern borders (Austria, Italy and France) each brought two members, but 
had only one vote. The nature of the commissioners' `expertise' is questionable. 
None had an `ethnographic' background, no information indicates whether any 
spoke Albanian, but the majority had some experience of service in Balkan, 
Ottoman or Adriatic territory. For example, on the southern commission, Colonel 
Goudim-Levkovitch was the Russian Military Attache at Athens, but Major 
Thierry, member of the German Staff, had no apparent Balkan experience. 
Balkan knowledge was not necessarily an advantage or evidence of expertise, 
as the examples of Constantine Bilinski and Consul N. Labia, the Austrian and 
Italian delegates on the southern commission, show. Both had previously been 
consuls at Janina, where they had been subject to much criticism because of 
their perceived anti-Greek views. 193 
Both commissions also seem to have received fairly limited instructions by the 
Conference. They were to proceed on an ethnographic basis (mother tongue), 
and were instructed not to accept plebiscites, petitions or other public 
manifestations as evidence of nationality, probably to prevent interference by 
interested parties. 194 The southern commissioners added further stipulations to 
this purpose: delegates should not meet Greek or Albanian deputations, they 
should not be escorted by any Greek or Albanian officials and the escorts must 
remain outside any villages examined. 195 The British representatives apparently 
received very few additional instructions, although the representatives of the 
193 Elliot to Grey, 8 Sept. 1913, FO 371/1802/41432: Grey minute, 9 Sept. 1913, FO 
371/1802/41432. 
194 Grey to Cartwright, 8 Aug. 1913, BD, IX. ii, no. 1226. 
195 Attachment in Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 5 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287/46428. 
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more interested powers were probably better equipped. The two British 
representatives complained they had not received any instructions, apart from 
the Conference protocols, and that they needed a decent map. It was only after 
repeated appeals from the commissioners that topographers were sent to aid 
their work. The commissioners had cited the inadequacies of existing 
topographical maps, and the ambassadors were not able to agree on an official 
version. 196 Both commissions ultimately followed a common pattern in their 
work: interviewing and questioning people in the disputed villages, and then 
meeting to discuss their findings. The rules of procedure were theirs to 
decide. 197 The commissioners communicated with their respective capitals by 
telegram and surface mail, wherever either was available. The remoteness of 
many of the areas under investigation led to inevitable delays and sometimes 
complications, as information did not arrive. Colonel Edward Granet, British 
delegate on the northern commission and former Military Attache in Rome, 
wrote that he found unforwarded correspondence waiting for him at Scutari. 198 
Northern Commission 
The northern commission eventually started work at the end of October 1913 at 
Lin, on the northwestern shore of Lake Ochrida. 199 Problems soon emerged. 
The opinions of the commissioners largely mirrored those of their respective 
ambassadors in London, with geo-political objectives superseding ethnographic 
`findings'. The Russian representative, General de Potapov, and his French 
colleague argued in favour of Serbian claims, while the Triplice representatives 
196 Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 6 Oct. 1913, FO 371/1803/45565; Granet to Grey, 23 Sept. 1913, FO 
371/1822/43551; Crowe minute, 24 Sept. 1913, FO 371/1822/43551: `It seems to me 
extraordinary that the British delegate on the frontier commission should have neither 
description nor map of the frontier laid down. ' 
197 Crowe minute, 6 Oct. 1913, FO 371/1822/45864. 
198 Granet to Grey, 23 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1823/57915. 
199 Granet to Grey, 1 Oct. 1913, FO 881/10492, no. 4. 
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opposed them. Granet, who Whitehall had believed would take a conciliatory 
position, increasingly considered the Franco-Russian claims so extravagant that 
they could not be taken as a serious basis for discussion. He subsequently 
came to support proposals advocated by the Triplice commissioners. 
Meanwhile, the Serbian Ambassador in London complained that Granet had `no 
will of his own' and always sided with the Triplice, counter to Entente 
interests. 200 At the town of Prizrend, ambiguities in remit intensified animosities. 
The delegates were attempting to delimit the frontier between the `districts' of 
Prizrend and Luma (the areas surrounding these main towns being named after 
them), but disagreements emerged over the definition of a `district'. Was it to be 
an ethnographic area, as the Italian and Austrian delegates argued, or was it an 
administrative area {the former Ottoman kaza), as Potapov claimed? 201 
Eventually, the Triplice representatives and Granet moved from their original 
position and advocated a frontier based on current Serbian outposts that were 
able to defend the town of Prizrend. Although they admitted that this would 
leave a considerable number of Albanian speakers in Serbian territory, they 
also found that strategic and geographic considerations outweighed their 
ethnographic objections. Potapov argued for a compromise far in excess of this, 
though it has to be said that his precise proposal remains unclear. 202 With the 
`district' issue still not resolved, the commission adjourned in December 1913 
until the spring, because of bad weather and the need to return before roads 
200Grey to Granet, 7 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287/50160; Granet to Grey, 23 Oct. 1913, FO 
371/1823/49925; Granet to Grey, 30 Nov. 1913, Albania and Kosovo, I, no. 80: It is unclear 
what prompted this attitude. Perhaps Granet had developed Italophile inclinations from 
his 
service in Rome. During the commission, Granet and the Triplice representatives appear 
to 
have travelled separately from the French and Russian members. 
201Granet to Grey, 4 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1823/54900; O'Beirne to Grey, 8 Dec. 1913, FO 
371/1823/55409. 
202Attachment in Granet to Grey, 23 Dec. 1913, FO 421/287/57994; Granet to Grey, 30 Nov. 
1913, Albania and Kosovo, I, no. 80; Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 256-7. 
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became impassable. 203 The new Albanian kingdom was established in March 
1914, although the northern territory was still without fixed frontiers. The 
Serbian outposts effectively became the de facto frontiers but this was not 
formally endorsed by the powers. 
When the commission resumed its work in Scutari, in April 1914, the same 
divisions persisted. These proved so severe that Granet communicated to 
London his doubts as to whether they would ever arrive at a `definite and honest 
conclusion'. 204 Granet's inability to distance himself from the inter-personal 
issues within the commission appears to have been a considerable factor 
constraining his influence on the proceedings. Perhaps the most damaging 
decision the northern commission made, and one contrary to their original 
directives, was to agree upon a policy of `compensations': an Albanian 
(Austrian) gain to be offset by a Serbian (Russian) one. They had begun 
visiting, in turns, sections of the disputed frontier, in order to decide on the 
merits of each section. However, the lengthy discussions and the inability to 
reach agreement resulted in the acceptance of a scheme that considered the 
visited sections simultaneously. The Dibra and Lake Scutari questions were 
considered in this way, but no agreement was reached. 205 The discussions on 
Vermosh and Velepoja in Gusinje, mountainous regions in the disputed 
Albanian-Montenegrin frontier, proved particularly pertinent. Potapov argued 
that these had been promised to Montenegro, but the Triplice commissioners 
maintained that the London peace agreement (between the Balkan League and 
Turkey) had unequivocally stated that any territory belonging to the Albanian- 
203 Granet to Grey, 12 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1823/56104. 
204 Granet to Grey, 1 May 1914, Albania and Kosovo, I, no. 90. 
205 Ibid. 
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speaking Clementi tribes should become part of Albania. 206 Negotiations took 
on an increasingly tense political tone, and relations deteriorated to such an 
extent that Granet communicated to London that only a change of 
commissioners could break the deadlock and produce results. Whitehall did not 
support him, because it did not want to jeopardise more important objectives 
elsewhere by proposing a course that would offend the other powers over a 
marginal British interest. 207 By August 1914 the commission had still not 
finished, but with five of the six great powers at war its operations finally 
ceased. 
Southern Commission 
Meanwhile, the southern commission began its work at Monastir, on 4 October 
1913. Obstacles soon materialised: in fifty-eight days the commissioners visited 
only six villages and interviewed fourteen people. Athens was repeatedly 
accused of attempting to influence decision-making with the use of extensive 
propaganda and subversive initiatives. The commission reported a so-called 
`Sacred Legion' which cried `union or death' at every opportunity, and the 
presence of irregular troops that were used to ensure that all doors of Christian 
homes remained closed to conceal the Albanian speaking women inside, or so 
it was believed. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Doughty-Wylie, the British 
representative and commission chairman, reported that houses were painted in 
the Greek colours of blue and white, and that the church bells rang whenever 
the commission arrived at a town or village. He believed that this was meant to 
reinforce the Christian (Orthodox) and thus supposedly Greek nature of the 
206 Enclosure in Granet to Grey, 2 May 1914, FO 421/293 no. 78; Granet to Grey, 6 June 1914, 
FO 421/293, no. 166; Granet to Grey, 10 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 183; H. M. V. Temperley, 
A History of the Peace Conference of Paris 6 vols. (London, 1921), pp. 337-9. 
207 Crowe to Granet, 2 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 149. 
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town. He wrote that the commissioners were always greeted either by a hostile 
crowd, clamouring for union with Greece, or by school children speaking Greek 
and waving Greek flags. 208 The inference was that the `Greeks' were 
orchestrating these welcome parties. The suspicion of the commissioners 
seemed verified on one visit, when a group of children appeared to speak 
Greek. However, when the senior Austrian delegate, Bilinski, threw down a 
handful of coins, they all started squabbling in Albanian. 209 
The commissioners appear to have realised the grave deficiencies in using 
language as the solitary criterion to determine ethnography. Many people in the 
region were bilingual or trilingual, and spoke Albanian in their homes (mother 
tongue), but Greek for business or general communication outside the home 
(lingua franca), whilst Turkish was the official language, and some also spoke 
Vlach or a Slavonic dialect. This bi-or multi-lingualism seems predictable 
considering that there was no separate Albanian Church, no agreed written 
language until 1908, and that the teaching of Albanian had only recently been 
allowed in schools. Additionally, the commissioners discovered that within the 
family, the younger generation, particularly male members, commonly spoke 
Greek. The commissioners surmised that this phenomenon was a result of 
economic necessity: Greek was the language of trade, whereas Albanian had 
no wide commercial usage. On the other hand, the older generation, especially 
women, spoke Albanian. In response to this discovery, Doughty-Wylie recorded 
that the junior Italian delegate, Captain Fortunato Castoldi, proposed that only 
old people should be examined, although this was not borne out by the official 
208 Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 26 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 193; Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 30 Oct. 
1913, FO 421/287, no. 202; Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 26 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 162; Kondis, 
Greece and Albania, p. 118. 
209 Swire, Albania, pp. 170-1; Pribram, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, p. 209. 
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commission reports. Doughty-Wylie, in his position as commission chairman, 
telegraphed London to petition that language not be the sole criterion, but that 
nationality, geographical features and economic and strategic considerations 
should also be considered. 210 
On 30 October 1913, supposedly in response to Greek attempts to mislead the 
commission, and less than two weeks after the demarche to Belgrade, the 
Austrian and Italian governments sent a bilateral ultimatum to Athens. It stated 
that in any village in which the southern commission met with Greek 
interference, the commission would be instructed to regard the town as 
Albanian; and if the commission failed to finish by the end of November, the 
Greeks would be compelled to leave by 31 December 1913.21 1 This received a 
hostile reception in all the Entente capitals. For instance, Grey's first response 
was to withdraw from the Albanian commissions altogether, but he eventually 
decided against this in order to protect the related British strategic interests in 
the Aegean. 212 
Nevertheless, on 13 November 1913, Doughty-Wylie informed the other 
commissioners that they had been authorised to proceed on the new basis of 
`seulement la nationalite, mais encore la situation economique, strategique et 
geographique'. 213 On this basis he proposed a frontier, roughly midway between 
210 Grey to Bertie, 7 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 75; Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 26 Oct. 1913, FO 
421/287 no. 202; Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 1 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 245; Grey to Doughty- 
Wylie, 6 November 1913, FO 421/287, no. 242. 
2" Ed. Note, BD, X. i, p. 62; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 36-7. 
212 A. Nicolson to O'Beirne, 4 Nov. 1913, A. Nicolson MSS, FO 800/371; Grey to O'Beirne, 4 
Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 72; Grey to Dering, 4 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 73; O'Beirne to Grey, 10 
Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 77; O'Beirne to Grey, 4 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287 no. 210; Grey to Dering, 
3 Nov. 1913, FO 421/ 287, no. 222; Grey to Dering, 4 November 1913, FO 421/287, no. 229. 
213 'Proces-verbaux de la Commission Internationale pour la delimitation de la Frontiere 
Meridionale Albanaise' [hereafter cited as SAC minutes], 13 Nov. 1913, FO 93/1/36; Also at FO 
881/10355X, pp. 49-50. 
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the French and Italian proposals. It started at Cape Stylos in the west and 
finished, although not definitely fixed, near the point where the Koritza district 
met the Grammos Mountains. The proposal received a favourable response. 214 
The commission made considerable progress during the next month, possibly 
due to the death of Bilinski, who appears to have been very vocal in opposing 
any concessions to the Greeks. The main stumbling block to any agreement 
remained the allocation of the district of Argyrocastro. The junior Austrian 
delegate who replaced Bilinski, Vice-Consul Buchberger, and the Italian 
representatives, remained determined that the area should be settled on an 
ethnographic basis, and that the frontier at Argyrocastro be juste et equitable'. 
Buchberger claimed that of the 25,000 inhabitants, 14,000 were Muslim and 
11,000 Orthodox, with the majority speaking Albanian. The French and Russian 
delegates opposed this. 215 It was decided to postpone the decision until they 
visited the area on 10 December 1913. It was then agreed that, except for three 
villages (Policani, Skoriazes and Sopiki), the Argyrocastro valley was 
predominantly Albanian, but that it would not be possible to draw the frontier in 
such a way as to include the aforementioned villages within the Greek 
mainland. Goudim-Levkovitch considered this regrettable but agreed, on 
condition that Greece was compensated for the loss of these three villages. The 
Italian delegates then proposed to move to Florence in Italy to finish their 
deliberations on the basis of Doughty-Wylie's directives, using the maps of the 
Geographical Institute in Florence. 
216 
Having surmised that the commission would advocate a frontier largely to 
Albanian advantage, Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, protested 
214 Bertie to Pichon, 19 Nov. 1913, DDF, VIII, no. 497. 
215 SAC Minutes, 5 Dec. 1913, FO 93/1/36; Also at FO 881/10355X, pp. 59-67. 
216 SAC Minutes, 10 Dec. 1913, FO 93/1/36; Also at FO 881/10355X, pp. 69-74. 
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directly to Grey. 217 He threatened to resign on 10 December 1913, unless 
Greek claims were settled satisfactorily. Grey perceived that Venizelos was 
under considerable domestic pressure not to lose either northern Epirus or the 
Aegean islands. Grey was also aware that, although Venizelos was probably 
the only Greek statesman who could withstand the political consequences of 
the loss of northern Epirus, 218 his position would be extremely tenuous without a 
resolution of the Aegean dispute. Consequently, on 12 December, Grey willingly 
revived his proposal of a `simultaneous resolution' of the Aegean islands and 
northern Epirus disputes. 219 
Before the remaining powers responded on 17 December 1913, the southern 
commission concluded its operations. It reported its findings three days later in 
a report which became known as the Florence Protocol, recommending, with 
minor rectifications, the frontier proposed by Doughty-Wylie, starting at Cape 
Stylos and finishing at Lake Ochrida, and ceding both Koritza and Argyrocastro 
to Albania, but Konitza to Greece (Appendix C). The majority of the disputed 
towns were left to Albania. On 31 December, the Triplice replied to Grey's 
proposal to link the southern Albanian and Aegean questions, stating that they 
preferred to acquiesce in the Florence proposals, which all six great powers and 
the Albanian provisional government eventually accepted. Only Venizelos and 
the Greek representatives raised objections. The Entente seemed to have an 
unofficial understanding that Greece would get the islands if Stylos and Koritza 
became Albanian, despite the Triplice having rejected this when Grey first 
217 Grey to Elliot, 25 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 84. 
218 It was clear by this point that Greece would not gain northern Epirus but Grey also wanted to 
keep Venizelos in power. 
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touted the idea. Greece eventually gained all Aegean islands, except for three 
islands which were returned to the Ottoman Empire. 220 Additionally, on 18 June 
1914, the Greeks issued a Royal Decree ceding the island of Saseno in Valona 
bay to Albania. 221 The island had become Greek in 1864 as part of the Ionian 
Islands settlement, despite being much further north in the Adriatic. It was 
uninhabited and without running water, but was important because of its 
position at the head of the Otranto Straits and its proximity to the Albanian 
mainland. Its transference to Albania was deemed necessary therefore for 
Albanian, and also Italian and Austrian, strategic security. 
Conclusions 
According to the Carnegie Report investigating the Balkan wars, the new 
Albanian state comprised 11,317 square miles. This included 3,922 square 
miles from Janina vilayet, 3,529 from Monastir, 2,970 from Scutari and 896 from 
Kosovo. 222 This was far short of the vision of an ethnographic Albania 
envisaged by the Albanians, but it did represent a fairly even compromise 
between the Russian and Austrian proposals of December 1912. As Grey wrote 
to a friend in February 1913, `if a good settlement of Albania would mean war 
between two or more great powers, and an inferior settlement would secure 
peace between them, the latter has to be preferred. '223 In this sentence, Grey 
clearly illustrated his true motivation in the discussions he was to chair at 
London. He later wrote that `the [Ambassadors'] Conference had not settled 
anything, not even the details of the Albanian boundaries, but it had served a 
220 Lichnowsky memo., 31 Dec. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 103; Swire, Albania, p. 184; Stickney, 
Southern Albania, pp. 38-9; Grey to Bertie, 26 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 373. 
221 Erskine to Grey, 23 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 239; Erskine to Grey, 25 June 1914, FO 
421/293, no. 263. 
222 Carnegie Endowment, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, p. 418. 
223 Grey to Pease, 1 Feb. 1913, quoted in G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon: Being the Life of 
Sir Edward Grey Afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon (London, 1937), p. 233; Grey, Twenty- 
five Years, I, p. 271. 
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useful purpose'. 224 By this, he meant avoiding war between the powers, 
preventing Russia from moving towards the Triplice and safeguarding British 
sea power. Throughout the Conference and the resulting commissions, Grey's 
apparent impartiality and pragmatic approach, combined with his sense of 
ingenuity and inventiveness, had contrived to produce compromises on which 
he could convince Russia and Austria to agree. As a bi-product, the new 
independent state of Albania had been created. However, as Grey was fully 
aware, the results of these compromises were far from perfect. 225 British policy 
was thus clearly in line with defensive realist rhetoric. British representatives 
oscillated between the two coalitions trying to create a balance, both in the 
Balkans and more widely. Britain believed that an enlarged Serbia with Adriatic 
access, coupled with the benefits for Russia of warm ports, would 
fundamentally upset the balance of power in the region, if not throughout 
Europe. Meanwhile, Sazonov was also constrained by the system. He felt 
unable to stop the tide towards an independent Albanian state without causing 
great power conflict. The creation of Albania was about making a new balance 
in the Balkans and Adriatic, and therefore preserving great power interests and 
the system as a whole. The geo-political factors were clearly more important 
than the proclaimed ethnic rationale. Robert Vansittart, then a junior clerk in the 
British Foreign Office, but already with substantial overseas service already 
behind him and with a distinguished diplomatic career ahead of him, offered a 
forlorn but accurate comment on the role of ethnographic criteria in the 
delimitation of Albanian boundaries: `In outlining the frontiers of Albania it has 
224 Grey, Twenty-five Years, I, p. 271. 
225 Ibid, pp. 273,276. 
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been often necessary to disregard ethnography for larger reasons; but there is 
no reason to disregard it unnecessarily. '226 
226 Vansittart minute, 5 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1823/54900. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Experiments with Self-government: provisional authorities, the 
international control commission and Prince Wilhelm of Wied 
(1912-14) 
This chapter explores the period in Albania after independence and before the 
First World War, including the provisional regimes, the international commission 
of control established by the Ambassadors' Conference to prepare the state for 
a permanent regime, and the first Albanian kingdom. The new state officially 
came into existence on 7 March 1914, with the arrival of the Mpret (literally in 
Albanian `king'). From its inception, the newest `nation' in Europe, and the 
world's first predominantly Muslim one, faced insurmountable problems. Within 
six months of his arrival, the Mpret fled the country, never to return. During this 
period the Albanian nationalists failed to assert themselves, because they were 
unable to agree on any vision of what an independent Albania meant. Instead 
local traditions, interests and rivalries, especially religious and geographical 
ones, came to dominate. Meanwhile, the great power solidarity, especially 
Austro-Italian, which in 1912-13 had been so crucial in the creation of an 
independent Albania, unravelled as these powers returned to their previous 
policy of competition and rivalry. In turn, the Albanian state began to dismantle. 
This chapter argues that a variety of factors were responsible for the failure of 
the experiment of the first independent Albanian state. It contends that the 
majority of these reasons cannot be attributed to the new prince. Instead, and 
acknowledging the importance of perpetual and new Albanian rifts and intrigue, 
it argues that external pressures and enmity from interested parties (both great 
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powers and neighbouring states) were the prime determinants, and that these 
had materialised well before the onset of the First World War. 
As Eugen Weber famously noted, `Frenchmen' needed to be created from 
peasants after the formation of the French nation-state. 227 Equally, in the 
Albanian case, few nationalists existed at the point of independence, and 
`Albanians', as opposed to `Albanian speakers', needed to be created. This was 
especially so because the proclaimed definition of the Albanian nation-state was 
so closely linked to ethnicity, and had been constructed so quickly. Despite the 
centrality of `imminent dangers' to many nationalist discourses, there is much 
less study of the pursuit or continuation of nationalism after independence or 
unification: the `nation' and the `state' are usually considered synonymous with 
one another. This idea coincides with the criticism that most studies of Albanian 
independence stop in 1912-13. Moreover, experiments in creating a nation and 
nationalists may be unsuccessful. When the initial goal (for instance 
independence) has been achieved and the impending or imminent threat has 
dissipated, the nationalist fervour that went along with it (on whatever scale) 
may diminish, and a counter-revolution (typified most graphically by the Terror 
following the French Revolution in 1789) may take place. 
Ismail Kemal's Provisional Government and Rival Regimes 
At Valona (November 1912), a provisional government, under the Presidency of 
Ismail Kemal, had been established to govern the country until the powers had 
decided on Albania's future. 228 Throughout 1913, the provisional government 
took some impressive steps. Most significantly, it established an independent 
227 E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 
London, 1977). 
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Albanian Muslim church, and appointed a patriotic Albanian Muslim Mufti as its 
head, thus breaking allegiance to the Ottoman Sheik-ul-Islam. Jurisdiction over 
civil cases was passed to the civil courts, and a jury system was introduced for 
criminal cases. These initiatives were not radical enough for many nationalists, 
especially those from the United States, who had greater experience of liberal 
and revolutionary traditions. In other areas, progress was severely limited. By 
the end of 1913, Albania remained without any international recognition by other 
states (above all from the great powers, Balkan neighbours, and the Ottoman 
Empire). 229 The lack of Austrian and Italian recognition was perhaps the most 
surprising and damaging. Foreign states occupied much of what the provisional 
government considered `Albanian' territory: Serbs and Montenegrins in the 
north; Greeks in the south; an international force at Scutari had replaced the 
Montenegrin forces there. Propaganda hostile to Ismail Kemal's government 
prospered, and numerous schemes to replace the previously popular President 
materialised. It was alleged that he aspired to the Albanian throne himself, and 
he was accused of accepting bribes and being subservient to Italy. His rivals, 
especially Essad Pasha, did everything to promote these accusations. 230 
Throughout 1913, support for the government dwindled. There had been 
problems with its composition from the start. Key nationalists were not part of 
the new regime. Mehmed bey Konitza and Philip Nogga, both Albanian 
representatives to the London conferences, were still pre-occupied overseas, 
and other influential leaders, especially Bib Doda, had retired from national 
politics. In September 1913, eighteen committee members presented Ismail 
Kemal with a document detailing the faults and shortcomings of the provisional 
229 Jacques, Albanians, pp. 343-44; Swire, Albania, pp. 180-1. 
230 Lamb to Grey, 22 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 375; Swire, Albania, p. 181. 
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government. 231 Many ministers resigned, perhaps most notably Mehmet Pasha 
of Kalkadelen, the Minister of War, who had been so influential in maintaining 
stability and the besa (meaning `faith', and when it is in operation no Albanian, 
not even one carrying arms, will injure another). Harry Lamb, the British 
delegate on the international control commission, and former British Consul at 
Salonika, maintained that these defections meant that Ismail Kemal had to seek 
less well-known, less able and often tainted functionaries to serve. This further 
reduced the creditability of the government it was intended to bolster. 232 The 
government became increasingly dominated by Muslims, especially the feudal 
beys. This generated mistrust and uncertainty amongst Orthodox Christians and 
Catholics, many of whom had been amongst the most nationalistic during the 
1912 campaigns. Lamb considered Ismail Kemal's failure to gain the confidence 
of the Malissori and Mirdite Catholic tribes in northern Albania particularly 
damaging. 233 Although these problems were damaging, they are fairly typical of 
provisional regimes, which tend to be weak and prone to attack from opposition, 
because they are often temporary and based on dubious legitimacy. 234 
The provisional government had many rivals for its authority: these were 
associated with the tribal, religious and geographical divisions, which 
independence had not rendered irrelevant. Greek troops controlled large areas 
of northern Epirus assigned to Albania. In the north, an international force was 
stationed in Scutari, under the leadership of British Colonel Phillips. Many 
northern tribesmen remained indifferent to the whole independence project. 
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Mirdita remained virtually a separate entity, despite the heroic efforts of the 
Mirdites during the first Balkan war. In December 1913, Ismail invited Bib Doda 
to become Vice-President of the provisional government. This was a direct 
attempt to link Mirdita with the provisional government's zone of control. Ismail 
hoped that the arrangement could be used to extend the provisional 
government's influence and authority over a wider area of northern Albania. 
Although he accepted the offer, Bib Doda ruled precisely as he had done 
before: he never left Mirdita, and he played no active part in the government. 
Thus, as Lamb wrote, his hypothetical allegiance was 'practically worthless'. 235 
Potentially the greatest internal challenge came from Essad Pasha's so-called 
`Senate of Central Albania'. Essad was an influential bey who dominated much 
of central Albania from his base around Durazzo and Tirana, where he had the 
support of many of his tenants, redrifs (a form of personal bodyguard), Muslim 
clergy and Bosniaks (Muslims from Bosnia). He was exceedingly critical of the 
provisional government. Ismail had offered Essad the position of Interior 
Minister, in an attempt to curtail his activities and gain control of Essad's 
demobilised force (estimated at nine thousand men). Essad refused to 
acknowledge the provisional government's authority and instead established a 
rival Senate, with himself as President, on 16 October 1913. This occurred on 
the same day as the first meeting of the international control commission, and it 
illustrated Essad's determination not to submit to its authority either. Essad's 
Senate consisted of his friends, family and supporters. It was less 
representative than the provisional government, but it was successful in gaining 
support from people across Albanian society, including those who 
had 
235Lamb to Grey, 30 Dec. 1913, FO 421/292, no. 7. 
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previously opposed this notoriously self-obsessed and unscrupulous schemer, 
because of what were considered his well-founded criticisms of provisional 
government activities. 
236 Eventually fighting broke out between Essadists and 
supporters of the provisional government. 
Establishment of the International Control Commission 
With the provisional government stumbling, the powers dithered over what to do 
with the new state. By March 1913, they had decided that, instead of placing 
Albania under the sovereignty, or suzerainty, of the Sultan, and the inevitable 
complications for the Balkans that might result from having a Muslim head of 
state, a European Christian prince should rule. 237 Albania would therefore be 
independent rather than autonomous. An international control commission, 
consisting of representatives of the six great powers and, unlike the two 
boundary commissions, an Albanian representative, would govern Albania until 
the arrival of the prince, facilitate the transfer to his authority and assist him in 
running the new state for ten years. By the end of July 1913, an even more 
detailed formula had been worked out, by which Albania was to be guaranteed 
by the six powers, it was to have a civil administration that would be run by the 
control commission for six years, with a further preliminary six months to enable 
the commissioners to determine the details, and Dutch officers to command the 
gendarmerie. On Russian insistence, Grey agreed to prevent any Roman 
Catholic officers from participating, lest they prove susceptible to Austrian or 
Italian influence. Grey insisted that the Entente keep this resolution secret in 
236 The Times, 3 July 1913; Swire, Albania, pp. 179-80; Essad was vilified because of his 
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order to avoid repercussions, thus clearly illustrating that on occasion he too 
acted outside the concert. 238 The flag of Skanderbeg was recognised as the 
official Albanian flag because, Grey believed, it was universally popular 
amongst Albanians. 239 
The control commission arrived in Albania in October 1913. It faced problems 
from the start. Lamb wrote that the commission was hampered in its activities 
because of the needs of their own respective governments to decide whether to 
recognise and work with the provisional government, and the other regional 
authorities existing de facto. This decision was deemed necessary, if the 
commission was to work successfully with them and manage to bring the 
country under control, and to unite it under one single administration, ready for 
the arrival of the new ruler. 240 The commission held its first meeting on 16 
October 1913. It was agreed that each delegate would hold the presidency of 
the commission in turn, for one month at a time, 6 tour de role. From the first 
meeting, divisions became apparent. This great power rivalry, which would 
prove to be the major destabilising factor in the new state, emerged at an early 
stage. The trivial issue that produced the first controversy centred on the 
admission of an Albanian delegate to the commission. Disagreement 
materialized over how this delegate should be chosen. The Italian delegate, 
Alessandro Leoni, suggested that the decision be left to the provisional 
government. Lamb maintained that it was doubtful whether he would be 
recognised as the `delegate of Albania' anywhere outside Valona, where the 
provisional government had control, and particularly north of the Skumbi river. 
238 'Proceedings of the Ambassadors' meeting held on 29 July 1913' in Bertie to Grey, 29 July 
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Lamb favoured some form of election or popular selection, possibly by the four 
or five major municipalities. If that was considered too difficult, he would accept 
a selection by the commission itself. 241 The Russian and French delegates 
argued for selection by the commission, but the Triplice representatives 
remained adamant that the task should be entrusted to the provisional 
government. According to Lamb's account, they believed it possible to influence 
the government's decision. After several meetings, it was agreed that the 
commission would select the delegate, but on the proviso that this would be 
temporary, and that a permanent appointment would be made after the 
establishment of the future Albanian government. On 30 October 1913, Mufid 
bey Libohova was selected as the Albanian delegate, and resigned his position 
as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the provisional government to do so. This 
arrangement satisfied both sides-a control commission decision but a 
provisional government man-yet Mufid made it clear that he would not be 
controlled either by the provisional government or by Ismail Kemal. 242 It is 
interesting that being the Albanian delegate on the control commission was 
considered a more important and influential position than that of Albanian 
Foreign Minister, presumably because Albania had still failed to establish 
diplomatic relations with any other state. The decision was important because a 
representative of a small state had been invited to sit as part of the concert, 
albeit at a low level, but inevitably he proved far less influential than his great- 
power colleagues. 
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In Search of a Prince 
The major problem facing Albania at this point was uncertainty about the state's 
future, and above all the delay in having a new ruler appointed. There was 
much consensus on this point, but for different reasons, and with diverse ideas 
about who would be a good choice. Ismail claimed that only the appointment of 
Albania's monarch could stem the violence that was becoming endemic in the 
country. He blamed the provisional government's lack of progress and 
acceptance on the powers' failure to determine Albania's future, and specifically 
on their delay in appointing a prince. Essad pressed its urgency too. 243 His 
claim seemed largely political rhetoric, aimed at undermining Ismail. His earlier 
statements and subsequent actions indicate that he had no intention of 
submitting to rule by anyone else, and instead coveted the Albanian throne 
himself. The British representatives in Albania (Lamb, Doughty-Wylie, Granet 
and Phillips) all seemed particularly anxious. Lamb and Doughty-Wylie, for 
instance, made repeated appeals to the British Foreign Office to hasten the 
ruler's announcement and arrival. They were both convinced that this was the 
most effective way to reduce divisions and uncertainty amongst the 
Albanians. 244 In London, Aubrey Herbert and other members of the Anglo- 
Albanian Society exerted political pressure continuously. 
245 As early as May 
1913 (while the Conference of Ambassadors was still in session), Herbert had 
written to Grey stressing the importance of selecting someone with the right 
qualities as the Albanian prince. According to Herbert, if the prince was to 
succeed in uniting the Albanians behind him, then it was important to select a 
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Protestant and a man of `considerable stature', because the Albanians 
respected a `tall man'. 246 
After the conclusion of the London conferences, the six powers devoted much 
time to discussing the future ruler of Albania, but they ultimately agreed to leave 
the decision to the Ballhausplatz and Consulta. Z47 Officials in the Ballhausplatz 
wrote that they were concerned about the delay in appointment, lest the 
situation became permanent, but difficulties had arisen because of concern that 
the prince might lead Albania into a particular sphere of influence. 248 A 
formidable list of candidates was proposed. These included Aladro Castriota, of 
the Albanian colony in Italy, who claimed descent from Skanderbeg, and Prince 
Ghika of Romania and Prince Arthur of Connaught, who was allegedly favoured 
by many Albanians. However, all three were rejected on the grounds that they 
might lead Albania into a hostile orbit. The powers also debated whether the 
prince should be Christian or Muslim. Eventually, a Christian prince was agreed 
in order to protect the rights of the Christian minorities, and also in the hope that 
Albania would become a European state and not a vassal of the Ottoman 
Empire. The nominations of Princes Burhan Eddine and Abdul Medjid of the 
imperial Ottoman dynasty, and Prince Ahmed Fuad Pasha of Egypt, who was a 
descendent of the early nineteenth-century hero Ali Pasha of Tepelena, were 
therefore rejected. 249 The great powers were continuing with the realist policy 
nurtured during the Ambassadors' Conference, of maintaining the balance of 
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power by using the European concert to contain the ambitions and strength of 
their proteges, satellites and partners. 250 
Eventually, a `compromise candidate' was agreed upon. He was the Lutheran 
German Prince Wilhelm of Wied, a third son, captain in the German army and 
nephew of the Queen of Romania, who had pressed his candidature. 251 In so 
doing, the great power representatives followed the pattern, employed during 
the nineteenth century, of giving new Balkan states German Protestants as their 
rulers. However, the new Albanian state received far less international support 
than its Balkan counterparts had when they had gained independence. When 
Greece and Bulgaria became independent and were put under a foreign 
(German) prince, the then great power representatives gave them sufficient 
military support to enable the new rulers to maintain order until a native army 
could be organised. Albania, however, was provided with no international 
forces, except those at Scutari, who were ordered not to leave the town, plus a 
handful (fifteen) of Dutch officers, under General Willem de Weer, who had 
responsibility for organising the gendarmerie. 252 The powers were already 
reneging on their commitment to the establishment of a viable Albania and 
undermining its chances of success. Edith Durham claimed that Wilhelm was 
chosen specifically because selecting a man of limited ability made it easier to 
get rid of him later. 
253 
Initially Wilhelm seems to have made sensible decisions, designed to safeguard 
both his own future and the new regime. At the end of December 1913, 
Wilhelm 
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provisionally accepted the throne but only on certain conditions, namely 
guarantees for a great power loan, his Civil List and an assurance that Essad 
Pasha recognised the `will of Europe'. The British Ambassador in Berlin wrote 
that other conditions included that the scheme of organisation for the 
administration of the country was subject to Wilhelm's approval and that an 
agreement by which all the great powers approved his candidature was first 
obtained. On 6 February 1914, Wilhelm announced his acceptance of the 
throne. On 21 February, he received a deputation of representatives from 
throughout Albania led by Essad Pasha, in Neuwied, who had travelled to 
Germany to formally offer him the throne. 254 
Wilhelm wisely refrained from taking up the throne until the internal situation 
had improved. This may indicate that he was not as inept as some have 
claimed. 255 Problems and divisions within the country had escalated. The Young 
Turk government had resolved to restore Ottoman suzerainty over Albania. In 
October 1913, the Porte sent Major Bekhir Grebeneja, together with several 
followers, to Albania with the idea of propagating the idea of the Albanian- 
descended Izzet Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, as a Muslim prince. 
256 At 
the time, it appeared that an arrangement had been reached with Jsmail, and 
that the President had broken Albania's neutrality. 257 One Whitehall official 
described the affair as reminiscent of the Jameson Raid in southern Africa. The 
intention seems to have been to make it appear that Ismail had consented to 
the Turks bringing arms and military forces to Albania, and to Izzet Pasha as 
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prince, in exchange for Albania (under Ottoman sovereignty) regaining those 
districts that the London Conferences had ascribed to Serbia, Greece and 
Montenegro. On reflection, the British Foreign Office determined that it 
appeared more likely to have been a plot to ensnare Ismail. Nevertheless, it 
succeeded in diminishing Ismail's credibility, as his enemies had presumably 
intended. On 11 January 1914, Ismail declared his intention to hand over the 
Valona administration to the control commission if Essad also surrendered his 
authority to it. 258 
The control commission agreed to assume control until Wilhelm's arrival, 
considering this the best way to stem the mounting disorder and violence. On 
22 January 1914, the provisional government abandoned its powers in favour of 
the control commission. Ismail Kemal retired to Nice and never returned to 
Albania. 259 The commission invited Essad to resign. He refused. Essad 
objected to being treated in the same manner as Ismail, who had been 
dismissed for his involvement in the Bekhir affair. In response, the commission 
stated that Essad Pasha would be removed, by force if necessary. Eventually, 
on 3 February 1914, Essad did resign but, significantly, only on the proviso that 
he would lead the delegation to Neuwied to welcome Wilhelm, and formally 
offer him the crown, an accession that he had until then persistently opposed. 
Lamb considered this condition far from satisfactory but saw no alternative, in 
the light of Essad's perceived support and strength in Albania. 26° The 
international administration in Scutari was also removed, although a military 
force remained. The control commission had managed the considerable 
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achievement of successfully linking under one administration all Albanian 
districts allotted to it, except Koritza and Argyrocastro, which remained under 
Greek occupation. By the start of Wilhelm's reign, in March 1914, the situation 
appeared promising and the commission delegates had reason to be confident. 
Such optimism proved ephemera(. 
Wilhelm's choice of capital (Durazzo) created a multitude of problems, above all 
by aggravating the rivalries between the various Albanian factions. Wilhelm 
insisted on landing at Durazzo, despite having received advice against doing 
so. He considered the port one of the chief towns in Albania, and one where he 
would have the use of a suitable residence without being dependent on any 
prominent Albanian. He resisted alternative proposals to arrive at Scutari, 
because of its proximity to the Montenegrin frontier, despite the protection that 
the international forces could provide there, or at Valona, because it had been 
the provisional capital. 261 Lamb had persistently warned against the advisability 
of Wilhelm landing at Durazzo, especially under Austrian auspices, because he 
considered that this would seriously jeopardise the Prince's chances of 
establishing a stable national administration. It would give Albanians the 
impression that he was under the influence of Essad Pasha, and thereby 
promote Essad's prestige relative to other authorities, especially the provisional 
government, and even Wilhelm himself. It was alleged that Wilhelm had entered 
into a secret arrangement with Essad to land at Durazzo, and that this had been 
Essad's intention in leading the Neuwied expedition. However, no evidence has 
survived to confirm or disprove this. 262 Lamb favoured Wilhelm disembarking at 
Scutari, where he would be under the protection of the international forces, and 
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then embarking on a tour of the country. 263 Nevertheless, on 7 March 1914, 
Wilhelm sailed from Trieste to Durazzo, which he declared as his capital, much 
to the jealousy of both northern and southern Albanians, who preferred Scutari 
and Valona, respectively. The majority of Albanians rejoiced at his arrival. Here 
was their `Skanderbeg' to end all their problems, and they declared him Mpret 
or king, although the great powers recognised him only as a hereditary prince. 
However, he was not to bring the much-anticipated happiness and prosperity to 
his new subjects. 
264 
The New Albanian Kingdom: royal shortcomings and external threats 
Wilhelm's honeymoon period was short-lived. With his arrival, the control 
commission transferred its powers to him, but remained in its advisory capacity. 
On 10 April 1914, a scheme of organisation was drawn up and signed by 
Albanian representatives and control commission delegates. Religious 
complaints surfaced almost immediately: Muslims hated a Christian prince, and 
as a Lutheran he satisfied neither Catholics nor Orthodox. Wilhelm then made a 
number of errors. He failed to tour the country, which made it difficult for him to 
exert his authority, and ensured that the early optimism soon diminished. He 
was criticised for wasting money on such things as the High Court of Appeal 
when there were only fledgling law courts, the appointment of school inspectors 
when there were few schools, and the maintenance of ministers to other 
countries who never even left Albania. In contrast, the gendarmerie, arguably 
Albania's most urgent requirement, received only modest funding. 
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Wilhelm formed his cabinet on 17 March 1914. It was universally unpopular. 
Only two of its members had recently been resident in Albania, its members 
were considered too steeped in Ottoman government methods and the 
landowning Muslim class was over-represented. Many did not speak or write 
Albanian, although the Albanian spoken language was supposedly the 
cornerstone of the Albanian state. Turkhan bey Pasha, who had enjoyed an 
illustrious career in the Ottoman diplomatic corps, was chosen as Prime 
Minister. He had not lived in Albania for many years, nor had he been involved 
in the nationalist movement. He was suspected by some of having leanings 
towards Russia, following his service there, by others of having Ottoman 
sympathies, and by others of being an Italian agent. Even Hasan Prishtina was 
criticised by Lamb as a `mere puppet in the hands of Essad', although the two 
men usually took opposing positions. The most controversial appointment was 
Wilhelm's choice of Essad Pasha, who, in a complete volte-face, had now come 
around to `support' Wilhelm, as Interior and War Minister (and effective Prime 
Minister). Many nationalists considered him a traitor, primarily because of his 
role in the Scutari capitulation to Montenegro (April 1913), and few trusted him. 
Durham, in one of her more accurate assessments, pointed out that Essad 
believed that by ingratiating himself with Wilhelm he could become effective 
ruler and perhaps usurp power. Conversely, Wilhelm considered it the lesser 
evil to bring Essad into the government, in the hope that he could contain his 
activities. 266 Essad's appointment as Interior and War Minister was particularly 
significant, because it gave him control of those limited forces and munitions 
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that the state did possess, and made the Prince even more dependent upon 
him. Essad soon obtained the upper hand. He managed to keep Wilhelm 
`prisoner' in Durazzo, and prevented him from touring the country as the 
Albanians and the British representatives had urged. 
Responsibility for Albania's continuing problems was not solely Wilhelm's, a 
view to which even his critics subscribed. Durham wrote that `We may blame 
Wied for his incompetence, but only a man of unusual force of character could 
have made headway against the powers combined against him'. 267 Lamb wrote 
to the Foreign Office that, despite repeated appeals for financial and military 
support, Wilhelm had not received the assistance he so desperately needed. He 
went further, claiming that the great powers had failed to live up to their earlier 
pledges and commitments to him. 268 British officials in Whitehall, if not Albania, 
were now lukewarm about the new Albanian experiment the powers had 
sponsored. Grey, who had been crucial in maintaining the European concert in 
London regarding Albania, seemed to lack confidence in Wilhelm's abilities, and 
expected him to fail in his appointed task. He noted that, despite being keen 
and eager to learn, Wilhelm had no knowledge of Albania, its tribes or its 
customs, and he lacked sufficient skill to rule the turbulent country. 
269 Even 
supposedly disinterested powers were already reneging on their promises to the 
new sovereign, especially since the initial crisis had been resolved. Albania was 
no longer considered capable of disrupting the great power, Balkan or Adriatic 
balances. 
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In early 1914, intervention and plotting by Albania's rivals revealed itself most 
clearly in Greek interference in southern Albania. Although the Greeks denied 
responsibility, and Sir Francis Elliot, the British Ambassador in Athens, 
supported this view, Greek involvement was extensive. Lamb reported on the 
frequent visits to Corfu of Christaki Zographos, a former Greek Foreign Minister 
who would return to that post in 1915. The development of events clearly 
illustrated that the Greeks were not prepared to leave their `countrymen' to the 
`mercy' of the Albanians. 270 Before Wilhelm's arrival, a `national' revolt had 
started in northern Epirus. On 22 February 1914, a meeting of the 
representatives of all the occupied provinces, at Argyrocastro, had proclaimed 
that the Epirotes would resist by force of arms any attempt on the part of the 
Albanian gendarmerie to `violate their territory'. They also announced the 
establishment of the `Provisional Government of Autonomous Northern Epirus' 
under the presidency of Zographos. This was notified to the president of the 
control commission in a telegram from Corfu received en clair on 28 February 
1914. Despite all claims that this was a `national insurrection', in reality there 
appears to have been only an infinitesimal number of the `native' population 
involved, the majority of whom had previously served in the Greek army or had 
been imported from Greece, including prisoners recently released from Cretan 
jails. This was followed by a declaration of the independence of autonomous 
`northern Epirus' at Argyrocastro, on 2 March 1914, presumably orchestrated to 
pre-empt Wilhelm's arrival and the establishment of the new kingdom. To 
conceal their complicity, the Greeks had withdrawn their troops the day before 
270 Elliot to Grey, 5 Mar. 1914, FO 421/292, no. 218; Lamb to Grey, 28 Feb. 1914, BD, X. i, no. 
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(1 March 1914), although they had left a number of troops in Koritza for 
`treatment'. 271 
Venizelos was under considerable pressure from the Epirotes, the Greek public 
and the political opposition to help the insurgents but, at this time, Greece was 
in no position to enrage the great powers. Therefore, in an attempt to assuage 
both sides, Venizelos appealed to the powers to ensure linguistic and religious 
safeguards in northern Epirus, and did so again four weeks later. The powers 
took two months to respond. This delay added to the uncertainty, confusion and 
anxiety. In their reply, on 24 April 1914, the powers urged the Albanian 
government to implement the guarantees and to include local elements in the 
gendarmerie. 272 Meanwhile, on 6 April 1914, the Greek troops left in Koritza for 
`treatment' had escaped and started a revolt, and were joined by Greek 
partisans and `Epirote' bands. To defend the town, there were only fifty 
gendarmes and their Dutch officers. Within a few hours, the public buildings and 
vantage points were in Greek hands. Wilhelm was keen to lead forces against 
the Epirotes, although these `forces' amounted only to armed civilians and 2500 
gendarmes under the Dutch officers. Such an action would have enhanced 
Wilhelm's prestige in Albanian eyes, but he was prevented from taking it by 
Essad, the Italian forces in Durazzo and the majority of the control commission 
delegates. Essad and the Consulta feared that Wilhelm's involvement would 
jeopardise their plans, and, according to Lamb, the commission members 
dreaded the potential outcome of any military action for the inexperienced 
271 Lamb to Grey, 28 Feb. 1914, BD, X. i, no. 119; Also at FO 421/292, no. 206; Kondis, Greece 
and Albania, pp. 130-2. 
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Albanian forces, especially because the Greeks had announced that they would 
invade if there was any regular military action by the Albanians, which in turn 
would probably have resulted in Italian and Austrian intervention. Meanwhile, 
Essad had announced his intention of sending a force to southern Albania 
(northern Epirus). Wilhelm saw the danger in this move but he dared not 
oppose it. The commission concluded that the only way to avoid a bloodbath 
was to offer concessions. The great power governments agreed to approve 
whatever was decided upon by their representatives on the ground, on 
condition that there were no boundary modifications, thus ensuring that their 
interests were protected. The Albanian government also agreed to negotiate, 
and invited the control commission to act as mediators. 273 
The control commission delegates met the insurgents at Santa Quaranta in an 
attempt to stop the resistance, but then proceeded to Corfu because of the less 
intense political climate there. Negotiations took place between 9 and 17 May, 
and resulted in the Corfu Protocol of 18 May 1914. This ceded a level of 
autonomy to the Epirotes, who were to be under the nominal hegemony of 
Wilhelm, and provided for the recruitment of local elements into the 
gendarmerie, and the teaching of Greek in schools. The Albanian government 
in Durazzo accepted this at the end of June 1914, as did the autonomists, with 
much reluctance, a month later. 274 Although it accepted these provisions, the 
Albanian government did not accept the right of northern Epirus to have a 
273 Appendix 1 'The Corfu Protocol', FO 608/37/92/1/1/4392; Lamb to Grey, 1 May 1914, FO 
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separate administration, but took the view that Albania was in no position to go 
to war against Greece. Meanwhile, for the Greek side, the local autonomy 
option represented a considerable modification of their former position. This 
option was pursued for two main reasons. Firstly, Greece needed the support of 
the Orthodox Albanians and, contrary to Greek ambitions and their religious 
affinity, it was becoming apparent that the majority desired to be Albanian not 
Greek. 275 Secondly, union with Greece was not yet possible because it would 
have resulted in considerable opposition, if not intervention, by Austria or Italy. 
Therefore, in opting for local autonomy, the Greeks, as opposed to `Epirotes', 
managed to circumvent both the Albanian responses and great power interests, 
and simultaneously secured Greek dominance and interests in the region. Lamb 
was not blind to this trick. He wrote to Grey that the Greeks understood that the 
arrangement `simply smoothes the way for a speedy annexation of northern 
Epirus'. 276 Elsewhere, the great powers had been primed to modify their former 
plans for Albania because they were not prepared to go to war with Greece, 
whom even Germany and Britain did not wish to offend. The start of the First 
World War meant that the great powers never formally agreed to these 
resolutions. 
Austro-Italian Rivalry and the Collapse of Wilhelm's Regime 
The greatest threat to Albania came not from its Balkan neighbours but from the 
great powers. Lamb made numerous complaints about his fellow 
commissioners. He carped that only he made decisions for the Albanian state 
based on the best interests of the Albanian people, and that the other 
commissioners were more concerned to consult `back home' to ensure that their 
275 Ed. Note, Austro-Hungarian Documents, pp. 33-4. 
276 Lamb to Grey, 3 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 151. 
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decisions safeguarded their respective geo-political interests. 277 Durham went 
further, alleging that only Germany and Britain had ever intended to act 
honestly. She considered Leon Krajewsky, the French representative, one of 
the worst, and accused him of being even more pro-Slav than the Russians. 278 
Great power rivalries dominated the commission and in turn undermined the 
state, regardless of any individual intentions. The first example centred on the 
question of the Albanian Bank. As early as September 1913 (before the arrival 
of the international commission), the Austrian and Italian representatives made 
an agreement with the provisional government, in an attempt to gain exclusive 
rights in the Bank and the consequent influence in Albania. The Entente 
commissioners argued that the provisional government had no right to make 
this agreement, and that the Albanian Bank must be international on the same 
lines as the Moroccan Bank that had been established by the Algiers 
conventions (1911). Eventually, and with help from Jagow, Grey ensured that 
the Bank would be international. 279 Elsewhere, the Entente powers were no less 
complicit in their duplicity to undermine the new state. They refused to 
subscribe to the loan that was necessary to implement reforms, and to rebuild 
and establish Albania on a secure footing. All the powers refused to send the 
troops necessary for stability and security. 280 After the great power controversy 
over the larger Balkan crisis had subsided, most of the governments returned to 
a policy of ambivalence towards Albania, or to the pursuit of their longer-term 
ambitions. 
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Richard Bosworth has maintained that Albania continued to be the major 
consideration for Italian policy makers, to the extent that the Sarajevo crisis was 
viewed as merely adding to the `graver continuing problem in Albania', and that 
Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister intended to act 
`honestly' regarding Albania. Sir Rennell Rodd, the British Ambassador in 
Rome, maintained at the time that the alleged Italian intrigue in Albania must be 
`quite unauthorised' because the continuance of an independent Albania was 
the Consulta's `only weapon' against Austrian aggression. 281 In practice, Italian 
actions seem far removed from this idealised policy. Contrary to Bosworth's 
analysis and Rodd's observations, and perhaps the Foreign Minister's 
intentions, Italian efforts in practice sought to undermine and destabilise the 
newly independent Albania, and to replace the fledgling regime. What Rodd 
does not seem to have appreciated is that an Italian-controlled Albania would 
be an even better weapon. This breakdown in Austro-Italian solidarity, which 
had been so instrumental in London, was enormously damaging to the new 
state's, and Wilhelm's, chances of success. 282 The Austro-Italian objective in 
creating Albania had been to prevent Serbian access to the Adriatic and, in turn, 
effective Russian access. With this objective achieved, both states returned to 
their traditional rivalry in Albania, and both connived and intrigued to become 
the dominant force in the new state. Wilhelm later wrote to Swire that he 
considered the fallout to have started over issues outside the Albanian problem, 
and even went so far as to link the change in attitude to the 
fear that a great 
power war might break out. This theory becomes credible only 
from July 1914 
onwards. In reality, it had been a very venturesome arrangement, 
born out of 
281 Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers, pp. 377-417; Rodd to Grey, 23 June 1914, 
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expediency and the great Slavonic (Russo-Serbian) threat. In mid-1914, the 
situation deteriorated rapidly, particularly as the French, Russians and their 
proteges exploited the feud. Having persistently opposed the establishment of 
an independent Albania, these forces were exceedingly willing to undermine 
it. 283 However, Austrian and Italian actions were to prove far more divisive and 
destabilising. 
In May 1914, whilst the Corfu negotiations were still ongoing, a series of minor 
disturbances in central Albania, especially in the Shiak region, a small rural 
area between Durazzo and Tirana, proved impossible to contain. They had 
begun as traditional Albanian grievances, but they soon escalated and had 
profound implications for the national regime. Reports had emerged of armed 
men concentrating near Shiak. There was nothing exceptional about these 
reports, but the (potentially) volatile situation appears to have intensified, 
although other similar ones did not, because of personal differences in the 
Durazzo administration. Amid accusations that he was conniving with the 
insurgents and diverting military supplies in a plot to overthrow Wilhelm, Essad 
Pasha was arrested on a charge of treason and imprisoned aboard an Austrian 
cruiser. The Austrians and the Dutch Major, Johan Sluyss, appear to have 
instigated his arrest because they feared he would obstruct Austrian plans in 
Albania. They therefore took advantage of the temporary absence of Leoni and 
Baron Carlo Aliotti, the Italian Envoy Extraordinaire to Wilhelm, from Durazzo. 
But the Italians soon turned the situation to their own advantage. Leoni, who 
had returned from the Corfu negotiations, and Aliotti, who had returned from 
283 Crackanthorpe to Grey, 21 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 171; Swire, Albania, pp. 194-6. 
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Rome, persuaded Wilhelm against a court martial. Essad was released into 
Italian custody and subsequent exile. 284 
This outcome aggravated the situation and damaged Wilhelm irrevocably, 
although he had tried desperately to assuage both sides. To ordinary Albanians 
he appeared weak, and unable to restrain his rivals and maintain law and order. 
As Heaton-Armstrong commented, Wilhelm's 
decision, which neither acquitted nor condemned his late most powerful 
minister, made an exceedingly bad impression on his loyal subjects; they 
considered that the King [Wilhelm] had robbed them of their prey and 
allowed himself to be outwitted by the Italian diplomats, who were 
generally believed to be Essad Pasha's allies. 285 
Meanwhile, Essad's redrifs and many of his relatives joined the Shiak 
insurgents in protest. According to Heaton-Armstrong, the rebels consisted 
primarily of disenchanted peasants whose (perhaps unrealistic) dreams had not 
been fulfilled by the Prince's arrival. Their initial demands had been based on 
local customs and rights. Various outside sources (Serbs, Ottoman Turks, 
Essadists, Epirote autonomists) then sought to exploit the revolt for their own 
purposes. Propaganda flooded into Albania. The most influential argued that 
Wilhelm was seeking to destroy Muslim rights, and that a Muslim prince was 
needed for protection. By the end of the month, a revolution had been 
proclaimed, the Ottoman flag had been hoisted and a series of demands 
issued. These included, most notably, the restoration of Ottoman rule or else 
the appointment of another member of the Ottoman royal family, and the 
284 Rodd to Grey, 21 May 1914, FO 421/293, no. 103; Lamb, Various Reports, FO 421/293, nos. 
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reappointment of the Sheik-ul-Islam as Chief Mufti. 286 It is significant that the 
religious component was so prominent in this rebellion. In the independence 
campaigns, and in opposition to the claims of their Balkan rivals, the Albanians 
had persistently downplayed their religious differences in order to appear united 
and gain independence. In 1914, outside forces were soon able to exploit these 
differences for their own goals. The insurgents soon surrounded Durazzo. To 
oppose them, the Prince had only a small number of gendarmes, Dutch officers 
and foreign volunteers, and Bib Doda's Mirdites. The latter refused to fight and 
break the besa. The Prince's prestige depended primarily upon the support that 
he had from the powers. In this case, they all refused to give him either material 
or monetary aid. 287 
On 23 May 1914, the actions of another Dutch Officer, Captain Saar, provoked 
the final phase. Saar had been sent to meet the insurgents, but, seemingly 
ignorant of Albanian customs, whereby most Albanians carried arms although a 
man who had given his besa would not use them, he mistakenly fired on a 
group of Albanians. It appeared to many Albanians that the Prince's troops had 
broken the besa. According to Lamb, it also confirmed rumours that Wilhelm 
intended to massacre the population. This prompted even more people to side 
with the rebels. 288 The rebel leaders proclaimed that they did not trust or 
recognise the Prince, and insisted on meeting only great power representatives 
(in effect, the control commission delegates). They met three times but with little 
success. Wilhelm seems to have received poor advice-perhaps a reflection of 
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p. 357; Lamb to Grey, 22 May 1914; FO 421/293, no. 129; Lamb to Grey, 27 May 1914, FO 
421/293, no. 131; Lamb to Grey, 4 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 185: Lamb was more sceptical 
than Heaton-Armstrong of the composition of the insurgents. He commented upon the 'dubious 
character' of the representatives he met, that many were 'unknown' to him, and that some even 
attempted to `conceal' their `true identity'. 
287 Swire, Albania, pp. 208-9; Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, pp. 84-9. 
288 Jacques, Albanians, p. 357. 
136 
the other priorities that his great power advisers had. The commission 
delegates repeatedly urged Wilhelm to leave Durazzo, and he repeatedly 
refused to do so. With shells bombarding the town, Wilhelm was persuaded to 
escort his family to safety on an Italian ship stationed in the harbour. Wilhelm 
had proclaimed his intention to return to the palace, but once he was on board 
the Italians seem to have taken the matter into their own hands. The ship raised 
anchor and sailed out of port, with Wilhelm aboard. 289 
In these events, there were three determining factors: Essad Pasha; great 
power actions, above all Austro-Italian; and Wilhelm. It was alleged that Essad 
had been scheming with the rebels and Italians to provoke an incident and 
seize the throne for himself, but such allegations were never proven. 290 Swire's 
allegation that the Italians were reluctant to hold a full investigation, for fear of it 
revealing Italian duplicity, is most likely correct but cannot be taken as self- 
evident. The same is true of the accusations made following Essad's departure. 
Despite persistent allegations that he was promoting the insurrection from 
abroad (financially, materially and with propaganda), nothing was ever proven. 
According to Heaton-Armstrong, whilst Essad was too clever to leave any 
`incriminating documents' in his own possession, even those documents that 
were sequestered were never examined and eventually returned to Essad. 
291 
Like other Albanian leaders (such as Turkhan Pasha), Essad seems to have 
been a pawn of the great and lesser powers. Had the Italian officials wanted, 
they could most probably have restrained him, whilst during his arrest and 
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imprisonment Essad appears to have been completely helpless, dependent 
upon the whims and actions of great power superiors. 
Austrian and Italian actions and rivalry were far more important. The Italians 
and Austrians were split and working against one another, and against Prince 
Wilhelm. The response to the Sluyss-Essad confrontation was the first 
significant indication (on the surface at least) of the conflicting and divergent 
objectives of the Triplice allies in Albania, and of the breakdown of Austro-Italian 
solidarity. Accounts differ greatly, but it appears that the main controversy arose 
because the Austrian representatives, anxious at their deteriorating influence in 
Durazzo, had attempted to use the altercation, and the absence of the 
commission delegates and Aliotti, to secure the dismissal of Essad and to 
enhance their own position at the expense of their Italian rivals. Lamb wrote to 
Grey that the Austrians were able to profit from the absence of the Italian 
representatives (Aliotti and Leoni) in Durazzo, and had succeeded in 
momentarily eluding the vigilance of the Italians. The Italian Charge d'Affaires 
(Castoldi - who had previously been the junior representative on the southern 
boundary commission) allowed himself to be duped into acquiescing in what 
was to be done. On their return, Aliotti and Leoni immediately succeeded in 
turning the incident to Italian advantage, by conniving for the release of Essad 
into Italian custody, and thus again relegating Austrian influence and advantage 
to second place. 292 Following Saar's faux pax, the Italians in turn exploited the 
Durazzo bombardment. By `imprisoning' Wilhelm offshore, they dealt the 
Prince's dwindling credibility as sovereign another blow. He appeared to have 
292 Lamb to Grey, 31 May 1914, FO 421/293, no. 158; Rodd to Grey, 21 May 1914, FO 421/293, 
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abandoned his people. 
293 In reality, he was offshore for only one night, and 
even that not at his own behest. Nevertheless news of his departure spread 
quickly throughout Albania and Europe. Sir Rennelf Rodd, the British 
Ambassador in Rome, reported the extent to which the Consulta had retracted 
from its earlier position of support for the new Albanian state. He wrote that San 
Giuliano believed that there was no longer any hope of maintaining the Prince, 
and that the commission (on which Leoni was still influential) should take control 
of the administration, but this change in Italian policy had obviously come about 
much earlier. 294 Heaton-Armstrong and Durham (who were both in Durazzo) 
wrote that the Italian forces supposedly defending Durazzo were repeatedly 
seen signalling to the insurgents. Yet the Dutch officers were unable to remove 
the Italian forces. The Dutch officer who first detected this Italian duplicity was 
himself forced to resign. This is perhaps indicative that Holland too as a small 
state was unable to carry much weight in the great power system, and despite 
the Dutch forces supposedly representing the European concert. 295 
Wilhelm's role was the most interesting. There were times when he could have 
acted more decisively. Heaton-Armstrong's forlorn comments about Wilhelm's 
military failings, despite his training in the German army, and the decision to 
send Essad into exile, are intuitive examples. 296 However, Wilhelm seems to 
have received extremely poor information and conflicting advice. According to 
Heaton-Armstrong, he was often left isolated and without support. This was in 
spite of Wilhelm desperately needing counsel because he found himself in 
situations of which he had no experience. Heaton-Armstrong also recorded that 
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many of Wilhelm's `better' decisions, for example regarding the defence of 
Durazzo, were blocked by other members of the administration. 297 Wilhelm's 
role in Essad's arrest remains ambiguous. It is unclear whether he authorised 
the pre-emptive strike, or acquiesced only after Essad had been arrested. 
According to Lamb, Wilhelm did not authorise the use of guns. Lamb therefore 
placed greater culpability on Sluyss and the Austrian officials. 298 
Descent into War 
The Italians continued working to undermine Wilhelm but none of the other 
powers sought to help him. Between May and July 1914, Wilhelm repeatedly 
appealed to the great powers for military and financial assistance. He blamed 
the current situation on the failure of the great powers to settle the Epirus 
question in line with their own decisions in London, and their subsequent 
unwillingness to help him in his difficulties. 299 Lamb and Phillips sent numerous 
appeals to the British government that this was the only way to save the 
Albanian situation. On each occasion, they were informed of the impossibility of 
sending troops or other assistance. The Foreign Office maintained that morally 
Britain was not in a position to help, and that practically it was physically 
impossible to assemble an expeditionary force large enough to be effective in 
Albania. Furthermore, there would also be complications for the concert if the 
297 Ibid, pp. 84-6. 
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powers were forced to resort to arms to uphold the Albanian regime. 300 Faced 
with these obstacles, the Prince's position became increasingly untenable. 
By August 1914 and the start of the First World War, Wilhelm's position had 
deteriorated further. One by one, the great powers withdrew their 
representatives from Albania. From a great-power perspective, they had more 
important things to deal with than Albania. With the assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, even the Austrians, until then Wilhelm's most vehement 
supporters, albeit for motives of self-interest, became uninterested in Albanian 
affairs. The international squadrons in the Bay of Durazzo were the first to be 
withdrawn. Italy (still neutral) was the only power to remain. With the outbreak of 
war, Phillips and his international force were evacuated from Scutari. A Council 
of Consuls of the Powers was left to supervise the administration of the town 
and district. 301 Diplomatic representation was withdrawn from Durazzo. This 
inevitably had consequences for the working of the commission. Grey ordered 
the withdrawal of Lamb on 12 August 1914, the day on which Britain declared 
war on Austria. By then the German and Russian representatives had already 
departed, leaving their votes with the Austrian and French members, 
respectively, and the Dutch mission left on 7 August. The Italians repeatedly 
urged the Foreign Office to keep Lamb in Albania, arguing that the whole 
control commission would dissolve if he left, and that the Albanians would 
regard this as a desertion of the Prince by the great powers. This would in turn 
create a new set of difficulties for the remaining powers. 
302 Meanwhile, the 
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administration remained short of funds. The Consulta, who together with the 
Ballhausplatz, was responsible for administering the promised loan, refused to 
authorise the commission delegates to pay the remaining sums. Instead, Aliotti 
demanded that Italy receive fishing, telegraph and other concessions in 
exchange for them. 303 The Austrians refused to help Wilhelm for fear of 
offending the Italians, who had remained neutral in the war. Only at this late 
stage, and when a greater emergency required it, did Austro-Italian co- 
operation re-emerge. 
With the control commission went the last hopes for Prince Wilhelm's regime. 
His supply of funds finally ran out on 13 August 1914, and the remaining 
representatives of the commission urged him to leave. He refused to do so, 
although he did send his children back to Germany on 22 August 1914, with 
Heaton-Armstrong. The Prince's intransigence caused his opponents great 
annoyance. He was finally convinced to leave following the firing of shells into 
Durazzo. He departed, with his wife, on board the Austrian Misurata, on 3 
September 1914. He never formally abdicated or renounced his rights to the 
throne, and he declared that his thoughts would always be with Albania. He 
entrusted his possessions and the palace to the commission under the 
presidency of the Italian Consul. 304 He asserted his desire to return to the 
throne with the conclusion of war, and the Austrians promoted his candidature. 
The Albanians, almost all of whom appear to have interpreted his departure as 
303 Durham 'Albanian Letter', 14 Aug. 1914, The Near East, 28 Aug. 1914, in Edith Durham, pp. 
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his abandonment of them, made it clear that they did not want him to return. 
Wilhelm kept his promise not to return unless the Albanians desired it. 305 
Conclusions: a failed experiment? 
The Albanians had united in 1912, only to proclaim independence when the 
various factional differences (religious, linguistic, geographic, tribal, and 
lifestyle) were minimised by the threats caused by the first Balkan war. When 
these threats declined, Albanian schisms resurfaced. From the autumn of 1913 
until the outbreak of the First World War, these important issues were not dealt 
with, as an independent and self-governing Albania came into being for the first 
time. Internal and external rivalries and intrigue sought to undo what had been 
established, and threatened the very nature of the Albanian state. The appetites 
of the great and small powers that had an interest in Albanian territory 
resurfaced, as did Albanian differences, as varying groups sought to assert their 
authority, or protect their traditional rights, privileges and influence. This rivalry 
was not about balancing, but was instead designed to upset, or even 
destabilise, the international system. With the advent of the First World War, 
these pressures increased even further. The concert that had worked so hard 
for Albania's creation, and that had been preserved using the Albanian 
question, was now broken. It was no longer a check on the ambitions and 
rivalries of Albania's enemies. Significantly, it was not the Albanian question, 
which had for so long tested the principles of European concert diplomacy, but 
events elsewhere in the Balkans that eventually brought down the concert and 
provoked the European war. When the Albanian question no longer threatened 
peace between the powers and the great-power balance, the powers 
305 Wilhelm to Swire, 5 Aug. 1928, quoted in Swire, Albania, p. 232. 
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abandoned Albania. Simultaneously, Albania's `friends' were no longer in a 
position to protect it. As Durham wrote, `The infant state of Albania was to be 
flung to the wolves to save its elders'. 306 
At the point of proclaiming independence, the Albanians were only in phase A of 
applying Hroch's model of the national awakenings of small nationalisms. 307 
During their independence experiment, they were not able to progress into 
phases B or C. During the brief provisional government and Wied's reign, there 
seem to have been few, if any, initiatives to advance the nationalist movement. 
Instead counter-national ones, often based on Islam that, as Hastings argues, 
was the `inhibitor of nations', were able to gain the ascendancy. 308 The small 
band of nationalists and the larger bulk of the population were not ready to 
withstand the pressures that came with statehood, not least the external ones to 
which they would be subject. Faced with these obstacles and the varying 
intentions of some great power representatives, the nationalists found that they 
were unable to create `Albanians'. Wilhelm was repeatedly accused of not 
understanding Albania or Albanians, and of not being strong enough to take 
control. He has therefore been given much blame for the failure of the first 
independent Albania. In reality, although Wilhelm did not help foster phase B of 
Albanian nationalism (for example, he chose few nationalist leaders for his 
cabinet), he often showed considerable foresight. For instance, he once 
remarked that `if Albania is to be ruled peacefully, three persons ought to be 
hanged: Ismail Kemal, Essad Pasha and myself. If all three were dead, Albania 
would fare much better,. 309 However, outside pressures and the growth of 
306 Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 258. 
307 Hroch, Social Preconditions, pp. 22-3. 
308 Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, pp. 165-6,200-2. 
309 Wilhelm quoted in Swire, Albania, pp. 199-200. 
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counter-national forces were far more influential in the demise of an 
independent Albania. Faik Konitza probably summed up Albania's predicament 
best: 
It is clear that, above all else, Albania has the failing of being friendless 
and defenceless, and of being where it is, an easy gift placed along an 
important route. And she has another failing, which is considerable ... 
that of being tiny in size. 
310 
31 o F. Konitza to Delbrück, 2 Nov. 1915, Faik Konitza, no. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
The Entente Powers and the Projected Partition of Albania: the 
attempt to form a Balkan alliance (1914-15) 
When she left Albania in 1914, Edith Durham noted what people had said to 
her: `Now that the powers are busy fighting each other, they will leave us free to 
manage our own affairs. '311 The international forces left quickly, but Albania did 
not cease to occupy the attention of the great powers. It was perceived as 
having a key role to play in any future Balkan settlement. Both sides in the First 
World War were ready to barter away Albanian territory in order to gain allies in 
the Balkans. The instability in Albania gave the neighbouring Balkan states and 
the interested great powers a situation that they could exploit in their own 
interests, and so overturn the decisions so laboriously achieved during the 
London conferences. Moreover, the situation created by the war was entirely 
new. Austria, whose attitude and policies had been so instrumental in the 
formation of Albania, was the enemy rather than the partner of the Entente 
powers. The latter were now free to pursue their own power-political and military 
objectives. The establishment of independent Albania in 1913 had been the 
compromise that reconciled the competing interests of the great powers, and 
preserved their concert. With the collapse of that concert into war, the existence 
and the interests of this small, fledgling state were expendable. Britain 
ostensibly entered the war of 1914 in order to uphold the 1839 guarantee of 
Belgian neutrality. But significantly, there was no parallel commitment to uphold 
311 Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 289; Other versions of material presented in this Chapter have 
been published as N. C. Guy, `The Albanian Question in British Policy and the 
Italian 
Intervention, August 1914-April 1915', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18 (2007), pp. 109-31 and N. 
C. Guy, `Britain, Greece and the Offer of Northern Epirus, August 1914 - December 1915' in G. 
T. Papanikos and N. C. J. Pappas (eds. ), European History: Lessons for the 215' Century. 
Essays from the 3rd International Conference on European History (Athens, 2006), pp. 335-44. 
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Albanian neutrality, even though it had been internationally agreed only one 
year earlier. Despite Britain's rhetorical justifications of the decision for war 
being all about protecting the rights and independence of small nations, Grey's 
previous policy of self-determination for Albania was soon abandoned under the 
exigencies of war. Instead he pursued a strategy of using Albanian territory as 
an inducement to attract potential allies. Those former interested parties were 
thus enabled to revive their old expansionist appetites-hence the renewed 
constellation of acquisitive states Austria, Italy and Albania's Balkan 
neighbours. 
From the start of the war, both sides entered into negotiations with the neutral 
Balkan states of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, in an attempt to recruit them, 
or to at least secure their neutrality. Significantly, none of them negotiated with 
Albania. In the Balkans, the Entente powers desperately needed to provide help 
and support to Serbia, but Serbia's landlocked position made it difficult for them 
to deliver this themselves. The British doubted whether they could supply 
armaments or ammunition to the Serbs. Even if they could at least provide them 
with money, it was not clear that it would be possible for the Serbian 
government to purchase anything useful. 312 Serbia needed above all a Balkan 
ally or, better still, the re-formation of a Balkan alliance such as had operated 
during the Balkan wars. In the case of Bulgaria, this could only be achieved by 
territorial concessions, and in reality these were only possible in Macedonia, at 
the expense of Serbia. 313 Bulgaria had been left embittered by both Serbia and 
Greece following the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, but Serbia was hardly likely to 
give up its Macedonian spoils willingly. Therefore, the Entente formulated a 
312 Grey minute, 16 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2171/39796. 
313 Grey minute, 13 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1900/38875. 
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policy whereby they would offer Serbia territory in northern Albania, and in 
particular the prized asset of an outlet on the Adriatic. This would recompense 
Serbia for surrendering territory in Macedonia to Bulgaria. Since the creation of 
Albania had originally been an Austrian idea to keep Serbia away from the 
Adriatic, the fact that the Entente powers were now at war with Austria made 
the abandonment of Albania easier to contemplate. 
Preliminary Negotiations 
Throughout the war, diplomatic negotiations over alignments in the Balkans 
were probably more complex and drawn out than negotiations anywhere else: 
the actions of one state affected the actions of the others; there were ancient 
antagonisms and bitter rivalries to overcome; states were unwilling to commit to 
either side without knowledge of their neighbours' actions or guarantees by the 
powers. From the start, Entente diplomats, especially Sazonov, argued that 
Greece was the crux of any successful confederation scheme: if Greek support 
was gained, Bulgarian support would follow as a natural consequence. 314 
Moreover, there was hope that the Greek government, still bound to Belgrade 
by its 1913 Treaty obligations, by which Greece was bound to support Serbia if 
Serbia was attacked by a third power, would fulfil these commitments and join 
Serbia, with resulting knock-on effects on the actions of the other Balkan states. 
Initial signs appeared promising. Following entreaties, Venizelos offered 
unconditional support to the Entente. Venizelos feared that, unless Greece 
joined Serbia, the Entente powers might return the Aegean islands to the 
Ottoman Empire, in exchange for Ottoman neutrality. Although the Entente had 
initiated the conversations, its members felt unable to accept the Greek offer, 
314 Buchanan to Grey, 14 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1900/39186. 
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fearful of the response such a step might invoke in neutral Constantinople. 
Perhaps the best chance of acquiring Greek assistance was consequently lost. 
David Lloyd George, future British Prime Minister and then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, later claimed that this decision was `a stupendous error of 
judgment', and may have prolonged the war by a whole two years. 315 From then 
on progress was agonisingly slow. 
It is doubtful whether Venizelos could have brought his offer to fruition. His 
position was complicated by the attitude of the Greek King. Constantine, 
influenced by his German ancestry and wife, and the views of the General Staff, 
had a passionate belief in the superiority of German militarism, and was 
convinced of an ultimate Germany victory. He had no sympathies for the 
Entente, and no desire to help the Serbs in a conflict against Germany. 
However, he did recognise Greece's obligations. The Entente foreign ministers 
believed this would be useful in preparing public opinion for the confederation. 
They consequently pledged help for Greece against Bulgaria, if Greece stayed 
neutral or joined the confederation. Attitudes in Athens were largely dominated 
by fear of any retaliatory action by the Bulgarian government. William Erskine, a 
British official in Athens, appears to have had a fairly accurate perception of 
Greek attitudes, especially in comparison to his superiors in Whitehall. He 
reported that, in his view, the offer of the whole of southern Albania up to the 
Skumbi river (north of the territory Greece claimed), without Valona, would be 
insufficient to gain Greek entry. 
316 
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Italian attitudes and interests were also paramount in British thinking. Many 
British diplomats considered that, as Italy was the only neutral power, its 
preoccupation with Albania (in particular its strategic, economic and cultural 
interests in southern Albania) could prove a key obstacle to the re-formation of 
the Balkan states' confederation. Grey claimed that Italian intervention would be 
`the turning point in the war', because of the perceived impact it would have on 
the other neutral states, especially Romania. 317 The Greeks were concerned 
lest the Italian attitude should prove a block to their aspirations, especially in 
northern Epirus, as it had been in the 1913 London conferences. However, on 
20 August 1914, Grey dismissed his colleagues' fears. He stated that, as far as 
he could ascertain, Rome was showing no interest in Albania, made no mention 
of anything affecting Albania, except Valona, and did not even claim Valona. He 
went so far as to suggest that Italy might accept `international status' for Valona, 
in the same manner as Tangiers, in which all the powers interested in the 
Adriatic could participate. Grey urged Athens to uphold the Corfu agreement of 
May 1914, and warned against any designs upon the town of Chimara. 318 From 
the outset Grey, who had been so instrumental in establishing an independent 
and viable state of Albania, was willing to dismember it in the interests of British 
wartime policy. Yet it soon became clear from the corresponding Italian 
negotiations, especially Italian actions regarding the island of Saseno, that 
Grey's initial view had been short-sighted. 
The negotiations between the Entente powers and the Italians were closely 
related to those with the Balkan states. The Italian government asserted 
that, as 
Austria had attacked Serbia, Italy was not obliged to invoke the Austro-Italian 
31 Grey to Buchanan and Bertie, 22 Mar. 1915, in Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, pp. 296-7. 
318 Grey to Erskine, 20 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1900/42267. 
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Alliance, because Austrian actions were in violation of Clause Seven, which 
forbade territorial changes in the Balkans without Italian approval. 319 As a result, 
the Central Powers and the Entente vied for Italian support and intervention on 
their sides. From the onset of hostilities, Italian policy makers acted to preserve 
Italy's paramount interests, and sounded out Entente representatives regarding 
the prospect of Italian co-belligerency. They feared that the war would change 
the equilibrium in the Adriatic, and possibly in the Mediterranean too, thus 
endangering Italian strategic and naval interests there and in the Balkans, 
especially the Albanian littoral. 320 
Negotiations started as soon as the war began. The Italian representatives 
expressed their sympathy with the Entente cause of ending German military 
domination of western Europe, and hinted at the possibility of entering the war 
on the Entente side. Russian documents show negotiations with the Italians 
earlier than most western accounts allow for. As early as 1 August 1914, 
Sazonov had endorsed Raymond Poincare's, the French President, suggestion 
that they should attempt to attract Italy by offering Valona and `freedom of 
action' in Albania. This was in spite the latter being beyond proclaimed Italian 
ambitions at that point. 321 Marquis Andrea Carlotti, Italian Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, had included the annexation of Valona amongst Italian claims in 
order to secure `a preponderant position' in the Adriatic. 
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Russian diplomacy thus encountered a difficult situation. Having entered 
the war ostensibly to protect Serbia and Slavic interests in the Balkans, 
Russia had already offered Italy, a `preponderant position' in the Adriatic, 
anchored in Rome's possession of Trieste and Valona. 
323 
By 10 August 1914, Sazonov had proposed an agreement including the 
annexation of Valona by Italy, as he was anxious for Italian intervention at the 
earliest opportunity. 324 In these opening exchanges, the position of Albania was 
considered important but still marginal. The chief interest was Valona. Italy was 
prepared for Valona to be not only neutralised, but perhaps even 
internationalised, with all the Adriatic powers taking part in the administration. 
Italian officials claimed that they would not object to the division of the rest of 
Albania between Serbia and Greece, but on condition that the whole Adriatic 
coast from Mount Stylos to the mouth of the Boyana was neutralised. These 
initial proposals represented a complete change in Italian policy from the 1913 
Ambassadors' Conference in London, but they supported longer-term policies 
that coveted expansion into the eastern Adriatic. 325 
The negotiations were slow and uneven. Grey refused to countenance what he 
considered `hypothetical negotiations', despite pressure from Sazonov on the 
necessity of Italian entry. 326 Despite his insistence that it was an inopportune 
moment to press the Italians to abandon their neutrality, Grey was fully aware, 
from reports by Rodd, that the Consulta had decided to join the Entente and 
323 du Quenoy, `With Allies Like These', p. 415. 
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was merely awaiting a decent pretext to take up arms against Austria. 327 For the 
time being, discussion amongst British policy makers centred on what might 
furnish the necessary excuse. Most believed that a much greater threat to Italy 
than the protection of its interests in Albania would be needed. Sir Eyre Crowe, 
British Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, considered that only 
seeing Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia all `in a blaze' would induce the 
Italians to help Serbia and Montenegro. 328 Others within Whitehall took a 
different view, and considered that the Albanian position might win over the 
Italians. This was particularly true since San Giuliano had hinted at the 
importance of Albania when he had commented that the timetable would 
depend upon `the march of events on the other side of the Adriatic'. 329 As 
George Clerk, then a Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office, remarked, it was hoped 
that, although Albania might now have become a secondary issue in European 
international affairs, it was definitely true that Valona may yet provide cause for 
war between Italy and Austria'. 330 Evidence suggests that some form of Entente 
action in the Adriatic may indeed have induced Italian intervention. In 
September 1914, Grey, Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador in Rome, and Sir 
Francis Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris, all proposed action in the Adriatic, 
including the destruction of the Austrian fleet there, to induce Italian 
involvement. The idea was eventually dropped because of Franco-Russian 
opposition. 
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Occupations of Albania 
Throughout September, discussions continued but they remained low key 
because officials in Rome and Athens still refused to agree formally to 
intervention. Within one month, the Italians and Greeks had both acted to 
safeguard their Albanian interests. The departure of the Albanian sovereign and 
great power representatives, the disintegration of the Albanian state and 
dispersal of the small gendarmerie gave the interested parties (Italy, Greece, 
Serbia and Montenegro) ample opportunity to use the situation to their 
advantage. The Greeks, still neutral, were the first to respond. By the beginning 
of October 1914, the situation in northern Epirus was deteriorating partly, it was 
believed, due to the complicity of the Epirote police. The British relief mission, 
under Mr Duncan, had been forced to leave. It was reported that Muslims in 
Argyrocastro were threatened with massacre, and that the Greek-speaking 
(mainly Orthodox Christian) populations were convinced that Athens had 
approved such an extermination of `non-Greek' (Muslim) elements. It appeared 
that all respectable members of the Autonomous Northern Epirus government, 
including Prime Minister Zographos, were powerless. This inevitably gave the 
Greeks the `opportunity' that they had been seeking to intervene. Initially the 
Consulta objected to any Greek action, allegedly to protect the decisions in 
London, but undoubtedly out of fear of any Greek designs regarding Valona. 
332 
The Italians claimed that, as the only great power signatory of the statutes 
creating an independent Albania not involved in the war, it was their 
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responsibility to prevent the occupation of Albanian territory. 333 Venizelos 
sought to gain Entente support for an occupation to protect the Greek 
population from violence by Muslim irregulars. However, he stressed that Greek 
intervention would go ahead even without this. 334 In response, Grey, trying not 
to lose Italian goodwill, attempted to reach an agreement with the Italians. He 
did not see how Britain could support this move otherwise. The Consulta replied 
that it would make no objection to a Greek occupation of Argyrocastro to 
`restore order', as it too might need to do so at Valona, as long as it was 
understood that the London resolutions still generally held good. Antonio 
Salandra, the Italian Prime Minister, deputising at the Foreign Office following 
San Giuliano's death, refused to acknowledge the agreement formally or 
publish it. Whitehall believed this was for fear of the impact it would have on the 
Muslim Albanians, particularly Essad Pasha, whom Whitehall suspected had a 
tacit understanding with the Consulta. Rodd communicated his belief that the 
Consulta was prepared to communicate with Athens, but only by using London 
as an intermediary, and on the understanding that no official agreement would 
be reached. 335 Salandra stated that he preferred any Greek action at 
Argyrocastro to pre-empt Italian action at Valona, but he stressed that this 
would not necessarily occur, even if the Greeks occupied Argyrocastro. 336 The 
Greeks agreed to these conditions, and were satisfied that their occupation 
could be used as a pretext for an Italian occupation of Valona. 337 Whitehall also 
secured an agreement that the Consulta would not confer with Vienna or Berlin, 
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but, considering that the Italians had already gained agreement for intervention 
from them, this was an easy promise to make. 338 The Entente also stated that 
they were prepared for the Serbs to occupy northern Albania, but the Serbs 
declared that they had no current interest in doing so, unless attacked by 
Albanian bands. By contrast, the Entente leaders persistently refused to 
sanction a Montenegrin occupation of Scutari, primarily because they viewed 
such initiatives as detracting from help for Serbia. Nevertheless, as early as 8 
August 1914, Montenegrin forces had unofficially occupied Mount Tarabosh, 
overlooking Scutari, in a first initiative to secure the territory that the powers had 
denied them at the London conferences. 
339 
Greek troops crossed the southern Albanian border in October 1914, officially 
re-occupying all of southern Albania, apart from Valona, and establishing a 
military administration by 27 October. Four days later, supposedly in response 
to the Greek occupation and to Ottoman intrigues, and to uphold Albanian 
neutrality, Italian troops as a `cautionary measure' occupied Saseno Island. 
They established a `sanitary mission' at Valona to provide relief for the 
inhabitants, especially the foreign nationals. The Consulta argued that Ottoman 
intrigues would undermine Albania's future stability and were in the Austro- 
German interest, following the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war (2 
November 1914). Therefore they proposed boarding and searching all vessels 
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flying Greek or Ottoman flags, to prevent the landing of arms and ammunition in 
Albania. 340 Saseno was the closest Italian forces could get to the Albanian 
mainland without occupying it. It was believed that it would provide an ideal 
base from which to search any vessels. The move clearly illustrates the 
importance of the Albanian littoral to Italian policy makers. Their actions placed 
the Consulta in an ideal position, if events were to develop in a way that `forced' 
them to intervene. This would also enable Italy to control the Otranto Straits, 
and therefore access to the Adriatic. For this policy, the Consulta obtained 
unanimous Entente support, although Petrograd was prepared to accept it only 
as long as traditional French interests and operations in the Adriatic were not 
compromised. 341 The Saseno occupation was an incredible achievement and it 
would play a significant part in subsequent negotiations. Baron Sidney Sonnino, 
soon to be Italian Foreign Minister, later claimed of the incident: `They [the 
Entente] would swallow anything rather than risk pushing new forces into the 
arms of their enemies. '342 Moreover, as San Giuliano had earlier predicted, the 
occupation of Valona would remove it from the bargaining table. It would require 
both the Entente and Central Powers to make more substantial offers to secure 
Italian intervention. Surprisingly, yet crucially, all the Entente representatives 
appear to have failed to realise this, and in so doing they made a calamitous 
error. 343 Instead of making Italy more receptive to a possible intervention, as 
intended, the Entente would now have to offer more to secure it. In late 
September 1914, Carlotti had already taunted Sazonov that the Italian 
entitlement to Valona (on the basis of the decisions made in London, and to 
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protect it from aggressors) would grant the Italians `absolute mastery' of the 
Adriatic. 344 None of the Entente negotiators seem to have taken the hint. 
Sazonov's Balkan Initiatives 
The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers, declaring war on 29 October 
1914. This made the Serbian position even more precarious because it created 
the possibility of a joint Austro-Ottoman offensive against Belgrade. From early 
November, Sazonov took the lead on the diplomatic front. In his first proposal, 
Sazonov was prepared to offer Bulgaria the so-called Enos-Midia line in 
exchange for Serbian Adriatic access in northern Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Greece would be confirmed in the possession of northern Epirus 
and the Aegean islands. 345 The Entente had still not gone far enough to satisfy 
the Bulgarians, who re-asserted their decision to remain neutral. 346 Grey, in a 
reversal of his attitude during the London conferences, seems to have decided 
that the powers had made a mistake in shutting Serbia off from the sea: he was 
adamant that Serbia must have access to the Adriatic in northern Albania. Grey 
saw this as the answer to inducing officials in Belgrade to cede territory to 
Bulgaria in the east, the offers of which the Entente needed to increase, in order 
to compete with Austro-German ones. 347 To further this proposal and overcome 
Serbian objections, the French proposed to negotiate directly with the 
Bulgarians, without notifying or communicating this to the Serbian government. 
This was more than Sazonov or Grey were prepared to countenance. 
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Meanwhile, the ability of the Entente to persuade the Greek government to 
contemplate concessions had greatly diminished. Venizelos was not prepared 
to give up the solitary town of Cavalla in eastern Thrace to secure northern 
Epirus. The latter was no longer as attractive as a means of compensation 
because the Greeks were now in possession of it. 349 As a result, the Greeks 
became increasingly intransigent, refusing to make any concessions to Bulgaria 
but claiming compensation for any Bulgarian gains in Thrace. News soon 
arrived that the Serbs had occupied Albania as far south as Elbasan, although 
they stressed that this was only `provisionally' to ward off Albanian incursions, 
and was not indicative of designs on Albanian territory. The Entente feared that 
such action would give Montenegro the excuse to seize Scutari and provide a 
similar pretext for Bulgarian operations in Macedonia, which the Entente wished 
to prevent at all costs. 
350 
Securing Bulgaria's immediate intervention against Austria was therefore 
considered the top priority to protect Serbia from a crushing defeat. To achieve 
this, the Entente needed to guarantee Sofia the Enos-Midia line, and even the 
districts in the `contested zone' in Macedonia promised under the 1912 Serbo- 
Bulgarian convention. They also needed to allow for a coterminous Serbo- 
Greek frontier. 351 Sazonov attached great importance to the fact that Greece 
and Serbia needed a common frontier. He argued that this, together with 
Bulgarian territorial aspirations, could be achieved only at the expense of 
Albania. He had always opposed Albania's creation, and argued that recent 
events had confirmed that its independence was untenable. Sazonov detailed 
sas Bertie to Grey, 7 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/68557. 
350 Bertie to Grey, 28 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/76590; Bertie to Grey, 29 Nov. 1914 and Clerk 
minute, 30 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/76686; des Graz to Grey, 2 
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351 Buchanan to Grey, 29 Nov. 1914, and Clerk minute, 30 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/76689. 
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the precise line that the Greco-Serbian frontier should take. It would start at 
Pogradec, would pass by the watershed of the rivers Skumbi and Deval and go 
south to the Adriatic at the mouth of the Skumbi, although Valona would be left 
to Italy. By acquiring the fertile region of Durazzo, Shiak, Cavaya and Tirana, 
Serbia would receive some material compensation for the loss of Macedonia, 
whilst Greece would gain Albanian territory further north than that defined as 
northern Epirus, including Berat and Elbasan. Even ethnic considerations were 
invoked for this division, as the Skumbi represented the traditional division 
between Ghegs and Tosks. Despite some French support, officials in Whitehall 
did not give this scheme much credence. Their objections centred on their belief 
that Venizelos would refuse the proposal, and not accept the allocation of 
Monastir to Bulgaria. They also believed it would be violently opposed by the 
Serbs and Albanians, especially the northern tribes, and that no definite 
acceptance by a Balkan state would be achieved if Sazonov kept putting 
forward one new idea after another. The Balkan leaders would merely wait for 
the next one to see how it differed, hoping for and expecting improvements. 352 
Nevertheless Sazonov continued to draw up Balkan schemes. He argued that 
Austrian objections (during the Ambassadors' Conference) regarding Albania 
were no longer relevant, that an enlarged Bulgaria should no longer be feared 
and that the precise details should be left to Russian arbitration, in accordance 
with the 1912 Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. By the end of November 1914, 
Sazonov was prepared to accept a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality as the 
price. 353 Grey was not prepared to go beyond the proposals formulated 
in mid- 
November. Although prepared to offer Bulgaria compensations up to the Enos- 
352 Buchanan to Grey, 27 Nov. 1914, and Olliphant and Clerk minutes, 28 Nov. 1914, 
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Midia line and to secure Serbian access to the Adriatic, Grey refused to 
countenance the partition of Albania between Greece and Serbia, insisting that 
this would arouse Italian objections because the Consulta would feel shut off 
from securing its interests in the Adriatic. British ministers were urging that 
Bulgarian neutrality must be secured, as they believed its delay was preventing 
the Greek and Romanian governments declaring their allegiance to the Entente. 
Consequently, Grey urged that the Bulgarians should be pressed for a reply, 
and Sazonov proposed to guarantee the Greeks against a Bulgarian attack. 354 
On 5 December 1914, the Entente offered Greece the whole of northern Epirus, 
except Valona. Venizelos refused. He was insulted that Greece should be 
offered so small a cession of territory, and stated that the whole of northern 
Epirus meant less to him than the possession of Cavalla, whilst the Bulgarians 
were to receive vast territories for nothing more than neutrality. 355 The internal 
Greek situation had developed in a way that necessitated the maintenance of 
Greek neutrality. Royalist circles were becoming increasingly pro-German; 
Venizelos and his supporters were becoming more vehement in support of a 
pro-Entente policy; the occupation of northern Epirus had in itself produced 
problems. Members of the Greek parliament and public were attacking their 
government for leaving northern Epirus under a military administration, instead 
of incorporating it into the ordinary civil regime. There was a realistic danger of 
further Greek manoeuvres, especially as Venizelos had sounded out the 
Consulta as to a possible advance on Berat, a significant town in central 
354 Grey to Buchanan, 2 Dec. 1914, FO 371/1902/77504; Elliot to Grey, 1 Dec. 1914, FO 
371/1902/77623; Buchanan to Grey, 2 Dec. 1914, FO 371/1902/78111. 
355 Elliot to Grey, 7 Dec. 1914, FO 371/2241/249; Curtwright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback, 
p. 61. 
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Albania. 356 Despite the Greek rejection, a further Entente offer was forwarded to 
Sofia, but this too was rejected. The Bulgarians repeated their commitment to 
remain neutral, but added that they might be convinced of the necessity of 
participation on the Entente side, if a more definitive and substantial offer was 
made. This did not materialise. 357 The Entente remained desirous of Greek 
support, fearful that without it the whole confederation scheme would collapse. 
Before any further offers could be made, the position regarding Albania was 
transformed by the Italian occupation of Valona, and its hinterland, on 26 
December 1914. The Consulta reported that they had heard gunshots in the 
port on Christmas Day, and had received an appeal from the Albanian 
government at Durazzo, which presumably meant Essad, for them to occupy. 
They claimed that the move was necessary to defend Albanian neutrality and to 
oppose the policy of the Ottoman Empire. The official explanation stated that 
disorder, around Durazzo, had spread to the neighbourhood of Valona. Sonnino 
added that the occupation was only `provisional' and that the Consulta had no 
intentions of further action. 358 There is considerable evidence to dispute these 
assertions. The Consulta had already been pressing the Porte to recall the 
Ottoman officers, whom it blamed for fomenting agitation in Albania. The 
occupation was also a direct response to reports of expected Austrian action in 
the eastern Adriatic, because of the absence of the Montenegrin army. It is 
reasonable to suppose that Italian action would serve as a reminder to Vienna 
that Italy had interests in Albania, and the Balkans in general, that it wished to 
protect, and was prepared to do so by force if necessary. Conversely the 
356 Elliot to Grey, 28 Dec. 1914, FO 371/2503/2625. 
357Bax-lronside to Grey, 9 Dec. 1914, FO 371/1902/81073; Bax-Ironside to Grey, 9 Dec. 1914, 
3 
FO 371/1902/80984; Bax-Ironside to Grey, 9 Dec. 1914, FO 371/1902/81174. 
Swire, Albania, p. 246; T. N. Page, Italy and the World War (New York, 1920), pp. 175-6. 
162 
American Ambassador in Italy, Thomas Page, wrote of discussions between the 
Consulta and the Central Powers regarding Italian action `for the purpose of 
upholding the agreement concerning Albania'. This was in order to divert `public 
opinion from its attitude toward the Triple Alliance' and because The Entente 
powers would understand, probably to their discomfiture, that the Triple Alliance 
is still working together. '359 Italian documents are even more illuminating. They 
attest to Sonnino's direct involvement three days earlier, when he had sent 
details to Aliotti to provoke `a local incident to facilitate intervention and the 
opportunity to execute our plan'. 360 Most of all, the occupation ensured the 
removal from the bargaining table of the most obvious acquisition that either 
side could offer the Italians in return for intervention. Despite all the 
protestations that Italian troops would not advance further than Valona, Italian 
actions remained highly suspect. The Balkan states became more aggressive in 
their pursuit of Albanian territory, keen to stake out their claims before Italian 
forces were able to prevent them. Reports materialised of a Serbo-Greek 
understanding regarding Albania: if the Albanian tribes attacked the Serbs, then 
the Greeks would create a `diversion' in the south. 
361 
From the beginning of January 1915 information emerged, detailing the 
likelihood of an Austrian offensive against Serbia and Austrian agitation in 
Albania. This made help for Belgrade even more imperative. 362 It prompted the 
Entente to resume Balkan negotiations: the importance of Albanian territory 
within them declined, particularly for the Greeks. Clerk commented that, as far 
as Balkan territory went, Athens had practically nothing more to hope for in the 
359 Rodd to Grey, 26 Dec. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 107; Page, Italy and World War, p. 174. 
360 Sonnino to Aliotti, 22 Dec. 1914, DDI, Series 5, II, no. 377; Also at du Quenoy, 'With Allies 
Like These', p. 423. 
361 Elliot to Grey, 8 Jan. 1915, FO 371/2241/2970. 
362 Percy memo., 9 July 1915, FO 371/2264/102672, p. 12. 
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war. Northern Epirus was already to 'all intents and purposes hers', the 
Consulta showed signs of preventing a further Greek advance, for example 
northwards to the town of Berat, and Sofia would eventually form a barrier 
between Greece and Serbia in Macedonia. The Bulgarians would probably also 
try to seize Cavalla, to which the Greeks were resolutely opposed. In addition 
no more offers of Albanian territory could be made. Theophile Delcasse, the 
French Foreign Minister, refused to do anything that might offend the Consulta. 
Instead, the Entente sought to find payment for Greece outside the Balkans, 
and eventually settled upon Smyrna, because Ottoman possessions had 
become bargaining tools, following the Ottoman entry in November 1914.363 
These initiatives failed because opposition from Constantine resulted in 
Venizelos resigning on 6 March 191 rj 364 Despite the loss of the most 
passionate Greek advocate of the Entente cause, relations between the Entente 
and Greece remained good. There were indications that the new Greek 
government might agree to join them, although most likely this would not 
include the restoration of a Balkan bloc. The final reply came at the beginning of 
May 1915.365 By this point the situation had been completely transformed by 
Italian entry into the war. 
Italian Entry and the Partition of `Albania' 
Italo-Entente negotiations progressed no further, as the Consulta was diverted 
by negotiations with the Austrians. The initial interpretation, that Italian neutrality 
was merely a means of playing for time in order to extract the highest price from 
363 Clerk minute, 11 Jan. 1915, FO 371/2241/3601; Buchanan to Grey, 3 Feb. 1915, FO 
371/2242/13210. 
364 Buchanan to Grey, 5 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2243/25532, and Bertie to Grey, 4 Mar. 1915, FO 
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the highest bidder, has long been discounted. In reality, the Consulta had 
quickly surmised that its irredentist ambitions could be secured only by entry on 
the Entente side. Any alliance with Austria, or even neutrality, was unlikely to 
produce the desired results. The true tenor of Italian intentions became obvious 
when the Consulta asked for concessions from the Entente in exchange for 
intervention, although they had asked for the same concessions from the 
Central Powers in exchange for mere neutrality. The Consulta simply spun out 
negotiations with the Austrian government until it was possible to extract the 
necessary concessions from the Entente. 366 By the middle of February 1915, 
the Austrian negotiations had reached an impasse, and Rodd was able to report 
that he believed the Consulta had definitely decided to join the Entente. 367 The 
position of the Balkans, if not Albania specifically, was crucial. Since the 
beginning of the conflict, there had been reports of the impact that a Balkans 
expedition might have on Italian thinking. As Clerk maintained, the Italians were 
waiting for the Dardanelles campaign before acting. By the end of February 
1915, and the start of the operation, Rodd too was urging that the time had 
come `to speak more plainly' in Rome, but it was decided, once more, to wait for 
the Italians to make the first move. 368 
Eventually, on 4 March 1915, Imperiali approached Grey as to a possible 
agreement. Any such agreement would have several Albanian clauses, albeit 
as part of a much wider settlement, predominantly in the Adriatic. The Albanian 
clauses centred upon Valona, but also the creation of a `Muslim state' in the 
central Albanian lowlands (the area inhabited almost exclusively by Muslim 
366 Renzi, 'Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War', p. 1426; Lowe, 'Britain and the 
Italian Intervention', p. 539. 
367 Rodd to Grey, 16 Feb. 1915, Grey MSS, FO 800/65. 
368 Rodd to Grey, 28 Feb. 1915 and Clerk minute, 1 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2375/23560. 
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Albanians) as an Italian protectorate. In addition it was proposed that any part of 
the coastline annexed by Greece or Serbia, which de facto meant the rest of the 
Albanian coastline, should be neutralised. 369 The central Muslim state 
stipulation probably arose from Italian treaty obligations with Essad Pasha. This 
territory represented Essad's power base and would also exclude many 
nationalist elements (Orthodox Albanians in the south and northern Catholic 
tribes, who had both opposed him in the past). Throughout the negotiations, the 
Italians tried to obtain as much as possible, the Russians tried to stop them, and 
the British worked for an agreeable compromise, in accordance with 
contemporary ideas about the balance-of-power and British naval interests. 
Neither Whitehall, nor any of the Entente or Italian negotiators, foresaw the 
collapse of Austria-Hungary. Whitehall feared Italy replacing Austria as the 
dominant power in the Adriatic and western Balkans. Therefore, it deemed it 
necessary to increase Serbian acquisitions to provide a counterweight, and to 
make additional commitments to the Serbs as an alliance partner. Conversely, 
the Foreign Office did not want to see Serbia, especially a Russian-dominated 
one, sufficiently enlarged to upset the balance of power in the Balkans and 
Adriatic to Russian advantage. Ideas of self-determination, especially relating to 
the Albanians, were not considered. 
Although the majority of the Consulta's demands proving uncontroversial, the 
negotiations did not run smoothly. Sazonov had became increasingly resistant, 
largely because he had realised that Italian aspirations in Dalmatia were in 
contravention of Slav interests, and this led to a re-evaluation of the possible 
help Italy could provide. Sazonov advised his ambassadors in London and Paris 
ass Grey minute on Imperiali verbal, 4 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/28275; Memo. in Buchanan to 
Sazonov, 11 Mar. 1915, MOEI, Series 3, Vll. i, pp. 446-8. 
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to repeat his conviction that Italian aspirations should be `proportional' to their 
assistance, and not solely against Austria-Hungary. 
370 Sazonov desired to 
exclude Italy by defeating Italian ambitions in the eastern Adriatic, but 
eventually Franco-British pressure lessened his objections. The obstructive 
Russian Ambassador in Rome was also replaced to facilitate negotiations. 371 
Grey thus found himself once more in the role of mediator. He was more than 
willing to work to secure an Italian agreement. At the beginning of March 1915, 
Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay acknowledged complete recognition of the 
Russian government's claims to Constantinople and the Dardanelles straits, 
despite this being in contravention of the long-term interests of both. 372 Grey 
had insisted upon the importance of this, to `remove Russian suspicions as to 
our attitude and to get rid of the Russian objections to the participation' of Italy 
and the Balkan neutrals. 373 Nevertheless, Russian objections consistently 
threatened to jeopardise Entente chances of securing help from the neutral 
states, especially Italy. 
Sazonov's objections to the Albanian settlement were considerable and were to 
play a major role in the discussions. He passionately disapproved of the idea of 
creating a central Muslim state, believing it would be completely impractical, 
and was adamant that the whole of Albania should be partitioned between 
Greece and Serbia. He continued to oppose any scheme that included blocking 
Serbian access to the Adriatic, but he accepted that Serbian and Montenegrin 
370 Untitled memo., 2 Mar. 1915, MOEI, Series 3, Vll. i, no. 276; Sazonov to Benckendorff and 
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167 
ports could be neutralised. 374 All these issues had an impact upon Serbia's 
potential Adriatic access, and therefore on Russian use of any Adriatic ports, 
375 
Delcasse also opposed any future Muslim Italian-controlled state in Albania, 
and even the neutralisation of the Adriatic coast: this could be prejudicial to 
Serbian commercial expansion and have severe implications for Serbian 
morale. 376 Grey, on this issue, as on so many others, held a position halfway 
between Rome, on the one hand, and Paris and Petrograd, on the other. Grey's 
personal views were immaterial: he considered Italian intervention crucial. He 
stated that, although he had no principled objections to the creation of an 
independent Muslim state, he believed that there would be great difficulties in 
sustaining the state in practice. 37 Attempting to bring the sides closer together, 
Clerk proposed that the idea of the `state' was a matter of detail that should be 
left for discussion. He added that, although the Italian claims were considerable, 
it might be worthwhile to meet their wishes, albeit only after some 
`opposition'. 378 Eventually, Delcasse was convinced by British arguments, as he 
too was desirous to avoid further delaying Italian entry. He agreed to accept the 
Italian proposal, including `in principle' any British suggestions regarding 
Albania. 379 Under immense diplomatic pressure, Sazonov too gradually, and 
grudgingly, lessened his objections. He conceded the recognition of Italy's 
outright annexation of Valona and the Muslim state idea, albeit with certain 
modifications and stipulations. It was in these that controversy persisted. 
Sazonov maintained that, whilst Durazzo was to be the capital of the Muslim 
state, the seaboard territories generally would need to be placed under Italian 
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rule. More significantly, he insisted that a central strip of Albanian territory 
should be left to provide Greece and Serbia with a conterminous frontier. 380 
Although Sazonov considered other parts of the Adriatic, as the home to native 
Slav populations, more important than Albania, he held out on negotiations 
regarding Albania; but in other areas, including Dalmatia, he was prepared to 
compromise. Throughout negotiations, the Albanian question was closely tied to 
that of Dalmatia and the general Adriatic settlement. Sazonov insisted that, if 
the Italians wished to annex the Dalmatian coast from Sebenico northwards, 
they must abandon their pretensions to Albania, whilst keeping Valona. 
Dalmatia was most definitely Slav but it was also home to non-Orthodox 
Catholic Croats and Slovenes. Sazonov was prepared to make concessions at 
the expense of the Croats and Slovenes, but not of his protege Orthodox 
Serbia, whose claims focused on northern Albania. Eventually, Sazonov chose 
to grant the Italians two Dalmatian ports rather than make concessions in 
Albania. Sazonov was prepared to go so far as to threaten that, if the Italians 
did not join the Entente `soon', all promises might be withdrawn. He also 
continued to argue vehemently against the Muslim state, claiming that it could 
not be self-sustaining. He was only prepared to give Italy this claim, including 
Durazzo, if it abandoned claims further north, together with Spalato which, he 
argued, must become Slav. Later he relented to some extent, maintaining that 
Spalato could be neutralised and that Italy could retain the Dalmatian islands for 
strategic reasons. 381 
380 A Nicolson minute, 22 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/34055; Grey to Rodd, 25 Mar. 1915, FO 
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The Italians succeeded in holding out, arguing that if the proposals were 
rejected then Italy would not enter the war, because its object was to make the 
Adriatic secure. If this objective was jeopardised, its operations would be futile. 
It was not so much fear of Austria but fear of Russia that dominated Italian 
thinking. The Consulta feared that, after the war, Austria-Hungary would be 
replaced by Russia as the dominant power in the Adriatic, if not the 
Mediterranean, through its position in the Balkans, including above all an 
enlarged and strengthened Serbian protege. The Italians considered that only 
Pola, a port in Istria, could provide an adequate guarantee of security. Valona, 
despite all perceptions to the contrary and the former Italian interest in the port, 
was a far lesser prize. Since its occupation, it had been discovered that, without 
a massive works programme to convert it into an adequate naval base or 
defensive station, Valona would not be able to secure the Adriatic. Rodd 
insisted that he did not believe that the Consulta would really break off 
negotiations. However, an increasing number of reports was materialising, and 
from `credible sources', thus they could not be dismissed as Italian propaganda 
or intrigue, that the Consulta was about to conclude a definite agreement with 
the Ballhausplatz. 382 More crucially, disastrous news from the Dardanelles, at 
the end of March, made the signing of any agreement all the more imperative 
for the Entente. Sonnino considered himself in a stronger position. He had 
received a firm indication that Grey would not support the prospect of a Russian 
client state in the Adriatic, considering such an eventuality as potentially 
dangerous to Britain as to Italy. Sonnino had notified his ambassadors that 
Benckendorff, 17 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/31554; Buchanan to Grey, 19 Mar. 1915, FO 
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Rodd had informed him that, from `the military viewpoint England has interests 
in common ... military predominance in the Adriatic is of primary importance'. 383 
At the beginning of April 1915, Grey announced that, because of his failing 
eyesight, he was to take a rest. He passed over control of the Foreign Office to 
Herbert Asquith, the British Prime Minister. This news, coming at such an 
impasse in negotiations, could not fail to impact on both Sazonov and Sonnino. 
Sazonov was particularly disturbed. He greatly valued his personal relationship 
with Grey. He considered that his recent acquisition of British support for 
Russian designs on Constantinople would not have been achievable without 
this relationship. He feared that another foreign secretary would not feel obliged 
to abide by it. He was informed only indirectly of Grey's departure. 384 He 
therefore moved to bring about a quick resolution of differences with Sonnino. 
Under these circumstances, Asquith was able to secure that agreement which 
had so eluded Grey. 
This agreement had something for both sides. The Italian government would be 
responsible for Albanian representation in foreign affairs of the small Muslim 
state version of Albania. The Entente ensured that the hinterland of such a 
`state' would be limited to the east, to provide a territorial connection between 
Greece and Serbia, west of Lake Ochrida. 385 From the British perspective, this 
arrangement served two purposes: it would help to maintain the balance of 
power, and it would ensure that the Serbs would not be dependent on the 
Adriatic for their maritime outlet. Serbia's landlocked position had placed it in a 
precarious position, and had prevented the Entente providing help and supplies. 
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Under the terms of the Pact, Clauses Five, Six and Seven related to Albania. 
Most significantly, Valona and Saseno were to go to Italy in full sovereignty, the 
coast was to be neutralised as far south as Cape Stylos, thus neutralising the 
Corfu straits, and the Albania created in 1913 was to be tri-sected between 
Serbia and Montenegro in the north, Greece in the south and a small 
neutralised Muslim state under Italian tutelage in the centre. 386 
In the final stage of discussions, Sazonov and then Sonnino and Salandra 
raised new objections. Grey, returning after his recuperation, finally brought his 
full weight to bear on the proceedings. Together with Delcasse, he persuaded 
Sazonov not to insist on Italian entry by 1 May 1915, and he persuaded the 
Consulta, against its wishes, to delay signing until 2 September 1915.387 
Although other areas of the settlement remained more important, the Albanian 
question was particularly time-consuming because the Italians raised several 
new objections. The Italians modified their position regarding Article Seven. 
They suggested that the frontier question should be left open, and objected to 
the definition of Lake Ochrida as the point from which the Serbo-Greek frontier 
should start. Grey countered by arguing that there were several points of 
drafting where the Entente had considered improving the text, but had dropped 
these to save time. His main argument centred on a threat to a key Italian 
ambition. If the Consulta pressed the definition of the territorial connection in 
eastern Albania, the Entente powers would need to raise the definition of the 
Dalmatian hinterland already assigned to Italy. Grey argued strongly that the 
Italians should not press for a weakening of Article Seven: such an action would 
lead to a double loss of time and make it necessary to discuss two more 
386 A. Nicolson memo., 15 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/45066. 
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changes. He also stressed the effect on morale of Italy entering the war at the 
earliest opportunity. 388 In response, Sonnino relented, stating that he now 
accepted Grey's point of view, together with the points raised by Sazonov, and 
hoped that signing could take place immediately. 389 The projected gains in 
Dalmatia had proved more attractive than those in Albania, and Sonnino dared 
not jeopardise them. The Russians likewise waived raising any new points as to 
the Albanian hinterland, and Sazonov stated that he was now content to leave 
any necessary redrafting to Grey. 390 The final Pact of London was eventually 
signed on 26 April 1915, and the signatories deliberately did not call it a treaty, 
to avoid it requiring parliamentary approval. 
The final version (Appendix D) with reference to Albania included Valona, 
Saseno and surrounding territory, sufficient for the defence of Italy, in full 
sovereignty (Article Six). It also provided that Italy should obtain the Trentino 
and Istria (Article Four) together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands (Article 
Five) and Valona (Article Six), and that, providing the central portion of Albania 
was reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state, 
Italy would not oppose the division of northern and southern Albania between 
Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Britain and Russia so wish 
(Article Seven). The coast from the southern boundary of the territory around 
Valona assigned to Cape Stylos was to be neutralised. The clauses regarding 
Italian representation of Albania in foreign affairs, and the coterminous Greco- 
Serbian frontier west of Lake Ochrida, were also included. 391 Less than two 
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389 Rodd to Grey, 23 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/48886. 
390 Rodd to Grey, 24 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/49188; Grey to Rodd, 24 Apr. 1915, FO 
371/2508/49773. 
391 'The Treaty of London, 26 April 1915' in Temperley, History of the Peace Conferences of 
Paris, V, pp. 388-9. 
173 
years earlier, Grey and the same Italian, French and Russian Ambassadors, in 
London, had represented four of the six great powers who had created, 
delimited and guaranteed an independent Albanian state. By the end of April 
1915, they had negotiated Albania's complete dismemberment. Italy formally 
entered the war against Austria, and severed diplomatic relations with 
Germany, on 23 May 1915, although it did not declare war on Germany until 28 
August 1916. The Consulta was highly satisfied with the terms, for it had finally 
secured the long-coveted foothold in the Balkans, and far-reaching territorial 
concessions elsewhere in the Adriatic. As Salandra later claimed, and there 
were many who would agree with him, the Pact was `the greatest, if not the first, 
completely spontaneous act of foreign policy executed by Italy after the 
Risorgimento'. 392 Sazonov, in contrast, remained highly dissatisfied. 393 
Interventions and Albania's Strategic Position 
Although the Pact was not published, there were strong suspicions that it 
existed and that its scope covered `Albania'. The agreement revived long-held 
suspicions of the Italians in Belgrade and Athens, and heightened their mistrust 
of the Entente: the Serbs regarding Italian claims to Dalmatia, and the Greeks 
regarding Asia Minor. 394 The possibility of Serbian and Greek gains elsewhere 
had diminished, and without the possibility of these as trade-offs, the ever- 
dwindling prospect of the confederation scheme may have been rendered 
inoperable. In reality, although the Balkan states did not know this at the time, 
the Italian agreement was very much in line with the confederation proposals. 
Throughout the Italian negotiations the Entente leaders, especially Sazonov, 
392 Salandra quoted in Renzi, `Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War', p. 1432. For 
details of these revised Italian policies see Chapters 6 and 7. 
393 See for instance Sazonov to Benckendorff, 20 Apr. 1915, MOEI, Series 3, VII. ii, no. 564. 
394 Percy memo., 9 July 1915, FO 371/2264/102672, pp. 41-2. 
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had been determined to ensure the Balkan scheme, and insisted in particular on 
ensuring a sufficient Greco-Serbian frontier in Albania and a Serbian Adriatic 
outlet in northern Albania. 
395 
Negotiations for the formation of the Balkan alliance had been continuing. At the 
start of August 1915, the issue of what to do with Albanian territory became 
prominent. The Consulta had formalised those concessions it was prepared to 
grant Serbia and Greece in Albania, and upon which subsequent offers of 
territory in Macedonia to the Bulgarians could be based. The definition, and 
determination, of the Greco-Serbian frontier in Albania proved very contentious. 
Under the Italian Pact, the arrangements for this had not been specified, in 
order to secure Italian co-operation. Sonnino was resolute not to see Austria 
replaced by another dominant power in the Adriatic. Sazonov was determined 
to secure the largest possible Adriatic frontage for Serbia, and for the Serbo- 
Greek frontier to be as long as possible, to secure rail and other 
communications. Sonnino wished to limit this in order to maximise the scope of 
the central Albanian state. 396 Conversations continued on these lines until news 
arrived that the Bulgarians wanted an announcement from the Allies that Serbia 
had consented to the proposals regarding Macedonia. 397 The Allies had not 
secured the necessary concessions from the Serbian government for fear of 
acerbating the delicate Serbian political situation. Nevertheless, on 3 
September the Allies offered Bulgaria the Enos-Midia line and the `contested 
zone' in Macedonia, if Bulgaria entered the war against the Ottoman Empire. 
The Allies were prepared to disregard Serbian sensibilities in a desperate 
395 Buchanan to Grey, 12 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/29374; Grey to Buchanan and Bertie, 14 
Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/44480; A. Nicolson minute, 15 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/45066. 
39 Rodd to Grey, 9 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/109491; Rodd to Grey, 11 Aug. 1915, and Grey to 
Bertie, 12 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/111103; DMO memo., 10 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/110393. 
397 Grey to des Graz, 27 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/120224. 
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attempt to prevent Bulgaria aligning with the Central Powers. 398 On 22 
September 1915, however, Bulgaria mobilised in support of the Central Powers, 
and declared war on the Allies on 12 October 1915.399 
Following Bulgarian entry, the military situation in the Balkans, particularly the 
position of Serbia, quickly deteriorated. This, in turn, had an impact on the 
diplomatic front. It also rendered the idea of the Balkan confederation null and 
void. Conversely, there was no longer any need to offer Bulgaria compensation 
in Macedonia, and the resulting compensation for Greece and Serbia 
elsewhere, including Albania. More critically, Serbia was now surrounded on 
three sides by enemies, and the long-feared decisive onslaught had arrived. 
This made any form of Balkan agreement all the more expedient. It also made 
the position of `Albanian' territory even more important. Bulgarian entry also 
revived the issue of Greek treaty obligations. A Balkan alliance on the terms of 
the first Balkan war was no longer possible, but the Allies still held out hope of 
establishing one similar to that of the second Balkan war. This was directed 
against Bulgaria and based on a Greek-Serbian-Romanian partnership. As 
early as 17 September 1915, the Allies had proposed the idea of a Balkan bloc 
aimed against 'Bulgaria. At that point, they still hoped that the proposal would 
secure at least Bulgarian neutrality. 400 Allied offers to supply 150,000 troops to 
Salonika, which Serbia was obliged to send under the 1913 Treaty, and even 
the cession of Cyprus by Britain, were insufficient to prompt the Greeks to 
398 des Graz to Grey, 28 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/121477; des Graz to Grey, 1 Sept. 1915, FO 
371/2265/123654; Grey to Bertie, 3 Sept. 1915, and Clerk minute, 3 Sept. 1915, FO 
371/2265/124331. 
399 Stavrianos, Balkans since 1483, pp. 561-3. 
400 O'Beirne to Grey, 17 Sept. 1915, and Clerk minute, 18 Sept. 1915, FO 371/2269/133735; 
Following the Pact with Italy, where the text refers to the four great powers (Britain, France, 
Russia and Italy), as opposed to the three Entente Powers (Britain, France and Russia), they 
will be referred to as the Allies or Allied Powers. 
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intervene. The Athenian government insisted upon, at most, a policy of 
benevolent neutrality. 
401 
The Greeks once more exploited the military situation to their advantage in 
northern Epirus. The Prime Minister, Stephanos Skouloudis, issued a 
proclamation stating that the Greek return to northern Epirus was a success of 
the highest importance (kiryx or first order), and implemented a series of 
administrative reforms. The Athenian press announced a Royal Decree 
reuniting northern Epirus with the Kingdom of Greece. In the December 1915 
Greek elections, the northern Epirotes, inhabitants of territory still officially part 
of the state of Albania, were allowed to vote and to return deputies to the Greek 
parliament. On 11 January 1916, the elected representatives took up their seats 
at the opening of the new Greek parliament. This last step proved too much for 
the Allied representatives. In spite of the necessity of gaining Greek assistance, 
the Allies, under Italian influence, and in view of the plight of the Serbs, were 
not prepared to so blatantly offend Albanian sensibilities. They demanded an 
explanation from Athens, and declared that such moves were not in line with the 
decisions of the great powers regarding Albania. The Greeks protested at the 
Allied demands, claiming, in particular, that it was necessary to give the 
northern Epirotes a voice, as taxes were levied upon them. Nevertheless, the 
Greeks were eventually forced by the Allies to exclude the northern Epirote 
deputies. 402 With their troops now positioned at Salonika, the Allies were much 
better placed to ensure that their demands were met. 
401 Percy memo., 22 Oct. 1915, FO 371/2278/174823; Elliot to Grey, 9 Nov. 1915, FO 
371/2278/167911; Zaimis quoted in TNA: PRO CAB 42/2/31, par. 214 [hereafter cited as CAB]: 
Also at Lowe, 'The Failure of British Diplomacy', p. 93; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 41. 
402 Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 61-3; Swire, Albania, p. 245. 
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Under attack from three sides, the Serbian position rapidly deteriorated. 
Somewhat ironically, the Allies decided that `Albania' would be Serbia's 
salvation. An Adriatic Mission was instituted to supply the Serbs through 
Albania, and help was sought from the northern tribes to facilitate it. Grey went 
further. He proposed bringing the Albanians within the Balkan confederation. He 
argued that, to ensure their participation, it would be necessary once more to 
secure Albanian independence. Despite acknowledging many problems (above 
all in determining with whom to negotiate, and the need to give guarantees 
about Scutari), Grey considered this the best solution under the circumstances. 
Grey was sceptical that the scheme would be successful `without offering the 
Albanian tribes anything except food and good words and bribes'. He was not 
prepared to go so far as defining any frontiers for a future Albanian state, as this 
would inevitably create too much disagreement amongst the Allies and 
opposition from Albania's neighbours. 403 Delcasse and Sazonov vetoed the 
scheme. In so doing, Sazonov argued in favour of an Italian protectorate for the 
whole of Albania-the very policy he had vehemently opposed in the 
discussions over Italian entry. He now considered this a lesser evil than an 
independent Albania. 404 But, as one official pointed out, they were tied by the 
`Gordian knot' of the London Pact, especially in relation to Valona. 
405 British 
thinking about Albania was determined by that of its alliance partners. Any 
moral sentiment was discarded for the harsh reality of wartime realpolitik. With 
Albania's chief proponent Austria now the enemy, the Entente was able to 
403 Buchanan to Grey, 21 Nov. 1915, Percy minute, 22 Nov. 1915, and reply Grey to Buchanan, 
23 Nov. 1915, FO 371/2279/175469; Grey to Rodd, 21 Nov. 1915, FO 371/2279/177332; 
Durham, Balkan Tangle, pp. 284-5. 
404 Buchanan to Grey, 24 Nov. 1915, FO 371/2279/177902; Buchanan to Grey, 22 Nov. 1915 
and Percy minute, 23 Nov. 1915, FO 371/2279/17657. 
405 Memo., 10 Nov. 1916, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35/1; Troubridge to Admiralty, 9 Jan. 1916, 
'The British Naval Mission in Serbia', TNA: PRO ADM 137/1141 [hereafter cited as ADM]; For 
details of the Serbian retreat through Albania see C. E. J Fryer, The Destruction of 
Serbia in 
1915 (New York, 1997), esp. pp. 49-125, and 'Rear-Admiral Troubridge's Serbian Journal', pp. 
136-238. 
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propose schemes for Albanian partition and dismemberment, with the aim of 
securing the desired Balkan alliance. By the end of 1915, this scheme had 
failed, the Serbs were fleeing south over Albania's northern mountains, 
admittedly towards the Adriatic, but not under the victorious circumstances of 
which they had dreamed for so long, and the future of an independent Albanian 
state was once more in doubt. 
Conclusions 
The discussions surrounding entry into the First World War are very illuminating 
for the question of Albanian independence. From the start, `Albania' or Albanian 
territory was a significant feature of proposals to create a Balkan confederation. 
It was to provide compensation to Greece and Serbia for concessions 
elsewhere. Admittedly, Austrian considerations were no longer relevant, but the 
Allies went further in abandoning the Albanians, especially in light of their 
pledges to other small states such as Belgium. In 1914 and 1915, Entente 
diplomacy with Greece and the other Balkan states was short-sighted, 
misguided and ultimately unsuccessful, because Greek fears, especially of the 
Bulgarians, were consistently underestimated. 406 Most Balkan states preferred 
to adopt a wait-and-see attitude in order to determine correctly what their 
neighbours would do, and also to judge accurately who the potential victor 
would be. No state was prepared to sacrifice itself for a losing cause and, 
except for some Serbian victories in late 1914 in repelling the Austrian 
offensive, the Allies were not winning. Diplomacy was closely linked to military 
developments. But it was a vicious circle. The ever-worsening Serbian position 
required the Allies to obtain the support of the Balkan states to help Belgrade; in 
406 Curtwright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback, p. 64. 
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order to gain that help the Allies needed military success. This was clearly far 
from the predictions about small and neutral states seeking to balance the 
international system by siding with the weaker coalition. Instead it clearly fits 
with Paul Schroeder's views on 'bandwagon ning'. 407 Such a strategy is 
particularly important for small states because of the greater risks associated 
with choosing the wrong side. As the British General, Sir William Robertson, 
later wrote, `since the war began, diplomacy had seriously failed to assist us'. 
However, as Grey so rightly replied, `diplomacy in war is futile without military 
success to back it'. 408 
The policies and actions of all the Allied great powers were clearly indicative of 
wider strategic trends. From the British perspective, the question of Albania was 
related to concerns about Russian pre-eminence in eastern Europe. In Poland, 
British negotiators favoured the creation of a semi-autonomous Poland as a 
counterweight to Russian ambitions. 409 In Albania they preferred a small semi- 
autonomous and Italian-controlled Albania for much the same reasons in the 
Adriatic, and as a means of protecting British sea power. For the Italians, 
although their gains did not correspond to their maximum irredentist claims, 
they secured much more than their initial demands. Their policy regarding 
Albanian territory had protected their three core objectives in the war effort: 
protection against Austria and Russia, control of the Adriatic and potential for 
expansion and dominance in the Balkans. For the Russians, under the 
agreement, Serbia had been enlarged and had finally gained ports on the 
Adriatic and an extended boundary with Greece. Both of these should have 
407 Schroeder, `Historical Reality', pp. 108-48, esp. pp. 117-23; For similar views on how small 
states in the Second World War needed to accurately judge who the victor would be see Baker 
Fox, Power of Small States, esp. pp. 182-3,187. 
408 Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, p. 330. 
409 For further details see 'Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, pp. 363-4. 
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fostered Serbia's future stability and growth, and provided a good base for 
Russian expansion in the Balkans as a result. For the French, their Greek 
protege and their Russian ally had both benefited. There were glimpses of hope 
for the Albanians too-at least some form of state would survive, albeit in the 
central region where the conservative Muslim peasants had shown themselves 
the least receptive to the nationalist programme. Whilst Russian and French 
policies on the Albanian question remained largely constant, the war had 
caused a revision of British and Italian interests in Albania and the Adriatic. The 
policies pursued and decisions arrived at in London in 1913 were unable to 
meet their geo-political interests in the region, or their wider war aims. 
The change in British attitudes, especially considering the staunch defence of 
Belgium, was perhaps the most surprising. British ministers would face 
numerous questions in parliament on this dichotomy. They would persistently 
maintain that the questions of Belgium and Albania could not be compared. 
Regarding Albania, as Grey appreciated, the situation was different: five out of 
the six powers who were signatories to the international guarantee for Albania 
were now at war, the machinery set up there to ensure that guarantee no longer 
existed, the government had disintegrated, and the new ruler, Prince Wilhelm, 
had left the country. 41° Conversely, it is possible to view the confederation 
discussions, and especially the Pact with Italy, as a continuation of the British 
policy of 1913. Grey saw both agreements as an application of the balance of 
power. In 1915, nobody expected, or even called for, the complete 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the withdrawal of Russia or the creation of 
the Serb-Croat-Slovene state. In this sense, the Pact of London can be seen as 
410 Grey to Rodd, 17 Dec. 1914, FO 371/1902/85201. For further details of how the British 
government viewed the Albanian question differently to other small state national questions see 
Chapter 5, pp. 208-10. 
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an Anglo-French attempt to arrive at a new balance. For if the Russian 
government was to increase its position in the Balkans, particularly through the 
acquisition of Constantinople and Serbian access to the Adriatic, it was 
considered necessary to make concessions to the Italians as a 
counterbalance. 411 British policy makers were not unaware of the deficiencies of 
their agreement, but wartime expediency overrode any moral objections. Of the 
Pact more generally, Grey stated: `In war you will have secret treaties. Many 
things regarded as criminal are regarded as inevitable in war. '412 Clerk wrote, in 
what Cedric Lowe has aptly described as an unusual dose of realpolitik, `the 
answer, if one ever has to be given, is that we cannot strain the principle of 
nationalities to the point of risking success in the war. '413 
411 Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 30-1. 
412 Grey cited in D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference 
2 vols. (New Haven, 
1939), II, p. 502. 
413 Clerk minute, FO 371/2376/37639; Lowe, `Britain and the Italian Intervention', p. 
544. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
Anarchy, Occupations and Renewed Independence 
during the First World War 
`The Albanian problem, though not the most important, is one of the most 
difficult of the war, and unfortunately one that under any practical solution 
involves a considerable measure of hardship to the Albanians. A14 
For the first sixteen months of the war, great power concerns about Albania 
related to any possible diplomatic lever or advantage. From January 1916, 
fighting between the powers took place on Albanian territory. This territory in 
turn took on a more immediate significance, as both sides sought to consolidate 
and strengthen their possession and control of the areas they occupied, and to 
extend their authority. In pursuing these policies, the powers would come into 
conflict with both enemies and allies. The Italians would find opposition to their 
policies in southern Albania, not only from the Greeks but also from the French. 
Each of the great power armies used propaganda, incentives and bribes to win 
over the Albanian nationalists and non-nationalists in the zones they controlled, 
and to disrupt activities in those of their rivals. Great power political objectives 
continued to be at the heart of all policies, especially the 1915 Pact of London, 
in spite of prior agreements, offers to Albanians of autonomy or independence, 
and the wider declarations in 1917 and 1918 in favour of self-determination and 
nationalism. 
In Albania at the start of the war, traditional rivalries had resurfaced, and the 
country had fragmented into separate zones, each controlled by a traditional 
414 Clerk minute, 17 Aug. 1916, FO 371/2623/161285 
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local chieftain. Albania was not in a stable enough position to sustain a long- 
term single administration, and most Albanians do not appear to have wanted 
this. For almost all of the war, counter-revolutionary forces were in the 
ascendancy with religion a major motivation, in line with Hastings's views on the 
conservatism of Islam, and its inability to be a force in favour of nationalism. 415 
Only in the later stages, when other (non-national) courses and options had 
failed or been discredited, did an Albanian nationalism re-appear, based largely 
on the Orthodox south and its enlightened diaspora, although many local 
motives were also involved. All the powers, perhaps with the exception of 
Austria, had already decided that the future of the fledgling independent state 
should be revisited (either by great power negotiations or a subsequent peace 
conference), and that the guarantees agreed at London in 1913 were no longer 
viable. By 1918, Albanians living in Albania or abroad were once more leading 
the movement for an independent state of Albania, on the lines of President 
Woodrow Wilson's principles. 
It is possible to identify three distinct stages. During the first, the Albanians were 
primarily left to their own devices and counter-revolutionary forces 
predominated. In the second, various foreign armies invaded territory previously 
determined as Albanian, each with differing impacts on the Albanians they 
came into contact with and on the question of Albanian independence, and 
some vying for the leadership of the Albanian national movement. In the third 
period, `Albanians' became tired of their reliance on foreign states, and resolved 
once more to satisfy their national ambitions according to their own aspirations, 
and in opposition to realist rhetoric about weak states. 
415 Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, esp. pp. 200-2. 
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Albanian Activities (1914-15) 
With the outbreak of the First World War, most great power states had 
withdrawn their diplomatic representation from Albania, and had taken little 
interest in domestic affairs in Albania. 416 Following Wied's departure, many 
`Albanians', especially those who had played a role in the nationalist 
programme, also left Albania: some returned to their former homes in places 
such as Switzerland and the United States; many southerners went into 
voluntary exile, as a result of the complications arising from the administration in 
Autonomous Northern Epirus. Outside Albania, Albanophile organisations 
continued to exist and function, but their national programmes seem to have 
been shelved temporarily. These `Albanians' tended to be loyal and patriotic to 
their host government and its war efforts, and perhaps this is indicative of the 
variable allegiances of many Albanians. 
417 
The response of those who remained in Albania was mixed. Local and regional 
considerations dominated, as had also happened before 1912. One important 
British report at the end of the war detailed the divisions as follows: in the north, 
Scutari and its neighbourhood under a local commission of Muslims and 
Christians; the Malissori under their local chieftains; 'Mirdita under Bib Doda; in 
the centre, the region of Durazzo and its neighbourhood district under Essad 
Pasha, although with various other opposition groupings; and the south, divided 
between Valona and its neighbourhood under the control commission; and the 
southernmost district occupied by the Greeks. After the war, this led some 
foreign observers to argue in favour of a system of administration similar to that 
in Switzerland, because they believed that each region was desirous of some 
416 For further details and the departure of Prince Wilhelm see Chapter 3, pp. 140-3. 
417 For instance for details of Albanian activities in SwitzerNand see Durham, `Notes from 
Albania', 2 Oct. 1914, in Edith Durham, pp. 67-8, at p. 68. 
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form of federal or cantonal self-government. 418 It seems that, during much of the 
war, national identity was of little significance and that Albanian divisions, of the 
type that had proliferated under the Young Turks, were far more important. 419 
The division of `Albania' into smaller and smaller units, with few links between 
the different areas, was nevertheless a step back from the former nationalist 
movement. Local autonomy options were able to thrive because the differences 
and rivalry between the various Albanian groups resurfaced, and disrupted the 
uneasy coalition. The small number of international forces remaining were in a 
few select locations, such as Durazzo and Scutari. In any case, they did not 
consider it their duty to deal with internal Albanian problems. Many influential 
Muslims beys and agas had signed up for the southern nationalistic package, in 
1912, only because of the external threats, and as a means of protecting their 
traditional privileges and customs. There was never any intention or desire for 
Albania to become a modern, democratic, independent state of the type 
envisaged by (some) southern intellectuals. The war made it clear that most still 
looked east to Constantinople. This was to a large extent understandable 
because, as rich Muslims, they had often been educated there, and many had 
served in the Ottoman court. In addition, the attempt at independence had 
failed, or at least had not matched the needs of the majority of the people in the 
short period in which it had existed. This had discredited the national ideal. 
Thus a range of groups and individuals who had opposed it, had not supported 
it, had used the nationalistic problem only for short-term purposes, or 
had been 
apathetic to it, sought to use the situation created by the war to 
further their own 
local or individual interests. The development of these various 
factions and 
418 Albania, FO Handbook, FO 373/2/1, pp. 85-6. 
419 However as Duijzings and others have shown Albanian local identities were not necessarily 
incompatible with Albanian national identity. See for example Duijzings, 
Religion and Politics, p. 
24. 
186 
rivalries was promoted by intervention and intrigue by representatives of great 
power states and small Balkan states. They hoped to secure willing clients that 
they could use to secure their ambitions in Albania after the war. 42° This in turn 
fostered and deepened Albanian divisions. Without stability and security, the 
problems of trying to forge an Albanian `nation' after independence thus proved 
too difficult for the small nationalist elite. 
The development of four factions was particularly important, especially as these 
groupings appeared to compete for the leadership of the Albanian `national' 
movement, albeit usually to safeguard their own local interests, as opposed to 
national ones, and because of their dealings with the representatives of other 
states. They were the Senate of Central Albania, Essad Pasha, the Union of 
Kruja and an Albanian Committee under Bib Doda. The divisions between these 
groups were largely tribal and geographical, with religion of secondary 
importance. The first three were primarily Muslim, the fourth Catholic. 
In the first months of the war, the most notable developments occurred in 
central Albania and involved the Senate of Central Albania (despite a similar 
name, this was a new initiative, distinct from that formed by Essad in 1913). 
421 
Swire offers the most detailed account of this period, but even it remains 
muddled and confusing. Three days after Wilhelm's departure, members of the 
groups who had been involved in the Shiak insurgency entered Durazzo and 
hoisted the Ottoman flag. When they had achieved this initial objective, many 
420 A. Mitrovic, `An6aH14u y nonumuuu Aycmpo-YzapcKe npeMa Cp6uju 1914-1918' 
('Albanians 
in the policy of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia 1914-1918'), in Mitrovic, 
Serbs and Albanians, 
pp. 79-136, at pp. 81-8,109-16; H. J. Burgwyn, The Legend of 
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Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919 (London and 
Westport, Connecticut, 
1993), pp. 55-64. 
421 For details of the Senate of Central Albania see Chapter 3, pp. 115-6. 
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involved in the rebellion to remove Wilhelm proceeded to fall out amongst 
themselves. This was perhaps the inevitable result of such a disparate group. 
Like the Albanians involved in the rebellions against the Porte, they all had very 
different objectives and they lacked consensus on what to do next and, most 
importantly, on what sort of Albanian regime they wanted-other than one not 
involving Wilhelm. The major dispute centred on who should be offered the 
Albanian throne. Numerous alternative candidates were proposed, even though 
Wilhelm had not officially abdicated. Muslim Albanians continually looked for 
Muslim alternatives, and the possibilities included Achmed Fouad, an Egyptian 
Prince, who was supposedly very enthusiastic about the prospect. Some of the 
foreign powers tried to push Christian alternatives. The Germans were 
reportedly keen to have another German Prince re-established: Prince Burann- 
Eudin and Prince Victor Napoleon were mentioned. 422 Others wanted a return to 
Ottoman rule, as they were concerned about the loss of traditional privileges 
following independence; and many viewed the Ottoman Empire as their natural 
protector against the Slavs. There were also some who had previously 
supported Essad Pasha, and amongst them were alleged Italian, Serbian and 
Ottoman agents. Despite these differences, the insurgents managed to form a 
`Senate for Central Albania', consisting of twenty-nine people. Its formation was 
notified to the powers. The French, Austrian and Italian members of the control 
commission, who had remained in Durazzo, were informed that their services 
were no longer necessary, and they left at the end of September 1914. This 
ended diplomatic representation to Albania and the recognition thereby entailed. 
The Senate dispatched a delegation to Constantinople to offer the Sultan the 
422 Rodd to Grey, 27 Oct, 1914 and H. Nicolson minute, 9 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1896/68866; 
Durham, `Notes from Albania', 2 Oct. 1914, in Edith Durham, pp. 67-8; Rodd to Grey, 29 Sept. 
1914, FO 371/1896/54150; H. Nicolson minute, 25 Sept. 1914, FO 371/1896/53190; Swire, 
Albania, pp. 236-41. 
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crown, or, as an alternative, to ask him to nominate a suitable prince. It also 
constituted a national assembly at Elbasan. Failing to procure the Sultan, they 
turned their attention to acquiring a Muslim prince, a German non-Muslim one 
or even the return of Wilhelm. 423 This episode is an interesting one. In itself it 
was relatively minor but it offers an unusual twist on Albanian nationalism. The 
protagonists recognised themselves as Albanians and purported to have 
national objectives. Unlike most developments, especially those in 1912, in 
which religion is not seen as important in Albanian nationalism, or else is a 
counter-revolutionary and conservative force, for these Albanians their religion 
was an integral part of their Albanian identity. 
424 
Meanwhile, the war gave Essad Pasha another opportunity to attempt to seize 
power. He was prepared to make arrangements with anyone, including 
Albania's staunchest enemies, as long as they promoted his personal position. 
According to Swire and Dusan Batakovic, as early as September 1914, he met 
Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic in Nish and was liberally supplied with 
funds and equipment. 425 In Dibra, Essad gained many additional recruits for his 
`army', and many signed up in the belief that this would free Dibra from Serbian 
control. At the same time, the Essadists in Durazzo had persuaded the Senate 
to send men against the Epirotes. In their absence, Essad crossed the frontier 
with over 5,000 men and marched quickly towards Durazzo, entering it on 2 
October 1914. Within three days, he had forced the Senate to make him 
President, reportedly having threatened to shoot every member who opposed 
him. It is distinctly likely that there was Italian, and even French, involvement in 
423 Swire, Albania, p. 236-41. 
424 See for example Chapter 1, esp. pp. 46-54,62-7. 
425 Swire, Albania, p. 237; Batakovic, `CpncKa enada u Ecad-nawa TonmaHU', pp. 41-3 and 63- 
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this successful coup. On the day when Essad was declared President, and 
almost a month before the official Italian occupation of Saseno, the Italian and 
French representatives of the control commission returned to Durazzo and 
publicly embraced him. L'Independence Albanaise, a publication, based in 
Sofia, that promoted an independent Albania, asserted that the Italian 
government had advanced five million francs for this operation. 426 
The third grouping, the `Union of Kruja', consisted largely of Essad Pasha's 
former allies, who now opposed him. It was not particularly nationalistic, and 
favoured union with the Ottoman Empire. On 20 December 1914, a meeting, 
which became known as the `Union of Kruja', began at a farm near Kruja, with 
delegates from all the districts opposed to Essad. They passed several 
resolutions: to be reincorporated in the Ottoman Empire; to invite an Ottoman 
prince to be their king; to drive Essad from the country; to elect an 
administrative council `under no single leader' to protect the rights of the people; 
to initiate compulsory military service. They also resolved to prevent anyone 
from the rival districts (especially Dibra and Mati) from passing into Union- 
controlled territory. 427 Essad's and the Union's actions largely offset one 
another. Few initiatives of substance resulted. Eventually, Essad obtained the 
upper hand, following the Serbian and Montenegrin occupation of much of 
northern and central Albania, in June 1915. This act was motivated more by 
fear of Italian intentions than of Albanian rivals. With the arrival of Austrian and 
Bulgarian forces, Essad too retired into exile. He went first to Italy and then 
426 Page to Lansing, 1 May 1915,875.00/4 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1211 
[hereafter M1211], roll 1 [hereafter r. ]), Relating to the Internal Affairs of Albania 1910-1944 
[hereafter Internal Affairs], Political Affairs 1910-29, Records of the Department of State 
[hereafter DOS], Record Group 59 [hereafter RG], National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 
USA [hereafter NACP]; Swire, Albania, pp. 237-8; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 81-4; 
L'lndependence Albanaise cited in Jacques, Albanians, p. 359; Batakovic, `CpncKa enada u 
Ecad-nawa TonmaHU', pp. 43 and 65. 
427 Jacques, Albanians, p. 359; Swire, Albania, pp. 238-9. 
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France, where, in his self-proclaimed capacity of Albanian President-in-exile, he 
was assigned two diplomatic representatives (Krajewsky and de Fontenay), 
although the Italians no longer recognised his position. 428 
The Albanian Committee, under Bib Doda's presidency, which presided over 
Scutari, San Giovanni di Medua and Alessio, was the most nationalistic of the 
four groupings, in spite of 'Bib Doda's circumspect allegiance before 1914. The 
Albanian Committee had successfully managed to suppress the spread of 
Essad's propaganda, despite his support by the Italians, and had forbidden him 
from entering the towns under its control. It found it more difficult to control the 
propaganda of the Union, especially as many Muslims agreed that only the 
Porte could protect them. They consequently called for the Ottoman flag to be 
flown over Scutari. Bib Doda managed to secure a compromise, by replacing 
the national Albanian flag with one of red and black stripes. The most 
nationalistic initiative of the Committee occurred in May 1915, when the Italian 
Consul suggested that a National Government be formed. This never took place 
because of Muslim opposition. 429 
Great Power Occupations: 
The Austrian zone 
The policy of the Central Powers towards Albania had evolved, but it included 
the maintenance of an independent Albania, although again purely for reasons 
of geo-politics. With the Allied retreat, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops 
occupied northern, eastern and central Albania, including Durazzo and 
Tirana. 
The Bulgarian government wished to retain considerable portions of Albanian 
428 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 100-3. 
429 Swire, Albania, pp. 240-1; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 90-1. 
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territory for themselves, in accordance with the rescinded treaty of San Stefano. 
The Austrians aimed at (re-)establishing a viable autonomous Albania under 
Austrian control, although the extent of this autonomy varied from proposal to 
proposal. The Porte appears to have supported the Austrian position, whereas 
officials in Berlin wanted to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and persistently 
opposed any unilateral Austrian action. Most disagreements occurred between 
the two most directly interested states, Austria and Bulgaria. In particular, a 
dispute raged about the right to occupy the two important Kosovan (Serbian) 
towns of Prizrend and Prishtina, which both states claimed. 430 As Austria was 
the great power, and because its troops occupied far greater portions of the 
disputed territory, the Ballhausplatz's policy proved more effective. From 
January 1916, the start of the Austrian occupation, the Austrians declared that 
they had entered Albania only to expel the Serbs and Italians, and they called 
upon the Albanians (both Christians and Muslims) to help them do so. Many 
Albanians, including the important Mirdite leader Bib Doda, welcomed the 
Austrians and invited their fellow Albanians to receive them as `liberators'. An 
Albanian civil committee was established (29 April 1916) at Scutari, under 
Austrian control. The initial enthusiasm for the Austrian arrival soon waned. A 
significant number of Albanians began to view the Austrians with suspicion. 
Many remembered the part the Ballhausplatz had played in bringing down the 
Wied government. It was reported that the Austrian troops treated their Albanian 
hosts poorly. They forcefully requisitioned all sorts of commodities and supplies 
at very low prices, or on credit. On 23 January 1917, the Ballhausplatz 
reiterated its public proclamation that Austria-Hungary was endeavouring to 
preserve the integrity of Albania, and had only entered the country in pursuit of 
430 TNA: PRO GFM 33/2201/5004, E285612-E285748 [These are copies of German documents 
obtained during the First World War and deposited in The National Archives, 
Kew. ]; Mitrovid, 
`An6aHüu y nonumuüu Aycmpo-YaapcKe', pp. 88-90 and 116-8. 
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a common foe. This failed to reassure the Albanians. Very few joined the 
Austrian military or became its informal allies, despite considerable financial 
inducements and propaganda to do so. The most notable group that did side 
with the Austrians was a force under Ahmet bey Zogu, the future King Zog and 
nephew of Essad Pasha, who, despite being only 21 years old, had emerged for 
the first time as a notable force in Albanian affairs. Swire wrote that even those 
Albanians who did join 'lacked a definite national cause'. He added that they 
`fought without the same ardour as in previous struggles against the Turks'. 
There were also concerns about what the Ballhausplatz planned for Albania 
after the war. A delegation, including Zogu, went to Vienna to demand 
immediate autonomy from the new Austrian Emperor. Despite speaking well of 
the civil administration, they apparently feared becoming only another province 
of the Habsburg Empire after the war. 431 
The most noticeable developments in the Austrian-occupied zone had occurred 
in central Albania, especially in Elbasan, where the central powers hoped to 
gain Zogu's support for their proposals. In February 1916, Zogu used the 
vacuum created in central Albania by the retreat of Serbian and Essadist forces, 
in the winter of 1915-16, to seize Elbasan and establish a national assembly. 
This elected a `commission of initiative' under Zogu's presidency, which in turn 
convened a National Congress under Akif Pasha Elbasani, who had been the 
Minister of the Interior in Prince Wilhelm's government, and had never resigned 
from that post. The main programme of the National Congress was the 
restoration and return of Prince Wilhelm-a policy that several other nationalists 
and colonies abroad were also advocating, including even those who had 
431 War Trade Intelligence Department memo., 20 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2619/210652; Swire, 
Albania, pp. 259,265; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 95-6,105; Mitrovid, 'An6aHqu y nonumuqu 
Aycmpo-YeapcKe', pp. 128-13; Fischer, King Zog, p. 12. 
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previously rebelled against him. Zogu wrote to Auguste Kral, formerly Austrian 
representative on the international control commission, who had been 
appointed Civil Administrator in Albania, to express his confidence that the 
Congress would meet with his approval, and that Austria would in turn assure 
Albania `the expansion of the frontier line in accordance with the principle of 
nationality'. 432 This meant reuniting the Albanians with their co-ethnics in 
Kosovo, Chameria (the area of Albanian-speakers allotted to Greece) and other 
areas. 
This was far from the policy the Ballhausplatz officials intended for Albania. 
They had no intention of the Albanians leading their autonomy or independence 
movement themselves; rather it was to be strictly controlled. The Ballhausplatz 
had probably not yet definitely decided its policy, or obtained agreement for 
such a policy from its alliance partners. Under the pretext of a cholera epidemic, 
Austrian troops occupied Elbasan and established a military cordon around the 
town. The next day it was announced that assemblies for political purposes 
were prohibited in districts occupied by the imperial army. Subject to far 
superior forces, the Albanians were obliged to submit to this decision. On 14 
February 1916, Akif Pasha resigned his position and declared that Albania 
would be governed temporarily by Austria-Hungary. Despite Zogu's initial co- 
operation with Austrian forces, he was interned for the rest of the war when he 
went to Vienna to congratulate the new Emperor. Swire alleges that this was 
because Zogu was conspiring with the Bulgarians for the re-establishment of 
Albanian administrative independence. Eventually, on 10 March 1917, the 
Austrian government granted immediate autonomy to the Albanians, under 
432 Spiers to War Office, 13 Mar. 1918, FO 371/3155/49228; Spiers to War Office, 14 Mar. 1918, 
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Austrian protection. This caused a storm of protest from influential Albanians 
who claimed it was pointless, because Albania was already legally independent. 
Austrian actions at Elbasan had in any event revealed Austria's true intentions. 
Albania's rivals would persistently use this co-operation against them in future 
discussions on the state's future. 433 Zogu, however, does not seem to have 
been personally hindered by his involvement. 
Allied rivalry and independence in southern Albania 
In southern Albania, in the territories occupied by the Allies, there was also 
controversy over Albanian territory, and competition for it. In the light of the 
Allied victory, these initiatives were to prove more important. To counter 
Bulgarian activities, and because the Allies had little faith in Greek forces, 
French troops had occupied territory near Koritza and, by November 1916, had 
advanced as far north as Monastir and Lake Prespa. Meanwhile, Italian troops 
had occupied northern Epirus, including territory south of the Florence Protocol 
line. This close proximity of Greek and Italian forces, especially the Italian 
occupation of Greek territory, produced considerable Greek resentment at the 
violation of its neutrality. There were numerous protests from Greeks in the 
occupied zones and from both Greek governments (that in Athens headed by 
King Constantine and the rival administration under Venizelos stationed at 
Salonika), all of which proved detrimental to the ongoing Allied efforts to induce 
Greece to enter the war. 434 The military developments had an impact upon the 
relationship between the Allies, and on their Albanian policies. 
These were 
based on three main considerations. Firstly, the Entente representatives were 
433 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 99,106; Fischer, King Zog, pp. 12-4; Swire, Albania, p. 
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perturbed that the Italian intervention in northern Epirus had gone ahead without 
their prior knowledge or approval. 435 Secondly, French activities worried the 
Italians. They were concerned that the French might have designs on southern 
Albania and even on the island of Corfu, both of which the Consulta considered 
strategic interests. 436 Thirdly, the Italians were anxious about the Quai d'Orsay's 
continued support of Essad Pasha. On 23 August 1916, Essad arrived at 
Salonika with French recognition and considerable Serbian support, posing as 
President of the Albanian government-in-exile. His five to eight hundred tabors 
were to fight as part of the Allied Eastern Army. 437 All three sets of suspicions 
and antagonisms persisted and festered as the war continued, and in their own 
ways had an impact on the Allied war effort in the Balkans, and on policy 
towards Albania. 
Surprisingly, the first significant developments took place in the French 
occupied zone. On 10 December 1916, fourteen Albanian representatives 
(seven Christians and seven Muslims) created an administrative council and 
proclaimed Koritza an autonomous republic. This regime was highly significant 
for the Albanian nationalist movement, and it was indicative of the resurgence of 
Albanian nationalism in one of the areas where it had been strongest before the 
war. According to Jan Karl Tanenbaum, this regime `acted as if it were an 
independent state, for it minted its own coinage, printed its own stamps, and 
introduced its own flag'. 438 Stickney considered that the republic gave the 
435 Rodd to Grey, 12 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2623/204081; H. Nicolson minute and Clerk minutes, 2 
Nov. 1916, FO 371/2623/219594: Although Clerk was under the impression that there was 
some sort of military understanding that the Italians should advance through Epirus, in order to 
link up with the Allied force at Salonika. 
436 Rodd to Grey, Rome, 12 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2623/204081. 
437 Serbian memo., 31 Jan. 1916, FO 371/2615/20162; Elliot to Grey, 28 Sept. 1916, FO 
371/2615/203979. 
438 J. K. Tanenbaum, General Maurice Sarrail, 1856-1929: The French Army and Left Wing 
Politics (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1974), pp. 163,165. 
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Albanians the opportunity for self-government under the French, which she 
described as the `tutelage of those well disposed toward and more experienced 
than themselves'. Overall, it was a successful experiment in which Muslims and 
Christians worked together in the administration, and, in particular, without all 
the complications of great power rivalry and intrigue that had so beset Wilhelm's 
regime. 439 
The great powers appeared far from uninterested. It has been suggested that 
the French became a new force in Albania, and showed new interest in it 
becoming an independent state. 440 In reality, as H. James Burgwyn in particular 
has shown, French activity was only at a local level, and for strategic as 
opposed to moral or national reasons. Colonel Henri Descoins, the French 
commander in Koritza, signed a proclamation stating that the regime was to be 
under French military protection. It was suspected that Descoins was even the 
author of the document. For the week prior to the proclamation, General 
Maurice Sarrail, Commander of the Eastern Army, and Descoins were in 
repeated communication about this project. On 8 December 1916, Sarrail had 
cabled that the Albanian nationalists should be supported. Tanenbaum 
contends that Sarrail instigated this action to protect Koritza from Venizelist 
forces, which had prompted guerrilla warfare by some Albanians. By expelling 
the Greeks and converting the Albanian nationalists to the Allied cause, Sarrail 
hoped to protect the left flank. A peaceful and stable Koritza under French 
control would reduce the number of French troops needed, discourage the 
Austrians from moving into southern Albania and enable the Eastern Army's left 
439 Burgwyn, Mutilated Victory, pp. 77-9; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 69-70. Stickney 
includes details of many of the achievements of the regime. For successes of the regime see 
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flank to join up with Italian troops in Valona. 441 Officials in the Quai d'Orsay, 
especially Aristide Briand, the French Premier, were far less duplicitous. Briand 
was not well informed by Sarrail, even misinformed. Following an enquiry from 
Rome on 13 December 1916, Briand denied knowing anything about the new 
republic and had to cable Sarrail for details. In his reply, Sarrail asserted that 
the French military authorities had played no role whatsoever in the creation of 
the new state. Briand assured his Italian colleagues of this. Mehmed Konitza's, 
a prominent Albanian who had previously been a representative of the 
provisional government to the London conferences, description of the 
declaration does not consider French motives as nearly so altruistic. He argued 
that the fertile land in Koritza province, especially the copper and coal deposits 
which were near the surface, were sought by the French military in order to 
supply their troops. 
442 
Irrespective of its cause, this move generated much tension with the Italians. 
Briand repeatedly assured Sonnino that the French had no designs on either 
Albania or Koritza. It appears that, even by March 1917 (when he resigned as 
Premier), Briand had not yet received full information. Sarrail's reports still 
insisted that the Albanians had proclaimed the republic, then asked for it to be 
put under French protection, and that Descoins had merely complied with the 
wishes of the local population. Sarrail wrote that he had `always let the 
population do what it wanted; ... 
it does not behove me to meddle in the Greek 
and Balkan internal political question. Koritza wanted to be independent: now it 
is, '443 However, the ramifications of the Koritza declaration would continue to 
aal Tanenbaum, Sarrail, p. 164; Burgwyn, Mutilated Victory, p. 77-9. 
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reverberate well into 1917 and beyond. 444 On 16 February 1918, Sarrail's 
successor eventually abrogated the proclamation. The Quai d'Orsay was far 
from keen to have the Albanian nationalist movement develop too far under 
French influence, in case it jeopardised their more important goats regarding 
Greece. Changes were only nominal: Greek schools re-opened and Essad was 
prevented from transferring his government to the town, as sops to the Italians 
and Greeks, following the latter's eventual entry into the war. But, Koritza 
retained essentially the same government, and the republic's flag continued to 
fly over the town. Inter-religious co-operation was maintained, and both faiths 
were thankful to the French for the opportunity of self-government without much 
interference. The Albanians were also assured that this action did not threaten 
their independence. 445 
Having achieved relatively little on the diplomatic front regarding French 
activities in Koritza, the Italians or, more precisely, Sonnino, took the initiative in 
order to secure Italian interests in southern Albania. From March 1917, the 
Albanian flag was hoisted throughout the Italian zone of occupation and a 
measure of autonomy was granted. On 3 June 1917, at Argyrocastro, 
Lieutenant-General Giacinto Ferrero, the commander of Italian forces there, 
proclaimed the unity and independence of the whole of Albania under the aegis 
and protection of Italy, although the Italians controlled only a small portion of 
Albania, and the Allies not much more. 446 By the terms of the proclamation, 
Albanians were promised full liberty in internal affairs, including free political 
institutions, law courts, schools and their own army. In foreign affairs, the state 
444 See for example Clerk and Campbell minutes, 21 Aug. 1917, FO 371/2879/163402. 
445 Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 70; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 111; Swire, Albania, p. 272: 
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was to be supervised by Italy. 447 Although the Albanians enjoyed relatively little 
autonomy in the Italian occupied zone and the Austrians in practice controlled 
most of `Albania', there were noticeable improvements in the affected areas. 
Swire wrote that the `Italians assumed in Albania the attitude of a benevolent 
although somewhat autocratic guardian'. Two hundred miles of good roads and 
fifty miles of rail track were constructed, hospitals were opened, schools 
established, national newspapers circulated, model farms introduced and prices 
regulated. The Italians paid high prices for the produce they requisitioned, and 
this did much to improve the fortunes of the local populace. Relations between 
the resident `Albanians' (no mention was made of the Greek- and Vlach- 
speaking populations) and the Italian military authorities appear to have 
remained good. This in turn helped improve relations between Albanian 
nationalists and the Consulta. 448 Despite some protests, including several from 
Essad, other Albanian leaders were not ill-disposed towards the new regime, 
and this helped its establishment. Durham was unhappy that the declaration 
had occurred without some form of referendum, but she hoped that the 
Albanians would try it for `a while at least', until they had time to consolidate. 449 
Her advice in turn influenced the attitudes and actions of some of the Albanian 
nationalists. 
These provisions obviously ran counter to the 1915 Pact, whereby an 
independent Albania was to be limited to a small section in central Albania, with 
the north going to Serbia and Montenegro, and the south (except Valona) to 
447 Pearson, Albania, 1, pp. 106-7; Chekrezi, Albania, pp. 161-2; Dako, Albania, pp. 145-6; 
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Greece. Sonnino had never whole-heartedly embraced the idea of Albanian 
partition, and he now returned to Italy's former policy of supporting Albanian 
independence. It appears that he hoped to gain Albanian sympathies and 
increase their confidence in Italy, in order to secure, before the peace 
conference, additional territory to that specified in the London Pact. 450 Sonnino 
was concerned by French activities in southern Albania, but even more so by 
the burgeoning idea of the union, after the war, of Serbia, Montenegro and the 
former Habsburg provinces with a substantial Serbian speaking population in 
Croatia and Slavonia. This idea was being promoted by Entente propaganda, to 
disrupt the Austrian war effort and to encourage the now stateless Serbs. In the 
London Pact, Sonnino had not taken account of the prospect of a united 
`Yugoslavia' on the other side of the Adriatic, nor had any of the other Entente 
leaders. As a result of this prospect, Swire claimed, there was a change in 
Sonnino's policy, with Albania becoming far more important in Italian strategic 
interests. If the `Yugoslavs' were to gain a large expanse of territory on the 
eastern Adriatic, that could endanger Italian strategic interests in the Adriatic, 
then Sonnino wanted an enlarged Albania as a counter-balance. In arguing for 
Albanian unity and independence, Sonnino was making arguments on the new 
basis of national self-determination (the principles upon which the United States 
would soon enter the war), but geo-politics were paramount. He did not want to 
relinquish other gains from the London Pact. For example, he intended to retain 
the claim to control Albanian foreign policy and also the port of Valona. Sonnino 
continued to emphasise the particular importance of Valona, especially 
regarding the Otranto straits, which continued to require Italian acquisition of the 
town. It would not be part of a renewed independent Albanian state. By 
450 Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 18; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 106-7. 
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contrast, Woodall does not even mention the impact of the `Yugoslav' threat. 
His discussion focuses solely on French and Greek antagonisms in southern 
Albania. This view seems far less convincing, as it would not necessitate a 
change in policy regarding northern Albania. Moreover, Italian complaints to 
Britain regarding the French declaration at Koritza only emerged in the summer 
of 1917 and after questions over the Italian declaration at Argyrocastro had 
been raised. Woodall has also argued that the Italian action was a response to 
Sonnino's fears that the Allies would renege on their promises in Asia Minor. He 
contends that Sonnino therefore decided to `tighten Italy's grip' on the territory 
already in Italian control, including reserving the occupation of Albania for Italy 
alone. This idea does not seem to be substantiated by later events; acquisitions 
in Asia Minor, and elsewhere in the Adriatic, proved far more attractive to the 
Consulta than those in Albania. 451 
This last move, along with the supervision of Albanian foreign policy, clearly 
revealed Sonnino's real intentions. His colleagues appear to have been less 
well informed: not even his fellow Cabinet ministers had prior knowledge of the 
Foreign Minister's plans. On 20 June 1917, Sonnino was forced to appear 
before the Chamber of Deputies in Rome to explain his actions. His statement 
backtracked from the 3 June 1917 proclamation. He declared that, when he 
spoke of the unity and independence of Albania under the protection of the 
Kingdom of Italy, this meant protection against Albania's neighbours and not a 
protectorate in the colonial sense. He added that the future peace conference 
would have the task of determining the precise boundaries of the 
Albanian 
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state. Italy claimed predominant influence over Albania on the grounds of 
strategy and national need only. 
452 
Italy's allied partners were just as anxious about Italian activities in southern 
Albania, not least because of the impact on the Greek negotiations. Even before 
the proclamation, the British Foreign Office had considered sending Harry Lamb 
on a special mission to investigate Italian activities there. 453 Particularly 
concerning, from a British perspective, was the extension of the Italian zone of 
occupation into Greek territory: that is, south of the Florence line. Despite Italian 
assurances that this was only temporary, to protect Valona and the Corfu 
channel, Italian actions were treated with much suspicion. Whitehall and the 
Quai d'Orsay received repeated appeals and protests from the Greeks. 454 The 
Italian proclamation at Argyrocastro increased and confirmed these suspicions. 
Whitehall viewed the move as an `implicit violation of the London declaration', in 
that it referred to these changes, foreshadowing that which would materialise in 
an eventual final peace treaty, and because they contravened the sections of 
the 1915 Pact relating to Greek and Serbian claims. The Italians had also acted 
without first gaining the consent of the other signatory powers to the London 
declaration. Only token protests were communicated to the Italians, because 
the Foreign Office did not expect to receive much support from the Quai 
452 Sonnino to Ferrero, 1 June 1917, DDI, Series V, VII, no. 174; Sonnino to Supreme 
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d'Orsay if it pursued the matter. For, as one clerk wrote, it looked as if the 
French had decided to allow a `free hand for Italy in Albania', and that this was 
the `quid pro quo by which the French obtained their free hand in Greece'. 4"5 
This French view appeared to be confirmed later in the year when Bertie, still 
British Ambassador in Paris, reported that the Quai D'Orsay considered Koritza 
to be `part of Albania'. 456 This reflected a French u-turn from the London Pact 
and also Sarrail's policy in the Koritza republic. It hinted at French support for 
Italian claims in Albania. Moreover Rodd was anxious that it should not be 
leaked that Italy acted without Allied consent. He believed that this might 
precipitate a push in Rome for the resignation of the Foreign Minister, which he 
considered far from desirable for the war effort. 457 Albania's future had become 
closely tied with Italian geo-strategic interests and policy. 
The struggle for northern Albania 
French and Italian friction continued throughout 1917 and 1918, during the 
campaigns to push Austro-Bulgarian forces out of Albania and, in particular, in 
the rush to be the first state to occupy the town of Scutari. It was important for 
the Italians to occupy as much Albanian territory as possible, to facilitate their 
revised plans for a `large Albania'. These Italian initiatives initially came in for 
much criticism. Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, claimed that 
the independent Italian activities and policies in Albania were endangering the 
security of the Allied Eastern Army. When, however, with the failure of the 
summer campaigns, the Italians again attempted to consolidate their position in 
southern Albania, including establishing a native administration under Italian 
455 H. Nicolson minute, 6 June 1917, FO 371/2881/112035. 
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control that would deter Serbian, Greek, French and Essadist forces from 
entering the Italian occupied area, the Quai d'Orsay raised no objections, in line 
with their new policy of allowing Italy a `free hand' in Albania. Italian ambitions 
soon resurfaced because, after the defeat of Bulgaria (30 September 1918), the 
Austrians were forced to withdraw from their now exposed positions. Ferrero, 
however, informed Sonnino that, given the number of Italian troops available, he 
would be unable to occupy Durazzo or Elbasan before the French, Serb or 
Essadist forces. 458 On 7 October 1918, at a conference at the Quai d'Orsay, 
Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Sonnino (but no American representative) 
made a crucial decision regarding the occupation of Albanian territory. 
Clemenceau agreed that the two French divisions occupying Albania should be 
withdrawn and be replaced by Italian ones. Sonnino interpreted this as meaning 
that his European partners had agreed to reserve all of Albania for Italy, and for 
the next eighteen months the Consulta justified the Italian occupation on the 
basis of this decision. The French took a different view. Michel Pichon, the 
Foreign Minister, insisted that although Italian troops had been allowed to 
occupy Albania, this did not preclude Serbian troops from occupying northern 
Albania, as stated in the Pact of London. He maintained that the agreement 
covered only territory up to the Mati river, in other words central Albania. North 
of the river would be within the jurisdiction of the French General Louis Franchet 
d'Esperey. 459 The Italians continued to object, and in effect attempted to argue 
that, on the Albanian question, the 7 October conference overrode the London 
ass Swire, Albania, pp. 278-80; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 22-4. 
ass Sonnino to Piacentini, 9 Nov. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 75; Sonnino to Diaz, Bonin Longere, 
Imperiali and di Cellere, 20 Nov. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 250; Pastorelli, L'Albania, pp. 68-9; 
Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', pp. 25-6: However, sources disagree as to the nature of these 
objections. Woodall argues that the Italians insisted that the 7 October conference related to the 
whole of Albania and in particular that Scutari and Alessio should be reserved for Italian 
occupation. By contrast Pastorelli contends that during further negotiations, in Rome, between 
Sonnino and Barrere it was agreed that northern Albania, except for Scutari, was reserved for 
Italy. 
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Pact. Throughout these exchanges neither Whitehall nor Washington were kept 
informed. In July 1919, the Foreign Office complained of having no knowledge 
of any agreement relating to the occupation of Albania. 
460 
This tenuous great power agreement was further complicated when it became 
clear that Serbian forces would be the first to reach Scutari. None of the powers 
relished this situation, especially the Italians. As a result, Sonnino revised his 
Albanian policy further. Discussions once more became bi-lateral between the 
Italians and the French. Sonnino, who still considered Albania reserved for 
Italian occupation, proposed that there should be no Serbian troops at Scutari, 
and that, if the Serbs arrived there first, they should be replaced by a mixed 
detachment of British, French and Italian troops (similar to the international 
regime which had operated before the First World War). Despite giving Ferrero 
orders not to proceed past the Drin (Pichon having agreed to an Italian 
occupation to this point), Sonnino demanded talks with Clemenceau before that 
decision was made permanent. Clemenceau insisted that the rights of the 
powers to zones of occupation in Albania still rested on the London agreements 
of 1913 and 1915, and therefore also gave rights to the Greeks in the south, 
and to the Serbs in the north. Despite having allowed an Italian occupation into 
the northern zone, he pointed out that this was due to military necessity, and did 
not reflect a change to or abandonment of the principles of the earlier treaties. 
Sonnino did not mollify his position. What mattered were not the negotiations, 
but actual possession of territory: the Italian troops would soon occupy 
territory 
north of the Drin, territory that was claimed by Serbia as part of 
`Greater Serbia'. 
For wartime expediency, the French continued their conciliatory attitude 
to Italy 
460 Curzon to des Graz, 25 July 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 15. 
206 
in Albania. As part of this, but only after having failed to produce a 
rapprochement between Italy and Essad Pasha, the Quai d'Orsay eventually 
withdrew their de facto recognition of Essad, recalled his diplomatic 
representatives and informed Essad that he was not to attempt to return to 
Albania. When Serbian troops entered Scutari, on 5 November 1918, they were 
soon replaced by a French squadron under Colonel de Fourtou. This was later 
augmented by both Italian and British detachments, in accordance with 
Sonnino's ideas for an international regime. 461 By the end of the war, the 
Italians had enjoyed much success in their plans for Albania: Italian forces were 
in possession of the bulk of Albanian territory; Sonnino had prevented the Serbs 
from occupying northern Albania, especially the key centres; and French 
conciliation had encouraged Sonnino to carry out his plans for a large 
independent Albania, under Italian control. In the ensuing years, these were all 
issues that would come up against considerable opposition. Sonnino found that 
his plans for Albania were not as easy to implement as he had hoped. 
Nevertheless the prospects for a revived, large, independent Albania looked 
more promising than they had in April 1915, with the signing of the Pact of 
London. 
Entries and Exits 
In 1917, three major political changes had an impact on the Albanian situation 
and the war effort generally. Firstly, following the overthrow of King Constantine 
and under immense Allied pressure, Venizelos finally brought 
Greece into the 
war on the Allied side (12 June 1917). This gave greater weight 
to Greek claims 
461 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 114-6; Pollo and Puto, History of Albania, p. 170; 
Swire, Albania, p. 
333; `Memorandum on the Occupation of Albania', 3 July 1919, cited in 
Woodall, 'Albanian 
Problem', pp. 26-9: Woodall covers these events in much more detail 
based on the account of 
records in the French archives and Sonnino's personal papers 
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to northern Epirus, especially relative to any pledges to the Albanians. 462 
Secondly, following the Bolshevik revolution, Russia withdrew from the war 
(November 1917). The true impact of the Russian withdrawal materialised only 
gradually. In 1916-7, the Russians had played only a minor role in discussions 
regarding the Albanian questions. After the Serbian capitulation, Russia was far 
less interested in the Balkans. On 23 November 1917, the new Soviet 
government published the details of the Pact of London. Many of its 
components had been suspected, but this was the first confirmation of its 
provisions. It had serious ramifications in all the Balkan states, especially 
Albania. The Austrians translated the Pact into Albanian and proceeded to 
distribute it throughout the country. This prompted tremendous protests, 
especially from Albanian nationalists abroad. 463 These revelations made many 
Albanian leaders and supporters realise that they could not depend on great 
power support, and that they needed to start reforming and organising ready for 
the end of the war. Nevertheless, many prominent Albanians believed that 
Russian absence would be helpful in the longer term, especially at the 
subsequent peace conference. One nationalist, Melida Frasheri, commented 
that, without Russia, the French would no longer have the same excuse to 
protect Greece and Serbia as they had before the war. 464 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, on 7 December 1917 the United States 
entered the war on the Allied side, as an Associated Power. This would have a 
number of implications for Albania, even though the United States had never 
previously recognised an independent Albanian state, and at this point 
had no 
462 Stavrianos, Balkans since 1453, pp. 566-8. 
463 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 110,112; Swire, Albania, p. 265. 
464 M. Frasheri to Herbert, 15 Nov. 1918, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/1. 
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Albanian policy. 465 The Americans were not a signatory to the London Pact, and 
they entered the war on the basis of the rights of national self-determination, as 
later clarified in President Wilson's legendary fourteen points (Appendix E). This 
was in complete contradiction to the Pact of London, which had been based on 
strategic necessity and political ambition: the dichotomy that is central to this 
study. At the upcoming peace conference, the differences between the terms of 
American and Italian entry were to prove a major complication. However, the 
fourteen points were not entirely positive. No mention was made of Albania, in 
contrast to some of the other Balkan nationalities, and some provisions were 
counter to Albanian interests, above all those regarding Serbia, and perhaps 
Italy. American policies also influenced the policies of its great power Allies. 
This resulted in similar declarations and a revival of, for the British at least, their 
original objectives of helping and protecting small states. 466 These `new' liberal 
nationalistic principles would form the basis on which the Allied and Associated 
Powers proclaimed they were now fighting the war. But the Albania question 
was viewed very differently to many of the other national questions under 
consideration. Albania's supporters considered the Albanian question 
equivalent to the Belgian question. The great power statesmen disagreed. 
Unlike the `new' Slav nationalisms, there seemed to be nothing to gain from 
aiding the Albanian nationalists, or non-nationalists promoting Albanian 
nationalism. 467 On 18 February 1918, responding to questions in parliament, 
Arthur Balfour, Foreign Secretary, replied that 
465 Lansing to Barnard, 5 Oct. 1914,875.00/2 (M1211, r. 1), Internal Affairs, DOS, RG 59. 
466 Stickney, Southern Albania, 70-1; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 110-11,114. 
467 Durham to Herbert, 19 Mar. 1918, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47; Army Council to Grey, 13 Feb. 
1916, FO 371/2615/28547: In 1916 the War Office had had an idea of sending British troops to 
Albania to play on the internal differences in the country and `their warlike spirit' to interfere with 
the central powers, but these ideas never came to fruition. 
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the arrangements come to in 1913, to which Albania was not a party, 
have now ceased to have binding force, as all the signatory Powers are 
now engaged in war. As regards the future ... His Majesty's Government 
would be glad to see the principle of nationality applied as far as possible 
to this as to the other difficult questions which will have to be settled at 
the Peace Conference. 468 
In drafting this response, one clerk noted that `from a purely legal point of view, I 
should say that as four of the six signatories are at war with the other two the 
arrangement no longer possesses binding force'. This argument was dictated 
by `policy rather than law'. 469 The London Pact would determine future British 
policy. In June 1918, Mehmed Konitza proposed an Albanian detachment under 
Herbert's leadership in return for independence after the war. The Foreign 
Office rejected this offer. As Harold Nicolson, at the time a junior Foreign Office 
clerk, wrote, 9 we can scarcely in honour encourage the Albanians to fight for a 
dismembered country '. 470 
As MacGinty has shown, for small-state European nationalisms in western 
Europe, the entry of the United States and Bolshevik activities had important 
impacts. 471 These ideas can also be applied to the Albanian case. American 
entry also influenced the burgeoning Albanian nationalist movement. The most 
influential initiatives took place in the United States, especially within Vatra (the 
Pan Albanian-American Association). Vatra had initially supported Austria in the 
war, but the entry of the United States onto the Allied side necessitated a switch 
468 Lambert minute, 18 Jan. 1918, FO 371/3154/34264; Durham to Herbert, 19 Mar. 1918, 
Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47. 
469 Lambert minute 18 Jan. 1918, FO 371/3154/34264; 
371/3154/34264. 
470 H. Nicolson minute, 22 July 1918, FO 371/3157/127525- 
471 MacGinty, 'Small States', pp. 45-8. 
WED minute, 16 Feb. 1918, FO 
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in allegiance. In particular, Vatra understood and supported liberal American 
political ideals and institutions, and had confidence in Wilson's principles of self- 
determination. They thought these would be helpful in assisting the Albanian 
cause to regain those territories (Kosovo, Chameria, Hoti, Gruda, etc. ) that they 
had been denied in 1913. Albanian-Americans started to expound their views to 
Albanian relatives and friends in Albania and elsewhere. 472 
Albanian Nationalist Revival (1916-18) 
Albanian nationalist initiatives had started as early as April 1916, but there had 
been many problems. Edith Durham alleged that the delays were the result of 
differences among the leadership of the Albanian-Americans, who had become 
important in the national revival because of their democratic inheritance and 
financial assistance. She contended that they squabbled amongst themselves 
and that, in particular, two rival factions (both originally from southern Albanian) 
were competing for control of the Albanian-American nationalist movement. The 
result was a standstill in putting forward any united initiatives, thus repeating the 
problems experienced in the campaigns against the Young Turks. 
473 British 
Foreign Office officials opposed any encouragement of an emerging Albanian 
national movement, in contrast to its support of, for instance, the Czech and 
Polish movements, because of Mehmed Konitza's perceived anti-Italian views. 
Mehmed's plans to visit Switzerland in April 1916, to meet Albanian-Americans 
there and discuss ways of gaining great power support, were consequently 
472 Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 29; Swire, Albania, p. 266. 
473 Durham to Herbert, 28 June 1917, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47; Elliot to Grey, 
30 Apr. 1916, 
FO 371/2619/94755: Meanwhile, Mehmed Konitza's schemes also started much earlier 
than 
other accounts, especially Woodall's, allow for. The prime reason 
for the delays appear to be 
that Mehmed was not consistent in his support of Italy rather than Fan 
Noli's support for Austria. 
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blocked. 474 According to Herbert, in 1917, on his recommendations and due to 
their close friendship, Mehmed came to support the idea of an Italian 
protectorate. These plans were postponed because Mehmed came under 
(unofficial) French influence, and temporarily came to support the unrealistic 
idea of a French protectorate. 475 Such a situation was by no means unique 
amongst the Albanian diaspora. Like other influential nationalists, Mehmed was 
inconsistent in his policy, and regularly shifted his allegiance between people 
and programmes that he saw as influential or useful. This weakened the 
position of the Albanians vis-ä-vis their adversaries, because they were seen as 
unreliable or undependable, and sometimes even as dishonest. It also meant 
that they persisted in pursuing a number of different rival and often contradictory 
solutions, although their greatest successes had been achieved in periods of 
unity and consensus. Other national leaders, such as the Czech Tomas 
Masaryk, were equally willing to shift allegiances, but they did not gain such a 
poor reputation by doing so. 
476 
Vatra's first real impact was not felt until the summer of 1918, when a new 
President was elected to head the organisation, although the main driving force 
behind the new policy and tactics was Mehmed Konitza. Until then, the 
organisation had been under the influence of Bishop Fan Noli, who had been 
pro-Austrian. Since Italy's declaration at Argyrocastro, Mehmed had been 
anxious to work with the Italians for an independent Albania. He assured 
474 Elliot to Grey, 30 April 1916, Lamb minute, 24 May 1916, Clerk and A. Nicolson minutes, 
25 
May 1916, FO 371/2619/94755- 
475 Durham to Amery, 23 Oct. 1917, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47: The `Mademoiselle Audrey 
affair' is an interesting and intriguing one. Durham alleged in her correspondence 
to members of 
the Anglo-Albanian Society that the French lady was a ploy by the French to promote 
the idea 
of a French protectorate as a rival to an Italian or Austrian one, 
but the prospect of that, not 
least in light of the Italian opposition it would have raised, was never very 
likely. The details of 
how the affair ended however are far from clear. 
476 See for example G. Lewis and A. M. Schlesinger Jr., Tomas Masaryk 
(eBook, 2003). 
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Sonnino that, if the Consulta made a formal declaration supporting an 
independent Albanian state, to include within its frontiers all territory with a 
predominantly Albanian population, then Italy would receive the full support of 
Vatra for a protectorate. Sonnino subsequently invited leading Albanian 
nationalists in exile, who called themselves the National Albanian Committee, to 
Rome in early December 1918. Sonnino was keen to harness the support of 
the Albanian nationalists for Italy, but he was not prepared to go so far as a 
formal declaration, for fear of the response it might produce from the Allies. In 
mid-October 1918, Pichon warned the Consulta to stop fermenting Albanian 
nationalism in the zones of Italian occupation, because the London Pact had 
reserved southern Albania for Greece. In early November 1918, the British 
Foreign Office and the American State Department, having heard reports that 
the Italians were preparing to establish a puppet government in Albania to 
present the peacemakers with a fait accompli, warned the Consulta against any 
unilateral action in Albania. 477 Sonnino was not so insensitive as to offend his 
partner's sensibilities openly. Nevertheless, he did promise to help the 
Committee organise Albania as a modern state, and to assist it in gaining the 
territory it claimed as part of its irredenta, thus continuing his policy of trying to 
block Greek and especially Slav gains there. In return, the Albanians, except 
for, significantly, Dr Mihal Tourtoulis, an Orthodox Christian who had previously 
served as Minister of Public Instruction and Health under Wilhelm of Wied, 
agreed to recognise an Italian protectorate. Tourtoulis remained convinced that 
the Italians would not use their influence for the good of Albania, and that their 
presence would instead lead to continual discord and further conflict. He 
therefore never accepted the idea of an Italian protectorate and was a constant 
47 Sonnino to Piacentini, 29 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 694; Lansing to Barclay, 16 Nov. 
1918, and Barclay to Lansing, 19 Nov. 1918, FRUS PPC, II, pp. 374-5; Pastorelli, 
L'Albania, pp. 
64-6; Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', pp. 30-1. 
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block to Italian aspirations. 478 It was only after enduring the occupation that 
other prominent nationalists came to support his views. 479 These were certainly 
gains that the Italians, and probably also the Albanian representatives, knew 
that the Consulta could not guarantee. Neither, as it turned out, nor as Sonnino 
had hoped, could the Consulta control the Albanian nationalists. 
The Italians also worked with Albanian leaders inside Albania. As they moved 
northwards in 1918, Italian forces allowed the Albanians to continue with their 
local administrations, but simultaneously helped to organise meetings 
throughout Albania to draft petitions and demand independence under Italian 
protection. This policy had two objectives: in the short term, to make the areas 
easier to govern; in the longer term, to overturn the London Pact by creating 
organisations and manifestoes that could be used as propaganda, at the peace 
conference, in favour of an Italian protectorate. 480 The Consulta had no intention 
of relinquishing its authority, or of establishing one central regime or provisional 
government. French interference in the local administration at Scutari upset this 
scenario, and promoted amongst the Albanians the idea of the need for a 
central unified Albanian administration. On arrival in Scutari, the French forces 
had removed from power local Albanian leaders, including Bib Doda, who had 
collaborated with the Austrians during the war, and set up their own 
replacement government, which produced great discontent. Many of the leaders 
in Scutari thus came round to supporting the idea of an Italian protectorate, and 
the French insensitivity fostered further their desire to establish an Albanian 
478 Tourtoulis to Herbert, 12 Jan. 1919, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/1; Phillips to Clerk, 28 Dec. 
1918, FO 371/3570/9031; Rumbold to Balfour, 7 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3570/6937- 
479 See Chapters 7 and 8, esp. pp. 290-5,301-27 passim. 
480 Sonnino to Piacentini, 6 Nov. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 32; Sonnino to Piacentini, 20 Nov. 
1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 243; Sforza to Sonnino, 23 Nov. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 305; 
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provisional government under Italian protection. 481 Sonnino was less than 
optimistic about the project. He sent Colonel Ettore Lodi, considered an expert 
in Albanian affairs, to Albania in the capacity of Political Liaison Officer to the 
Albanian National Council. Lodi had instructions to prevent the formation of an 
Albanian provisional government, by manipulating any meetings which took 
place. General Piacentini, the Supreme Commander of Italian forces in the 
Balkans, likewise had orders to use troops and bribes, as necessary, to prevent 
its formation. About 100 Albanians met at Alessio on 9 December 1918, and 
Lodi was successful in his task of steering the meeting away from creating a 
provisional government. 482 
That was not the end of the matter. Throughout December 1918, Mehmed 
Konitza, now the central figure in the Albanian nationalist movement, travelled 
throughout Albania, with the object of organising a second meeting of Albanian 
leaders, beys and agas. This finally took place at Durazzo on 25 December 
1918. Here Lodi was unable to control the meeting as he had done at Alessio. 
Over Lodi's objections, the Albanians proclaimed themselves a National 
Assembly, and then proceeded to form a provisional government with Turkhan 
Pasha recalled as Prime Minister, Bib Doda as Deputy Prime Minister and 
Mehmed Konitza as Foreign Minister. The Assembly issued a declaration 
protesting against the foreign intrigue that had led to the temporary withdrawal 
of Wilhelm, and asserted that this could not be used in favour of Albanian 
481 Sonnino to Imperiali, Bonin Longere and Miniscalchi, 8 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 492; 
Sonnino to Imperiali, n. d. Dec. 1918, and LC minute, 17 Dec. 1918, FO 371/3148/206726: The 
Consulta promoted the idea of French culpability in the movement to (re-)establish an 
Albanian 
provisional government but it appears that Whitehall did not support their views, 
dismissing the 
suggestion as Italian propaganda. 
482 Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', pp. 35-6; Pearson, Albania, 1, p. 112. 
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partition. 483 They expressed their desire for a restoration of the independent 
Albanian state of 1913-14, together with claims to their ethnic irredenta. Those 
attending the meeting consisted of delegates from across Albania, but there 
was no delegate from Koritza, which was still under French control, and Bib 
Doda was the only representative of the northern clans. The Albanians were 
once more acting independently. In these activities, they were making their own 
decisions and, for the first time, defying the great powers if their interests could 
not be reconciled with Albanian nationalist ones, and against the traditional 
realist rhetoric of the states system. Their abandonment of any hope of gaining 
great power support was a last resort. Only when efforts in this direction had 
been completely unsuccessful did the Albanians have the incentive to devise 
their own independent policy, given that there were no other alternatives. As 
late as October 1918, Mehmed was still advocating an Albanian regiment under 
Aubrey Herbert, and Albanian commitment to Britain, and even to Italy, in return 
for recognition of an independent Albania. 484 
The establishment of the provisional government was not welcomed in the 
Consulta. Although the meeting had been arranged with Italian support, 
Sonnino had misunderstood its purpose. Italian officials appear to have thought 
that the meeting in Durazzo was being called for the purpose of expressing the 
desires of the Albanian people to the expected peace conference, as earlier 
local meetings had done. Afterwards, Sonnino ordered that the Albanians be 
483 `Constitutive Act of the [Durazzo] Provisional Government', 25 Jan. 1919,875.00/29 (M820, 
r. 555), General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931 
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Imperiali, Bonin Longere and Miniscalchi, 8 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 492; Sonnino to 
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prevented from leaving Durazzo until they had explained their actions. Lodi 
therefore told the delegates that they must abrogate their decision. Mehmed 
went to Rome to explain why the government had been formed despite Italian 
objections. 485 Mehmed was fully aware that this move had taken the Italians by 
surprise, and had gone much further than they had anticipated, but he was 
anxious not to lose Italian support. He ascribed the appointment of Turkhan 
Pasha as Prime Minister as an attempt to mollify Italian objections. 486 
Meanwhile, Sonnino wanted to maintain Albanian support for Italy. Appreciating 
that it was too late to undo this move, he merely insisted that all reports and 
acts of the Albanian Assembly would have to be reviewed by the Italian military 
authorities, and that the Italian government would not recognise the Albanian 
government, pending the outcome of the peace conference. The French, British 
and American governments likewise refused to recognise it. Lodi cleverly 
explained to the Albanians that these decisions had been forced on Italy by their 
Allies, but that, in reality, the Consulta fully supported the Albanian nationalists. 
The Italians were attempting to play a double game: not to lose face with their 
Allies, but also to maintain support of the Albanian nationalists. 487 In reality, they 
had already lost control of the nationalists. Once more, the Albanians were 
attempting to take their future out of the hands of the great powers and rival 
neighbour states, and to have a role in determining the future of their state. 
485 Piacentini to Sonnino, 26 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 660; Piacentini to Sonnino, 26 Dec. 
1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 661; Sonnino to Piacentini, 29 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6,1, no. 694; 
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Conclusions 
Throughout the First World War, all the powers changed their positions and 
attitudes regarding Albania, whilst the Balkan states remained largely constant, 
but devised new methods and techniques for achieving their goals. As the war 
progressed, nationalism and nationalist interests played an increasing role. 
Following on from Wilson's fourteen points, the Allies pledged to uphold the 
interests of subject nationalities and small states. This was primarily for reasons 
of self-interest and position in the wider war effort. For the British, particularly, 
appeals to the Poles and Czechs were designed to upset Austrian war efforts. 
In south-eastern Europe, a similar agenda was pursued, despite the lack of 
direct British interests there. One War Cabinet memorandum stated that British 
general-European interests were too deeply rooted in the Balkans for Britain to 
be detached from Balkan politics. Although Britain had `no material interests in 
south eastern Europe', it was `indirectly almost as much affect[ed] as [the] other 
great powers' . 
488 
The Foreign Office considered the Albanian question as different to many of the 
other small-state national questions under consideration during the First World 
War. The Foreign Office denied that Britain had any commitments to Albania 
because those signed before the war were `void', as all the signatories were 
now at war. 489 MacGinty has shown how western European small states 
benefited from a `seminal structure of empowerment' produced by the war. 
490 
Such ideas could also be applied to small states in eastern Europe. The war 
improved their position at the bargaining table, and the Greeks, especially, 
488 War Cabinet memo., 6 Feb. 1917, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35/1. 
489 Lambert and H. Nicolson minutes, 18 Jan. 1918, WED minute, 16 Feb. 1918, FO 
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sought to capitalise upon the new opportunities and on their increased 
importance in the international (great power) system. By contrast, the Albanians 
were slow both to benefit from and also to seek to benefit from the new 
international order. They still faced opposition to their national goals from the 
Greeks, Serbs and Italians, had the great powers opposed to their national 
aspirations, and for most of the First World War they were internally divided, 
and therefore weak, especially in comparison to their rivals. Only towards the 
end of the war, and with the new steps towards unity, did the Albanians make 
any progress in capitalising on the opportunities this crisis in the great power 
system provided for small states. 
By the end of 1918, the Albanians had once more achieved a nominal 
administration over the whole country. In reality the French, Italians, Greeks and 
Serbs still occupied and controlled the vast majority of territory the Albanians 
would claim at the peace conference, and the government remained 
unrecognised, shadowing its predicament in 1912. However, the counter- 
revolution had been defeated. As with Albanian initiatives during the Balkan 
wars, it took greater external threats, and a realisation that they could not rely 
on the support of others, to create this unity and resolve. Significantly, the 
Albanian movement was again marked by an absence of religious differences, 
whereas in times of discord religious affiliations appear to have been more 
prominent. The great powers' mistrust of, and concern about, each other meant 
that they paid scant attention to Albanian actions or activities. In the last months 
of the conflict, and in those immediately after the armistice, rapid progress was 
made on the Albanian national front. This was similar to the experiences of 
other eastern European nationalities, but also different, because of the lack of 
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great power support for these activities in Albania. Nevertheless, internationally, 
the Albanians viewed the situation at the end of the war with promise, as the 
most interested states would no longer be involved. Melida Frasheri summed up 
their position in a letter to Herbert. He wrote that 
I think that the new situation of the three states-Russia, Austria and 
Turkey-will cause a salutary change for Albania, as much for the morale 
of the Albanians as for the politics of the powers and the little states 
towards us. 
He added that the three powers most interested in the Albanian issue before the 
war, Italy not withstanding, would no longer be a political factor at the peace 
conference. Therefore he considered that the Albanian question would be 
resolved by `friendly and disinterested powers'491 with less concern for power- 
politics, and would provide a fairer settlement, based on Wilsonian principles. 
This view was naive: geo-political interests were at least as important after the 
war, if not more so, because larger prizes were at stake. 
491 M. Frasheri to Herbert, 15 Nov. 1918, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/1. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
The Peace Conference of Paris I: 
the problem of southern Albania 
`Is Albania to become the Poland of south-eastern Europe? '492 
Chapters Six and Seven consider the interactions and the respective roles of 
nationalism, especially when defined as language nationalism or self- 
determination, and geo-politics in the Albanian question during the Peace 
Conference of Paris (1919-20). For as Dockrill and Goold have argued, in 
settling the many questions produced by the war in eastern Europe, the great 
power policy makers faced the problem of reconciling conflicting wartime 
priorities and commitments with the supposedly new self-determination 
diplomacy. 493 Wilson intended that the Conference would be based on his 
fourteen points and national self-determination, but these `new' ideals faced 
opposition from the secret treaties signed during the war, above all the Pact of 
London, in which great power interests remained protected. Despite the 
supposed `new diplomacy', there would be only a limited role for the small 
states, and the great power representatives (now including the United States 
and Japan) would make the key decisions. By the time the Peace Conference 
started, many of the stronger `small' states were already independent 
(Czechoslovakia and Poland), and it would be the responsibility of the 
Conference to decide their boundaries. Others, including the Albanians, were 
still trying to convince the great power statesmen to accept the notion of their 
nominal independence. The great powers therefore sought to try and prevent 
the decomposition of eastern Europe and the Middle East into smaller and 
492 Herbert memo., n. d., Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33. 
493 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 87,254. 
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smaller sub-divisions, based on nationality, and to make the new states as 
rational as possible. But, as Alan Sharp has argued, the `demand for nation- 
states, based on a single nationality, was not itself rational in the world of 1919'. 
It was not possible to place all Poles in Poland or all Germans in Germany, 
even if the peacemakers had desired to do so. The result was that, in Europe, 
over thirty million people were left in states in which they were an ethnic 
minority, an object of suspicion by the dominant nationality and a target for their 
co-nationals abroad. 
494 
Such arguments only applied to those states whose independence fitted in with 
great power policy projections. Where independence was viewed as neither 
beneficial nor necessary for great power interests, or for the balance of power, it 
was, despite the new rhetoric, not supported. The Albanians were a small 
grouping, and this was not something that was viewed positively in 1919-20. 
Across central and eastern Europe, borders were unable to meet the Wilsonian 
principles because of the mixture of nationalities, outdated and unreliable 
population figures and also due to the tendency for the peacemakers to 
consider economic, historical and strategic factors in addition to ethnic ones, 
even when their own strategic interests were not at stake. 495 Such an 
eventuality was not new. The 1913 Ambassadors' Conference had already 
shown the effects that a narrow definition of nationality, an interlaced 
population, and alternative priorities, could have on the attempt to produce 
ethnic or national frontiers. Not only was self-determination not new, neither 
were the problems associated with establishing states and delimiting them on 
this basis. 
494 Sharp, `Genie', p. 25; Also at M. MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 
and Its Attempt to End the War (London, 2001), p. 496. 
a95 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, p. 91. 
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Colonel Edward House, Wilson's senior adviser, maintained that the Albanian 
question differed significantly from the other European `national' questions, such 
as Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which became independent, and 
Ukraine and Armenia, which did not. He also projected that the Albanian 
question involved `little if anything more than rectifications of frontier', and that, if 
`nothing is done except in the matter of the Italian claim to Valona and in 
providing for advice and guidance to Albania, she will be no worse off than she 
has been,. 496 In reality, the Albanian question proved to be both different and 
more complicated. At the start of the war, Albania had existed in its entirety and 
had been independent. It was neutral in the war, and might possibly have been 
an ally if Essad Pasha's force was taken into account. The Peace Conference 
did not resolve the Albanian question, and its territory did not form part of any of 
the five peace treaties, or the Treaty of Rapallo (12 November 1920), which 
settled Italo-Yugoslav disputes. 
Albania was thus a marginal issue. Although the representatives at the time did 
not think of it in these terms, there were three distinct phases to the Albanian 
question during the Peace Conference, albeit with some overlap. The first was 
the peace preparations of all the relevant parties. The second focused on the 
southern Albanian question, from January to July 1919. The third phase 
considered the northern Albanian question, from March 1919 to March 1920. 
Chapter Six considers the first two, and Chapter Seven the third. At the 
Conference, the division of the Albanian question into small sub-sections, and 
496 House memo., May 1919, FRUS PPC, IX, p. 577. 
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its inclusion in other questions under consideration, indicated the weak position 
of the Albanians. 
Language Nationalism Revisited 
The problem in 1919, as in 1913, was how to define a nation or a nationality, 
now under the supposedly new guise of Wilson's national self-determination. It 
appears that for Wilson this had two main components: the right of autonomy 
for national groups, and the democratic processes within states. Wilson tended 
to confuse these two elements. As Alfred Cobban pointed out, national self- 
determination was essentially a synonym for popular sovereignty. Sharp has 
argued that Wilson essentially followed the western civic tradition, which has 
tended not to distinguish between the concept of a person as a member of an 
ethnic group and as a citizen of a state. Such a view was understandable 
considering the ethnic mix of the United States and, in particular, Wilson's 
views, as a Southerner, on the right of secession. 497 Given the ethnic mix of 
eastern Europe in particular, such a conception was never going to be practical. 
As Sharp pointed out, the question that the American delegation asked 
themselves was, `if national self-determination was to legitimise the new 
frontiers, what criteria would determine nationality? ' The western tradition 
emphasised choice in establishing nationality, but the eastern or German one 
did not. Instead nationality was `determined not self-determined, and the 
determining factors included ethnicity, language, religion, culture, historical 
allegiance and geography. 498 For the Americans in 1919, as for the 
ambassadors in London in 1913, language came to be the favoured criterion. 
The evidence soon showed that it was inadequate, and could not be neatly 
49' Cobban, The National State, p. 63; Sharp, 'Genie', pp. 12-3; Sharp, 'Minorities', p. 178. 
498 Sharp, 'Genie', pp. 13-4 emphasis added. 
224 
delimited on maps, especially in eastern Europe, where many nationalities 
overlapped and were intermingled; and the various categories could also be 
subject to further subdivisions, by language or religion, or both. 499 This was a 
particularly pertinent point for the Albanians. Wilson therefore came to regret his 
commitment to national self-determination. As he admitted to the Senate, `when 
I gave utterance to those words ["that all nations had a right to self- 
determination"] I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, 
which are coming to us day after day,. 500 In addition to the general ignorance of 
eastern Europe on the part of the leading members of all the main delegations, 
a further problem was created, as Sharp has maintained, by the innate 
contradiction between the right of self-determination and the right of the state to 
maintain its existence. 501 This proved particularly problematic in eastern 
Europe, because of the competing national claims. It therefore led Allied experts 
to believe in both ethnic (based on pseudo-linguistic foundations) and historical 
bases for small states in the region. 
Even more importantly, none of the great power representatives, not even 
Wilson, was ever entirely committed to the principle of self-determination. The 
British Foreign Office wanted to see minority groups assimilated into newly 
created states or enlarged ones. If the right to appeal de facto was granted to, 
for example, the Macedonian Bulgarians, then it would be difficult to refuse it in 
the case of other nationalist movements, for example the southern Irish, 
Flemings, Catalans and French Canadians. These ideals were therefore limited 
499 Sharp, 'Genie', pp. 14,20,23; Sharp, `Minorities', pp. 170,178; Also at L. 
Riga and J. 
Kennedy, "'The Inquiry" and the Mapping of East Central Europe in 1919: Mitteleuropa as 
Middle America? ' (Unpublished conference paper given at the Association for the 
Study of 
Nationalities World Convention, Columbia University, New York, 23-6 March 2006). 
500 Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, IV, p. 429. 
501 Sharp, 'Minorities', p. 172. 
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to eastern Europe. 502 The fourteen points included many features that might be 
considered contrary to self-determination, and they allowed for other priorities in 
the drawing of frontiers, including international stability, historical development, 
economics, defensible frontiers, security and communication. 503 Above all, for 
the Albanian question, Point 11 provided for Serbian access to the sea and 
economic independence, and the restoration of Serbian, Montenegrin and 
Romanian frontiers (Appendix E). The most likely location for Serbian access to 
the sea was in northern Albania, especially before the dissolution of Austria- 
Hungary. Albania was also not listed as one of the Balkan states to be restored 
after the First World War. The Albanian question had a further complicating 
factor, in that it was covered by the Pact of London (Appendix D). Despite the 
supposedly new basis for negotiations, Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd 
George, the French and British Prime Ministers, and the Italians, still adhered to 
this, at least when it suited their purposes to do so. As negotiations progressed, 
it became clear that Italian claims far exceeded the terms of the 1915 
agreement. Thus the Albanian settlement would be a combination of national 
self-determination based on language, great and small power interests and 
previous agreements between the powers. 
Preparations for Peace (1917-19) 
Great-Power Policies and Positioning 
The changed international climate had profound implications for the Albanian 
question. There were no representatives from Austria (previously the 
staunchest advocate) or Russia (formerly the strongest opponent). Of the 
five 
502 League of Nations, The Complaints of Macedonia: memoranda, petitions, resolutions, 
minutes, letters and documents, addressed to the League of Nations, 1919-1939 
(Geneva, 
1979), pp. 20-1,36-7. 
503 Sharp, `Protection of minorities', pp. 177-8; Sharp, `Genie', p. 13; Temperley, History of 
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great powers represented in Paris (the United States, British Empire, France, 
Italy and Japan), Italy was the most directly interested in the Albanian 
question. 
504 Since Italy had entered the First World War, Italian policy had 
undergone considerable revisions. In 1915, Italian Adriatic policy had been 
motivated by a fear of Austria, and was designed to weaken Austrian power. 
With the break-up of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire into several small 
states, this issue was no longer relevant. The former Italian policy had not taken 
into account the prospect of a large, strong Yugoslavia as a replacement for 
Austria on the northern and eastern shores of the Adriatic. By January 1919, 
Italian policy had changed to reflect this. The Consulta sought to curb potential 
Yugoslav claims in Trentino, Dalmatia and Albania. At the start of the 
Conference, possession of Valona remained Italy's key objective in Albania, but 
elsewhere Sonnino, still Foreign Minister, no longer sought Albania's 
dismemberment, and pursued a policy in favour of Albanian nationalism. This 
policy change dated from the 1917 protectorate. For Sonnino, there were 
several advantages in supporting a `large' Albania. Most importantly, he hoped, 
it would act as a counterpoise to Yugoslavia on the eastern side of the Adriatic, 
especially if Albania could be established under Italian protection. This would 
give the Consulta its long-coveted footstep in the Balkans. A large Albania 
would be much better for this project than a small one. A large Albania would 
also better protect the Italian enclave at Valona from the potentially hostile 
Yugoslavs. Throughout 1919-20, Italian policy and priorities would be modified 
to adapt to international opposition, domestic pressures and Albanian activities. 
For the Consulta, as for the Greek government, more spectacular and 
504 As the Japanese Delegation took no active part in European discussion their views will not 
be considered. 
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grandiose gains elsewhere came to take precedence over less attractive ones 
in Albania. 505 
French policy was also similar to that in 1913 and, as then, did not favour the 
Albanians. For the Quai d'Orsay, as for the Foreign Office and State 
Department, there were no strategic or economic interests at stake in Albania, 
or in the larger Balkan peninsula. With the two main determinants of French 
Balkan policy (Russian interests and German encroachments into Greece) now 
removed, French officials used Balkan issues to improve France's alliance 
network throughout Europe, and therefore its own security. The French sought 
to use the Albanian question to foster relations with Italy, Yugoslavia and 
Greece. This effectively meant trying to contain Italian influence in Albania, and 
to secure gains for the Greeks and Serbs, but simultaneously maintaining good 
relations with the Consulta. This proved difficult to achieve in Paris because of 
the revised Italian claims in the Adriatic, and even more so in Albania, because 
of French support for the Greeks and Serbs. French officials were particularly 
perturbed that these Italo-Greek antagonisms might spill over into Asia Minor. 
Therefore, soon after the start of the Conference, the French delegates reverted 
to their Pact of London policy involving the tri-partition of Albania. As 
Clemenceau maintained, this policy was legally correct and offered something 
to all sides (strategically, economically and ethno-nationally). However, by 
maintaining French troops in Albania (Scutari, Koritza and Pogradec), despite 
appeals by the French military to recall them, the Quai d'Orsay kept open the 
505 Imperiali to Sonnino, 18 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 590; 1. J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the 
Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking (New Haven and London, 1963), p. 76; 
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possibility of allowing a non-partitioned Albania under an Italian mandate, in 
exchange for French gains elsewhere. 
506 
American policy proved more complicated than Wilson's pledges. American 
schemes would have profound impacts on Albanian developments, despite 
there having been no American strategy on Albania before 1918.507 Albanian 
writers have often based Wilson's programme on his alleged statement `I have 
one voice at the Peace Conference and I will use that voice in favour of 
Albania'. However, there is no mention of this in Wilson's correspondence. 508 
The Inquiry, a body consisting mainly of academics, was established by Wilson 
to formulate plans for a lasting peace, based on scientific principles. An initial 
report on Albania (December 1917) recommended that, for primarily economic 
reasons, an `independent Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political 
entity ). 509 The final report (21 January 1919) failed to make definite 
recommendations on many aspects of the Albanian question. It considered that 
the problems involved were `so complicated in details, and the proposed 
settlements are so experimental in form, and so many interests are involved, 
both near and remote, that definite recommendations are felt to be unsafe at 
this time'. Specific problems were identified with the `highly artificial' 1913 
boundaries, which cut off economic intercourses, national affiliations and tribal 
ties, the latter being considered the strongest bond amongst Albanians. A 
united Albania was considered impracticable, owing to the weakness of the 
506 P. S. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish 
Relations from the Paris Peace conference to Locarno (Minneapolis, 1962), esp. pp. 4-7,21; J. 
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07 Lansing to Barnard, 5 Oct. 1914,875.00/2 (M121 1, r. 1), Internal Affairs, DOS, RG 59. 
508 For example Fiftieth Anniversary Book cited in G. Pano, `The Albanian-American 
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national affiliation of the people, backward institutions, difficulties in 
communications and disruption by neighbouring states. The Inquiry suggested a 
solution similar to the 1915 Pact: a small independent Albanian state should 
continue to exist; northern Albania, including Scutari, San Giovanni and Alessio 
(9,800 square kilometres and 275,000 people) to the Yugoslavs under a League 
of Nations mandate; Valona to Italy (although not in full sovereignty but under a 
restricted League mandate); and in southern Albania, the two key towns, 
Argyrocastro and Koritza, and the surrounding areas should be ceded to 
Greece. These recommendations were based on a combination of ethnic, 
economic and strategic factors. It was believed that this policy would open the 
markets and pasturelands in the mountainous north to the Albanian nomadic 
farmers, and enable the development of the Boyana waterway and a harbour at 
Lake Scutari, which were both considered more economically feasible under 
Yugoslav control. In the south, Argyrocastro and Santa Quaranta should go to 
Greece for ethnic reasons, being the main area of Greek settlement, whereas 
the proposals regarding Koritza were primarily economic and strategic. The 
Inquiry admitted that this area was predominantly Albanian. The allocation of 
Koritza was necessary in order to maintain communications with Monastir and 
Thrace. The report also alluded in its recommendations to the importance of the 
Hellenic inclinations of the population and past Greek success in assimilating 
Albanians. 510 Central Albania was the most difficult question. It was suggested, 
with the utmost caution, that central Albania should be granted nominal 
independence under some disinterested power, as mandatory of the League, 
because the Albanians were considered incapable of governing themselves. 
510 `Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendations Prepared by the Intelligence Section in 
accordance with instructions, for the President and Plenipotentiaries', 21 Jan. 1919,185.112/1, 
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The mandatory power was `left open': the authors opposed Italy for a number of 
reasons (past interference in Albania, including in 1914, and hostility to 
Yugoslavia and Greece being the main ones). However, neither Britain nor the 
United States, the only two powers who, according to the report, would `be 
willing to spend their efforts unselfishly', would accept the mandate. Therefore 
the Italians should be allowed a temporary mandate limited to Valona, but much 
less than the Consulta wanted, 
511 
Unlike most Inquiry proposals, these recommendations did not become policy. 
By the start of the Peace Conference, the American position had become more 
sympathetic towards Albanian nationalism. The only original feature that 
remained was the belief that the Albanians were unprepared for full 
independence of the type proclaimed in 1912. The Americans, therefore, 
reluctantly came to support the idea of an Italian mandate. They insisted that 
the nature of the mandate, and therefore Italy's power and influence, must be 
strictly limited. The reasons for this shift remain unclear, for there were no 
special directives regarding Albanian policy. Although Wilson himself often went 
against the principle of self-determination, he insisted that any violation of it 
must be reported to him and justified. Neither Pastorelli nor Goldstein's 
explanations, of the change that followed discussion with members of the British 
delegation, seem adequate. 512 The American records for the winter of 1918-19 
are scant in references to such conversations between American policy makers 
511 Ibid, pp. 49-50,56-8 of item 648. 
512 Pastorelli, L'Albania, p. 90; E. D. Goldstein, 'Britain Prepares for Peace: British Preparations 
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and junior British officials, who in any case often had their ideas vetoed, and 
were themselves inconsistent in their support of Albanian nationalism. 513 
British policy was based on a series of complicated paradoxes: national 
sovereign states were necessary for order in Europe, but the application of 
national self-determination in itself might lead to international tension or internal 
anarchy. Maintenance of the balance of power, despite Wilson's views to the 
contrary, remained the main driver. The Foreign Office hoped to exploit national 
self-determination to strengthen the states system, by the creation of 
consciously sovereign states. Therefore, when the idea of a Balkan 
confederation failed, Britain sought to balance Italy in the Adriatic and the 
Balkans with a strong Greece and Yugoslavia. Whitehall wanted a strong 
Greece, to replace the Ottoman Empire and protect British interests in the 
eastern Mediterranean, including the India route and the Straits. Whatever the 
higher rationale, the first steps to supporting the selected regional proxy 
nationalisms were usually strategic. Greece was chosen for this role because 
Venizelos was clearly seen as the key to long-term friendly Anglo-Greek 
relations. 514 By contrast, the Albanians were not viewed as useful to maintaining 
the British interests in the region, and were therefore not supported. Despite its 
importance in Middle Eastern policy, religion (specifically the Muslim population) 
does not seem to have influenced British policy on Albania and the Balkans. 
515 
513 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 52. 
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Unlike the Inquiry, no central body co-ordinated British peace preparations, but 
the Political Intelligence Department (PID) soon became influential. 516 
Overriding traditional interpretations, Goldstein and others have maintained 
that, in questions associated with eastern and central Europe, especially in the 
territorial committees, the Foreign Office retained considerable influence in the 
formulation of British policy. The initial disagreements, over favouring the new 
ethnically-based small states or preservation of the Habsburg Empire, were 
resolved by the collapse of the great power, but policy was still governed by 
strategic interests. On the presumption that the balance of power would 
continue to be the major plank of British policy, the PID considered that, 
following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the formation of new, smaller, 
`national' states would produce sovereign entities that would stabilise and 
reinforce the new international order produced by the war. Self-determination 
was therefore supported because `there is every reason to hope that states 
based upon the conscious existence of a common nationality will be more 
durable and afford a firmer support against aggression than the older form of 
state'. 517 In south-eastern Europe, the PID contended that self-determination 
offered `the best prospects of a permanent peace', and was therefore `desirable 
and advantageous' for British interests. Recommendations were to be based 
`on the principles of nationality, self-determination, security and free economic 
opportunity', in order to ensure future stability and remove possible friction. For 
these reasons, the PID advocated that Yugoslavia and Romania should obtain 
516 Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 221-8; Calder cited in A. Sharp, `Some Relevant Historians - 
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their ethnic irredenta . 
51 8 However, in Albanian policy, and as Chapters Six and 
Seven indicate, the PID does not seem to have been as influential as Goldstein 
and others have maintained, primarily because of the Albanian question's inter- 
connectedness with Italian ambitions. Senior colleagues were not prepared to 
distance themselves from these plans, because issues that involved great 
power interests were to be dealt with by the Supreme Council. Eventually, in 
December 1919, Lloyd George assumed personal control of British policy. 519 
The policy for Albania advocated by Allen Leeper and Harold Nicolson, the two 
officials assigned to investigate the Albanian question, did not give such 
prominence to self-determination. Leeper and Nico'Ison considered the 1913 
settlement obsolete, and they emphasised that the northern commission had 
never fully reported. Three ideas were proposed. Firstly, a tri-partite scheme 
similar to that under the London Pact (north to Yugoslavia, south to Greece, and 
centre to Albania), which was contrary to self-determination and unacceptable 
to the Italians. Secondly, leaving the frontiers as in 1913 but allowing the Serbs 
and Montenegrins to advance to the Drin river, whilst allowing Greece to annex 
a line between the Drin and Voyussa rivers. This too was contrary to self- 
determination and unacceptable to the Italians. Leeper and Nicolson favoured 
the third suggestion, which, without allowing changes in the north, would cede 
to Greece a large portion of northern Epirus. The remainder would be given to 
Italy under a mandate. Although this policy did not satisfy Yugoslav claims, it 
was unlikely to create conflict between the Italians and Greeks. The internal 
organisation of Albania would be a cantonal system, similar to that in 
Switzerland, as they believed this would reconcile outstanding tribal and 
518 PID, `South-eastern Europe and the Balkans' minute, Dec. 1918, FO 371/4355/f68/pc68, 
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religious differences. The throne should be given to an Italian prince, possibly 
the Duke of Abruzzi, to safeguard Italian interests and appease Italian public 
opinion. In return, the Italians would be required to neutralise the Albanian coast 
and the Corfu channel. Albanian territory was considered a bargaining chip that 
could be used to facilitate negotiations with the Italians in areas where British 
interests were more directly involved. For this reason, the report concluded by 
recommending co-operation between the South-eastern Europe and Middle 
Eastern sections, in order to co-ordinate policy relating to Tripoli, Dodecanese, 
Anatolia, Abyssinia and Albania. 520 Various other government departments 
independently came up with similar proposals to the PID. For instance, the 
Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) in the War Office, in September 1918, 
under Major Harold Temperley, had proposed a similar scheme, except for a 
few minor differences regarding the southern boundary. 521 British policy towards 
Albania was therefore determined by a combination of motives: although it 
employed the new self-determination rhetoric, geo-political and strategic 
concerns continued to be the prime determinants, especially the balance of 
power and position of Greece. 
Revived Balkan National Ambitions 
Venizelos and the other Greek representatives had an accurate picture of their 
position in great-power policy projections. They appreciated the positive 
attitudes of both France and Britain and hoped to capitalise on them. On the 
other hand, they were acutely aware that the Italians were the main obstacle to 
their national ambitions. Woodall has alleged that the Greeks were not 
520Toynbee to Headlam-Morley, 15 Nov. 1918, FO 371/4352/f18/pc18; Goldstein, 'Britain 
Prepares', pp. 103,107-8. 
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concerned with Italy, particularly the danger of Italian influence in the Balkans. 
Admittedly, as Woodall and Petsalis-Diomidis argue, Venizelos and the other 
Greek policy makers became fixated on becoming a Mediterranean power, as 
opposed to a Balkan one. They became fanatical with the Megali Idea (Great 
Idea) of eastern Mediterranean acquisitions (eastern Thrace, the Dodecanese, 
Asia Minor, even Constantinople), and were prepared to compromise over 
Albania to achieve them. Greek officials were less concerned than the 
Yugoslavs (Serbs especially) by the Italians being granted concessions in 
Albania, but there were several calculated reasons for this. During the war, the 
focus of Italian interests, except for Valona, had shifted further north, and had 
thus become less incompatible with the gains sought by Greece. Venizelos 
welcomed the prospect of an Albania under Italian influence, because he 
considered that it posed fewer risks than an independent state. Venizelos was 
shrewd enough to realise that it cost little to be magnanimous on issues such as 
an Albanian mandate, in which Greece had few interests, in the hope of greater 
gains elsewhere. Greek claims were therefore limited to the provinces of 
Argyrocastro, by the right of self-determination, and Koritza, for primarily 
economic and strategic reasons. They believed that these goals would be 
attainable, and would also help offset potential Italian gains elsewhere in 
Albania. 522 In the pursuit of its national ambitions in northern Epirus, Greece 
occupied a stronger position than the Albanians and their claims to southern 
Albania, because Venizelos had been able to align Greek ambitions more 
closely with the policies of the great powers. 
522 Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 135,137-8; Goldstein, 'Britain and Greater Greece', p. 344; 
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 42-3. 
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At the opening of the Peace Conference, Yugoslavia (which until 1929 was 
known officially as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) had a much 
weaker position in the international system. Serbia was internationally 
recognised and had accredited representation at the Conference, but none of 
the great powers had recognised Yugoslavia as an independent state, although 
they had recognised Czechoslovakia and Poland. This made it difficult for the 
Yugoslav delegates to have their claims heard, which was particularly important 
now that there was no longer a Slav state (Russia) recognised as a great 
power, and able to protect their interests. As the Yugoslav delegation was 
involved in territorial disputes with six of their seven neighbours, including Italy 
and Albania but excluding Greece, this proved problematic. The Italians in 
particular were in a much stronger position, or, as No Lederer put it, were in 
possession of `every strategic advantage': they would be involved in the inner 
discussions of the Supreme Council; had the London Pact which bound Britain 
and France to support their claims in the northern Adriatic; and were in 
possession of many of the disputed areas, including much of northern Albania, 
although not the town of Scutari. As well as these external problems, internal 
divisions, especially the rivalry between the Catholic Croats, who considered 
themselves more highly cultured, and the Orthodox Serbs created problems in 
devising a policy that was acceptable to all sides. The Italians sought to exploit 
and promote these divisions and rivalries. 
523 
The different linguistic groupings of the delegation had different priorities. The 
Serbian and Montenegrin delegates maintained that the territorial restoration of 
523 Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 82; Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', p. 40; A. Mitrovid, 'Jyaocnaeuja, 
An6aHCKO 17umawe u I4manuja 1919-1939' ('Yugoslavia, the Albanian Question and Italy 1919- 
1939'), in Mitrovic, Serbs and Albanians, pp. 231-73. 
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the medieval kingdoms, especially the Drin frontier and Scutari, should be the 
main targets, and that concessions should be offered to Italy in the northern 
Adriatic. The Croat and Slovene members argued that Fiume (an Istrian port not 
provided for by the London Pact, but now sought by the Italians), the Dalmatian 
coast and islands, as the home to native Slav populations, should be the 
primary focus, at the expense of claims in northern Albania, where ethnic 
arguments and self-determination were more questionable. Initially the Serbian 
section held the upper hand, but eventually the Yugoslav delegation 
pronounced in favour of an independent Albania within the 1913 frontiers. Their 
main motive was strategic: to prevent Italian control over Albania and 
penetration into the Balkans. They sought to prevent the bizarre and dangerous 
situation of being bordered by Italy on both their northern and southern frontiers. 
This initially appears as a reversal of Serb policy in 1913 and a triumph for the 
Croatian delegates. Their back-up position, adopted because the former policy 
was unlikely to be successful as no great power supported it, was far more 
favourable to Serbian and Montenegrin ambitions in northern Albania. The 
Yugoslavs therefore asserted their right, in the event that Italy was granted a 
mandate over Albania, or a foothold in it, to acquisitions in northern Albania (as 
far south as the Drin river) as compensation, including Scutari. This would make 
the southern Yugoslav frontier more defensible, provide for the long-coveted 
Serbian Adriatic port and fulfil Serbian and Montenegrin ambitions in the 
region. 524 With Serbian forces occupying much of northern Albania, they were 
well placed to pursue this alternative, should the opportunity present itself. 
524 Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 96; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 41; Swire, Albania, pp. 292-3; 
The deficiencies of the 1913 frontier in defensible terms had been illustrated due to raiding 
parties and perpetual fighting. 
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The Albanian Delegations 
The position of the Albanian delegations was even weaker than that of the 
Yugoslavs. At the opening of the Peace Conference, on 19 January 1919, 
`Albania' was no longer recognised internationally as an independent state. As 
one Inquiry report stated, 
The attempt to establish a State of Albania in 1912-1914 met with such 
incomplete success that it seems not accurate to put Albania into ... [the] 
class of possible new States. Whether it will exist in the future as a 
separate political entity, and whether it will be left by the Peace 
Conference free from such outside control as will make it an independent 
government, are too uncertain for any statement to be made as to 
Albania's being a signatory to the Treaty of Peace. 
525 
This decision made Albanian status equivalent to that of an enemy or previously 
non-existent state. In addition, Albania's chief defender in 1913, Austria, had 
been defeated and, as a consequence, had lost its great power status. The 
support of Sidney Sonnino and the other Italian delegates for Albanian 
nationalism was counterproductive because of the hostility of the other 
(stronger) great powers and small states to Italian ambitions. This did not bode 
well for consideration of the Albanian question or for receptivity to Albanian 
claims, although initially the various Albanian delegations do not seem to have 
appreciated this. 
There were many rivals for the title of leaders of `Albania' and `official 
delegation'. The most prominent proved to be that constituted by the Durazzo 
Congress (December 1918), and led by Turkhan Pasha (Sunni), Mehmed 
525 'Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty', Dec. 1918, FRUS PPC, I, p. 311. 
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Konitza (Bektashi), Dr Mihal Tourtoulis (Orthodox) and Bishop Luigi Bumci 
(Catholic), and which thus ensured that all four Albania faiths were represented. 
The delegation was sent to argue Albanian claims, to prevent Albania's 
dismemberment and to nullify the claims of what the Durazzo Congress termed 
pretenders to the title of Albania's government, such as Essad Pasha or Prince 
Wilhelm of Wied. 526 Wilhelm never attended the Conference but Essad Pasha 
presented himself in April 1919, proclaiming himself Albanian President, and 
referring to his recognition in this capacity by both the French and Italian 
governments. Other delegations included those from the Albanian colonies in 
Romania, Switzerland and the United States, most notably Vatra. There was 
also a range of `special interest' groups who continued to press for the interests 
of a particular locality, region or town. One notable example was the provisional 
government of Autonomous Northern Epirus--a Greek-inspired venture 
designed to enhance Greek claims. The Albanian community in Kosovo was not 
represented directly. Although he was eager to attend the Conference, Hasan 
Prishtina was prevented from doing so by his inability to secure a passport. 
Prishtina blamed this on the opposition of many Tosk Albanian southerners, 
above all Turkhan Pasha, who, Prishtina claimed, desired to restrain Kosovan 
pretensions and ambitions. Hasan increasingly bemoaned the lack of an official 
`Kosovan' delegate at Paris, especially within the Durazzo delegation, as the 
major reason why claims to reunite Kosovo with Albania were not considered in 
Paris. 527 
526 Pollo and Puto, History of Albania, pp. 171-5. 
527 Prishtina to a compatriot, n. d., Hasan Prishtina, no. 61; Prishtina to Kadri Efendi, 16 
June 
1920, Hasan Prishfina, no. 65; Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', pp. 129-30; Swire, Albania, pp. 
285-316 passim; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 119-44 passim. 
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A variety of tactics were used by the various Albanian nationalist organisations 
and their international spokesmen, as they attempted to raise the importance of 
the Albanian question, and to gain great power support for their national 
ambitions. Prishtina and his friends in the Committee for the National Defence 
of Kosovo, for instance, worked tirelessly publishing newspapers, leaflets and 
other propaganda aimed at highlighting the Kosovan issue. 528 Gregory Pano 
suggests that there was little difference between the ideas of the various 
Albanian groups and that, as none of the delegations were recognised, it was 
therefore of little significance who argued them. 529 In truth, the existence of so 
many competing delegations pursuing such a wide variety of tactics was in itself 
important, and proved detrimental to their national cause. Albanian differences 
could be exploited by Albania's rivals as evidence that the Albanians were not 
ready for self-government, because they could not even decide amongst 
themselves what constituted Albania, how it should be run and by whom. As the 
Conference progressed, there was a definite widening in the type and variety of 
policies pursued, and much disagreement emerged within delegations, most 
clearly in the split in the Durazzo delegation in April 1919.530 
This study concentrates primarily upon the role and policy of the Durazzo 
government delegation, because it was the closest the Albanians came to 
gaining `official' status. As a result of its late formation, the delegates did not 
meet together before their arrival in Paris, although separately they had drawn 
up several proposals. The delegates believed that the great power statesmen 
528Prishtina to Sotir Kolese, 11 Jan. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no. 58; Prishtina to Sotir Kola, 29 
Jan. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no. 59; Programi themeltar i komitetit <Mbojtja Kombetare e 
Kosoves dhe Dibres> i nenshkruar nga Hasan Prishtina, Hoxhe Kadriu etj. (The 
Initial 
programme of the Committee of 'The National Defence of Kosovo and 
Dibra', signed by Hasan 
Prishtina, Hoxhe Kadriu etc. ), 30 Aug. 1920, Hasan Prishtina, no. 66. 
529 Pano, `Albanian-American Effort', pp. 3-4. 
530 See Chapter 7, pp. 291-2. 
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would act in accordance with Wilsonian principles, and thus support the re- 
establishment of the independent Albanian state. Therefore, before the Council 
of Ten, commonly called the Supreme Council, Turkhan Pasha, as Prime 
Minister and leader of the Durazzo delegation, began by stating that 
The Albanians base all their hopes on the justice of [the] High Assembly, 
on whom they rely utterly. They trust that the principle of nationality so 
clearly and solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson and his great 
Associates will not have been proclaimed in vain, and that their rights- 
which have, up to now, been trampled underfoot-will be respected by 
the Congress whose noble mission is to dower humanity with a peace 
which, to be durable, must be based on right and justice. 531 
In accordance with these principles, the Albanians made extensive claims. The 
primary goal of the Durazzo delegation was to prevent the dissolution of the 
1913 Albanian state. However, they also advocated reconstituting Albanian 
frontiers on ethnographic lines, including that territory which the great power 
decisions in 1878 and 1913 had awarded to other states. Similar ideas were 
also promulgated by most other groups purporting to subscribe to an Albanian 
national programme. 532 There seems to have been little consideration given to 
how best to counter the arguments of the rival states, or to how to align 
Albanian aspirations with the expected policies of the great powers, not even 
with the Italians to any significant extent, which had proven so productive in 
1912. The Durazzo delegation identified three pivotal international factors that 
would impact upon the successfulness of its programme (the international 
occupation, diplomatic agreements, especially the 1915 London Pact, and lack 
of international recognition of the government), but it did not devise ways 
to 
531 Council of Ten minutes, 24 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, IV, pp. 111. 
532 See for example Municipal Authorities of Tirana memo., 2 Jan, 1919, FO 371/3150/4259 and 
Albanians in Switzerland petition, Dec. 1918, FRUS PPC, II, pp. 374-5. 
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tackle these problems. 
533 Although based on the new self-determination or 
ethnic rationale, these aspirations had little likelihood of success because they 
were so distant from the plans of any of the great powers. Small states tend to 
be less successful in their national programmes when they present extravagant 
claims and are disunited, because this makes them seem weaker and less 
useful to the great powers. In 1919, the Albanian policies and actions suffered 
in both of these ways. 
Southern Albania or Northern Epirus? (January - July 1919) 
The Presentation of Claims to `Southern Albania' 
Consideration of the southern Albanian question occurred in two stages. In the 
first stage, from January to March 1919, representatives from the small states 
(Greece, `Albania' and `Autonomous Northern Epirus') were invited to formally 
present their claims to the great powers, who were then supposed to deliberate 
upon these findings. The small states therefore had a formalised role in the 
international system, but the decisions were still made by the great powers, and 
in practice great power policies changed little from those already determined by 
geo-political interests. In the second stage, from March to July 1919, 
discussions took place more informally and the presentation of small state 
claims occurred through petitions and more low-level meetings, until eventually 
the Italians made a bi-lateral agreement (outside the Peace Conference) with 
the Greeks. The position of the small states, especially Albania, in this new 
international system was therefore little stronger than it had been under the 
concert system before the First World War. 
533 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 116-24 passim. 
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The Durazzo delegation presented its claims to southern Albania to the Peace 
Conference in two official audiences: the first on 24 February 1919, before the 
Supreme Council, and the second three days later, in the Territorial Committee 
on Questions relating to Greece (commonly called the Greek Committee). 
These claims built on the memorandum presented to the Conference on 12 
February 1919, but it does not seem to have been given much consideration by 
the great powers. 534 Before the Supreme Council, Turkhan Pasha detailed the 
losses of Albanian territory in earlier settlements. He blamed this on the fact that 
Albania's advantageous geographical position made it coveted by its 
neighbours, and on its lack of a great-power protector. He paid particular 
attention to the loss of Kosovo, claiming it was eighty percent Albanian, and that 
there had been Albanian inhabitants there since `time immemorial', whilst the 
Serbs had arrived only in the seventh century. This was one of the few 
instances in which Albanian representatives used the Albanian historical past to 
support their national claims to the great powers. Turkhan Pasha focused 
mainly on the territory claimed by the Greeks. He disputed Greek statistics on 
southern Albania, and argued that there were, at most, 20,000 Greeks there, 
and that many of these were migrant farmers working Albanian-owned land. He 
contested the view that all Orthodox Albanians should be considered Greeks, 
and cited evidence of the Greek Orthodox clergy using their faith, in 
collaboration with the Ottomans, to prevent education in the Albanian language. 
Turkhan admitted that small numbers of ethnic minorities would have to be 
incorporated into any Albanian state, but he bemoaned the fact that a far larger 
number of Albanians had been excluded by the Albania created in 1913. He 
challenged Venizelos' claims regarding the Epirote disturbances in 1914, 
534 For an English translation see Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 122-4. 
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quoting French sources that stated that this was the work of Cretan bands and 
Greek troops. Turkhan added that he believed the Greeks were claiming 
northern Epirus only to intimidate the Albanians into renouncing their claims on 
southern Epirus. Turkhan finished by appealing to the Conference's sentiments 
for a `lasting peace', and argued that `in the Balkans, unless the rights of 
nationalities are respected' this cannot be achieved. If the Conference, contrary 
to these principles, confirmed the dismemberment of Albania as effected in 
1878 and 1913, his country would never enjoy the peace necessary for 
economic development, and there would be continual disturbances of the 
frontiers of the Albanian state. Albanian claims before the Greek Committee 
continued in a similar vein. Turkhan stated that, of the 240,000 inhabitants, 
212,000 were Albanian and only 16,500 Greek, again far in excess of even the 
most generous great power statistics. He then proceeded to claim there `was 
not a single Greek' in the town or district of Koritza, and that, in Chameria, 
54,000 out of 60,000 inhabitants were Albanians, despite this region not even 
being part of the Committee's remit, as territory ceded to Greece in 1913.535 
These interviews were important because they were two rare occasions on 
which Albanians were allowed to present their views to the great powers, and 
given a formal role in the great power system, but the weak position of the 
Albanians is clearly evident. In the Supreme Council the prime ministers and 
presidents did not even show up to listen. Both Albanian presentations 
generated a poor reception, and they seem to have hindered rather than helped 
the nationalist cause. Crowe minuted that the Albanian claims were 
`hardly 
worth reading', and Harold Nicolson added that their `claims are 
fantastic and 
535 Council of Ten minutes, 24 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, pp. 111-16; `Minutes of the 
Committee 
for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Greece', 27 Feb. 1919, FO 608/37/92/l/4/3983 
[hereafter referred to as Greek Committee minutes]; Petsa'lis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 
142-3. 
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even the Italians do not propose that Albania should annex what is now Greek 
territory'. 536 The French delegates objected to hearing the claims because there 
were potentially `persons of enemy nationality' amongst the Albanian delegates, 
it was questionable whether Turkhan could be considered to govern Albania 
and there was no official delegation. The Greek Committee agreed to hear the 
Durazzo delegation only on the condition that representatives of northern Epirus 
were also heard. 537 However, Turkhan's introduction of the Durazzo delegation 
to the Greek Committee as `a pure representation of the entire people of 
Albania' was perhaps most damaging to Albanian national claims, to the 
prospect of great power backing and to the potential position of Albania in the 
great power system. This statement far exceeded the delegation's authority and 
differed significantly from the perceptions of the great power representatives in 
the room. 538 
These experiences were very different from that of the Greek representatives. 
Venizelos had been heard by the Supreme Council three weeks before the 
Albanians (3 and 4 February 1919), when the Greek Committee was first 
established. On the day when Turkhan appeared before the Supreme Council, 
Venizelos presented his claims on northern Epirus to the Greek Committee. 
Somewhat ironically, Nicolson wrote of that speech that Venizelos `is 
overwhelmingly frank, genial and subtle. His charm lights up the room. As 
536 H. Nicolson and Crowe minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 608/29/1/2193; Also at Petsalis-Diomidis, 
Greece, p. 143. 
537 Greek Committee minutes, 12 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/27947; Greek Committee minutes, 
26 Feb. 1919, CAB 29/8/WCP192. 
538 Greek Committee minutes, 12 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/27947: For instance, Italian figures 
which were most favourable to the Albanians were 107,000 inhabitants, 
61,000 Orthodox and 
46,000 Muslim, whilst 77,000 spoke Albanian and 30,000 Greek; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 
268,273. 
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always he has the triumph of his personality, but no real ice has been cut. '539 
More generally Venizelos and the Greeks were better received. Venizelos, the 
astute and charismatic politician, was able to charm the Allied leaders in a way 
that others could not, and in a way that it seems most Albanians could not even 
envisage. Venizelos was well prepared and was adept at paying well- 
orchestrated compliments to all the leaders. For instance, Lloyd George 
`beamed' at Venizelos' reference to the insignificance of the language test in 
northern Epirus, because many prominent Greeks spoke Albanian in their 
homes in the same way that `Mr Lloyd George spoke Welsh to his children ', 540 
Venizelos was all too aware of his good reception'541 but personality and 
charisma could only get him so far, in accordance with IR theory and the 
weakness of small states. This was especially so because Greek ambitions 
conflicted with great power interests in many areas. The Greeks divided their 
territorial claims into four categories: northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, Thrace 
and Asia Minor. The claim to northern Epirus was a line passing through 
Chimara, north of Tepelena, west of Voskopoja, to Lake Prespa, to join the 
Greek frontier. Venizelos based his claim on the majority of the population being 
Greek (120,000 to 80,000 Albanians). He admitted that not all the `Greeks' 
spoke Greek. Many spoke only Albanian, and hence the 1913 boundary 
commission, which had conducted its census solely on the basis of language as 
proof of nationality, recorded all the Albanian-speaking families as Albanian. He 
maintained that `neither race, nor language, nor skull' could be taken as the 
539 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 268; Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, pp. 
859-61. 
540 Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 255-6; Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, pp. 
859-61; Council of Ten minutes, 4 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, Iil, p. 875. 
541 See for example Venizelos to Repoulis, 4 Feb. 1919, cited in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 
137-8. 
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basis for determining nationality, and that national conscience must be the 
overriding factor. This was determined by religion and national sentiment, not 
language. He claimed that all the Christians within the region had always been 
attached to Greece, not to Albania or the Ottoman Empire. To him, this 
explained why over 300,000 had already emigrated to Greece. Although they 
maintained the Albanian language, these Christians had nonetheless been 
Hellenised in manners and customs, and they played an important part in 
economic life. Venizelos listed key Greek officials of Albanian origin, such as 
the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Greek Armies. 542 Interestingly, and in spite of the numerous efforts since 
1913 to portray the area as Greek, Argyrocastro was not emphasised. 
Venizelos sought to use claims in northern Epirus and the Dodecanese as 
bargaining tools with Italy for his greater goals in Asia Minor. He wrote that `the 
foremost virtue of a politician is to make the necessary partial sacrifices in time 
to secure the big results. '543 The representatives of the 1914 provisional 
government of Autonomous Northern Epirus appeared before the Greek 
Committee. They also contested the Albanian claims and reinforced the Greek 
ones. 544 
Great-Power Interests in the Greek Committee 
Following the presentation of Greek claims to the Supreme Council, and in 
accordance with the pattern already decided for other territorial questions, the 
Supreme Council referred Greek claims to a territorial committee. 545 F. S. 
Marston, an authority on the procedures of the Conference, claimed that there 
542 Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, pp. 859-61. 
543 Venizelos to Repoulis, 4 Feb. 1919, cited in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 137-8. 
544 Carapanos memo., 29 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3585/33955. 
545 Council of Ten minutes, 4 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, p. 875. 
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was an unwritten understanding that the committees were to determine the 
frontiers on the basis of nationality, and that the principle was not considered to 
constitute an interference in political matters. 
546 Yet geo-political interests 
hindered the functioning of the Greek committee from the outset. The 
representatives had clearly been instructed to protect strategic interests, and 
further problems resulted from restrictions on their remits, a lack of definite 
principles on which to base their judgments, and a feeling by many members 
that they belonged to merely advisory bodies. 547 On the Albanian question 
specifically, one major problem was that the Greek committee was assigned to 
deal only with issues pertaining to Greek ambitions, whereas it was later 
determined that Yugoslav and Italian ambitions were to be dealt with by other 
parts of the Conference. 548 This made the Albanian claims weaker still as it 
would not be possible for them to make trade-offs for similar claims elsewhere, 
although such `trading' would be possible for Greek aspirations. 
The Committee met from 12 February until 6 March 1919, and once gain in 
November 1919.549 Each of the four powers had two representatives, with 
technical experts also attending on occasion. The Italian representatives (de 
Martino and Castoldi) were indicative of Italy's hostile attitude towards the 
Committee, and the importance of retaining Italian gains in Albania. French 
`disinterestedness' was also questionable, as their technical expert was the 
controversial Leon Krajewsky. Jules Cambon, the French chairman of the 
Greek Committee, declared that the purpose of the Committee was to find `the 
546 F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and Procedure (London, 1944), 
nn. 111,117; Also at Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 138. 
' Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 138-9. 
548 See Chapter 7, pp. 268-71. 
549 For a record of these meetings in the official English translation see FO 371/3593 and 
FO 
608/37, and also CAB 29/8,9 and 11 (the latter set being incomplete). 
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best means of satisfying the ancient claims of the Hellenic nation and of at last 
completing the work of independence begun by the liberal nations of Europe a 
century ago). 550 It was clear that the Albanians would find themselves in a 
difficult predicament, and that the principle of self-determination would not be 
fully applied. 
The southern Albanian issue551 was discussed in the first three meetings (12, 
18 and 19 February 1919) because it was considered the most simple. It soon 
became apparent that the French and Italian views diverged, with the British 
and Americans in between. Harold Nicolson thought that nobody wanted to 
`show their hand'. 552 When positions were finally presented, on 18 February, 
there was much consensus between the British, French and American 
delegations. All three delegations accepted the Greek proposal that the frontier 
should start about twenty-five kilometres north of Chimara, at Gramala Bay. 
They agreed that territory south of the Voyussa should become Greek, because 
the area was essentially Greek in character and because the river was an 
important defensive line. The main differences regarded territory north of the 
Voyussa. The Americans considered it impossible to divide the region into 
purely Albanian and Greek zones and also to ensure communication links in the 
region (Valona for the Albanians, Janina for the Greeks). They were prepared to 
cede Chimara, Argyrocastro, Delvino and Santa Quaranta but not Premeti, 
Leskoviki, Ersek or Koritza. They thus denied Greece about two-thirds of the 
550 Greek Committee minutes, 12 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/27947. 
551 For continuity in the thesis I will refer to the question of southern Albania, contrary to the 
terminology used by the representatives in the Committee who used northern Epirus. 
552 Greek Committee minutes, 12 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/27947; Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 
260. 
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area it claimed. 553 Contrary to British and French views, and also to Inquiry 
reports, Clive Day, one of the American representatives, argued that economic 
and trade patterns tied Koritza with Valona not Santa Quaranta, and that 
strategic considerations were not relevant as another road linking Greece and 
Yugoslavia could be buiIt. 
554 
The British and French proposals ran only a few kilometres north of the 
American line until it reached the Voyussa. North of the river, the French 
proposed a line running east along the Lengaritsa river, south of Premeti to the 
River Osum, and then northeast to join the frontier proposed by Venizelos to the 
1913 boundary at Lake Ochrida, which represented about two-thirds of the 
territory they claimed but, more importantly, Argyrocastro and Koritza. 555 The 
British did not specify their proposal north of the Voyussa, but they argued that 
their line best reflected a compromise between the Greek and Albanian 
positions. 556 As Goldstein argued, considering that Venizelos' aims were to 
achieve the maximum possible gains, they `received a remarkable degree of 
support from within the FO'. This was especially true of northern Epirus where 
they were accepted on strategic grounds. 557 The important factor in British 
thinking continued to be the long-term position of Anglo-Greek relations. In the 
short term, this meant ensuring that Greece achieved tangible gains to maintain 
Venizelos in power. Harold Nicolson noted that `I need not elaborate the 
553 Appendices A, B and C, Greek Committee minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/34810; 
Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 140: Admitting the deficiencies of language statistics in the 
northern section, the Americans estimated 5,000 Greek-speaking inhabitants to 
115,000 
speaking Albanian and in the southern section 35,000 Greek-speakers to 50,000 
Albanian- 
s5peakers. 
5a Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 172; Woodall, Albanian Problem, pp. 55-6. 
555 Appendices B and C, Greek Committee minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/34810; 
Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 140. 
556 Appendix B, Greek Committee minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/34810. 
557 Thwaites memo., 7 Feb. 1919, FO 608/37/92/1/1/1575; Goldstein, `Britain and 
Greater 
Greece', p. 346. 
251 
disastrous effects which any weakening of M. Venizelos' position would have 
upon Greece itself and general Entente interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean'. 558 
The Italians proposed a very different frontier that was largely based on the 
1913 Florence protocol (and contrary to the 1915 Pact of London). De Martino 
and Castoldi argued that their proposal represented the `best approach' to a just 
division between the two nationalities, based on both ethnical and other 
considerations. Using statistics very different from those provided by Venizelos, 
de Martino criticised the significance of both the religious and language tests. 
He argued that, because of the lack of Albanian schools, many people had to 
learn Greek and this was not indicative of nationality, whilst the massacring of 
the Muslim population before and during the First World War meant that religion 
was also far from satisfactory. Castoldi cited economic factors in support of the 
Italian scheme. He argued that the regions north and south of the Voyussa 
could not be separated, as both were dependent upon Santa Quaranta as their 
natural sea outlet and line of communication. 559 He considered that the question 
of southern Albania was inseparable from Italian interests in the Adriatic, and 
above all the necessity of maintaining the neutralisation of the Corfu straits. 560 
The Italian representatives compromised little in the ensuing debates, and this 
clearly showed the importance of Albania in the Consulta's general Adriatic 
policy. In particular, the Italians opposed any starting point of the southern 
boundary north of Cape Stylos (approximately sixty kilometres further south 
than the other three proposed and being the point agreed by the ambassadors 
558 H. Nicolson to Crowe, 15 Mar. 1919, FO 608/37/92/1/1/4392. 
559 'Italian Proposal', Greek Committee minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/34810. 
560 Fuller minute, 20 Feb. 1919, FO 608/29/1657; Laroche memo., 18 Feb. 1919, cited 
in 
Petsatis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 141: Laroche believed the Greeks would probably accept the 
neutralisation of the coastline but the British Admiralty favoured Greek control of the 
Corfu base. 
252 
in London in 1913). De Martino repeatedly insisted on the military and strategic 
importance of southern Albania to Italy. If the coast from Valona to Corfu 
passed into the same hands as those that held Corfu, namely Greece, this 
would constitute a threat to Italy. The Italians also stressed geographic and 
economic factors. They argued that geography (sea, mountains, and Prespa 
and Ochrida lakes) favoured the 1913 frontier, whereas to its north there was no 
natural obstacle, which would make the rest of Albania (Italian-controlled) 
vulnerable to Greek assaults. Castoldi maintained that the fertile territory of 
southern Albania, particularly the plain of Koritza and the valleys of 
Argyrocastro and Kolonia, was necessary for Albania's economic prosperity. He 
dismissed transportation arguments because of the abundance of lines of 
communication between Greece and Macedonia, especially towards Monastir 
(Serbian) in the north west, and pointed out that the committee was precluded 
from considering Serbian interests. Castoldi believed it unfair to remove from 
Albania the only good carriage road when the Greeks were far more able than 
the Albanians to construct expensive roads, if needed. 
561 
The Italian arguments, especially concerning the Santa Quaranta-Koritza road, 
proved very unpopular. The French repeatedly asserted the importance of the 
road for Serbo-Greek communications, transportation and military security. 
Krajwesky maintained that the districts of Argyrocastro, Kolonia and Koritza 
traded with settlements further south, contrary to Italian claims, and that 
Musakia, Berat and Tirana plain, where communication was comparatively 
easy, were ample substitutes. 562 Crowe meanwhile expressed his surprise that 
the Italians had declared that Greek claims could only be justified in military 
561 Greek Committee minutes, 19 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/32612. 
562 Ibid. 
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terms, and questioned the validity of Castoldi's information. Harold Nicolson 
wrote of one exchange that de Martino 
then turns on old Castoldi to tell us all about the delimitation of 1913. 
Luckily I have brought with me the Proces Verbal of that commission. 
Castoldi says they had unanimously decided that the district, 
... of 
Argyrocastro, should go to Albania. I quickly looked up the reference. It 
said that the Italian Delegate (i. e. Castoldi himself) had expressed this 
view, but that all his other colleagues had dissented. Crowe reads this 
out. Castoldi turns purple. He tries to bluster. `Lascia stare', snarls 
Martino to him. It is all very embarrassing. But Castoldi, who is a good 
fellow, took it well: `vous etes un terrible diable', he said to me 
afterwards. '563 
The Albanian question next came up for discussion on 24,26 and 27 February 
1919, when the committee heard the Greek, Albanian and northern Epirote 
representatives. It has already been shown how the great power audience in 
the Greek committee seemed biased towards the Greek representatives, and 
that Venizelos was much more adept at currying favour with the great power 
statesmen. But Venizelos was concerned by Italian hostility to Greek claims, 
and his inability to prevent the Chimara coast being considered part of the 
Adriatic question. He therefore reduced Greek claims by 1300 square 
kilometres to 5138 square kilometres and 195,000 people, which made the 
Greek claims only marginally different from the French proposal. He hoped that 
such a `generous' offer, which in reality affected only 28,516 `Albanians' and 
1,157 `Greeks', would show Greek goodwill and help offset Italian opposition, by 
563 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 265. 
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making Greek ambitions appear moderate and realistic to the other powers. 56' it 
appears that none of the Albanian delegates envisaged using such tactics. The 
Albanians believed passionately in their cause, the merits of their argument and 
the honesty and integrity of the great power representatives, and their 
determination to base the southern Albanian question on ethnic principles. This 
naivety was indicative of the inexperience of the Albanian representatives and 
their understanding of the international system. It placed them in an even 
weaker position in the states system than their weak or non-state status implied, 
because they were not able to capitalise upon the tactics available to small 
states to increase the receptivity of their claims. 
Before the Greek Committee next discussed the Albanian question (4 March), 
Nicolson worked with Krajewsky and Laroche from the French delegation to 
prepare a joint Franco-British proposal. The major problem remained Koritza. 
Nicolson remained unconvinced by French arguments of its necessity as a road 
connection, but Laroche refused to allow it to become Albanian. He argued that 
the establishment of Italy as the mandatory power in Albania, and therefore 
across the only line of communication between Monastir and Santa Quaranta, 
would drive a permanent wedge between Serbia and Greece. It is clear from his 
diary that Nicolson was torn between his moral inclinations over the 
`Albanianness' of Koritza, the strategic necessities of maintaining Greco- 
Serbian communication, and British mistrust of Italian intentions. Nicolson wrote 
`it is terribly bad luck on Albania, who has Italy imposed upon her as a 
mandatory power, and then gets her frontiers cut down merely because none of 
564 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 268; L. Maccas, La Question Greco-Albanaise (Paris, 1921), p. 8; 
Petsaiis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 142. 
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us trust Italy in the Balkans'. 565 As in 1913, great power rivalry and interests 
persistently predominated and were decisive. In the end, Harold Nicolson's 
moral concerns were overruled by Crowe's desire to bolster Greece with a 
settlement based on economic and strategic necessity. Of this decision, 
Nicolson recorded `I feel heart-heavy about Koritza. I am convinced that it ought 
to go to Albania, Italians or no Italians ', 
566 
When they met on 4 March 1919, the positions of the American, French and 
British delegations had changed and all to Greek advantage, with opposition to 
Italy the major motivation, but they still lacked consensus. The Americans were 
prepared to grant Greece the Voyussa frontier, but nothing further north. The 
British now proposed a line that closely resembled the French suggestion. The 
French also advocated further Greek gains, above all the town of Premeti 
because it connected Santa Quaranta and Janina. The discussion again failed 
to decide upon a definite recommendation. There were two votes: one on the 
`up to the Voyussa' proposal, and the second on that north of it, in effect the 
American and the Franco-British proposals. The first was accepted by three 
votes to one, with the Italians objecting. The second produced a two-two 
deadlock, with the Americans this time siding with the Italians. No progress was 
made, and so the final report (8 March 1919) contained three 
recommendations: the Franco-British, the American with the variant over 
Koritza and the Italian, which Crowe managed to relegate to a separate 
annex. 567 The Central Territorial Committee, whose responsibility 
it was to 
565 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 276. 
566 Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 145; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 259,277: This attitude 
seems to differ significantly to the attitudes Nicolson displayed elsewhere on 
the issue, where 
he was more inclined to favour Greek ambitions. 
567 Greek Committee minutes, 6 Mar. 1919, FO 608/37/92/1/4/3931; Greek Committee report, 
8 
Mar. 1919, CAB 29/11/WCP401; Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 280; Petsalis-Diomidis, 
Greece, 
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collate the reports of the various territorial committees, also failed to agree and 
so confined itself to reiterating the views of their respective representatives on 
the Greek Committee. 568 During the Greek Committee, geo-politics superseded 
self-determination with the result that there was little movement from the original 
great-power positions. 
Anglo-American Co-operation and Initiatives 
Between March and June 1919, a series of Anglo-American negotiations took 
place outside the official Conference proceedings, in an attempt to satisfy the 
Supreme Council's request for a single recommendation on southern Albania. It 
was hoped that if these two powers could agree, then the other two, especially 
Italy, would be inclined to compromise. Geo-politics remained central to these 
discussions. Throughout, neither the Albanians nor the Greeks were consulted 
or informed: it was traditional old-style diplomacy, despite the new international 
rhetoric, with the small states as mere supplicants. The British appointed Harold 
Nicolson and Captain Jim Barnes, a junior member of the PID who had travelled 
extensively in Albania. The Americans appointed Dr Sidney Mezes, the Senior 
American Delegate on the Co-ordinating Committee and former Head of the 
Inquiry. Although all four were sympathetic to Albanian claims and the principle 
of self-determination their superiors often vetoed their ideas because of wider 
strategic interests and priorities. All three quickly became out of touch with the 
general trend in Albanian and in wider Adriatic and Balkan policies. This made 
pp. 146-7: Petsalis-Diomidis includes an interesting account of the differences in the French and 
English versions of the Greek Committee's recommendations and why the Italian proposal did 
not appear in the final version. 
568 Central Committee on Territorial Questions minutes, 17 March 1919, FO 371/3593/4244; 
Also at CAB 29/10/WCP370; `Central Committee report on Greece', n. d., CAB 29/13/WCP630; 
Central Committee report, 31 Mar. 1919 and 22 Apr. 1919, FO 608/92/1/4/5868; P. C. 
Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference 
of 1919-20 (Columbus, Ohio, 1974), pp. 86-7. 
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their proposals neither realistic nor practical, given the changing international 
climate. 
On the British side, Nicolson and Barnes both produced a range of schemes, 
driven by a variety of motives. Barnes, whom Nicolson once described as `far 
more Albanophile even than I am myself', 569 made a number of naive 
suggestions based on ethnic principles, but not ones that either his superiors or 
the other powers' representatives would accept. It appears that Barnes held the 
misguided conception that the Conference `seriously desired to constitute an 
Albania capable of surviving as an independent self-respecting State '. 570 For 
instance, on 25 April he proposed that Valona be given to Italy under a twenty- 
one year mandate, and that the rest of Albania be given as a personal mandate 
to the Italian Duke of Abruzzi, under the League of Nations, with Abruzzi as 
High Commissioner and the title mpret! Barnes contended that this arrangement 
satisfied the competing geographical, economic, cultural and ethnographic 
interests. It would maintain a non-partitioned Albania, including Koritza and 
eventually Valona, which the Americans would support, it would preserve Italian 
interests by means of the prince, and also benefit Greece and Serbia because 
there would be no outright Italian mandate. 571 
Nicolson was more mindful of the wider British interests at stake. He proposed, 
however, a number of curious schemes designed to fulfil different priorities. In 
one (27 March), he devised an agreement based on the 1914 Corfu protocol: 
the disputed areas would become a League mandate with Greece as 
569 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 313. 
570 Barnes, `Proposed Settlement of Albania', 25 Apr. 1919, FO 608/29/1/8333. 
571 H. Nicolson minute, 25 Apr. 1919, FO 608/29/1/8333; Also at Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 
150-51 and Goldstein, `Britain and Greater Greece, p. 348. 
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mandatory power. He admitted that the scheme was far from perfect, as there 
was the prospect of the Greeks obtaining the upper hand and voting for union 
with Greece, but at least it maintained Greek strategic control of Koritza, and 
partially offset Italian objections to annexation. 572 Another, equally implausible 
scheme (28 May 1919), but for different reasons, involved a tri-partitioned 
Albania: northern Albania would become an autonomous state under 
Yugoslavia; central Albania would go to Italy; southern Albania would go to 
Greece; and Koritza would be neutralised as a centre of Albanian culture and 
learning, including a central Albanian university under American protection. The 
Yugoslav and American mandates would last for twenty years, and a unified 
and independent area (including Ipek and Djakova in the north, which had gone 
to Serbia in 1913), would be created. 573 As Goldstein quipped, it is difficult to 
know whether Nicolson was completely serious or whether having `seen all 
serious solutions fail he decided to try a silly one'. 
574 
All these ideas met with little success because the British delegation remained 
divided over its priorities and commitments, although it was obvious that 
Nicolson and Barnes' superiors (especially Balfour, Crowe and Hardinge) were 
less sympathetic to Albanian nationalist claims and an un-partitioned 
independent state. It was appreciated that Koritza had been a significant factor 
in Albanian nationalism, but it was considered necessary for `strategic security' 
for it to go to Greece. 575 Nicolson was himself concerned about his ideas, 
especially those of 28 May, which would have provided a territorial connection 
572 Nicolson minute, `Settlement on South Eastern Europe', 27 Mar. 1919, 
FO 608/37/4392; Also 
at FO 608/46/8/5605; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 290,314; 
Helmreich, Paris to Sevres, p. 88; 
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 62-3; Goldstein, `Britain and Greater Greece', pp. 
347-8. 
573 Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 348-50; H. Nicolson memo. `Albania', 28 May 1919, and 
minutes by Crowe, Hardinge and Balfour, 29 May 1919, FO 608/29/1/11124. 
574 Goldstein, 'Britain and Greater Greece', pp. 348-9. 
575 See for example Temperley minute, 28 Apr. 1919, FO 608/29/1/8333 
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between the Italian zone and the `Bulgarian' (Macedonian) part of Serbia. 576 
Generally, the British delegation persisted in supporting ethnic self- 
determination as long as it also promoted their wider strategic goals. 
Disagreements within the American delegation were even more problematic. 
The Americans were also holding their own internal debate on the importance 
and practicability of applying ethnic rationales to the various peace settlements. 
Although Mezes was willing to negotiate with Nicolson and Barnes, these 
internal conversations seriously hindered his ability to do so. Thus by 21 April 
1919, Mezes was forced to return Nicolson's initial draft (27 March) because the 
Americans were `too pre-occupied' to consider it. 577 The Americans were still 
debating on what to base their policies but an anti-Italian stance was 
developing, which would impact on the Albanian questions because Albanian 
gains were viewed as synonymous with Italian ones. Dr Douglas Johnson, 
whose views Wilson considered `authoritative' on the Albanian problem, had 
become particularly hostile to Italian gains in the Adriatic, including Albania. On 
17 March, Johnson had circulated a memorandum seeking to use Albania as a 
bargaining chip against other Italian claims in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. At 
the same time, Mezes was still contemplating giving Greece gains in northern 
Epirus at Albanian (Italian) expense. 578 
Developments within the wider Conference complicated these Anglo-American 
initiatives further, by making Lloyd George, Clemenceau and, in particular, 
Wilson more hostile to Italian ambitions, including Albania. From 24 April to 6 
576 H. Nicolson memo. `Albania', 28 May 1919, FO 608/29/1/11124 
57 Mezes to H. Nicolson, 21 April 1919, FO 608/46/8332. 
578 Helmreich, Paris to Sevres, pp. 90-1; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 424-7; Woodall, `Albanian 
Problem', pp. 63-4. 
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May 1919, the Italian Prime and Foreign Ministers left Paris, protesting at the 
reluctance of the Conference to consider Italy's claims and Wilson's direct 
appeal to the Italian people to accept his fourteen points as the basis of the 
settlement. 579 Wilson's mounting opposition to the Italians, especially Sonnino, 
whom he held personally responsible for blocking resolution of the outstanding 
issues, had profound implications on his attitudes towards Albania, and above 
all his doubts as to whether Italy should receive the mandate. In a meeting with 
Cienenceau and Lloyd George on 6 May 1919, and in what constitutes one of 
Wilson's few direct references to the Albanian question, Wilson remained 
adamant that the Albanians should become independent and argued against 
Lloyd George's concerns about their unity. 580 
The rest of the American delegation was less convinced. According to Woodall, 
Day expressed support for the Italian mandate plan to his American colleagues, 
but, reiterated Wilson's refusal to partition Albania due to Wilsonian ideology 
and opposition to Italian imperialism, as eulogised in the London Pact, to the 
European delegations. He considered an Italian mandate within the 1913 
frontiers as the most feasible plan to gain consensus from all the powers, 
although personally he preferred giving the Argyrocastro district to Greece for 
`national reasons,. 581 For Day and other American delegates, political questions 
about small states were generally more important than rationale. They therefore 
became more sympathetic to Italian designs in Albania, to help facilitate Italian 
concessions on Fiume, Trentino and Dalmatia (the opposite of the scheme 
579 P. Mantoux, `Introduction' to P. Mantoux (ed. ), (trans. A. S. Link), The Deliberations of the 
Council of Four (March 24-June 28,1919): Notes of the Delivery to the German Delegation of 
the Preliminaries of Peace: Supplementary Volume to the Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 2 vols. 
jPrinceton, 1955), esp. xxii-xxix; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 370-87. 
80 Council of Four minutes, FRUS PPC, V, p. 483; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 150; Also at 
Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', pp. 66-7 
581 Day to Wilson, 22 May 1919,186.3411/18, pp. 3-13 (M820, r. 414), American Commission, 
DOS, RG 256; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 71-3. 
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envisaged by Mezes). 582 In essence, in spite of Wilson's pledges to remove 
such trade bargaining from international politics, his own officials were equally 
willing to play the bartering game that had been such a typical feature of old 
diplomacy. 
Although his advisers, including House and Johnson, emphasised the need to 
be conciliatory on the Albanian question, because of the wider Adriatic and 
Balkan concerns, Wilson remained adamant that Albania should not be used as 
a pawn and that, possibly, even at this early stage, self-determination should be 
applied. During his return voyage to the United States, he cabled Robert 
Lansing, Secretary of State, who now headed the American delegation: 
I meant before leaving to express to you and my other colleagues my 
very profound interest in the fortunes of Albania. I am fearful lest midst 
the multitude of other things that might seem more pressing and 
important, due consideration of those rights should be overlooked. I beg 
that you will be very watchful concerning them. 583 
Woodall suggested that Wilson's concern came too late, 
584 but it proved 
significant. Admittedly, in the second half of the Conference, the Albanian 
question was not considered independently but as part of the wider Adriatic 
question, given the ascendancy of political and strategic issues, but 
nevertheless Wilson's attitudes had profound implications. In delaying a 
decision on the question of Albanian independence and its borders, Wilson 
inadvertently ensured that by the time that a sufficiently stable, organised and 
582 Day to Wilson, 22 May 1919,875.00/181 (M820, r. 556), American Commission, DOS, RG 
256; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 71-3, Helmreich, Paris to Sevres, p. 102; Nicolson, 
Peacemaking, pp. 284-5; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 424-7. 
583 Wilson to Lansing, 30 June 1919,875.00/209 (M820, r. 556), American Commission, DOS, 
RG 256; Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', p. 73. 
584 Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 73-4. 
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anti-Italian national government was formed in Albania (by the Congress of 
Lushnje585), there was still a viable Albanian entity to preserve. 
Bi-lateral Italo-Greek Ne otiations 
Surprisingly, it was the Italians who secured an agreement over southern 
Albania, which had so flummoxed the other great power delegations. This was 
the result of direct bi-lateral negotiations with the Greek delegation, of the type 
that all governments had pledged to abandon in favour of the new open variety, 
but which the other great powers seemed willing to accept. 586 This was 
indicative of the continued weakness and difficulties of the Albanians. The new 
Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti, and Foreign Minister, Tommaso Tittoni, 
pursued a markedly different Albanian policy to their predecessors. Nitti, who 
had substantial experience in the finance ministry, was appalled at the expense 
of the Italian occupation of Albania (40,000 men and over 300 million lire 
annually). He was especially concerned because the occupation did not seem 
to be having the desired result, of making the Albanian population more 
receptive to nominal independence under Italian control, which could be utilised 
in Paris. Instead, there were daily reports of growing unrest in the Italian 
occupied zone, and resistance to the idea of an Italian protectorate, with the 
Italian troops needing to use coercive measures to control the local population. 
Harry Lamb put these complaints into three categories: restriction of liberty, 
disregard of property rights, and attempts at denationalisation. 587 
585 For further details on the Congress of Lushnje, see Chapter 8, esp. pp. 313-7. 
586 H. Nicolson memo., 4 July 1919, FO 608/120/3112/17010; Heimreich, Paris to Sevres, pp. 
164-5: By 1 August 1919 the other great power delegations appear to have known of the 
agreement and `bandwagonned' in support. 
Lamb to Clerk, 20 June 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 10; Pastorelli, L'Albania, p. 134; Woodall, 
`Albanian Problem', pp. 135-7, Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 152. 
263 
In this climate, Nitti was eager to come to a direct arrangement with the Greeks, 
which could in turn be presented to the Allies as a fait accompli on southern 
Albania. Such an idea had been mooted by Venizelos before the Conference 
(December 1918), but Sonnino had ruled it out. In any event, Venizelos had 
been encouraged to play a waiting game, because Phil-Hellenes persuaded him 
that he would gain more of northern Epirus at the bargaining tables because of 
British and French support. 588 By the resulting secret Tittoni-Venizelos 
agreement (19 July 1919), the Consulta agreed to support Greek claims, as 
defined by the Franco-British line in the Greek committee, to northern Epirus 
(Clause 2), including Argyrocastro and Koritza, and the Greek government 
agreed to an Italian mandate over Albania, Italian sovereignty of Valona, 
neutralisation of the Corfu straits, and demilitarisation of northern Epirus to 
twenty-five kilometres inland (Clause 3). On the surface, the agreement 
appeared to involve the abandonment of all but the most basic (Valona) of 
Italian interests in southern Albania. It was a pragmatic policy. By securing 
neutralisation of the Corfu straits, Italian strategic interests were safeguarded 
but without the costs of occupation. In private, it was much easier to abandon 
the new supposed ethnic rationale in favour of realpolitik. More importantly, 
Tittoni gained Greek support for Italian ambitions in Asia Minor, but Italy also 
secured full freedom of action in Asia Minor if Italian ambitions there were not 
fully satisfied, with the Consulta left free to determine whether or not this was so 
(Clause 7). This was a major Greek diplomatic blunder, although none of the 
Greek delegates, including the usually astute Venizelos, realised it. It undid 
most of the settlement, especially as Italian designs in Asia Minor came up 
588 Bonin Longere to Sonnino, 6 Jan. 1919, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 788; Helmreich, Paris to 
Sevres, pp. 42-3; Bianchiari and Sonnino cited in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 134-5. 
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against extensive Allied opposition. 
589 Nevertheless, Tittoni felt sufficiently 
confident to be able to focus his attention on northern Albania and the northern 
Adriatic, without the distraction of questions in southern Albania. It also gave the 
Consulta time to court the Albanians, and to work out an agreement with their 
Allies on northern Albania and the Adriatic, and possibly even Asia Minor. 
Tittoni soon reduced his support for Greek gains in northern Epirus, in an 
attempt to offset American objections to Italy gaining the port of Fiume. As early 
as 3 September 1919, Tittoni would argue that the Greeks should not be 
allowed to occupy Koritza following the French evacuation, because the 
Albanians would not accept it, and that its status should be determined by 
plebiscite. 590 In the second half of 1919, the question of southern Albania was 
considered only sporadically, when it encroached on the larger Adriatic 
problem. 
Conclusions 
Realist theory predicts that small states will favour a weaker coalition to balance 
the international system, but, as Chapter Five shows, this did not occur during 
the First World War. 591 Meanwhile, the great powers during periods of conflict 
favour the smaller states, but rarely the smallest, to tip the balance in their 
favour. After the war, the new great power hegemon in the Adriatic (Italy) 
sought to continue destabilising the system in its favour to preserve its strength 
and stability in comparison to the next strongest states (Greece and 
589 Wallace to Lansing, 16 June 1919,763.72119/5341 (M367, r. 417), Records of the 
Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Termination, 1914-29 [hereafter US 
Termination], DOS, RG 256, NACP; Crowe memo., 31 July 1919 FO 608/54/120/3/12/17010; 
Helmreich, Paris to Sevres, pp. 164-5; Goldstein, 'Britain and Greater Greece', p. 354; Grieve to 
Balfour, 1 July 1919, FO 608/108/1/2/16920: for further details see Woodall, `Albanian Problem', 
pp. 136-7 and Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 252-6. 
° Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 3 Sept. 1919, FRUS PPC, VIII, p. 77; Italian 
memo. DBFP, IV, no. 20; Miller, Diary, XX, pp. 400-1. 
591 See for example Schroeder, `Historical reality', pp. 108-48. 
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Yugoslavia). All three therefore competed over the weakest and smallest state 
(Albania). Albanian territory-in southern Albania in these discussions- 
became a bargaining tool that could either balance the system, as Britain 
hoped, or ensure Italian hegemony, as the Italians hoped. Once more, the 
economic and strategic advantages, not the ethnic or historical arguments, had 
far higher priority. The Albanians did not prove successful in re-establishing 
their national ambitions or their rights to southern Albania, because they found it 
difficult to reconcile these ambitions with those of the great powers, except for 
the Italians, and the other great powers remained opposed to Italian ambitions. 
When Italian strategic priorities shifted elsewhere, they were also prepared to 
reduce their interest in and support for Albanian nationalism, and instead they 
came to an arrangement with the rival small state Greece. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
The Peace Conference of Paris II: 
the problem of northern Albania and the Adriatic 
On 4 July 1919, Harold Nicolson wrote to the Foreign Secretary that Albanian 
territory should no longer be used `as an item in the general give-and-take of an 
Adriatic settlement'. 592 His wishes were not to be realised. As in 1913, the 
northern Albanian question proved even more controversial than the southern 
problem. It has already been shown how the southern question impinged on the 
wider Adriatic questions, especially in relation to Italian interests. This chapter 
shows that all the great powers, even the Americans, considered the northern 
Albanian problem as a subsidiary component of the larger Adriatic problem. The 
problem of northern Albania was closely tied up with the balances of power in 
the Balkans and the Adriatic, especially Italian ambitions and rivalry with the 
Yugoslavs, as diplomacy both inside and outside the formal Conference 
became much less Wilsonian and more realpolitik. In these discussions, two 
distinct phases are evident. From March 1919 to January 1920, when the 
question of northern Albania was considered as a subsidiary part of the Adriatic 
question, and there was no place for the small states or ethnic nationalism. 
From January to March 1920, ethnic and national considerations became more 
important, and the Yugoslavs were invited to contribute to the deliberations. By 
March 1920, Wilson had managed to secure the removal of the Albanian 
problem from the Adriatic question, and the revival of an Albanian-centred one. 
In discussions on the northern Albanian problem, reference to the Albanian 
national question and self-determination was superficial and sporadic, indicative 
592 H. Nicolson to Balfour, 4 July 1919, and Balfour to H. Nicolson, n, d., FO 608/28/6/18300. 
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of its low status and weak position in the international system. The Albanians 
were neither consulted nor allowed to present their claims. Consideration of the 
Adriatic question has been explored extensively. 593 For the purpose of this 
study, it is necessary to focus on those aspects that had an impact upon the 
Albanian question or questions. 
Northern Albania and the Adriatic Question 
The Italian Mandate and Strategic Interests: the defeat of the Albanian problem' 
During the first half of the Paris Peace Conference there was little progress on 
the related northern Albanian, Albanian mandate or Adriatic questions. For the 
Albanian questions, these problems centred on the important but divisive 
question: Would Albania become independent or be given as a mandate to 
Italy? Difficulties emerged due to opposition to Italian claims and problems in 
determining who had jurisdiction to consider these issues. Whilst being 
unfruitful, these exchanges are illuminating because they illustrate the particular 
weakness of the Albanian small state during the Peace Conference. In being 
considered suitable for mandate status Albania had been deemed equivalent to 
a colony or previously none existent state. These deliberations also reflect the 
changing balance of power in the Adriatic. They illustrate that the primary Italian 
interests in Albania had moved northwards (to the former Austrian zone) from 
their traditional base in southern Albania. 
When the Yugoslav delegation presented their claims to the Supreme Council 
(18 February 1919), this generated a series of Italian objections, starting with 
northern Albania, that such issues could not be dealt with 
by a territorial 
593 See for instance Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, Lederer, Yugoslavia; Burgwyn, Mutilated 
Victory, pp. 
243-312. 
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committee and should be reserved for the Supreme Council. This was in 
accordance with the decision that territorial committees were excluded from 
considering questions relating to geo-political interests. It was also a reaction to 
the opposition that had materialised to Italian ambitions on other questions, 
such as those allocated to the Greek Committee. The question of northern 
Albania was important, Sonnino maintained, because it was politically and 
strategically linked to Italian claims in the Adriatic. 
594 By March 1919, and the 
time when the territorial committees were due to start finalising their 
recommendations, these matters had still not been resolved and the issue was 
causing problems for the territorial committees. As some members of the 
territorial committees appreciated, there was the possibility of a three way 
paradox: the Greek Committee was to consider Greek claims to Albania, the 
Romanian Committee Yugoslav ones and the Supreme Council Italian ones. 
595 
On 4 March 1919, a particularly heated debate took place in the Greek 
committee, after the Italian delegate had raised a question about the size of an 
`independent Albania' and the extent of the Italian mandate. One of the Italian 
delegates, de Martino, explained that the Consulta now sought a large 
`independent' Albania, instead of the small protectorate allowed for under the 
London Pact, or the larger `unauthorised' one proclaimed in 1917. He 
maintained that the enlargement of Yugoslavia and Greece, and the 
continuation of their common frontier in Macedonia, meant that it was no longer 
necessary, or advisable, for these states to make gains 
in Albania. These 
arguments were very poorly received by the French and 
British delegates. Sir 
Eyre Crowe, one of the British delegates, indignantly suggested that 
the Italians 
594 Council of Ten minutes, 1 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, 
III, pp. 852-55; Council of Ten minutes, 18 
Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, IV, pp. 44-57. 
595 Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating 
to Romania minutes, 3 Mar. 1919, 
CAB 29/9/WCP225; Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 264; Stickney, 
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only used the Pact when it suited their purposes but otherwise ignored it. He 
went further proposing, that in light of these `changed circumstances', there 
should be a thorough re-evaluation of the whole of the 1915 Pact of London, 
which he knew the Italians could not accept, for fear of losing their other 
promised acquisitions. 596 The Supreme Council's decision on this matter was a 
strange one: questions that were explicitly vital to Italy were reserved to the 
Supreme Council, including consideration of the northern Albanian boundary 
and whether Albania should become independent; the southern boundary did 
not fall into this category and was suitable for consideration by the Greek 
committee. 597 The decisions regarding Albanian independence and the northern 
boundary issue had been deferred, but they were considered inextricably linked 
to the wider Adriatic problem. 
Between March and July 1919, a number of proposals were put forward which 
incorporated the problem of northern Albania. 598 One of the most significant was 
known as the Tardieu Plan (28 May 1919), named after its author. It was one of 
the few schemes covering the Albanian question to be put before the Council of 
Four. its central feature was the creation of a `Free State' including Fiume, 
which would act as a buffer between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Albanian 
clauses were more specific than previous ones had been: a mandate would be 
given to Italy, stretching from the present northern frontier to a southern 
boundary to be determined by the Conference; a railroad was to be constructed 
in northern Albania (with forty percent Italian capital, forty percent 
Yugoslav, 
596 Greek Committee minutes, 4 Mar. 1919, CAB 29/9/WCP263; Greek Committee minutes, 
6 
Mar. 1919, CAB 29/9/WCP244; Crowe minute, 6 Mar. 1919, FO 608/38/13/3967; 
Petsalis- 
Diomidis, Greece, pp. 145-6. 
597 Greek Committee minutes, 6 Mar. 1919, CAB 29/91WCP244; Council of 
Ten minutes, 11 
Mar. 1919, FRUS PPC, IV, p. 326. 
598 Johnson memo., 8 May 1919, in Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 162-4,172-4,510-4; 
Lederer, 
Yugoslavia, pp. 208-10; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 66-8. 
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and twenty percent from other sources) for use by the Yugoslavs. Interestingly, 
there was no mention of Valona going to Italy in full sovereignty, indicating that 
it was believed Italian interests there would be sufficiently served by possession 
of the mandate. 
599 
As with other proposals, American objections proved problematic. The 
American delegation, Wilson especially, seem to have been concerned that the 
Albanians were not ready for self-government. However, the State Department 
were also concerned about the alternative idea of a mandate scheme. Wilson 
was suspicious of Italian intentions regarding Albania, but saw no practical 
alternative because none of the other three great powers desired the mandate 
themselves. It was also unlikely that the Consulta would agree to another great 
power having the mandate. Unsure what to do, Wilson played for time and 
declined to comment on the Albanian clauses. 600 Appreciating that American 
objections were the prime reason for the delay in settling the Adriatic question, 
Frank Polk, the Under Secretary of State and Head of the American Delegation 
following Wilson and Lansing's departure, advocated a more flexible position on 
Albania. He proposed that the Americans should be more sympathetic to Italian 
claims. Nevertheless his stance was persistently compromised by Wilson-601 
These difficulties would become even more pronounced in the second half of 
the Conference. They would be particularly important for the Albanian question. 
599 Council of Four minutes, 28 May 1919, FRUS PPC, VI, pp. 78-82; Albrecht-Carrie, 
Italy, pp. 
6 ö8-90. Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, of Four minutes, 28 May 1919, FRUS PPC, VI, pp. 78-82; y, pp. 
188-90. 
601 Polk to Lansing, 14 Aug. 1919,763.72119/6176 (M367, r. 425), US Termination, 
DOS, RG 
256. 
271 
ubmerged in the Adriatic Question : excludi 
As with the problem of southern Albania, the change in the Italian delegation 
(July 1919) sparked a new phase in consideration of the Adriatic question, 
including northern Albania. 602 The Italians were not the only ones to have 
revised their Albanian policy, as geo-political interests (especially a desire for a 
quick settlement) overrode moralistic rhetoric. 603 Nevertheless, as with the 
southern Albanian question, most initiatives came from the new Italian 
delegation. Unlike the southern problem, these initiatives took place at great 
power level, excluding the Yugoslavs and failed to reach an agreement. In two 
months, Tittoni proposed three different schemes, each with different 
implications for Albania. The first plan (12 August) reinforced the clear 
connection between the northern Albanian question and Fiume. Tittoni allowed 
the establishment of a Free State of Fiume (albeit smaller than the version 
previously proposed by Wilson), in return for an Italian mandate over Albania 
and Valona in full sovereignty. The Epirus coast and Corfu channel would be 
neutralised, whilst the details of the southern Albanian boundary would be 
reserved for a bi-lateral agreement between the Italians and Greeks (in 
accordance with the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement). The northern boundary 
would be reconstituted. 604 The second plan (15 September) was introduced as 
an alternative, not a replacement, as Tittoni was desperately seeking a 
diplomatic solution to address increasing Italian domestic pressures. Under the 
second plan, the Fiume Free State was discarded with Italy instead gaining the 
corpus separatuni, and Yugoslavia the rest (except Albona). This in effect 
obviated the need for the plebiscite that Wilson was demanding, and which the 
602 Rodd to Curzon, 30 June 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 3. 
603 Ed. Note, DBFP, IV, p. 1; Council of Four minutes, 28 June 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 2; Also at 
FRUS PPC, VI, pp. 760-2. 
604 H. Nicolson note, 6 Aug. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 18; Abrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 244-5 
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Italians feared might not support their claims. Two changes affected Albania. 
There was no mention of Greek claims to southern Albania, and Yugoslavia 
was to be denied both territory and railway rights. 605 The third plan (8 October), 
presented by Vittorio Scialoga, then Tittoni's deputy but soon to become his 
replacement, included the Fiume Free State, but in return demanded three 
further concessions: a coastal strip connecting Fiume to Italy; an Italian 
protectorate over Zara (a port which like Fiume was situated in a predominantly 
ethnically Slav area, but with many Italians in the town); and an island near 
Fiume. 606 There was no mention of Albania. 
These three proposals were indicative of the changing priorities of the Italian 
government, its domestic problems, the opposition of the other great powers 
and, in part, the resistance to an Italian occupation in Albania and other 
places. 607 The largest difficulties stemmed from the activities of Italian 
nationalist poet Gabriel D'Annunzio, who had led a successful raid on Fiume on 
12 September 1919, and now governed the town. Designed to help Italian 
nationalist claims and well received in the Italian press, who became very vocal 
in its demands that the Italian government must keep the town, it complicated 
the position of the Italian negotiators. As the coup took place only three days 
after presentation of the second Adriatic plan, it appeared that the Italian 
government supported the move and had not been genuine in their earlier 
conciliatory overtures. 608 The impact on the American delegation was 
605 Council minutes, 15 Sept. 1919, Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 248, no. 49; Council of 
Heads of 
Delegations minutes, 15 Sept. 1919, FRUS PPC, VIII, pp. 224-5; Italian memo., 29 
Aug. 1919, 
DBFP, IV, no. 20; Miller, Diary, XX, pp. 400-1. 
606 Crowe to Curzon, 11 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 78; Polk cited in Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', 
6154-5. 07 On Albanian resistance to the Italians see for example Lamb to Clerk, 20 June 1919, 
DBFP, 
IV, no. 10. For further details, see Chapter 8, esp. pp. 311-18. 
608 Polk to Lansing, 31 Aug. 1919,763.72119/6458 (M367, r. 429), US Termination, DOS, RG 
256; Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 15 Sept. 1919, FRUS, PPC, VIII, pp. 
224-5; 
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particularly significant. On 14 September, Wilson had finally accepted the idea 
of an Italian mandate for Albania, albeit with strict controls. However, the coup 
revived his suspicions of Italian intentions, and made it more difficult for the 
American delegation and other great powers to get his support for their ideas to 
settle the Adriatic question on this basis. Admittedly, however, Wilson's major 
concession of the Italian mandate for Albania was conditional upon Italian 
acceptance of the Fiume Free State, which the Consulta could not accept, 
especially following 12 September. 609 As a result of the great-power interests in 
these interrelated questions, settlement of the Albanian question on these 
grounds was not possible, despite Wilson finally, albeit reluctantly, accepting 
the idea of an Italian mandate for Albania. As with Albanian nationalist initiatives 
Italian ones could also be detrimental to the nationalist cause. 
Most of the American delegation, including for the first time Douglas Johnson, 
although still not Wilson, seem to have agreed that the Albanians were not 
ready for self-government, but that they were a distinct nationality who were 
worthy of it at some point in the future. In order to foster that eventually, a single 
Albania was preferable to a partitioned one, and Italy was the only power 
prepared to take the mandate, and by implication the responsibility. Therefore, 
rather than oppose it, the Americans ought to use their influence to tighten the 
Wilson to Polk, 21 Sept. 1919,763.72119/6865 (M367, r. 436), US Termination, DOS, RG 256; 
Miller, Diary, XX, p. 403; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 145-53; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 147. 
609 Phillips to Polk, 14 Sept. 1919,186.3411/808 (M820, r. 436), American Commission, DOS, 
RG 256; Wilson to Polk, 14 Sept. 1919,763.72119/6833a (M367, r. 433), US Termination, 
DOS, RG 256; Wilson to Polk, 21 Sept. 1919,763.72119/6865 (M367, r. 436), US Termination, 
DOS, RG 256; Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, FRUS PPC, VIII, pp. 224-5; Polk cited 
in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 148,151-3. 
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mandate's terms, to prevent Italian exploitation of the fledgling state. They were 
still undecided as to what the boundaries should be. 610 
Whilst Wilson's reservations could not be ignored, it appears that Polk 
harboured the misconception that the European powers could persuade Wilson 
to concede over the Albanian question. Consequently, Polk encouraged 
European endeavours to come up with a joint memorandum about Albanian 
boundaries. He merely suggested that the mandate question should be 
considered at a later date. 611 The British and French representatives therefore 
attempted to facilitate a compromise between the Italian and American 
positions. The idea that was most favoured by the European great powers 
seems to have been a scheme whereby Italy would gain Valona in full 
sovereignty and the Albanian mandate. The southern frontier would be as 
proposed by the American Delegate on the Greek Committee (Argyrocastro to 
Greece, Koritza to Albania), which incidentally went against new Italian policy in 
the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement. Yugoslavia would not be given any territory, 
only the right to build and operate a railroad in the Drin Valley-a concession to 
both Yugoslavia and France. After consultation with Johnson, the European 
proposal was modified to eliminate the suggestions that Fiume city should go 
unequivocally to Italy, and that northern Epirus should go to Greece. The latter 
clause was agreed to by the Italians, even though it contradicted the Tittoni- 
Venizelos agreement. 612 The Italian representatives were willing to renege on 
610 Crowe to Curzon, 13 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 80; Polk to Lansing, 10 Sept. 1919, 
763.72119/6669 (M367, r. 430), US Termination, DOS, RG 256; Polk to Lansing, 14 Aug. 1919, 
763.72119/6176 (M367, r. 425), US Termination, DOS, RG 256; Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 238. 
611 Polk to Lansing, 31 Aug. 1919,763.72119/6458 (M367, r. 429), US Termination, DOS, RG 
256; Miller Diary, )(X, p. 403; Polk cited in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 145. 
612 Crowe to Curzon, 13 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 80 
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their pledge to the small state, in pursuit of its wider interests; having the 
support of at least two great powers made this all the easier. 
Throughout September and October 1919, negotiations remained tense and 
little progress materialised. The Franco-British belief that a united front would 
mollify Wilson's position was proven to be unrealistic. The American hope that 
the Consulta would accept the Albanian mandate as a substitute for Fiume was 
equally implausible. Although it was not included in the 1915 Pact, the retention 
of Fiume, which had become a nationalistic symbol of Italian aspirations, in 
what had been an unpopular war, had become essential for Italian policy 
makers because of the precarious domestic situation in Italy. Albania was in 
contrast a far less attractive prize. Nitti and Tittoni (like all Italian politicians of 
the period) faced immense public and political pressure, and needed a speedy 
resolution in Italy's favour for their personal survival. However, this was not 
something any of the other delegations were prepared to give them. In addition, 
there was growing unrest in Albania and mounting opposition to an Italian 
mandate amongst the Albanian delegations, which resulted in two official 
protests (9 and 12 October 1919). This made the mandate less desirable for the 
Consulta, even though the other powers had all now agreed to it. 613 
The position of Crowe, who had succeeded Balfour as Head of the British 
Delegation, was also complicated by the differing views of the Foreign Office 
and Prime Minister. 614 For Lloyd George, the crucial strategy was to achieve a 
solution as quickly as possible. As with other areas of the settlement, as long as 
613 Crowe to Curzon, 11 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 78; Pastorelli, L'Albania, pp. 169-70; Woodall, 
'Albanian Problem', pp. 154-5. 
614 Crowe to Curzon, 10 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 119; Curzon to Crowe, 12 Nov. 1919, DBFP, 
IV, no. 120; Crowe to Curzon, 13 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 121. 
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British interests were not affected, he did not concern himself with the details or 
the (in)justice of the case. For the Prime Minister, the Albanian problem was 
part of the much larger dispute over the division of Ottoman territory. He was 
motivated by a desire to gain Italian goodwill over British policy in the Adriatic, in 
order to gain what he considered much-needed Italian support for British 
interests in Asia Minor. Thus the marginal issue of Albania, and other issues in 
the Adriatic, where British interests were minimal (other than naval and 
Mediterranean ones), were expendable in order to foster goodwill on issues 
where British interests were greater. The Foreign Office pursued a different 
agenda. It persisted in seeking a permanent peace based on the balance of 
power. Allen Leeper was therefore instructed to work for an arrangement with 
the Americans on this basis. He determined that Wilson was prepared to accept 
the Italian mandate over Albania, but that only a very small area around Valona 
would be able to go to Italy directly, sufficient for the economic needs of the 
town and its security. 
615 
Eventually, by 9 December 1919, the American, British and French agreed to 
an important memorandum on the Adriatic. This was to be presented to the 
Italian government before the American delegation left the Conference (10 
December 1919). The agreement represented Wilson's `absolutely ... 
final 
conditions', commonly called his `last word' on the Adriatic, including Albania. In 
most sections it represented an earlier proposal by Wilson (18 November 1919) 
but the Albanian clauses showed significant modifications. Despite American 
sympathy for Albanian national aspirations, and Wilson's insistence that 
`there 
is to be no Italian exploitation, colonisation, or militarisation', American support 
615 A. Leeper memo., 14 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 122. 
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for Albanian nationalism seems to have been waning. Wilson's initial proposal 
(18 November) had made no mention of Greek claims in southern Albania, and 
had retracted from his former position of allowing Italy increased territory around 
Valona. 616 However, by 9 December the clauses on southern Albania had been 
revised. Italy would receive the Albanian mandate and Valona, the northern and 
eastern frontiers would be those determined in 1913, but the southern frontier 
was left unspecified and would be determined separately. Provisionally, in order 
not to delay the general settlement, Greek troops would be allowed to occupy 
the province of Argyrocastro (but not Koritza) until negotiations between the 
Allies, Italy and Greece had settled their status. For the first time, a draft of the 
mandate was included (Appendix F). The clauses relating to northern Albania 
were not changed. Under these clauses the Yugoslavs would have the right to 
construct and operate railways in northern Albania (defined specifically and 
arbitrarily as north of parallel 41 ° 15'), and full privileges of international 
transport. The right to control the development of the Boyana River was to be 
vested in the League of Nations, with power to delegate it to either Yugoslavia 
or Italy. 
617 
However, the British and French leaders, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, who 
had both taken personal control of the negotiations, used the departure of the 
Americans and Wilson's deteriorating position, following the November mid- 
terms, to attempt to modify these arrangements further. They sought to satisfy 
both Italian and Greek claims at the expense of Albanian and Yugoslav ones, 
616 United States Peace Delegation memo., 17 Nov. 1919, and memo., 18 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, 
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but also to impress Wilson. 618 The results of these discussions are more 
important than the details for the Albanian question. Nitti's initial proposal (6 
January 1920) made no reference to Albania, but the revised one (10 January 
1920), formulated with Franco-British assistance, and formalised by a 
memorandum on 14 January 1920, made slight modifications of the proposals 
on the southern Albanian frontier. It proposed that a Greek and Albanian 
representative be allowed to argue the case before representatives of the great 
powers, who could then make an award or resort to a plebiscite. Any Albanian 
territory and coast ceded to Greece should be neutralised. 619 Therefore there 
appeared to be agreement about resurrecting a unified Albania, but the Italians 
were not being entirely honest. They hoped to use Albanian partition as a 
means of forcing compromise on the Yugoslavs in the wider Adriatic question. 
To assert pressure on the Americans and Yugoslavs, the Italians asked for 
fulfilment of the London Pact if these new proposals were not accepted. In so 
doing, they had also distanced themselves from their support of Greece in 
southern Albania. Nevertheless, by 14 January 1920, there had been a 
dramatic shift in the Adriatic question. The British and French governments 
were at last prepared to work directly for a settlement of the Adriatic, particularly 
the heavily debated point of the territorial continuity of Italy with the corpus 
separatum, and to champion it in Belgrade. In a joint note, after pointing out the 
magnitude of concessions the Yugoslavs were being asked to make, they 
concluded that they were being asked `for the sake of an amicable and prompt 
618 London conference minutes, 12 Dec. 1919, DBFP, II, no. 56. 
sus Nitti to Lloyd George, 6 Jan. 1920, Franco-British Memo., 9 Jan. 1920, Italian memo., 10 
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settlement of a question which now threatens the peace and progress of 
southern Europe'. 620 
Reviving the Albanian Question: involving a small state 
Albrecht-Carrie wrote that the prospects of an agreement therefore seemed 
promising, but Yugoslav, and especially American, opinion had not been taken 
into account. 621 Neither would accept the scheme. Despite Franco-British 
initiatives for a resolution of the Adriatic question being once more 
unsuccessful, this section of the Peace Conference deliberations will be 
considered in some depth because of its importance to the Albanian problem 
and the insights it provides for the role of small states in the great power 
system. 
Nitti's position was becoming increasingly difficult, in part because of delays in 
settling the Adriatic question in accordance with Italian designs and leaks of the 
9 December memorandum. Therefore, on Albania, whilst conceding that the 
southern frontier could be redrawn, he insisted that the northern and eastern 
frontier must remain that of 1913.622 This prompted a change in the 
negotiations. For the first time since their representations to the Supreme 
Council and territorial committees, the interested small states (in practice only 
the Yugoslavs) were invited to present their case. By contrast, the Albanians 
were never invited to present their claims to northern Albania. Before the great 
powers, the Croat Foreign Minister and former leader of the Yugoslav 
620 Franco-British memo., 9 Jan. 1920, Adriatic Question, pp. 11-14; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 
268-70. 
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Committee, Ante Trumbic, argued that the Yugoslavs were convinced that the 
best solution was 
to trace the Albania state as it was when created [in 1913], with an 
autonomous administration ... From all that we know of the Albanians, 
they have adequate elements for the establishment of an administration 
capable of governing the country. 
He disputed Italy's judicial right to a mandate, since the League covenant 
envisaged mandates for states that had previously only been territories or 
colonies, not those that had enjoyed independence. He claimed that to award 
the mandate to Italy would create a situation similar to that of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina before the war, which would be dangerous to both Yugoslavia and 
Albania. On the other hand, if the great powers determined that Albania was not 
to be independent then Yugoslavia must claim northern Albania, especially the 
Drin Valley and Scutari. 623 Both alternatives were aimed at protecting 
Yugoslavian strategic interests against Italy. The interests of the Albanians 
appear to have been of little significance. 
Trumbid's ideas were not popular with any of the great powers and therefore 
were unlikely to be successful, but the Yugoslavs thought they would be more 
acceptable to the great powers than claiming this territory directly themselves. 
According to Lederer, Lloyd George, `flanked by his expert Leeper and armed 
with maps', kept interrupting Trumbic with pointed questions about the 
Slovenes, Zara and Albania. 624 The Italians insisted that Albania was incapable 
of independence, and that Yugoslavia should give up its London Pact claims. 
If 
Italy first received the city of Fiume and a mandate over central Albania, then 
623 'Meeting in Pichon's office' minutes, 10 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 66; Council of Heads of 
Delegations minutes, 12 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 67; Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 264. 
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Nitti would agree to `discuss' northern Albanian boundaries further. Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau were satisfied by this idea, having apparently agreed 
that northern Albania should be used as a bargaining tool to induce the 
Yugoslavs to accept the wider Adriatic settlement. For if the Yugoslavs did not 
receive Scutari, then they would feel cut off from the Adriatic, in both the north 
and the south. The purpose was to obtain Yugoslav acceptance of the Adriatic 
settlement devised by the European leaders, in order to exert pressure on 
Wilson to agree to it. They believed that Yugoslav (Croat) disappointment 
regarding Fiume could be offset by Yugoslav (Serbian) contentment over 
northern Albania, including the important town of Scutari. 625 
Nevertheless, Nitti refused to give up Scutari in order to gain Fiume, just as 
Imperiali and Mensdorff had refused to give up Scutari to gain towns in Kosovo 
in 1913. His reasons were, similarly, based on ethnic and geo-political 
foundations. Nitti claimed that Scutari was so important to the Albanians that if 
denied the town they would revolt, and it would then prove impossible for Italy, 
as the mandatory power, to maintain order. Eventually, however, he was forced 
to give up Scutari as he, unlike the Austrians in 1913, had no other great power 
representatives to back up his claims. The European proposal for settlement of 
the Adriatic question therefore included the partition of Albania, and the 
allocation of the three important towns of Scutari, Koritza and Argyrocastro to 
other states. Italy would receive Valona and the mandate; northern Albania 
would be an autonomous province of Yugoslavia; southern Albania would be 
625 Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 10 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 64; Council of Heads 
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delimited at the Franco-British line on the Greek Committee. 626 Geo-political 
strategic interests were far more significant than ethnic or national ones. This 
was even more evident in the discussions with the Yugoslav delegation on the 
precise frontier. Lederer wrote that Lloyd George `handed Trumbic a pencil and 
a map, suggesting the latter mark the extent of Yugoslav desires in northern 
Albania'. Trumbic declined to do so, claiming that he could not improvise on the 
`national frontier'. 627 
According to Clemenceau, there was a split in the Yugoslav delegation: the 
Serbs, who were reasonable, and wanted to accept the Allied offer in order to 
gain Scutari, as opposed to the Croats, the intransigent ones, who refused to 
moderate on Fiume, in order to secure Scutari. 628 It would have been expected 
that such disunity would weaken the position of the small Yugoslav state in its 
negotiations with the three European great powers. However, the Yugoslav 
delegation managed to outmanoeuvre the three great powers by securing 
opposition to it from the American great power, which the European great power 
leaders had been trying to prevent. Their actions would also benefit the 
Albanians. As Woodall asserts, Trumbic seemed to be fully aware that the 
Americans, despite their apparent lack of interest, would not allow the European 
powers to follow through with their bluff to enact the London Pact if the 
Yugoslav delegation did not accept the new scheme. Trumbic therefore kept 
Hugh Campbell Wallace, the American Ambassador in Paris, well informed and 
626 Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 13 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 70; Temperley, History 
of Peace Conferences, IV, p. 343: Before presenting the document to the Yugoslav 
delegates, 
Venizelos had been invited to examine the proposal and had approved it. 
627 Trumbic cited in Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 264. 
628 Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 13 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 70; Council of 
Heads 
of Delegations minutes, 14 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 72; Lederer, 
Yugoslavia, pp. 265-7; 
Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 272. 
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sought to use their regular contact to obtain American support to defy the 
ultimatum. 629 
American support for the Yugoslav position came swiftly, but it was not yet 
decisive. Wallace devised a scheme that gave a prominent position to Albanian 
national interests. Rather than Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece gaining Albanian 
territory outright, this should be awarded as mandates, except for Argyrocastro, 
which would go to Greece in full sovereignty. The Foreign Office was also 
toying once more with the idea of a triple mandate. 630 Although most of the 
State Department agreed that the new European plan was unacceptable, they 
placed a far higher priority on a satisfactory strategic settlement of Yugoslav- 
Italian interests and boundaries. They had therefore distanced themselves from 
ethnic arguments pertaining to Albanian interests. Polk, for instance, proposed 
two alternatives: withdraw from discussion of the Adriatic question after one 
final effort to settle upon the principles of 9 December; or insist that the Italians 
accept on the lines of 9 December, whilst hinting that American aid would 
otherwise be withdrawn. He warned that the State Department was no longer in 
a position to bring effective economic pressure to bear against Italy because 
there was no loan pending, an interruption of American coal shipments was 
unlikely to be effective and a full economic blockade would most likely have 
unfortunate results, 631 The most valuable assistance came from Robert 
Lansing, the Secretary of State, who expressed his dismay at the way `Italian 
questions' were proceeding, including whether the British and 
French 
629 Wallace to Lansing, 16 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8703 (M367, r. 457), US Termination, DOS, 
RG 256; Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', p. 216. 
630 Wallace to Lansing, 22 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8773 (M367, r. 458), US Termination, DOS, 
RG 256; A. Leeper memo., 13 Feb. 1920, DBFP, XI I, no. 101. 
631 Lansing to Wilson, 22 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8681 (M367, r. 456), US Termination, DOS, 
RG 
256; Polk to Wilson, 24 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8703 (M367, r. 457), US Termination, 
DOS, RG 
256. 
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representatives were trying to solve the Adriatic question without first consulting 
with the Americans. In response, the British and French Prime Ministers 
stressed that the scheme had not lost sight of the American viewpoint, and that 
the only changes to Wilson's `last word' were the partition of Albania and 
substitution of the Free State. 632 Even this was not sufficient to guarantee the 
Yugoslavs the much-needed American support, because President Wilson had 
still not commented and therefore no objections could be officially 
communicated. On 27 January 1920, Edith Wilson, the First Lady, replied that 
there would be no further changes to her husband's position regarding the 
Adriatic. A week later, Polk was directed to follow his second course of `moral 
persuasion' and the Yugoslavs were advised to accept no Franco-British 
compromises. 633 The small Yugoslav power had effectively stymied its 
European great power counterparts by using another great power to block their 
designs. 
Wilson's long awaited reply was eventually received on 9 February 1920. Using 
ethnic arguments, he brutally attacked the 14 January proposal. His main 
objection was that the proposal violated the principle of national self- 
determination in Albania: `the memorandum of 14 January partitions the 
Albanian people against their vehement protests, among three alien powers'. In 
comparison, he maintained that his `last word' memorandum prevented these 
injustices and maintained a degree of unity amongst the Albanian people. This 
intervention is highly significant, and can probably be considered Wilson's 
strongest support for Albanian nationalism and independence. Clemenceau and 
632 Draft reply to Lansing's memo., 21 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 80. 
633 Edith Bolling Wilson to Lansing, 27 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8833 (M367, r. 463), US 
Termination, DOS, RG 256; E. Bolling Wilson to Lansing, 3 Feb. 1920,763.72119/9974 (M367, 
r. 483), US Termination, DOS, RG 256. 
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Lloyd George may have been bluffing about their threat to invoke the London 
Pact, but Wilson had a far more powerful threat to use. As Woodall so 
accurately put it, `instead of threatening Italy with economic sanctions, Wilson 
... aimed his bolt at France and England'. 
634 The manifesto closed with the 
warning that if the Adriatic Settlement was not settled in accordance with the 
principles of 9 December 
the President desires to say that he must take under serious 
consideration the withdrawal of the treaty with Germany and the 
agreement between the United States and France of 28th June, 1919, 
[the military guarantee treaty] which are now before the Senate. 635 
Wilson's reply transcended much more than the Albanian or Adriatic questions. 
The Senate failed to ratify either treaty, but to the British and French 
representatives at the time the threat endangered their core objectives in the 
Peace Conference. It is remarkable that Wilson was prepared to go to such 
lengths, over such a small issue as self-determination in Istria and Albania. 636 
He used geo-political interests against the British and French representatives, 
and in an area where their direct interests were at best marginal, to secure an 
ethnic basis for the settlement of the Albanian national question. According to 
Woodall this harsh response was suggested by Johnson. On 7 February 
Lansing received a memorandum which stated that the President `approves the 
telegram prepared by Dr. Johnson, including the paragraph threatening the 
634 Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 221. 
635 Lansing to Wallace, 9 Feb. 1920, Adriatic Question, pp. 21-5; Also at Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, 
pp. 276-9. 66 Kirk memo., 7 Feb. 1920,763.72119/90101/2 (M367, r. 468), US Termination, 
DOS, RG 256. 
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withdrawal of the Treaties in the event that the American view is not 
accepted. '637 It has not proven possible to verify these assertions. 
The controversy thus centred on American and Franco-British divisions, the 
very situation that Clemenceau and Lloyd George had been trying to avoid. 
There was only a limited role for the representatives of the other states, 
including the Italians. The British and French Prime Ministers tried to be 
conciliatory: they contended that the 14 January proposal was preferable to the 
9 December one, insisting that it included only minor changes, and that these 
were to the Yugoslav advantage rather than the Italian in respect of Fiume. 
Regarding Albania they pointed out that 
the details of the administration of this country by Jugo-Slavia, Italy and 
Greece, have not yet been elaborated and in working to this end sight 
will not be lost of the feelings and future interest of the Albanian people 
and every endeavour will be made to carry out the arrangements in full 
consultation with them. 
They maintained therefore that the arrangements were made in the interests of 
Yugoslavia, in order to give the southern part of Yugoslavia a natural maritime 
outlet. The northern part of the population in Albania north of the Skumbi was 
predominantly Christian, whilst the southern part was Muslim (by which they 
presumably meant the central plains). Therefore, they thought it best to 
separate the administration between Yugoslavia and Italy respectively. 
They did 
concede that the whole of Albania should be brought under the mandatory 
system to make it possible to eventually satisfy the aspirations of 
the Albanian 
637 Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 221, n. 23. 
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people for unity and self-government . 
638 This tri-partite mandate was a late 
attempt to overcome Wilson's scruples on Albanian nationalism. 
Wilson was not so easily convinced. He objected to the idea that the proposals 
were being made in Yugoslav interests and that the tri-partite mandate would 
help Albanian aspirations for unity and independence. 639 Although he was more 
conciliatory in other areas of the settlement, Wilson reinforced his objections 
regarding Albania. Above all, he 
would of course make no objection to a settlement mutually agreeable to 
Italy and Yugoslavia regarding their common frontier in the Fiume region, 
provided that such an agreement is not made on the basis of 
compensation elsewhere at the expense of nationals of a third power. 640 
His willingness to accept such a scheme was on the basis that the proposed 
joint ltalo-Yugoslav agreement affected only the nationals involved. This third 
`power' was obviously Albania. Although Wilson understood that a three-fold 
division of Albania might be acceptable to the Yugoslav government, the 
American government was `just as vigorously opposed to injuring the Albanian 
people for the benefit of Yugoslavia as it is opposed to injuring the Jugo-Slav 
people for the benefit of Italy'. Wilson insisted that the differences between the 
Christian and Muslim populations would be increased by putting the two 
sections under the control of nationals of unlike language, government and 
economic strength, especially if one mandatory power (Italy) was represented in 
638 Lloyd George memo., 16 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George MSS, House of Lords Record Office, 
London, LG/F/60/1/24 [hereafter cited as LG]; Also at memo., 17 Feb. 1920,186.3411/1070 
(M820, r. 437), American Commission, DOS, RG 256. 
39 Wilson minutes, 17 Feb. 1920,186.3411/1070 (M820, r. 437), American Commission, DOS, 
RG 256. 
640 Memo., 25 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George MSS, LG/F/60/1/25. 
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the Council of the League of Nations and the other (Yugoslavia) was not. " 
Therefore he considered that to withdraw the mandate/s at some future point 
would be `well nigh impossible'. Although he was willing to accept a joint Italo- 
Yugoslav proposal, as long as that proposal only had an impact on their 
interests and was compatible with self-determination, but Albanian questions 
were outside the scope of such bi-lateral talks. 642 
The European great powers failed to move Wilson from this position. 643 Wilson 
insisted that the 9 December memorandum must be the basis for future 
negotiations on Fiume, but that the Albanian question was extraneous to the 
issue as his `last word' made adequate provisions for a Yugoslav economic 
outlet in northern Albania. 644 To ensure that the Allied leaders did not attempt to 
circumvent his proposals, Wilson published a series of documents, in what has 
been termed `open diplomacy', relating to the Adriatic discussions. The 
European governments backed down. They needed American support and 
financial assistance. They were not prepared to risk the Americans withdrawing 
from the remaining negotiations or rescinding former promises to them. 645 
It is difficult to understand Wilson's reasons for holding out on the Albanian 
issue, when in so many other areas of eastern Europe the principle had been 
disregarded in favour of other priorities. All explanations to date (pledge to 
Albanian cause; tiredness with deliberations; desire to make a stand on one 
issue of self-determination) seem unsatisfactory. Whatever his motives, the 
ý2 Presumably this objection applied to the Greek mandate too but this was not mentioned. 
Memo., 25 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George MSS, LG/F/60/1/25; Lansing to Wallace, 24 Feb. 1920, 
Adriatic Question, pp. 31-4; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 81-2. 
643 Davis to Polk, 26 Feb. 1920, Adriatic Question, pp. 35-7; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, pp. 282-3. 
rA4 Polk to Davis, 4 Mar. 1920, Adriatic Question, pp. 47-9. 
645 The Times, 9 Mar. 1920; For a fuller discussion of this Machiavellian `open diplomacy' see 
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 224, n. 26. 
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result ended the idea of Albanian partition or the Albanian problem being 
considered a part of the Adriatic question. Direct Italo-Yugoslav relations finally 
culminated in the Treaty of Rapallo, but Albania was specified outside its 
remit. 646 According to Woodall, Lloyd George blamed Wilson's support for 
Albanian nationalism as the main reason why the peacemakers failed to solve 
the Adriatic question at the beginning of 1920: 
Had Serbia [Yugoslavia] accepted our terms in Paris the whole question 
would now have been settled, but, owing to President Wilson's 
interference, especially with regard to northern Albania, the Serbians 
themselves now felt that they had been deprived of any possible access 
to the sea. 
647 
The deliberations during the Peace Conference of Paris had therefore not 
resolved the Albanian question, but Wilson's insistence on an ethnic settlement 
had ensured that it had been removed from the power bargaining over the wider 
Adriatic problems. The question of Albanian independence had been revived 
and there was some level of great power understanding that, once more, it 
would be considered holistically, not as part of several other questions. 
Albanian Initiatives and Responses 
In spite of the supposed `new diplomacy' and espousals in favour of self- 
determination, it was typical for the representatives of the small(er) states to 
have only a limited role in determining their own future during the peace 
deliberations in Paris. This was particularly so for the Albanians. Although an 
Albanian state had existed in 1914, in considering Albania suitable for mandate 
646 Young to Curzon, 25 Nov. 1920, FO 371148861C13685. 
647 Lloyd George quoted in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 223 [unreferenced quotation]. 
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status, the great powers did not initially deem the Albanian question to be a 
national question at all, but instead equivalent to a colonial problem, in areas 
not yet ready for independence. The Albanian absence from the Peace 
Conference deliberations (except for the two brief audiences for Turkhan 
Pasha) is one of the most striking features of the previous discussions. It 
illustrates very clearly the importance of `international' as opposed to `national' 
factors, and the periodic inability of Albanian nationalism to influence either the 
international system or their own fate. Most Albanian involvement in the 
Conference was localised, marginalised and often revolved around competition 
between themselves; what influence they had also tended to be negative. 648 
The Durazzo delegation, and many of the others, was initially anxious to work 
with the Italians, as the policies of the Consulta seemed to coincide with 
Albanian national aspirations, and it was believed that such a policy would 
therefore be beneficial. But opposition to such a policy soon mounted, as a 
result of the Italian policies pursued in Paris, and of Italian actions in Albania, 
which were not compatible with Albanian national interests. It also became 
increasingly obvious to the Albanian leaders that the Italians had limited 
influence with the other three powers, and even with the small states. This 
seems to have been responsible for many members of the delegation asking 
how effective a protector Italy would be against Yugoslav and Greek aggression 
and intrigue. Turkhan Pasha remained loyal to Italy, but Mehmed Konitza and 
Tourtoulis sought a non-Italian option. These views were reinforced by reports 
of Italian activities from within Albania, and a realisation of what an 
Italian 
mandate might mean. The trigger for this `revolt' was the arrival of 
Essad Pasha 
648 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 120-61 passim. 
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in Paris on 1 April 1919. On the one hand, this exacerbated animosities 
because he was a traditional rival but, on the other, it intensified the resolve 
amongst the previously competing factions that something needed to be done 
to prevent Essad from taking control of the Albanian movement in Paris. This 
was particularly important as Essad seemed instantly to be better received, 
especially by the American delegation, than many other Albanian 
representatives had been. 649 Their united front was illustrated most obviously in 
the presentation of identical memorandums by several of the delegations (4 and 
7 April 1919), in which the Albanians resolved to prevent partition, re-take 
control of their national movement on the international front and to prevent 
themselves being subject to domination or interference by outside forces (a less 
than veiled reference to the Italian, Serbian, Greek and also French and British 
troops in Albania). The first petition was signed by the Albanian government, 
and the second by Vatra, the Albanian delegation from Constantinople and the 
Albanian colony in Romania. They also informed the Supreme Council (14 April 
1919) that they no longer accepted the Italian mandate, and cited five reasons 
for this: the London Pact; fears of Italian aspirations; the harshness of the 
occupation, especially relative to that in Koritza; the work by Italian forces to 
divide the Christian and 'Muslims populations; and Italian designs on Valona, 
which they considered jeopardised long-term security in the Balkans. They 
requested an independent Albania under an American or British mandate. 650 
This represented the complete failure of Sonnino's Albanian policy. 
649 S. Bonsai, Suitors and Supplicants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York, 1946), p. 67; 
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This revised Albanian policy had little impact on proceedings. Although 
MacGinty and Handel have maintained that the `new diplomacy' of the First 
World War, Peace Conference and League of Nations represented a hiatus for 
small states in which their power and influence in the states system 
increased, 651 this was far from the experience of the Albanians, especially at an 
official level. Their presence in Paris, like that of many other factions, lobbies 
and pressure groups interested in a particular question, was at best tolerated or 
else deferred, ignored or ridiculed. In his useful but limited article, Gregory Pano 
investigated the work of Albanian-Americans, especially Vatra, and their 
influence on the American negotiators. Although his study is based on limited 
source material and applies only to the American situation, it includes many 
useful ideas that can be applied to the various Albanian delegations and 
support organisations. Pano argued that Albanian ideas had so little impact that 
it was immaterial who argued them. Their fallback position was an apparent 
`blind belief' in Wilson's support for them and their cause, based on his alleged 
pledge to them. Pano is correct that it was hardly a formal commitment, and that 
Wilson most likely made many similar casual promises in his innumerable 
meetings with various groups, including those with irreconcilable and 
contradictory claims. However, Wilson, if indeed he did make such a promise, 
cannot have failed to understand the raising of aspirations that such a positive 
avowal of support would entail. Until the latter stages of negotiations, especially 
those associated with his `final word', there is no indication of such support. In 
the preliminary discussions, Wilson had even commented that Italy could 
`probably have Valona', 
652 
651 MacGinty, `Small States', esp. pp. 50-2; Page cited in Handel, Weak States, pp. 5,180. 
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The influence of Albanian diaspora and supporter organisations also appears 
minimal. The records of the United States delegation clearly indicate that the 
American delegates respected the opinions of British Albanophiles, especially 
Aubrey Herbert. 653 Rothwell, meanwhile, has shown that Herbert had close 
personal ties with many influential members of the British delegation, but this 
does not necessarily seem to have translated into influence on policy. There is 
much criticism of him, especially by senior British officials such as Crowe. Other 
Albanophiles experienced an even more hostile reception. Of one Crowe 
minuted, `Captain Spencer is notoriously an adventurer of the shadiest 
character and of the most unsavoury antecedents. He ought to be in the 
dock. '654 This experience seems typical of the limited effectiveness of diaspora 
organisations. Joseph O'Grady's study of the impact of other immigrant groups 
argues that such organisations were typically less influential on American policy 
than has generally been assumed. O'Grady sees sponsors in the American 
Senate (for the Czechs and Poles especially), rather than immigrant groups, as 
important in policy making. 
655 For the Albanians, it is also difficult to find any 
tangible influence, in the American Congress or the British Houses of 
Parliament. By contrast, the change in Albanian attitudes did impact on Italian 
policy makers. Sonnino was anxious about the anti-Italian turn, lest their 
sentiments disrupted his plans. He instructed that any Albanians in Paris be 
prevented from returning to Albania and that their mail, which usually went on 
ships from Italy, be intercepted, to avoid their frosty attitudes having an impact 
653 Day to Built, 19 Feb. 1919,186.3411/62 (M820, r. 415), American Commission, DOS, RG 
256; Day to Mezes, 31 Mar. 1919,186.3411/133 (M820, r. 415), American Commission, DOS, 
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3 Aug. 1917, Hardinge MSS, FO 800/197; Crowe minute, 17 May 1919, FO 608/46/8/10041; 
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655 O'Grady cited in Pano, `Albanian-Americans Effort', p. 11. 
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upon the already turbulent domestic Albanian situation, and the restless Italian 
troops there. 656 His successors were even more receptive to Albanian initiatives 
and responses. 
In the short term, the anti-Italian turn by most Albanian representatives was 
more detrimental to Albanian causes than any other. It proved what the Greeks 
and Serbs had been arguing about Albanian duplicity and inconsistency, and 
reinforced great power concerns about Albanian readiness for independence. It 
also meant that Mehmed Konitza and others needed to formulate a new policy 
quickly, but significantly after their only opportunity to present their claims 
(February 1919) had passed. They now found themselves arguing ideas 
supported by none of the great powers (except perhaps, in part, Wilson), and 
against ones they had earlier presented to the Conference. Their inability to 
impact on great power policy became self-evident as the Conference 
progressed. For instance, in October 1919, having received news of the leaked 
Tittoni-Venizelos arrangements, the Albanians called daily upon the American 
and British negotiators with protests, but they were merely advised to accept the 
Italian mandate scheme. 657 When the Yugoslavs were invited to participate in 
the northern Albanian problem, no great power representative, not even Wilson, 
thought such an opportunity should likewise be afforded to the Albanian 
representatives. Finally, the changed policy generated irreconcilable differences 
between the leading Albanians. Turkhan Pasha never signed any petition 
against Italy, and as a result the other three leading members of the Durazzo 
delegation implemented a form of coup to oust him. Turkhan Pasha was not 
656 Sonnino cited in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 124. 
657 Tourtoulis, M. Konitza and M. Frasheri to Clemenceau, 17 June 1919, and Haul Pasha, 
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officially replaced until January 1920, but he left Paris and Mehmed became the 
nominal leader, but with no greater success. Albanian initiatives and activities 
were mostly low-key and unsuccessful. Neither their support for an Italian 
mandate, nor, from April 1919, their ambition of an American mandate were 
much of a counterweight to the ambitions of other states. This lack of influence 
and resistance to an Italian-dominated and controlled `independence' meant 
that the Albanians were unable to gain a great power supporter; or, more 
correctly, they were unable to obtain one that they wanted, once Italian 
intentions had become clear to them. As such, neither dependency on a great 
power, by aligning policy with that of the great power, or the `going-it-alone' 
approach produced anything significant, because the great power interests at 
stake in the issues being determined were too significant. 658 
Conclusions 
Perceptions of nationalism in Britain, the United States and France in 1919-20 
were based on the civic model, but problems materialised in eastern Europe, 
where this model was not practicable. For the Americans, language became 
the main determination of nationality, irrespective of the problems of bi- 
lingualism of some people, or of other affiliations or markers of identity. In 
eastern Europe, it was a matter of which groups would be sovereign, and which 
would not form part of the dominant group. As Margaret MacMillan wrote, 
"self-determination" was the watchword but this was not a help in 
choosing among (often many) competing nationalisms. The 
peacemakers had to act as policemen and they had to feed the hungry. If 
they could, they had to create an international order that would make 
658 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 132-42 passim; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 116-23 passim; 
Swire, Albania, pp. 303-11 passim. 
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another Great War impossible. Wilson promised new ways of protecting 
the weak and of settling disputes. 
659 
However, she failed to point out that the powers also had their own interests at 
stake. They were not disinterested policemen, but rather like loan sharks: the 
beneficiaries of their own decisions and actions. As Lansing later maintained, 
the self-determination principle was `loaded with dynamite, raising hopes which 
can never be realised'. 660 The answer turned out to lie in those groups that 
organised themselves and had established their position before the start of the 
Conference, such as the Poles, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. 661 Despite 
expectations to the contrary, the small or weak states, especially the smallest 
and weakest, remained just as weak as before under the new diplomacy. The 
great powers did not feel able to undo some pre-conference decisions, such as 
Yugoslav or Czechoslovak independence, yet it was deemed possible to 
overrule the similar Albanian resolution in 1918, and the great-power one in 
1913. The Albanians were even weaker than their rivals. In 1919, their influence 
was limited because they had formed several different delegations, each with 
contradictory objectives and agenda. Their rivals could use this against them, 
and it made the great powers take them less seriously. Thus, whenever the self- 
determination principle conflicted with great power interests, self-determination 
was usually ignored or marginalised, even by the Americans. In practical terms, 
the powers were not prepared to make any great efforts to ensure that the new 
boundaries would be respected, unless there was an impact on their own 
interests or on the balance of power. 
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The Albanians also suffered from the problem of being small in size. For many 
of the diplomats in Paris, size was a key consideration in terms of self- 
determination especially, as it linked to their other interests. For the British 
representatives, this meant the balance of power, and for the Italian and French 
a desire for grateful client states. Britain aimed to establish national states in 
central and eastern Europe to replace the old multinational empires, and they 
intended these states to be strong and stable. There was much to suggest that 
small states were weak, volatile and likely to be subject to aggression from their 
neighbours, regardless of the numerous examples that indicated otherwise. As 
one Whitehall official commented, he did not agree with small states becoming 
independent, and instead liked to see `a small state as part of a great 
empire,. 662 In general, Whitehall did not want to protect the weak. It wanted 
states to be strong enough to protect themselves. Yugoslavia and Greece were 
far more likely than Albania to provide a counter-balance to Italy in the Balkans 
and the Adriatic. Thus, they could argue that a large(r) independent Albania, 
especially an Italian dominated one, would not provide for stability and the 
maintenance of the status quo. Such a view clearly influenced the Albanian 
question, and was common to many of the arguments used against the 
Albanians in 1913. By 1919, their rivals had a stronger argument, based on 
evidence from the collapse of the Wied regime and Albanian divisions during 
the First World War and Paris Peace Conference. 
To Arnold J. Toynbee, the PID member and historian, the principles of 
nationality, democracy and self-determination were `the essential aim and 
expression of their cause'. 663 The gap in Toynbee's argument, and it was one 
662 H. Wilson, 9 Apr. 1920, FO 371/4387/pid876/f876; Also at Sharp, `Minorities', p. 184. 
663 Toynbee quoted in Goldstein, `British Peace Aims', p. 422. 
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common to most British and other great power officials, was the assumption 
that the mandatory power the local peoples themselves would choose would be 
the correct one and in line with their own great power policy projections. None 
of the great powers wanted the Albanian mandate, except Italy, and the 
Durazzo delegation eventually resolved that it did not want the Italians. The 
support and protection of a great power was considered indispensable for the 
9 new' states. British Cabinet discussions regarding Mesopotamia (that would 
become Iraq) recommended that, should the inhabitants of the region express a 
desire for Britain to act as mandatory power, then this should be taken up. 664 
The Albanian desire for an American or British mandate, as the only two powers 
they trusted to act in Albanian interests, was refused. The powers had a very 
strange interpretation of self-determination, especially for south-eastern Europe, 
where it is questionable whether any of the powers were really interested in or 
committed to the principle of self-determination. Plebiscites were used only 
sparingly, and in the Balkans not at all, in case people chose the wrong 
nationality! Instead, as Sir James Headlam-Morley maintained, `self- 
determination is quite demode. Leeper and Nicolson determine for them what 
they ought to wish, but they do it very well'. 665 
664 Ibid, pp. 423,428. 
665 J Headlam-Morley quoted in A. Headlam-Morley (ed. ), Sir James Headlam-Morley: A 
Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London, 1972), p. 44 emphasis added; Also at 
Goldstein, `New Diplomacy', p. 399. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
The Allied Occupations and Nationalist Resurgence (1918-20) 
`The Albanian people ... are not minded to submit to being sold like cattle in the 
European markets as the spoils of Italy, Serbia and Greece. 666 
This chapter considers the substantial developments in post-war `Albania' that 
would eventually prove more important to the question of Albanian 
independence than the intense and protracted deliberations in Paris. It starts by 
considering the great power Allied occupations (France and Italy especially, and 
to a lesser extent Britain). It explores the rivalry between them, and the actions 
and attitudes of Albania's neighbours, the Serbs (or Yugoslavs), and Greeks, 
and their persistent efforts to gain that territory previously determined `Albanian'. 
It also considers the role of the Albanians themselves. It examines the character 
and work of the Albanian governments, especially their realisation, by the 
beginning of 1920 (at the latest), that they could no longer depend upon the 
great powers, especially Italy, for protection or support. It considers their 
resolve, as in 1912, to take matters into their own hands and not leave the 
outcome of Albania's future to others, this time, including the great powers. It 
explains the reasons for this change in attitude, its impacts and why none of the 
great powers or Balkan rivals realised its significance, or were able to prevent it. 
This analysis will show that the Albanian example conforms only partially to 
traditional theories about weak states in the great power system and structural 
realism, on the one hand, and to the experiences of other resurgent eastern 
European nationalisms in the post-war era, on the other. 
666 Delvina to Herbert, 10 June 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/3 
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A Plethora of Regimes and Albanian Reactions 
The formation of the Durazzo government (December 1918) was not something 
that the Italians had expected or planned for, but Sonnino realised that it could 
not be reversed. There were a number of promising developments under this 
new regime, not least the experience of Christians and Muslims working 
together, and the agreement regarding the delegation to send to Paris. 667 
However, there were clear problems. To the nationalists, international 
recognition was more important than domestic concerns. The policy of the 
provisional government was therefore to await the decisions from Paris. This left 
a vacuum. The most influential, able and well-known leaders in the government, 
including both the prime and foreign minister, were at the Peace Conference in 
Paris. Those ministers left in Albania worked to preserve the status quo, and 
considered it their responsibility not to make any changes until Albania's future 
had been settled. Additionally, none of the great powers (including Italy), or any 
other state, had recognised the new Albanian government. Although the 
Durazzo government had claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Albania as 
constituted in 1913-14, in practice it had authority over about one-fifth of the 
pre-war state, and much of this only with Italian endorsement or co-operation. 
The other four-fifths of pre-war Albanian territory was occupied by the French 
(Koritza and Pogradec), the Serbs (northern and eastern Albania down to the 
D'Esperey line), and the rest by the Italians. There was also the inter-Allied 
regime in Scutari (British, French and Italian). The Allied occupation of Albania 
proved a major obstacle to the formation of a genuinely independent Albanian 
government. It also affected Allied relations with one another, producing much 
667 Phillips to DMI, 24 Jan. 1919 FO 371/3570/3815; Phillips to DMI, 26 June 1919, FO 
608/30/1/16235; Ed. note 1, Hasan Prishtina, p. 103. By contrast Nuro and Bato contend that 
the Durazzo Congress was organised by the `Italian occupiers'. In line with socialist rhetoric 
they condemn those involved as `feudal traitors... who aimed at legalizing the Italian's 
imperialism plans in Albania. ' 
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discord and friction. The deteriorating relations and intensification of inter-power 
rivalry helped promote the Albanian policy of independent action. Gradually, it 
became clear to a broad section of national and tribal leaders, although not to 
all, that the powers were not interested in `genuine' independence, but at best in 
a token one under Italian `protection'. Italian control would be used to further 
Italian interests in the Balkans, rather than to benefit Albania. 668 This rivalry 
mirrored events taking place within the Peace Conference, but for most ordinary 
Albanians events at home were more influential. 
The first half of 1919 was stable in southern Albania, especially in the French 
zone. In the Italian zone, British reports described some Albanian 
disenchantment, although much of this was attributed to the Grecophile 
elements. Still awaiting the decisions from the Peace Conference in Paris, 
neither the Italians nor the Greeks wished to be seen using force in the 
region. 669 By contrast, in northern Albania, especially in and around Scutari, 
there was much animosity, although these disagreements rarely turned violent. 
With negotiations still proceeding in Paris, neither side wanted to be accused of 
being aggressive or of breaking the peace. The Italians had agreed to an 
international regime only to prevent the Serbs from occupying Scutari town. The 
French Colonel (later General) de Fourtou, who led the international force in 
Scutari, found himself frequently clashing with the Italian Commander, Major 
Perricone, who controlled the Italian-occupied territory surrounding the town. As 
early as 1 January 1919, de Fourtou wrote of his inability to work with the 
Italians, and Phillips, now a Brigadier-General, of the incompatibility of the two 
668 'History of question of independence of Albania' memo., 2 Mar. 1925, FO 141/669/10; 
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 169-95 passim. 
669 Phillips to DMI, 19 May 1919, and Eden minute, 11 May 1919, FO 608/30/12/12241; Phillips 
memo., 31 Dec. 1918, FO 371/3570/13815. 
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men. 670 In particular, there proved to be disagreement over the jurisdiction and 
the nature of the regime. This escalated to such an extent that D'Esperey was 
forced to spend two days in Scutari inspecting the situation and speaking to 
Piacentini directly. This initiative failed, and the French, with British support, 
responded by requesting that the Italians withdraw to beyond a zone ten 
kilometres around Scutari. 671 This was just one of many incidents indicative of 
the deteriorating Franco-Italian relationship in Albania. The situation was 
complicated because the French at Scutari did not follow exactly the same 
policy as their representatives in Paris. Military leaders appeared eager to 
support Serbian aims, regardless of the impact on Franco-Italian relations. 
According to Woodall, Pichon repeatedly refused to agree to their requests to 
withdraw troops from Scutari. He explained that their presence was symbolic 
rather than effective because of the pivotal role of Scutari in the larger Adriatic 
question. He sought to use Scutari as a possible trade-off in the Adriatic 
dispute, and even observed that there was a `southern Adriatic question', 
centred on Scutari. 672 There were also numerous Franco-Italian complaints 
about Phillips, including his phil-Albanian tendencies. Nevertheless, Whitehall 
resolved to keep him in post, to maintain the international character of the 
regime and to restrain their Allies. 673 Relations between the Italians and 
Yugoslavs were particularly tense. It appeared that the Italians were using their 
base in northern Albania to attempt to destabilise the new Yugoslav regime. 674 
The Serbs sought to take advantage of the Italians' loss of support in Paris in 
670 Phillips to Clerk, 28 Dec. 1918, FO 371/3570/9031; d'Esperey cited in Woodall, `Albanian 
Problem', pp. 75-6. 
671 Spears to Balfour, 6 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3570/4839- 
672 Woodall, `Albanian Problem', 79-80. 
673 Derby to Curzon, 23 Apr. 1919, FO 608/76/8228; Balfour to French Ambassador in London, 
5 May 1919, FO 608/76/9148; H. Nicolson, `Memo. on Troops in Scutari', 7 May 1919, FO 
608/76/9335; Phillips to Gribbon, 11 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3570/13815; Sonnino to Imperiali and 
Piacentini, 11 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 518; Also at Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 81. 
674 Dodge to American Delegation in Paris, 19 June 1919,186.3411/630 (M820, r. 435), US 
Commission, DOS, RG 256. 
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the spring of 1919, by refusing to recognise Italy's right to occupy all of Albania 
within the 1913 frontiers. In particular, the Serbs refused to demilitarise the 
disputed zone north and east of the Drin. 
675 
Albanian responses once more varied. Some joined forces with the occupiers 
and intriguers, but others were more resistant. Essadists sided with the Serbs 
and many northern tribes, including the Mirdites, colluded with the Italians. 
These alliances were usually based on local requirements, and usually included 
the supply of weaponry to Albanian fighters in exchange for assistance, rather 
than for any national purposes. In one incident, on 1 March 1919, seven Italians 
were killed and twelve taken prisoner by Essadist forces, and turned over to the 
Serbian forces at Dibra. In another, Italian forces and Albanian comitadji 
(irregular armed bands) were accused of attacking a Yugoslav post. There were 
also reports of numerous atrocities being committed, including villages being 
occupied and burned, and hostages taken. Meanwhile, Albanians in Plava and 
Gusinje appealed to Britain for protection against the Yugoslavs, of whose state 
they were now part. 676 The situation appears to have been particularly difficult in 
Kosovo. Due to its inaccessibility, no great power had occupied the area during 
the war. With the Austro-Bulgarian retreat, the Serbs sought to re-occupy it. 
This prompted a revolt by the Kosovo-Albanians, especially the Sunni Muslims, 
which was heavily crushed by the Serbian forces, as an example to other 
675 DMI memo., `Situation in Albania', 2 May, FO 371/3571/69428; Dodge to Lansing, 18 July 
1919,763.72119/6070 (M367, r. 223), US Termination, DOS, RG 256; Lederer, Yugoslavia, pp. 
279. 
676Durham to Herbert, 3 Aug. 1919, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47; Phillips to DMI, 31 Dec. 1918, 
FO 371/3570/13815; DMI memo., `Situation in Albania', 12 May, FO 371/3571/69428; Dodge to 
Lansing, 18 July 1919,763.72119/6070 (M367, r. 223), US Termination, DOS, RG 256; Swire, 
Albania, p. 290; Albania, Geographic Handbook, Naval Intelligence Division B. R. 542 (London, 
1945), pp. 176,188; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 119; Lederer, Yugoslavia, pp. 279; Fischer, King 
Zog, pp. 18-9; Swire, Albania, pp. 287,289,291. 
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minorities. This in turn produced an influx of Kosovan refugees into Albania. 677 
One observer went so far as to claim that the Yugoslavs were deliberately 
expelling Albanians in order to change the ethnic character of the region, and to 
prevent the Durazzo government from claiming the region as part of `ethnic 
Albania,. 678 This flood of refugees added to the tensions because neither the 
French nor the Italians wanted them: the French because they could not be fed 
and because they spread disease; the Italians because they formed the base of 
a large Albanian nationalist movement, the Committee for the National Defence 
of Kosovo. The Committee claimed to represent 15,000 Albanians, and it called 
for the return of Kosovo and other Albanian-inhabited areas. Most importantly, it 
was a movement the Italian authorities had no control over. Italian reluctance to 
help this group contributed greatly to their unpopularity amongst the Albanians. 
Although the British forwarded repeated reports of Yugoslav-Albanian fighting to 
their Allies, there was no action to prevent the hostilities, because the French 
and the Americans refused to participate in the planned ultimatum to 
Belgrade. 679 
Most Albanians focused on local, tribal or family problems and concerns. As in 
earlier complaints, most Albanians persistently failed to see beyond their 
immediate environs and could not relate their grievances to wider ones. The 
traditional problems of geography, climate, poor transportation links and low 
677 Durham to Herbert, 17 May 1919, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47; Logoreci, Albanians, p. 208; 
Swire, Albania, 289-90; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', 93-4, n. 28: Such interpretations have 
prompted Woodall to view the problem of the Kosovo Albanians to date back to 1913, but it was 
a much older problem. 
678 Brodie to Phillips, 9 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3570/13815; Various minutes, 24 Feb. 1919, FO 
371/3570/31676; Phillips to DMI, 13 Mar. 1919, FO 608/76/2/7/4577. 
679 Prishtina to unknown, 5 Sept. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no. 60; Serbian Peace Conference 
Delegation to Curzon, 24 Mar. 1919, FO 371/3571/47222; Phillips to DMI, 3 Apr. 1919, and 
Derby to Curzon, 5 Apr. 1919, FO 371/3571/53987; Phillips to DMI, 18 Apr. 1919, FO 
371/3571/60719; Pichon to Day, 23 May 1919, FO 371/3571/79180; Day to H. Nicolson, 17 
June 1919, FO 608/109/1/2/12816; Phillips to DMI, 21 June 1919, FO 371/3571/92486; Sonnino 
cited in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 95-6. 
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levels of literacy (rather than religious differences) all hindered communications 
between the various groups, and joint action. 680 The military presence and the 
assorted Allied regimes added further complications, because movement 
between zones was restricted by internal barriers (similar to state boundaries), 
with official crossing points. This was something many Albanians were not 
accustomed to, especially in the north. These various regimes also blocked the 
Durazzo government's ability to extend its authority. This may be one of the 
reasons why the impetus came from abroad, including Kosovo, where, despite it 
being under Serbian rule, freedom of movement (if not freedom of speech and 
political thought) was easier. The most significant actions, although admittedly 
even these still had little impact on the national picture, took place within the 
diaspora and support groups. The Anglo-Albanian Society repeatedly asked 
questions in the British Houses of Parliament, wrote numerous press articles 
and held a variety of campaigning events. There were similar initiatives in the 
United States. 681 Hasan Prishtina also tried to launch a press campaign for 
Kosovo's inclusion in a reconstituted Albania, but as he was `in prison' in Vienna 
it was difficult for this to be very effective. 682 Nationalism still remained irrelevant 
to the needs of most ordinary Albanians. After at least eight years of war, they 
wanted stability and the opportunity to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, 
although others profited from the occupations by selling produce and materials. 
Only as opposition grew could the small narrow band of nationalists seek to 
draw supporters from these disparate groups. In 1913-14, the 'people' had put 
their faith in Wilhelm to bring them prosperity. When it became obvious that he 
could not, they turned against him, and against the ideology of an independent 
680 Prishtina to Rakip Kaja Begoli, 9 Oct. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no. 61. 
681 See for example: Herbert to Harmsworth, 21 July 1919, FO 371/3571/106271; Vatra, An 
Appeal to the Great People of America (Boston, 1919), in FO 371/351/138342; Vatra memo., 
Aug. 1919, FO 371/3571/146304. 
682 See for example Prishtina to Sotir Kolese, 11 Jan. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no. 58. 
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Albania. When the occupations in 1918-9 likewise failed to deliver what 
Albanians demanded, in much the same way as the British and Americans have 
in Iraq (and elsewhere) more recently, the people turned against them and 
sought other alternatives, both home-grown and imported. Nevertheless, as late 
as August 1919, the nationalists were still unsure of what to do, and were 
seeking advice from their foreign supporters. 
683 
Italian officials, forces and actions proved unpopular for several reasons. The 
Italian administration persistently tried to undermine, overrule or circumvent 
Albanian intentions, or else it attempted to control Albanian nationalism by 
asserting that all decisions of the Durazzo government must be ratified by the 
Italian High Commissioner. The provisional government did not want a small, 
central, Muslim-dominated Albania as described in the London Pact. This was 
shown most obviously in the protests of 3 June 1919, the second anniversary of 
the Italian proclamation. Admittedly, this was something that the Consulta too 
had decided it no longer wanted. Italian actions and policy in Albania 
consistently had the opposite effect to that intended. Above all, they continued 
to offend the Albanians. One such incident, which provoked immense uproar, 
involved taking down all Albanian flags on 28 November 1919, which had been 
put up to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the Albanians proclaiming 
independence. Italy's opponents (the Essadists, Serbs and Greeks) all used this 
to their advantage. 684 By contrast, the French zone of occupation in southern 
Albania was marked by comparative order and tranquillity, as a result of the tact 
and ability of the French officers. Pastorelli contends that Piacentini persistently 
failed to understand the Albanians or their ambitions, and underestimated their 
683 Durham to Herbert, 3 Aug. 1919, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47. 
684 Dodge to Lansing, 13 Sept. 1919,763.72119/7183 (M367, r. 439), US Termination, DOS, 
RG 256; Swire, Albania, pp. 286-8; Pearson, Albania, !, pp. 130,133. 
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strength and resolve. Piacentini's reports remained optimistic, and he failed to 
convey accurately to his superiors the growing discontent, or his inability to 
quell the escalating dissatisfaction. By contrast, other great power 
representatives were reporting considerable anti-Italian antagonism and that, as 
far as they could ascertain, the Italian press knew little of it. The Italian 
representatives in Albania emphatically denied that there was any truth in these 
suggestions, although they did acknowledge a few skirmishes between Italian 
and Serbian outposts. In addition, news of Italian problems in Paris began to 
emerge in Albania. Many Albanian leaders were disturbed by the Italian resolve 
to maintain Valona, which, as the town where independence had been 
proclaimed in 1912, was considered integral to an independent Albania. Italian 
failings also indicated that Italy would be an insufficient protector of Albanian 
integrity. The incursions on the northern frontier reinforced this view. Relations 
between the Italians, on the one hand, and the Serbs and French, on the other, 
also continued to deteriorate. Italian troops initially attempted to use force to 
push the Serbs further back. As this policy backfired, and as the Albanians 
became even more resistive to Italian occupation, the Consulta was persuaded 
to use diplomacy to expel the Serbs from Albania. The Consulta had previously 
argued that a strong military presence was needed to strengthen Italy's 
bargaining position. As the costs soared, and the talks in Paris floundered, the 
Italian people became disillusioned with the occupation, and the policy became 
increasingly untenable. 
685 
Nevertheless, in the short term, the Consulta sought to consolidate its position 
in northern Albania vis-a-vis Serbian forces. In June 1919, 
Sonnino attempted 
685 Dodge to Lansing, 13 Sept. 1919,763.72119/7183 (M367, r. 439), US Termination, 
DOS, 
RG 256; Pastorelli, L'Albania, pp. 318-22. 
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to secure British and American support for the removal of Serbian troops from 
central Albania, after failing to secure French support, on the basis of the 
November 1918 agreement. Although it was not a party to that agreement, 
Whitehall decided that the Italians, rather than the Serbs, could best preserve 
peace in Albania. With the larger Adriatic settlement still unresolved, British 
officials thought that their support on this issue might placate the Italians. The 
Foreign Office sent an official warning to the Yugoslav government, but Serbian 
activities continued and even intensified. The Yugoslav government proclaimed 
that Serbian troops were under the control of the Interior Department, not the 
War Department, as the area represented territory occupied by Serbia before 
August 1914, and was thus not subject to the control of D'Esperey. They 
declared that the boundary of northern Albania was the Drin, and accused the 
Italians of violating it. 686 This move was too much for even the Quai d'Orsay, but 
the great powers were unable to prevent the advance of Serbian and Essadist 
forces in northern Albania. Once more, Italian ambitions were detrimentally 
affected. This demonstrated to the Albanians the inability of the Italians, 
especially, and the great powers more generally, to protect `Albanian' borders. 
This in turn convinced many that independence, free from the interference of all 
outside forces, even great power ones, was the best option for Albania's future 
stability and integrity. Events in Scutari echoed those in Paris, and further 
illustrated Italian weakness relative to the other powers, and even the small 
Yugoslav state. The most damaging event was French success in defeating 
686 Dodge to Lansing, 13 June 1919,763.72119/5340 (M367, r. 417), US Termination, DOS, RG 
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Italian efforts to launch a gunboat on Lake Scutari. It was particularly humiliating 
for the Italians that a Serbian gunboat was stationed there instead, and that 
they were forced to withdraw their commander. 687 Events in southern Albania 
confirmed these views. Piacentini was particularly disliked because he did not 
conform to the Albanian image of a `strong man'. In August 1919, rumours 
emerged of the projected French withdrawal and a Franco-Greek plan to 
replace French troops with Greek ones-an eventuality which the Albanian 
nationalists and the Italians feared greatly. It appeared that the Allies were 
colluding against the Albanians. Despite Italian efforts to prevent this move, 
especially the Greek occupation of Koritza, in contravention of the Tittoni- 
Venizelos agreement, the Italians were again portrayed as weak and 
undependable protectors. The Italians secured French agreement that their 
occupation would continue, but once more Italy proved to be the loser. 688 
The Albanian resolve to determine their own future was mounting. By August 
1919, Phillips had concluded that the Albanians were resolutely opposed to the 
idea of an Italian protectorate, and were talking of proclaiming a besa against all 
foreigners. These initiatives escalated in the ensuing months. Following Nitti's 
public proclamation of Tittoni's Adriatic plans, including the partition proposal for 
Albania in the Italian parliament (27 September 1919), the Albanians became all 
too acutely aware of great-power designs. 689 These fears were reconfirmed 
when news of the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement leaked out, but Phillips continued 
to advocate a strictly limited Italian mandate as the best option for the 
687 Colby to American Delegation in Paris, 9 Nov. 1919,186.3411/975 (M820, r. 437), US 
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Albanians, following Sonnino's old policy of entente with the Albanians. 690 He 
correctly maintained that the alternatives, and those currently being proposed 
by Tittoni in Paris, all involved partition. Although he argued that Argyrocastro 
should go to Greece, Phillips maintained that Kosovo should become part of 
Albania-a policy which was never likely to get much support. This increased 
his prestige amongst the Albanians, but his promotion of these ideas did much 
to distance Phillips from the Serbs, Italians and French, the very people he was 
supposed to be working with and encouraging to compromise. His position was 
further weakened when five of the northern Albanian tribes proclaimed a besa 
and resolved to prevent Serbian seizure of Albanian territory. De Fourtou 
alleged that Phillips had helped orchestrate this. In response, Crowe ordered 
Phillips not to support the besa, for it was quite likely that Britain might sponsor 
the partition of Albania and give northern Albania to the Serbs. As one official 
wrote, `General Phillips seems to think Albania is the centre of the universe', 
and his independent actions, contrary to Crowe's instructions, continued to work 
against British official policy. Until his recall, and despite Whitehall directives, 
Phillips proved to be a strong promoter of Albanian nationalism. 691 
To counter the tide of Albanian nationalism, the Consulta requested the 
Durazzo government to send negotiators to Rome. Under an agreement signed 
on 20 August 1919, it was agreed that all of Albania would come under the 
control of the provisional government at Durazzo, except for Valona, where the 
Italian army was to maintain its presidia, and a few frontier regions. The 
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Albanian negotiators agreed that their government was to be subordinate to a 
civil Italian High Commissioner, and that the Albanian militia would be under 
Italian military command. There were special provisions for Argyrocastro where 
the Italian Officer, Colonel Lodi, was made Prefect in order to overcome 
Christian fears about Muslim rule and presumably, therefore, Greek objections 
to the agreement. The Italian government failed to ratify the agreement-by this 
point Nitti had decided to partition Albania. Thus the military rule continued but it 
did little to support the provisional government. 692 Nevertheless, by October 
1919, Morton Eden, Phillips' secretary, was writing that the popularity of the 
provisional government depended upon it being anti-Italian. 693 Support for the 
regime had already been dwindling because of its lack of progress, and its 
inability to achieve recognition or to secure Albania's objectives in Paris. The 
real turning point came in November 1919, when news of the proposed 
agreement between Italy and the Durazzo government emerged, including the 
acceptance of the Italian High Commissioner. Protests sprang up throughout 
Albania, demanding an explanation as to why their government had agreed to 
such an outrage. 694 As with governments in other states, for example Italy, 
public opinion left little room for compromise on national ambitions and integrity, 
and demanded quick success in achieving these goals. This added much 
pressure as negotiators fought for goals that the representatives of other 
(stronger) states were opposed to granting. 
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Congress of Lushnie and the Establishment of the Tirana Government 
The growth of anti-Italian hostility and a deterioration of the provisional 
government's popularity went hand in hand. Fears about the future of the 
country seemed justified when it became known that Bumci and the Italian 
delegation in Paris had worked out a further compromise agreement, whereby 
Albanian integrity and independence were preserved, but under Italian control. 
In protest, a meeting of all `true nationalists' in the country was called, and it 
eventually turned into a National Congress held at Lushnje from 28-31 January 
1920.695 By then, it included not only opponents of the Durazzo regime but also 
defectors from it. The Congress would prove to be one of the most important 
developments in the whole saga of Albanian independence. Its root causes lay 
in the delay in settling the Albanian question in Paris to Albanian satisfaction, 
and the deteriorating influence of the great powers, especially Italy. Albanian 
nationalists were exasperated by Italy's apparent intention to remain in 
occupation, and felt betrayed by the news that it appeared that the London Pact 
would be enacted. The Albanian delegation in Paris was isolated, and the 
Durazzo government had lost popular support due to its ineffectiveness and its 
inability to obtain recognition. Throughout December 1919, Albanians from 
across the country, but especially from districts in central Albania, elected 
delegates to represent them at the congress. 696 During these preparations the 
Italians did not hinder the Albanians. By contrast, members of the Durazzo 
government were far more concerned. On 13 January 1920, the Durazzo 
695 Eden to DMI, 14 Nov. 1919, FO 371/3571/166766; Phillips to DMI, 16 Nov. 1919; FO 
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government ordered their prefect in Lushnje to prevent the meeting, but the two 
companies of militia sent to disperse it refused to do so. 
697 
Fifty-six delegates from across the country met, including representatives from 
Valona, Koritza and Pogradec, and even from some regions outside the 1913 
state. The meeting began by expressing the dismay of those assembled at the 
prospect of Valona being given to Italy. The delegates considered that they had 
been misled, by the great powers, into believing that the principles of justice and 
self-determination would be applied to Albania. They argued that to trust the 
great powers was to believe in a `broken reed', and that the Albanians must rely 
on themselves alone to secure their complete independence and territorial 
integrity. They determined that a `Sacred Union' must be formed to reject the 
great-power plans for the partition of Albania. To accomplish this, they resolved 
to replace the provisional government, which was criticised as nothing more 
than a `puppet Italian regime', with a new administration `composed of honest 
men trusted by the people', and to hold a general election to elect a national 
legislative assembly, which would draw up a new constitution. They also agreed 
that the peace delegation in Paris would be reconstituted, and would be 
charged with the mission of requesting the complete independence of Albania 
within its ethnographical frontiers. Mehmed Konitza and Midhat Frasheri 
remained as members of the Peace Delegation, but Turkhan Pasha, whom the 
Congress was `especially disappointed with', Bumgi and Tourtoulis were 
replaced by Pandeli Evangjeli and Dr Charles Telford Erickson. 
698 The 
delegates in Lushnje drafted an emotive protest, addressed to the Italian 
697 Phillips to ! DMI, 31 Jan. 1920, and Phillips to DMI, 8 Feb. 1920, FO 371/3571/180096; Eden 
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Parliament and the Paris Peace Conference, against the partitioning of Albania 
on the lines of the London Pact. Invoking President Wilson's principles of self- 
determination, the protest declared that Albania was an independent state and 
that the Albanian people were not prepared to accept an Italian mandate on any 
part of its territory, any form of foreign protectorate, or limitation of its 
sovereignty, without the explicit consent of the Albanian people. The delegates 
reaffirmed the besa covering the whole country, but pledged to die in defence of 
Albania's political and territorial integrity. Other resolutions determined that the 
new government should be located at Tirana, then a small town in central 
Albania. The choice of capital proved to be one of the most contentious points, 
as different delegates proposed their respective spheres of influence. They 
settled on Tirana because, although situated in a Muslim-dominated area, it was 
inland and away from any of Albania's borders, to prevent interference, intrigue 
or attack from Albania's rivals. It also had good transport links with the port at 
Durazzo. Piacentini declared that he would not recognise the actions of the 
Congress, but the Italians faced a double whammy: they had lost control of the 
Albanian national movement, yet the momentum of Albanian nationalism was 
increasing. The Italian Commander decided that he would not bother the new 
government unless it interfered with his activities or disturbed public order. 699 
The Congress also addressed the issue of what type of state Albania should be. 
It reaffirmed the Organic Constitution of 1914, which had created the monarchy 
under Wilhelm, and had never been abrogated or suspended. It resolved that 
the war had not altered these conditions. As Wilhelm had never formally 
699 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 138-40; Polio and Puto, History of Albania, p. 177; Logoreci, 
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abdicated, the National Congress attributed limited executive powers to a 
Supreme Council of Regency (High Council). This was to consist of four 
persons, one representing each of the four religions: Sunni and Bektashi 
Muslims, Orthodox and Catholic Christians. They were appointed in place of the 
absent sovereign, and were to act on his behalf. To complement this Council, a 
new government was created by electing a cabinet of nine members under the 
presidency of Suleiman bey Delvina, with Mehmed Konitza as Foreign Minister 
and Ahmet Zogu as Interior Minister. 700 The Congress also established a thirty- 
seven member National Council or Senate, which was to be entrusted with the 
parliamentary powers until a general election could be held. On 20 February 
1920, all those members of the Durazzo government who had remained there 
under the protection of the Italian navy deserted the town and brought the 
archives and treasury to Tirana. It was a peaceful and bloodless handover, 
largely because of hesitancy by the Italian military and the popularity of the new 
government. 701 
For the time being, events in Albania appeared relatively stable. The delegation 
in Paris continued its efforts unsuccessfully; in Albania, the new government in 
Tirana, under Ahmet Zogu's leadership, was making preparations for direct 
action. Like Essad Pasha under Wilhelm, Zogu gained control of the most 
important office in the government, which would be responsible for carrying out 
many much-needed reforms, and through which he would control the all- 
important armed forces. He became Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian army, 
the core of which included his own men because tribal affiliations continued 
to 
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be important. In the coming months, it proved to be the young Zogu who came 
to take the lead in the Albanian nationalist movement. He was successful in 
winning the support of the gendarmerie and in inviting all Albanian prefects to 
join the new regime. 702 
Great Power Withdrawals and the Extension of Tirana's Control 
Allied actions provided the impetus for the next developments. On 11 March 
1920, the inter-allied occupation of Scutari ended, although the Italians under 
Perricone were authorised to remain. With Wilson's prevention of the Albanian 
problem being included in the general Adriatic question (February-March 
1920), 703 the main reason for British and French involvement in Albania was 
removed. More generally, there was increasing public pressure to reduce costs 
and bring the troops home. The justification given in parliament was that the 
War Office had decided that political missions could no longer be financed from 
army funds. If British involvement was needed for political purposes, then the 
Foreign Office would need to finance it, but it had decided that this was 
unnecessary. 704 The Franco-British withdrawal removed the buffer between the 
Serbs and Italians. When de Fourtou and his troops evacuated the city, they 
apparently expected their place to be taken by the Serbs. They handed over the 
defence of Mount Tarabosh and the Boyana line to them, and gave them 
weapons and ammunition. However, the Tirana government managed to secure 
control of the town. Phillips wrote that de Fourtou handed Scutari over to the 
municipality of Scutari, which in turn passed control to two members of the new 
government (Zogu and Kadri Hodj Effendi). Pearson alleges that Zogu's 
involvement had begun much earlier. Anticipating a Serbian response, Zogu 
702'The Assembly of Lusnia', Herbert MSS, DD/DRU; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 139. 
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had managed to forestall them by secretly occupying Scutari with a force of Mati 
clansman, before the French left. 705 Despite Serbian annoyance, and plans for 
an immediate assault, Phillips argued in March 1920 that there was no real 
advantage to be gained from such an initiative, especially with the San Remo 
(April 1920) talks opening, and Perricone's detachment still stationed there. 
Zogu was appointed governor of Scutari by the Albanian government, which 
had been impressed by his initiative and speedy action. Meantime, Phillips was 
recalled to Britain, as the Foreign Office became increasingly receptive to the 
Consulta's requests. This would ultimately complicate Britain's policy towards 
Albania. Although Phillips was undoubtedly sympathetic to the Albanian cause, 
from this point on Britain no longer retained any personnel in Albania, and had 
to rely on Italian information about what was happening. 706 
As the primary task of the Tirana government was the expulsion of all foreign 
forces from Albanian soil, the events at Scutari were exceedingly popular, 
especially in contrast to the hesitancy and apparent feebleness of the Durazzo 
regime. This impression was reinforced by the withdrawal of French forces from 
Koritza on 21 June 1920, with the French handing over control to the Albanian 
Committee there. By the Protocol of Kapishtica (15 May 1920) between the 
Tirana government and Greece (the first agreement between it and another 
government), the Albanians managed to ensure that Albanian rather than Greek 
forces would occupy Koritza following the French withdrawal. Both sides agreed 
to observe the status quo until the Peace Conference had concluded. 
The 
Albanians agreed to protect Greek nationals and guaranteed the right to 
Greek 
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schools, churches and language, and allowed Greek troops to occupy twenty- 
six villages in Albania, southeast of Koritza and north of the Florence line. 707 
The Albanian achievement regarding Koritza should not be undervalued. It 
enhanced the prestige of the Albanian government both at home and abroad, 
secured a temporary understanding regarding Koritza, and avoided the 
anticipated atrocities, which would have hindered the Albanian cause on the 
international front. 708 For the Greeks too there were advantages: the expected 
atrocities did not take place, and the Italian occupation was prevented. On the 
other hand, Tirana had agreed to a form of Greek occupation, and the frontier 
issue remained unresolved. The role of outside forces was once more 
significant. Lloyd George had ensured that the French withdrawal did not take 
place until completion of the San Remo Conference because he hoped to use 
Albania as a bargaining tool. As Woodall maintains, once more the great power 
leaders' overestimated the importance of Albania in Greek thinking. In 
comparison to potential gains in Asia Minor, Koritza was not highly prized. 709 
Moreover, the main objections to an Albanian occupation of Koritza had been 
removed. Whitehall had previously believed that Albanian control would ipso 
facto mean Italian control-either directly or indirectly. The independence of the 
new Tirana regime, combined with Whitehall's new conviction that Italy did not 
have enough troops (less than 25,000) in Albania to occupy Koritza, meant that 
the Albanians could not be viewed as Italian puppets. These arguments also 
seem to have satisfied Venizelos. Crowe maintained that the problems that had 
707 Phillips to War Office, 25 Mar. 1920, FO 371/3572/195649; Also at FO 421/298, no. 67; 
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previously necessitated the maintenance of French control, to provide a buffer 
between the Greeks and Italians, were now removed. 710 
The new government also made progress in central Albania. When Essadist 
forces attempted to seize control, the Tirana regime acted swiftly and decisively. 
They issued a manifesto to the population, warning against armed participation 
in the propaganda meetings being held by Essadist agents, and they sent 
delegates to Paris to attempt to negotiate directly with Essad. There was little 
anticipation of success, but Zogu thought that the initiative would gain the 
Tirana government valuable time. It did. An agreement was signed with some of 
the rebels, and by mid-April 1920 Zogu's forces had managed to defeat those 
that remained. 711 With Essad's threat removed, the Albanian government was 
able to send an armed force further south and to take a number of key 
settlements, including Argyrocastro, by 24 April 1920. On 13 June 1920, Essad 
was murdered in Paris by Avni Rystemi, an Albanian revolutionary student and 
Kosovo Committee member. 712 
By contrast, the Tirana government had not proven very successful in securing 
an Italian withdrawal but prospects were good with the Greek agreement, and a 
change in attitude in Rome as to the benefits of an Italian occupation. The need 
for action against Italy was crucial, because the lack of this had been the main 
reason why the Durazzo government had lost popular support, and it was also 
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the basis of the new Tirana government's ascendancy. Another interesting 
aspect of the Essadist revolt was the role of Castoldi, who had been appointed 
Italian Commissioner in Albania, and was suspected of being heavily involved in 
the planned Essadist conspiracy. This did nothing to improve the Italian position 
in Albania. 713 Meanwhile, by June 1920 the Italians had resolved to vacate 
Albania, except for Valona and key frontier zones. Woodall cites two reasons for 
this policy. Firstly, there was the deteriorating position of the Italian military 
relative to the growing strength of Albanian nationalism, especially the Islamic 
elements, and the Consulta's failure to gain support for the protectorate. 
Secondly, the Tirana government was insisting that the Italian troops be 
withdrawn and that the control of Albania be handed over to them. 714 There 
were a number of other factors. Above all, Woodall minimises the significance 
of economic considerations. In May 1920, the Consulta agreed to reduce Italian 
troop strength in Albania to 10,000, to save money: in effect to withdraw all 
detachments from the interior, and concentrate on the major coastal ports. It 
was becoming obvious to the Consulta that relations between it and the Tirana 
government were deteriorating. The British reported that there appeared to 
have been no co-ordinated policy, and a considerable divergence of views, 
between the authorities in Rome and Italian officials in Albania. The latter did 
little beyond constructing roads and, in particular, failed to suppress brigandage. 
Their attempts to enforce the teaching of Italian in schools were particularly 
unpopular. 715 One Italian Deputy commented that Italian policy `alternated 
between the mailed fist and the stricken glove'. It was also reported that the 
Italian-trained gendarmerie refused to take orders from their Italian officers, and 
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that many had joined forces with the insurgents. There were also Italian moves 
towards a return to a policy of an independent Albania on the 1913 model, and 
away from Nitti's ideas of partition. Pragmatic reasons appear to have motivated 
these changes. If Yugoslavia obtained Scutari and territory as far south as the 
Drin, then more than one million more Albanians would be incorporated into 
Yugoslavia. These Albanians would naturally gravitate towards central Albania, 
the area that was to be Italian-controlled, and leave this area exposed to 
disruption and instability. 716 
The Italians did not give up hope of retaining influence in Albania, especially 
Valona. Having secured the occupation of Koritza, the Delvina government 
decided to concentrate on negotiations with the Italians. Castoldi received 
instructions to drag out any negotiations as long as possible, and to support the 
Essadist elements. The Consulta hoped that by attempting to play off one group 
of Albanians against another, it might still be able to achieve Nitti's policy of 
partition, and without the costs of a formal occupation. "' The Tirana 
government resolved to concentrate its forces, correctly surmising that they 
were too weak to defeat both Italians and Serbs. They came up with the 
ambitious scheme of offering an entente to Italy. By this, they hoped to secure 
an Italian withdrawal and to obtain Italian aid to prevent a Serbian invasion in 
the north. Playing for time, the Italians rejected this proposal in the hope that the 
more pliable Essadists might gain the upper hand. Castoldi held negotiations 
with Albanian leaders in Durazzo and Tirana. He made little progress, because 
Delvina seems to have decided that Italy, not the Yugoslavs, was the greater 
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threat. "$ Delvina sent negotiators to both Belgrade and Athens in an attempt to 
gain allies. As a result, Castoldi informed his superiors that the Consulta should 
work for control of Albania through economic rather than military means . 
79 The 
small weak (non-state) had humbled a great power. 
The Consulta returned to a policy of a united Albania, along the lines proposed 
by Sonnino, but out of strategic expediency. On 24 June 1920, the new 
Premier, Giovanni Giolitti, declared in the Italian parliament that the 
Government was `not in favour of a protectorate in Albania, but wishes the 
independence of that country'. On 27 June 1920, he enlarged upon his speech, 
stating that Italy could not abandon Valona until Albania was strong enough to 
ensure that the port did not fall to another power. This was an acceptable 
position, but the Italian government was under considerable pressure. The 
press insisted on the necessity of keeping Valona but the socialists, who had 
made considerable gains in the elections in November 1919, openly objected to 
the policy. This attitude was completely irreconcilable with the Tirana 
government's intentions. Delvina had already secured an agreement in Athens. 
A variety of incidents had brought Albanian indignation about the Italian 
occupation to a head. With the start of the withdrawal, it was clear that the 
Italians were not prepared to pull out completely, and incidents between 
Albanians and Italian troops increased. The Italian military authorities continued 
to make a number of significant blunders. For instance, they arrested the newly 
appointed Albanian prefect of Tepelena, allegedly because he had refused to 
sign a declaration in favour of an Italian protectorate. Such incidents convinced 
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the Albanians that the Italians would be removed only through force, and that 
diplomacy was futile. 720 
In a report he sent to Herbert, Delvina detailed the events. Despite his obvious 
bias, his description differs only marginally from those of other contemporaries. 
He portrayed the decision to use force against Italy as being taken only 
following numerous petitions about the future of Valona-to which his 
government received very evasive replies. The spur for the revolt came from the 
inhabitants of the town. At a meeting of the Committee of National Defence (29 
May 1920), the men involved pledged to drive the Italians out of Valona. An 
ultimatum sent to Piacentini demanded the withdrawal of Italian troops from 
Valona and the handing over of Valona, Telepena and Chimara within twenty- 
four hours. 721 Instead of replying to the Albanian ultimatum, Piacentini replied 
with gunfire. The impasse was only lifted when Giolitti announced the 
immediate withdrawal of Italian troops (16 June 1920). Giolitti would have liked 
to maintain control of Valona but he saw the situation as pointless, for, as Swire 
argued, there was `no alternative but to withdraw'. Giolitti feared that sending 
more Italian troops might provoke general strikes and popular demonstrations 
that would gravely injure the solidarity of the army. The sordid conditions of the 
Italian army in Albania had become notorious (disease, especially malaria, 
death, demoralisation, possible conflict with Greeks, Serbs and Albanians) and 
lacked any attraction for soldiers. The Italian troops declined to take orders, and 
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some units had refused to embark on ships stationed at Bari and Brindisi and 
destined for Albania. 722 
The Italians sought, by diplomatic means, to try and retrieve their Albanian 
adventure, their long-coveted foothold in the Balkans and security in the 
Adriatic. Giolitti sent Aliotti and Castoldi to Tirana to negotiate an agreement. By 
16 July 1920, talks had broken down, resulting in a resumption of hostilities. 
The Consulta had expected its mission to be successful because of the two 
men's involvement in Albania 1913-14. However, once more the Italians had 
misunderstood the Albanians. Both men were unpopular in Albania because of 
their connection with the Italian conspiracy against Wilhelm, and Aliotti also for 
his perceived role in the Pact of London. The Italians were no longer in a 
position to prolong the negotiations. On 22 July 1920, Count Carlo Sforza, 
whom Giolitti had chosen as his Foreign Minister, rescinded the Tittoni- 
Venizelos agreement on the grounds that Greece had violated its secrecy. 
Sforza declared that the `nationalistic affirmations of the Albanian people have 
obliged the Italian government to modify the ends which they proposed to attain, 
and to establish a new policy ... to safeguard ... 
Italian interests in that 
region). 723 Sforza later wrote, in an attempt to justify his actions in forgoing 
Italian national ambitions, that he did not see how the agreement reached in the 
London Pact benefited Italy on any essential points of Italian interests in 
Albania. To him it appeared a contradiction. If the object of Italy was the 
maintenance of a viable and stable independent Albania on the lines of the 
principle of self-determination, then it did not seem understandable to deprive it 
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of one of its `lungs' in the port of Valona. He concluded that Albania should 
enter the Italian sphere of influence, but not as the result of some international 
agreement to which the Albanian people were opposed, for that would be costly 
and probably unsustainable. 724 
An armistice was concluded on 2 August 1920, followed by a secret protocol. 
The Italians acknowledged the complete independence and sovereignty of 
Albania within the integrity of the frontiers defined in 1913, relinquished their 
claims to the protectorate declared in 1917, the occupation and administration 
of Valona and a mandate over the country, or interference in Albania's internal 
affairs. The Italian government agreed to withdraw all war materials from Valona 
and to evacuate its holdings on the Albanian mainland. The Consulta was 
allowed to retain possession of Saseno and the garrison on it until the great 
powers determined what to do with the island. By 2 September 1920, all 
remaining Italian troops had left Valona. The agreement had numerous results. 
On the Albanian side, it bolstered the prestige of the Tirana government 
amongst Albanians, both at home and abroad. It was hailed as the first 
diplomatic pact between Albania and a foreign power, albeit an Albania that 
excluded the irredenta. For the Consulta, it represented a dramatic shift in 
policy, especially from its previous agreements, most notably the Pact of 
London. By acquiring Saseno (until its status was finally determined), Italy had 
obtained its major objective in Albania-protection of the Otranto Straits and the 
Adriatic. By holding the island, they would also be well positioned should an 
unfriendly regime come to power, or another state try to gain influence in 
Albania. The major drawback for the Consulta was the nature of the withdrawal. 
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Although the Italian government had agreed to use all its influence to obtain the 
full and unreserved recognition by the powers of the independence of Albania 
within its 1913 frontiers, these were not promises that the Consulta could 
definitely fulfil. A certain element of luck was also involved. The breakdown in 
ltalo-Yugoslav talks because of the Italian cabinet crisis gave the Tirana 
government breathing space in which to secure the Italian withdrawal. If the 
Italians and Yugoslavs had managed to come to an agreement, this would have 
been much more difficult. 725 
Conclusions 
By August 1920, the prospect of an independent Albania had considerably 
improved: only the Serbs remained as foreign occupiers in any large numbers. 
The work and initiatives of the Tirana government towards this purpose was 
impressive, especially its ability to remove the Italian great power through a 
combination of diplomacy and force. In these experiences, the Albanian 
example contradicts traditional theories about weak states in the great power 
system at the time, a system still largely based on multi-polarity and the balance 
of power. 726 Handel's arguments that weak states are not always `helpless', or 
mere pawns of the great powers, rests on the contention that the small state is 
able to gain external help from other weak states or other great powers. 727 The 
Poles, Czechs and Greeks were all able to foster French support and increase 
their relative post-conflict strength, but this was clearly not the case for the 
Albanians. Rothstein's interpretation, meanwhile, gives more weight to Albanian 
initiatives: he contends that a small power can `affect its chances of survival, 
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primarily by altering the expectations which the Great Powers held about its 
position and its likely response to external pressures,. 728 As such, the 
experience of the war and occupation strengthened and enhanced Albanian 
national solidarity, and Albanian activities simultaneously weakened Italian 
aspirations regarding Albania. This theory also has its limitations, for none of 
the nationalist leaders or either government ever had such a well-thought out 
plan. There was a distinct lack of consistent and coherent policies and, more 
often than not, they were merely responding to situations or the actions of 
individuals, rather than pursuing a set agenda. Moreover, as Holtsmark's 
`asymmetry of expectations' theory illustrates, the small power assigns far 
greater priority to its relationship with the great power than does the great 
power. 729 Hence, only when the Consulta, and the other great powers, proved 
to be uncommitted to the Albanian project, did some Albanians, but not all, 
move to a policy of expulsion, and of independence from them. Furthermore, 
such ideas do not take account of the remarkable situation produced as a result 
of the First World War, or of what Stanley Page has described as `the 
historically unusual juxtaposition of forces in the post-war, revolutionary and 
interventionist vortex'. In this, Handel's explanation for the nationalistic success 
of the Baltic and Danubian states can equally be applied to the Balkans. 730 In 
the post-war period, a power vacuum emerged because the great powers that 
had previously dominated-in the Balkans, Russia and Austria-were 
temporarily (in Austria's case permanently) defeated and weakened internally. 
Italian policy makers, and to a lesser extent French, were attempting to take on 
the great power role in the region but, due to the opposition both faced in Paris 
728 Rothstein, Alliances and the Small States, pp. 194-5; Also at Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 14 
729 Holtsmark cited in Salmon, Scandinavia, pp. 15-6. 
730 Page cited in Handel, Weak States, pp. 5,180; See also Baker Fox, Power of Small States, 
p. 187. 
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and on the ground in Albania, neither had been able to secure this by late 1920. 
In the interim, this increased the strength of the Balkan nationalists, including 
the Albanians. When British, French and American pressure was withdrawn and 
Italy under Benito Mussolini regained its strength, this position could not endure. 
In the 1930s, Zogu became increasingly dependent upon the Italians, and the 
Germans began to penetrate economically in the Balkans more widely. 73' 
731 On Zogu see for example Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 285-500 or Tombs, 
King Zog, pp. 100-239. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
Towards a Resolution? The Ambassadors' Conference of Paris 
and League of Nations (March 1920- November 1921) 
`To refuse recognition to a Balkan Government is like tying down a man 
outside an ant heap. '732 
On 5 May 1920, Mehmed Konitza wrote to President Wilson to thank him for his 
efforts, the previous year, to prevent Albania from being dismembered by the 
neighbouring states and Italy. He also called attention to Wilson's suggestion 
that Albania be recognised as an independent state by the newly formed 
League of Nations. He added that 
the Albanian nation, leaders and people alike, have no confidence in the 
declaration of Italy's Premier that `She is ready to aid Albania in its 
national insurrections, ... 
desiring only her independence and the 
development of the Albanian race'. 
733 
The experiences of the Peace Conference, epitomised in the open diplomacy of 
the publication of documents pertaining to the Adriatic question, and in leaks of 
the secret diplomacy Tittoni-Venizelos agreement, revealed the true intentions 
of the great powers. It illustrated to the new Albanian government that they 
could not depend on any of the great powers, least of all Italy. With the advent 
of the new Tirana government, the idea of taking up the League of Nations 
proposals gradually took shape. This chapter illustrates how the Albanians, 
although still anxious to secure the support of the British and Americans, 
worked to secure their independence in the new diplomacy of the League, the 
old diplomacy having seemingly failed them. They sought to use the League, as 
732 Herbert to Grey, 10 Nov. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33. 
733 M. Konitza to Wilson, 5 May 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35. 
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an impartial body, to ensure their recognition as an independent and sovereign 
state. The chapter also shows, however, that there were limits to the extent to 
which the League could fulfil this function. League supporters refused to admit 
that, although the League would play a valuable role in international politics, the 
foreign offices and chancelleries, especially those of the great powers, would 
still be of paramount importance. They had convinced themselves that 
international relations had now substantially changed, with the establishment of 
the League. But, in foreign policy, the primary goal of most states remained 
advancement of one's own position rather than the moralistic international 
rationale of the League. Geoffrey Roberts maintained that states systems often 
have multiple and overlapping power networks, each competing for power and 
influence in international relations. 734 The League sat contemporaneously with 
the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, which was a continuation of traditional 
old great-power diplomacy, and had been set up to resolve outstanding issues 
from the Paris Peace Conference. In this role, the Ambassadors' Conference 
had been given, and still retained, responsibility for the final decisions regarding 
Albania's independence and frontiers. As James Barros commented the 
Conference of Ambassadors ensured `the preponderance of the Great Powers'. 
Despite its wider remit, it was remarkably similar in composition and procedure 
to ambassadorial conferences before the war. 735 This chapter illustrates how, in 
1920-21, the Albanians and other groups challenged this authority. They 
deployed similar initiatives to those used in 1912, in terms of securing the 
support of other states, and in line with views about the needs of weak states to 
secure this recognition for their long-term security, but significantly not the great 
powers. Yet even the League was a continuation of great-power supremacy, 
734 Roberts, `History, theory and narrative turn', p. 713. 
735 Barros, The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations (Princeton, 
1965), pp. xix, 14. 
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through the great-power representatives' control of the League's Council and 
Whitehall's manipulation of Secretary-General, and former British diplomat, Sir 
Eric Drummond. 
Admittance to the League: ascendancy of the small states? 
The pursuit of League of Nations support was to prove the most pertinent and 
ultimately important aspect of Delvina's new policy. Letters regarding the 
Albanian issue had been sent to the League throughout 1919, but the main 
impetus was the drive by the Tirana government. It maintained that 
we are anxious for the assistance of the League of Nations. We have 
confidence in the League of Nations and believe that it will assist us to 
our independence and the territorial integrity which is essential if Albania 
is to exist. 
736 
Its reasoning used both ethnic and strategic arguments. Considering Serb, 
Greek and Italian claims to Albanian territory to be unjust, it outlined the 
privileges and concessions that it was prepared to grant the ethnic and religious 
minorities, especially the Orthodox Christians in the south, in an attempt to 
overcome its neighbours' objections to this territory becoming Albanian. It 
considered that the disappearance of Austria as a great power removed the 
main reason to offer Italy the concessions outlined in the London Pact. The 
position of the new government appeared fairly moderate throughout, and not 
too different from its predecessor. 737 It also sought the support of pro-Albanian 
parties in both Britain and the United States, to put pressure on their respective 
governments. In May 1920, a memorandum signed by over twenty British MPs 
736 Albanian Delegation to unnamed, n. d. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35; League of Nations, 
Complaints of Macedonia, p. 179. 
737 Albanian Delegation to unnamed, n. d. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35; League of Nations, 
Complaints of Macedonia, p. 179. 
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and other influential persons argued in favour of the British government's 
recognition of the Tirana government, and advocated the League as a 
satisfactory means of settling the Albanian question. There were also numerous 
parliamentary questions, especially by Aubrey Herbert and other members of 
the Anglo-Albanian Society. As late as November 1920, Herbert was sending 
memoranda to the Foreign Office, although he did not expect any action to be 
taken. He hoped that this situation might change if Albania was recognised by 
the League of Nations, but was worried that, `if it is refused admission into the 
League, its only chance of life is through fighting' because, he added, Albania is 
a `small, weak, defenceless state' open to aggression from all sides. 738 As in 
1919, these activities did little to influence British policy. 
The changes in Italian policy during 1920 have already been detailed. It was not 
the policy that the Albanians had anticipated or expected. The Italian 
government decided to adopt a policy aimed at both circumventing the 
agreement with the Tirana government and securing its interests in Albania, but, 
at the same time, saving the costs of a formal occupation (having been unable 
to secure this through force or diplomacy). It sought to use the Ambassadors' 
Conference, which, as the successor of the Peace Conference, had been 
invested with the task of the final determination of the Albanian question. The 
Italian government advocated an independent Albania but they did not seek a 
mandate, but to be granted `special interests' in Albania, which would allow 
Italy 
738 Memo. by British MPs, 26 Jun. 1920, FO 371/4885/C9; Herbert to Grey, 10 Nov. 1920, 
Herbert MSS, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/3; Herbert and Guinness to Lloyd George, 2 Aug. 
1920, FO 421/4885/C2931; Myers to Harmsworth, 2 Aug. 1920, FO 371/4885/C2930; 
Herbert to 
Harmsworth, 2 Nov. 1920, FO 37114885/C10317. 
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to intervene diplomatically and militarily, should Albania need it. Significantly, 
that `need' would be determined by the great powers, not the Albanians. 739 
There is little to suggest that the Ambassadors' Conference made much 
progress on the Albanian question in its first six months. Only following the 
Tirana agreement (2 August 1920) between Italy and the Tirana government did 
conversations appear to resume, focusing on what could be done to secure a 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. 740 Debate settled on two traditional questions: 
the futures of Scutari and northern Epirus. These issues had become directly 
related to one another, because the Yugoslavs had expressed their intention to 
press their Scutari claim if Greece made gains in northern Epirus. 
741 This 
complicated relations between the great powers because, under Italian 
influence, the ambassadors were opposing the allocation of Scutari to the 
Yugoslavs, although the British favoured Greek gains, including Koritza. The 
next major developments took place within the League. 
The most critical development began, on 12 October 1920, when, Pandeli 
Evangjeli, chief member of the new Albanian peace delegation, addressed a 
formal request for Albania's admission to the League of Nations. Due to the 
importance of this development to the question of Albanian independence, and 
the minimal attention it has received elsewhere, it is necessary to consider it in 
some depth. The new Albanian government in asking for the League to 
recognise Albanian independence, permit Albania to manage its own affairs and 
739 Eyres to Curzon, 15 Mar. 1922, FO 421/302, no. 82; Barros, Corfu Incident, pp. 16,309: 
Barros, meanwhile, has argued that the Ambassadors' Conference consideration of the 
Albanian question was a `usurpation of power' not directly directed to it by the Peace 
Conference and based on its ability to `overstep its allotted fields of endeavour'. 
740 Curzon to Imperiali, 6 Sept. 1920, FO 421/299 no. 57. 
741 Curzon to Russell, 24 Sept. 1920, FO 421/299, no. 72. 
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guarantee its integrity under the sanctity of the League, were thus attempting to 
determine its own future and also to take it out of control of the great powers 
and the Ambassadors' Conference specifically. However, as members in both 
the League's Council and Assembly, great power policy would still be of 
paramount importance. The petition was in accordance with Article One of the 
League's Covenant which allowed for a `fully self-governing State, Dominion or 
Colony not named in the Annex' to become a member if agreed to by two-thirds 
of the Assembly and providing that the applicant gave effective guarantees to 
observe its international obligations, and accepted any regulations prescribed 
by the League regarding its military, naval and air forces and armaments. The 
Albanian government maintained that Albania's independence was based upon 
the constitution of the Albanian state, as drawn up by the Ambassadors' 
Conference (1913) and Florence Protocol (17 December 1913 and ratified 
1914). They maintained that Albania's international status was recognised by 
the six European powers, plus Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, who had 
accredited diplomatic representation to its 1914 government in Durazzo. 
Information was also given regarding the gendarmerie and the present and 
future armed forces. 742 
Drummond has often been criticised for merely being a puppet of the British 
government, and for subordinating the League to Whitehall. His demagogy may 
have hidden his complicity. 743 In the memorandum he drew up on the 
application, it is clear that British interests were protected, because the 
conditions applied to Albania were far more extensive than those applied to 
other applications. Drummond maintained that Albania appeared to meet the 
742 Secretary-General memo., `Application by Albania for Admission to the League of Nations', 
25 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4886/C12126. 
743 See for example League of Nations, Complaints of Macedonia, pp. 13,17 
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`necessary conditions' because the 1913 Ambassadorial Conference and 
subsequent acts by the powers had constituted Albania as a fully self-governing 
state, and it had not been deprived of that status. However, the Secretary- 
General suggested that the Assembly might consider that the attempt by the 
powers to establish Albania in 1913-14 had not been successful. In particular, 
the outbreak of the war had interrupted the establishment of Albania as an 
organised and self-governing political community. Albania had undergone 
several serious internal disturbances in the course of the war, and, since its 
conclusion, the position of Albania had been rendered precarious by the 
difficulties that had arisen during the Adriatic question discussions. In particular, 
he drew attention to the 1915 Pact of London that, whilst not denying Albanian 
national claims, decreed that the international status of the country was a matter 
to be decided after the war. He concluded that 
The main question which falls to be decided by the Assembly would 
seem, therefore, to be whether in 1913-14 Albania in fact acquired the 
political organisation and the character of a State in so definitive a 
manner that she cannot be considered to have lost such character by 
reason of events which have since occurred, or whether, on the contrary, 
the international status of the country is at present doubtful. Should the 
former view be taken, it remains to be considered whether Albania is also 
actually in a position to give the guarantees required by Article 1 of the 
Covenant. 744 
Consideration of Albania's application came up before the General Assembly, 
on 17 December 1920, exactly eight years after the opening of the 
744 Secretary-General memo., 'Application by Albania for Admission to the League of Nations', 
25 Nov. 1920, FO 37114886/C12126. 
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Ambassadorial Conference in London, and seven years after the signing of the 
Florence Protocol. Lord Robert Cecil, as South African delegate, argued 
vehemently in favour of Albania's admission. In an impassioned speech, he 
declared that once a state was first recognised it remained in existence, even 
though its government might not be sanctioned. (In reality it was not unusual for 
states to disappear, as the examples of Poland in the late eighteenth century, 
especially, and also German and Italian unification had shown, the former due 
primarily to great power rivalry and the constraints of the international system. ) 
Cecil countered the objections that Albania could not be admitted, as it was not 
a Christian state, by arguing that `religion was outside the question, and there 
was "no reason for impugning the good faith of Albania, or her desire and power 
to fulfil her international obligations "'. 745 This `spirited championship'746 appears 
to have influenced the Assembly delegates considerably. Cecil's `plea for 
justice' on behalf of the Albanians resulted in Albanian membership being 
unanimously accepted (thirty-five votes to nil). 747 
The results of this achievement were profound. By being admitted into the 
League, the Albanian state was finally recognised de jure as a sovereign and 
independent state, albeit with its frontiers with Yugoslavia and Greece still 
undefined. 748 Thus, 17 December 1920 should, as such, be considered the true 
date when Albania achieved independence. Following its admission, Albania 
established normal diplomatic channels with all the powers, including Greece, 
Yugoslavia and Italy; but, significantly, its government was still not recognised. 
745 The Times, London, 18 Dec. 1920; Also at FO 371/4886/C13685; Committee No. 5 report, 
n. d., FO 3711704817751W786; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 157. 
746 Pearson, Albania, I, p. 157. 
747 The Times, London, 18 Dec. 1920; Also at FO 371/48861C13685. 
748 League of Nations minutes cited in Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 130; Pearson, Albania, I, 
pp. 157-8. 
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Admittance also required Albania to subscribe to a declaration to protect its 
minorities, and conferred specific international obligations, including full 
protection without distinction for birth, nationality, language, `race' or religion; 
use of any language to be permitted; equal rights for minorities to maintain 
charitable, religious and educational institutions. 749 Albania, with its multi-faith 
and bi- and multi-lingual population, with a nationalistic tradition that tended to 
respect and promote difference, was perhaps better prepared for this than other 
European, especially Balkan, states at the time. More importantly, in the short 
term, in securing admission to the League, the Tirana government had ensured 
that Albania would continue to exist in some form, albeit with its frontiers 
undecided and doubts still existing about the stability and viability of the regime. 
Crucially, Yugoslav forces still occupied large tracts of the north. Nevertheless, 
the Albanian admission was remarkable, especially when one considers other 
applications before the same meeting. Countries as diverse as Azerbaijan, 
Ukraine and Liechtenstein were rejected, on the grounds either that they did not 
have stable enough governments for acceptance, or that they were too small. 750 
Countries that are today considered well established and with a long history and 
tradition, certainly more so than the Albanians, were rejected. Albania was also 
the only country to obtain a unanimous vote in favour of admission. 
However, the admittance of Albania had not been expected. It is doubtful 
whether Albania would have been admitted without the determination and 
actions of Cecil, or the British Delegate, Herbert A. L. Fisher, the President of 
the Board of Education, who went against British policy. The fifth committee, 
which had been established to consider admission applications, including 
749 Pearson, Albania, I, p. 158. 
750 The Times, 18 Dec. 1920; Also at FO 371/48861C13685. 
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Albania, had recommended against Albania's admission. The committee had 
divided into two camps: smaller, disinterested states who favoured admission 
versus the representatives of the great powers and smaller, interested states 
who opposed it, but not because of any balancing tendencies on the part of the 
smaller states. Those in favour of admission argued that Albania constituted a 
nation by virtue of the unanimous desire of its inhabitants. The country 
possessed frontiers that had been fixed by an international convention, and 
neither the London Pact nor the occupation of Albanian territory had been able 
to deprive it of its position as an independent state. The main opposition was 
led by the French delegate, Rene Vivani. Rather than opposing the admission 
of Albania directly, he maintained that, as the chief Allied Powers had not yet 
decided on the status of Albania, the League Assembly would risk running 
counter to the will of the great powers if they came to a quick decision. It was 
also argued that Albania could not constitute a state due to its large Muslim 
population. On 6 December 1920, the committee voted by 13 votes to 8 in 
favour of Vivani's proposal to adjourn until Albania's international status and 
frontiers had been established by the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris. 751 It 
appeared that the French and British delegates had succeeded in keeping 
control of the Albanian question within the Ambassadors' Conference, and that 
the Albanian attempt to remove its settlement from the control of the great 
powers had failed. 
In the Assembly, this arrangement was upset by Cecil and Fisher, rather than 
the Albanians or other small states. Cecil has been described as, amongst other 
things, the `most sincere' founder of the League and, at this point, `the principal 
751 Committee No. 5 report, 6 Dec. 1920, FO 371/4886/C14095; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 155; 
Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 129-30. 
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advocate of the Albanian case'. 752 In various questions, above all in south- 
eastern Europe, on Albania (successfully) and on Macedonia (less so), he used 
his influence and position to try and produce a moral or ethnic settlement based 
on League principles. He was in regular contact with Albanian activists; 
especially those associated with the Anglo-Albanian Society, and he 
encouraged them to keep up their pressure and activities. It is not clear how this 
relationship developed or why. 753 Cecil had not expected much success: he had 
proceeded in the hope of securing some kind of pledge that the issue would 
eventually be settled. 
754 
Fisher's actions were also hugely important in influencing the attitudes of other 
delegates, despite being in opposition to British policy. The Foreign Office was 
anxious not to admit states whose boundaries had not been definitely fixed, and 
the governments of which had not been recognised de jure. In this category, it 
listed Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine as not 
being sufficiently established independent entities to warrant admission. The 
Foreign Office was chiefly concerned about the prospect of what it called 
`running the risk' of defending these states against external aggression. Of all 
the countries under consideration, the Foreign Office favoured admitting only 
Finland and Costa Rica, and possibly also Luxembourg and Iceland, but 
opposed the admission of the previous seven and also Lichtenstein, Monaco 
and San Marino. Moreover Curzon was against the admittance of any of the 
smaller states, and he believed that a minimum population limit should be fixed. 
He did not mention Albania specifically, but its application would probably not 
752 League of Nations, Complaints of Macedonia, p. 31. 
753 Herbert to Bob [Cecil] draft, 2 Dec. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/3; Cecil to Herbert, 7 
Dec. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/3. 
754 Cecil to Herbert, 7 Dec. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/3. 
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succeed if population size was taken into account. Curzon was particularly 
opposed to admitting Albania and Ukraine because of their political instabiIity. 755 
Despite having supported the French proposal in committee, and in line with 
official British policy, in the Assembly Fisher declared that 
the British delegation has 
... reviewed the position since the Report of 
Committee No. 5 was presented to the Assembly and is now prepared to 
accept the motion of Lord Robert Cecil and to vote for the admission of 
Albania to the League. 756 
On hearing this, Crowe minuted, 
this is perhaps the most astounding of the many curious acts of the 
Assembly. Apparently the British delegate voted for the admission of 
Albania, a country obeying no one recognised government, racially and 
religious divided into warring tribes, and having no defined frontiers. This 
is in spite of Cabinet instructions to the contrary. Presumably Balfour will 
explain to the Cabinet how this came about. 757 
Crowe was never particularly sympathetic to the Albanian case, but he was 
correct that Fisher appeared to have deliberately contravened official British 
policy. Some Foreign Office officials only became aware of Britain's vote 
through a report in The Times. 758 Whitehall proved at a loss to explain or justify 
it, and Arthur Balfour, now Lord President of the Council and rapporteur to the 
League Assembly, came in for some tricky questions in the Cabinet. This is not 
to say that Albanian acceptance would not have been agreed, but it is unlikely 
that it would have been unanimous. When it came to the vote, even the Greek, 
755 FO minute, 2 Nov. 1920, FO 37115484/W928; Curzon to de Fleurian, 11 Nov. 1920, FO 
371/5484/WI 852. 
756 Fisher minute, 16 Dec. 1920, FO 37117048/W786. 
757 Crowe minute, 20 Dec. 1920, FO 37114886/C13685. 
758 See for example Olliphant minute, 18 Dec. 1920, FO 371/4886/C13685. 
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Yugoslav, and French delegates voted in favour, in spite of their arguments 
against in the fifth committee. To save face, the Greek and Yugoslav 
representatives claimed that the past fortnight had seen a `great consolidation' 
in Albania's situation, and that they could now `regard the situation as 
sufficiently normal' to vote in favour of admission. In line with Schroeder's ideas 
about 'bandwagonning', they probably did not want to have a (new) hostile 
neighbour, however small, on their immediate borders. 759 Britain's apparent 
support, believed to be so important in the vote because it encouraged others to 
vote in favour, was largely due to the solitary actions of the British delegate 
rather than the design of British policymakers. The great powers were unable to 
control their own delegates, and the small states were not as powerless as had 
been suspected. 
British Revisionism 
The British government continued to refuse to recognise Albania for nearly a 
year. It maintained that admission to the League did not imply the recognition of 
Albania by all its members, and that the Ambassadors' Conference must 
establish an agreement on Albanian frontiers before according formal 
recognition. Although it appointed a representative (Consul without exequatus), 
Harry Eyres, it stipulated that this implied no endorsement of the Tirana 
government or the state of Albania. 760 The British attitude was still determined 
largely by that of the Italians and Yugoslavs. The Italians had, by the Tirana 
protocol, conceded some form of de facto recognition of the Tirana government, 
759 The Times, London, 18 Dec. 1920; Also at FO 371/4886/C13685; Schroeder, 'Historical 
Reality', pp. 117-23. 
760 Rumbold to Curzon, 27 Dec. 1920, and Crowe to Rumbold, 31 Dec. 1920, FO 
371/48861C14978; Curzon to Eyres, 17 May 1921, FO 421/300, no. 84; Curzon to de Martino, 
20 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 62: The irony of this view appears to have been missed or 
ignored: if Albanian frontiers were not fixed the southern frontier of Yugoslavia and the north- 
western Greek boundary were not either. 
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but the Yugoslavs remained decidedly hostile to even this. Whitehall appears to 
have found the Yugoslav view quite convincing. It was not considered possible 
to adequately predict the likelihood of the stability of the Tirana regime. 
Additionally, Britain was still officially bound by the London Pact. There were 
also some vague references to a settlement based on the old chestnut of the 
`merits of the case', which presumably meant `ethnic' or `national' frontiers. 761 
This non-recognition of Albania was common across the European powers and 
neighbouring states. Although diplomatic representation was sent to Albania, it 
remained unrecognised, as did the Tirana government. This put the Albanians 
in an unusual, even dangerous, position in the great power system: on the one 
hand their independence in some form had been assured by admittance to the 
League, but as yet no government had officially approved that independence or 
the government, despite votes in the League to the contrary. With no fixed 
borders, the state was particularly vulnerable to assault. 
Nevertheless, in 1921, there was a change in British strategy. As early as 20 
April 1921, Curzon had communicated to de Martino, who had become Italian 
Ambassador in London, that Britain fully shared the Italian government's desire 
to co-operate in the creation of an autonomous and independent state of 
Albania. This was the first British reference to such a commitment after the First 
World War. 762 What prompted this remarkable u-turn is trickier to determine. 
Inevitably, Albania's admission to the League must have played a part, but it 
does not explain what prompted the change at this point. One plausible 
explanation and one which William Bland and Ian Price advanced, was linked 
with proposed oil concessions for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later British 
761 Temperley statement, 9 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4885/ C10317. 
762 Curzon to de Martino, 20 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 62; Curzon memo., 10 June 1921, 
F0371/300, no. 107. 
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Petroleum), following the discovery of oil in Albania, during the war, by Italian 
and Austrian geologists. On 25 March 1921, Eyres signed an agreement 
between the Albanian government and Anglo-Persian giving the latter sole right 
to prospect for oil on Albanian territory, and, after exploitation, to select a 
portion of territory for use for the next fifty years. 763 As with the discovery of oil 
in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East, both then and 
subsequently, it appears economic considerations provided far more attractive 
and lucrative incentives for the promotion of an independent and democratic 
state than any moral or ethnic arguments. These developments were also a 
result of political changes in Greece. With the defeat of Venizelos in the Greek 
elections (14 November 1920) and the return of King Constantine (19 
December 1920), the Foreign Office became more supportive of Albanian 
nationalism, because a strong pro-British Greek state was no longer a realistic 
possibility. 764 So long as Albania was not dominated by Italy it was no longer 
necessary to offer Greece substantial portions of Albanian territory. An 
independent Albania might even strengthen the international system by 
contributing to the balance of power, as the Foreign Office had hoped it would 
do in 1913. 
An important memorandum for the Albanian question, drawn up on 10 June 
1921, detailed the possible lines that Curzon would accept for settlement of 
Albanian frontiers. It was essentially the policy the British would adopt 
throughout the subsequent negotiations: the war had put the 1913 settlement of 
763 Eyres to Curzon, 6 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 71; W. Bland and I. Price, A Tangled Web: a 
history of Anglo-American relations with Albania (1912-1955) (London, 1986), p. 13: However, 
Bland and Price's other allegation that the British government had colluded with the Tirana 
government a year earlier, in order to secure oil concessions in exchange for securing Albania's 
admittance to the League of Nations, is less plausible. Bland and Price have no references in 
this part of their book, the Foreign Office records reveal no evidence of such collusion and 
British activities in 1920 do not seem to support it. 
764 Goldstein, `Britain and Greece', pp. 355-6. 
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Albanian frontiers once more into the `melting pot'; but the Pact of London, in 
turn, `went to pieces under the pressure of events'. The powers were therefore 
responsible for substituting territorial arrangements acceptable to all parties 
concerned. On the southern boundary, it contended that Koritza and the 
surrounding mining area should go to Albania, primarily due to Italo-American 
opposition to it becoming Greek, but they still hoped that there might be the 
possibility of a Greek road connecting Macedonia and Epirus. There were some 
sops to the ethnicity principle: the memorandum argued that it was not 
defensible to give Koritza to Greece, because of its importance in Albanian 
history and to the Albanian people. On the northern boundary, the report 
contended that ethnic considerations `scarcely affect[ed] the question, if they did 
the boundary would have to be considerably extended'. Instead a `strong 
geographic frontier' was needed, to correct the local economic and 
administrative defects revealed in the frontiers drawn in 1913, and to improve 
the possibilities of defence without conferring offensive advantages to either 
side. It listed five possible changes: the Serbs to retreat from Mount Tarabosh; 
the Dibra road to become entirely either Albanian or Serb; Lin to become 
Albanian (all designed to provide freedom of economic access); Yugoslavia to 
retreat to the 1913 boundaries but to receive about ten kilometres of territory 
east of Scutari lake to protect Podgorica, and a strip of territory near Prizrend 
(both for strategic protection and to make tribal limits conform more closely to 
the political territorial boundaries); Scutari to remain in Albania. Curzon did not 
expect the Serbs to oppose this, although his reasons were not mentioned. 
765 
765 Curzon memo., 10 June 1921, FO 431/300, no. 107. 
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Further Albanian Initiatives in the League 
Meanwhile, the Tirana government had been attempting to deal with other 
urgent problems, resulting from the Yugoslav and Greek occupation, especially 
the aggressive actions of the Yugoslavs. 766 Albanians and their supporters 
stressed the importance of removing the Yugoslav forces, and securing the 
recognition of Albania and establishing its frontiers, as a means of deterring 
foreign aggressors. 767 By June 1921, there were even some reports of renewed 
Italian intrigue. 768 Between February and May 1921 the Tirana government 
appealed repeatedly to the League. 769 They asked for protection of Albanian 
borders in the north, and called attention to the difficulties with Greece on the 
`southern border', where the Greeks still occupied twenty-six villages, pending 
their final determination by the great powers. These memoranda requested 
confirmation of Albanian frontiers as drawn in 1913, thereby excluding Kosovo, 
Plava, Gusinje, Hoti, Gruda, Chameria and the other areas of Albanian- 
speakers previously claimed. 770 These areas appear to have been dropped, 
because Albanian officials had finally admitted how unrealistic and unattainable 
these were, especially within the international system in which they had to 
operate. This was in spite of objections from prominent nationalists like Hasan 
Prishtina. Moreover, the pledges made to secure League membership meant 
that the government could not covet this territory, and certainly could not use 
force to acquire it. Instead, it would focus purely on the 1913 frontiers. Strategic 
and pragmatic motives superseded ethnic nationalism, even for the Albanian 
766 For example on fighting in Koritza see Eyres to Curzon, 10 May 1921, FO 421/300, no. 88; 
Pearson, Albania, I, p. 160. 
767 For example Herbert to Harmsworth, 2 Nov. 1920, FO 371/48851C10317. 
768 Granville to Curzon, 1 June 1921, FO 421/300, no. 99. 
769 For example Evangjeli to US Government, 17 May 1921, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/45; Vrioni 
to League, 29 March 1921, Albania and Kosovo, I, no. 130: Pearson, Albania, I, p. 160, Swire, 
Albania, p. 343. 
770 League of Nations minutes cited in Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 131; Pearson, Albania, I, 
pp. 163-5; Pollo and Puto, History of Albania, p. 183. 
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leaders. On 21 June 1921, the Albanians renewed their appeal to the League. 
The new Albanian Prime Minister, Iljas bey Vrioni, described in detail the 
`abnormal' conditions of Albania. He appealed for the evacuation of Yugoslav 
and Greek forces from those parts of Albania's 1913 boundaries under 
Yugoslavia and Greek occupation, under Article 2 of the Covenant (which dealt 
with acts of aggression or war by member states). "' These events illustrated 
most clearly the precarious nature of the Albanian position, and the necessity of 
resolving the boundary issue. Despite much success in its other initiatives, as a 
small weak state Albania still needed the international system to guarantee its 
security. 
On 25 June 1921, Albanian, Greek and Yugoslav delegates were invited to 
express their views on the question of Albanian boundaries in a public session 
of the League Council. All parties used well-established arguments, already 
presented to the Peace Conference. 772 Despite Fan Noli's, the Albanian 
delegate to the League of Nations, impassioned appeal, it was decided that the 
question of Albania's petition was outside the jurisdiction of the League. Noli 
had asserted that the League of Nations should have authority over these 
questions, as it was the successor of the European concert that had originally 
fixed the Albanian frontiers, rather than the Ambassadors' Conference, which 
was to deal with issues pertaining to relations between the victors and the 
defeated. As Albania had remained neutral, it was outside its scope. As the 
Conference of Ambassadors' had already started discussing the Albanian 
question (as a result of the timely initiative of the Italians regarding recognition), 
the League merely recommended that the Ambassadorial Conference come to 
771 M. Frasheri to Herbert, 6 June 1921, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/1; Stickney, Southern 
Albania, pp. 132-3; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 164-5. 
772 For further details see Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 132-9. 
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a decision as soon as possible. 773 Various Albanian nationalist and diaspora 
groups had also petitioned the League, considering it the only `competent 
tribunal to pass judgment' upon their case. They continued to petition the great- 
power governments, and urged Herbert and other supporters to apply pressure 
on their respective governments. 774 These appeals do not seem to have 
generated any noticeable results, once again illustrating the limited 
effectiveness of such lobbying. 
Within a few days of the League hearing, Vrioni declared that Albania did not 
recognise the competence of the Ambassadors' Conference to re-open 
discussion regarding the settlement of Albanian frontiers. In particular, he 
maintained that the `Albanian people will vigorously oppose any decision 
involving dismemberment' of the 1913 frontiers. In their appeal against the 
decision of the Council, the Tirana government attacked the established 
international order and moved further from their former tactics of attempting to 
gain great-power support for their claims. Eventually, on 2 September 1921, it 
was agreed that both Albanian issues under consideration by the League of 
Nations (determination of Albanian frontiers, and the purported violation of 
Albanian territory by Yugoslav bands), should be dealt with by the Assembly. 
This was because the two issues appeared inherently interlinked; it seemed 
strange that the Assembly should deal with one and the Council with the other. 
This resolution seemed completely incompatible with the earlier decision (25 
June 1921), whereby it had been decided that the League was not competent to 
deal with the issue of Albanian boundaries. The Assembly appointed a sixth 
73 League of Nations minutes cited in Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 136; Pearson, Albania, I, 
166; Swire, Albania, p. 292. 
'ý74 For example see Noli to Herbert, 18 July 1921, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/45; United Committee 
of Kosove and chameria, 24 Aug. 1920, quoted in Pearson, Albania, I, p. 169; Stickney, 
Southern Albania, p. 137; Swire, Albania, p. 292. 
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committee to investigate the whole subject, and a commission of inquiry was 
agreed to investigate the conditions in Albania. Once more, the League was to 
potentially have a key role in determining Albania's future, and there was the 
possibility for conflict with the great powers in the Ambassadors' Conference. 
But the committee determined that the Albanians should merely await the 
decision of ambassadors, as to the delimitation of its frontiers. 775 The great 
powers had managed, once again, to maintain control of the question of 
Albanian boundaries. However, as the Foreign Office was by now anxious for a 
quick resolution of the remaining Albanian questions, it seemed probable that 
progress would be made. As Barros argued, British policy in the Ambassadors' 
Conference was not consistent, `twisting and turning like a pirouetting 
ballerina'. 776 This was particularly true of discussions pertaining to the Albanian 
question. As it was not a matter of direct strategic interest, British policy makers 
had the flexibility to shift their allegiances in response to changing 
circumstances and priorities. The Greek situation had necessitated such a 
change in Albanian policy. 
International Recognition and Finalising Albanian Boundaries 
As the result of an Italian initiative to resume Albanian discussions, there had 
been important developments on the Albanian question within the 
Ambassadors' Conference in Paris. Throughout 1920 and the first part of 1921, 
75 H. Nicolson minute, 13 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4885, C10317; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 169-72; 
League of Nations minutes cited in Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 139,141-4; Stavrianos, 
Balkans since 1453, pp. 714-15: The resolution regarding establishment of a commission of 
inquiry was adopted unanimously. It consisted of three impartial persons who were to visit 
Albania and report on the execution of the powers' decisions, disputes and disturbances near 
the Albanian frontier. The commission had the power to appoint observers to supervise the 
evacuation of all foreign troops from the territories allotted to Albania. When it reported in 1922 
the Albanian complaints were almost totally upheld. Stavrianos gave a more prominent position 
to the commission of inquiry considering the commission's report (12 May 1922) the 'birth 
certificate of the new Albania' but the commission does not appear to have fulfilled all the 
functions Stavrianos attributes to it. 
776 Barros, Corfu Incident, p. 10. 
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Albania was rarely discussed within the Conference, despite French and British 
representatives arguing in the League for the importance of the Conference as 
the mechanism for settling the Albanian question. The Albanian question had 
meanwhile been designated outside the Rapallo agreement. The other powers 
did not want to endanger that settlement by considering the Albanian one 
simultaneously. As Leeper wrote, it `was clever of the Italians to have adopted a 
conciliatory attitude to the Yugoslavs on this point [Albanian question] and to put 
the onus of refusing Scutari on the British and French governments'. "' In June 
1921, the Italian representative re-opened three issues: Albanian frontiers, 
recognition of Albania by the powers and Italy's `special interests' in Albania. 
Under this third category, the Italians asked that should Albanian independence 
prove unattainable in practice, the privileged position of Italy in Albania should 
be recognised. The Italians were still determined to preserve their strategic and 
other interests in Albania. It was probable that underhand tactics, as had 
occurred under Wilhelm of Wied, would be encouraged, in order to gain the 
opportunity for intervention to protect these `special interests' and to gain a 
foothold in the Balkans. 778 De Martino claimed that `Italy has continuously 
adopted a line of favouring Albanian independence' which was a policy the 
Consults would `continue whole-heartedly to propound and support' . 
779 Like the 
Greeks in the Corfu Protocol, the Italians sought to circumvent a former 
agreement regarding Albania, one that still preserved Albanian sovereignty and 
independence, but which also ensured that Italian cultural links, economic 
investments and, in particular, strategic interests would be retained. Curzon had 
"' Young to Curzon, 25 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4886/C12253; A. Leeper minute, 26 Nov. 1920, FO 
371/4886/Cl 2253. 
778 Curzon to de Martino, 20 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 62; Memo. on Albanian frontiers in 
Curzon to Hardinge, 14 June 1921, Albania and Kosovo, I, no. 127; de Martino to Curzon, 20 
June 1921, FO 421/300, no. 116; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 164. 
79 de Martino to Curzon, 20 June 1921, FO 421/300, no. 116, 
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agreed in advance to the first two points but was far less inclined to accept the 
third. He persistently refrained from answering the notes he received. 780 
Negotiations proceeded regarding the nature of Albania's recognition and, in 
particular, whether Italy should have any `special interests'. The Italians sought 
two main gains: the island of Saseno, and the right to bring aggression against 
Albania to the attention of the League, should the Albanians not do this 
themselves. The Consulta had initially sought to have the determination of 
Albania's frontiers also entrusted to Italy, but this had met with considerable 
opposition, and was eventually dropped. 781 By mid-August 1921, it had become 
apparent that the British were the main obstacles to Italian `special interests'. 
The Consulta consistently protested that the British, unlike the French, would 
not give assurances that recognised Italian interests in Albania. 782 On the 
northern frontier, there was much consensus: disagreement persisted over the 
southern boundary. The Italian and French representatives insisted that 
Chimara and Argyrocastro be allocated to Albania, but the British delegate still 
argued that these should go to Greece. The British delegate also remained 
hostile to Italian claims to Saseno, which resulted in a committee being 
established to investigate its future. 783 Eventually, on 29 September 1921, the 
Conference of Ambassadors agreed to maintain the political independence and 
territorial integrity of Albania, and to recognise Italy's so-called `special 
interests'. 784 On 16 November, but backdated to 9 November 1921, the day it 
was formally agreed, the great powers then involved in the Conference (British 
780 Curzon to Hardinge, 30 June 1921, FO 421/300, no. 131. 
781 Curzon to de. Martino, 17 Sept. 1921, FO 421/301, no. 75. 
782 Cheetham to Curzon, n. d. 1921, FO 421/301, no. 19. 
783 Crowe minute, 1 Sept. 1921, FO 421/301 no. 61; Curzon to de Martino, 17 Sept. 1921, FO 
421/301, no. 75; Conference of Ambassadors minutes, 28 Sept. 1921, FO 893/13/2. 
784 Curzon to de Martino, 17 Sept. 1921, FO 421/301, no. 75. 
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Empire, France, Italy and Japan, but not the United States) formally recognised 
an independent and sovereign state of Albania, and committed to protect its 
integrity. The Greek and Yugoslav governments' request to present their views 
to the Conference of Ambassadors was refused. On 7 November 1921, the 
British informed Eyres that they recognised the existing Albanian government 
as the de jure government for the whole of Albania. 785 
This declaration was obviously of immense importance in the development of 
an independent Albanian state. It committed the great powers not only to 
recognise Albania, but also to protect it against foreign aggressors. The powers 
agreed that the maintenance of Albanian independence was of international 
concern, primarily because of Italian interests pertaining to the Albanian 
coastline. As any violation of Albanian independence or frontiers might 
constitute a menace to Italian strategic security, it was agreed that, if Albania 
found itself unable to maintain its territorial integrity, it had the right of recourse 
to the League for international assistance. A second clause stated that, in the 
event of a threat being made to Albania's independence or integrity (due to 
foreign aggression or any other cause), and if Albania did not `within reasonable 
time' make an application for foreign assistance, then the great powers would 
bring the issue to the notice of the League Council. If the Council decided 
foreign assistance was necessary, the great powers would entrust this task to 
Italy. There was a fourth, and secret, clause. This was not communicated to 
anyone but the signatories, presumably to avoid opposition in the League. it 
stated that, if the League decided by majority vote that they could not usefully 
intervene, the governments represented in the Conference of Ambassadors 
785 'Declaration relative to the Independence and Integrity of Albania' (British Empire, France, 
Italy and Japan), 9 Nov. 1921, FO 93/117/2; `History of question of independence of Albania' 
memo., 2 Mar. 1925, FO 141/669/10; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 176. 
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would reconsider the question. 786 Nothing to this effect was specifically 
mentioned, but the inference was that, if the powers thought it necessary, such 
a task would be entrusted to Italy. This was potentially the most important part 
of the agreement. It undermined the sanctity of the League, as the new arbiter 
of international disputes, and it meant that the Italians had finally managed to 
secure international recognition of their Albanian interests by the other great 
powers, and a legal means of protecting them. The opportunity for intrigue to 
facilitate this was obvious, for the agreement gave great scope for possible 
Italian intervention, based on either territorial or economic threats to Albanian 
integrity and independence. It therefore could be described as representing at 
best a `conditional independence', similar to that which was suggested for 
Kosova more recently. Italy's claim to be the protector attained reality by the 
signing of two treaties with Zogu, especially the Treaty of Tirana (27 November 
1926). 787 
The declaration also announced that the great powers had decided to 
essentially reconfirm the Albanian frontiers as traced in 1913-14. The southern 
boundary was to be delimited on the basis of the lines of the Florence Protocol, 
with the important towns of Koritza, Argyrocastro and Chimara, together with all 
surrounding territory, becoming Albanian. This meant that the Greeks were 
obliged to return the twenty-six villages that they had occupied since 1918. The 
northern and eastern boundary line agreed (provisionally) in 1914 was to be 
rectified in four sectors, three to the advantage of the Yugoslavs and one to the 
786 Curzon to de Martino, 17 Sept. 1921, FO 421/301, no. 75; Milo, `Albania and the Balkan 
Entente', p. 41; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 175-6; E. Manta, 'Reciprocal Relationship between 
Politics and Economics: The Renewal of the 1926 Treaty of Tirana', Balkan Studies, 37 (1996), 
309-30, at p. 311. 
Chamberlain to Graham, n. d. Dec. 1926, FO 421/311, no. 88; Graham to Chamberlain, 3 
Dec. 1926, FO 421/311, no. 90. 
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Albanians: north-east of Scutari to Yugoslavia would guarantee the approaches 
to Podgorica; a slight rectification in favour of Yugoslavia, in the neighbourhood 
of Prizrend, would protect the town from Albanian assault (Albania would thus 
lose Gora and approximately 50,000 inhabitants, including a number of non- 
Serb Slavonic speakers); the road from Dibra to Struga would pass entirely 
through Yugoslav territory; the district of Lin would go to Albania to ensure 
economic communications between Elbasan and Koritza along the shores of 
Lake Ochrida. Hoti and Gruda were both confirmed as belonging to Montenegro 
(Yugoslavia) and Scutari as part of Albania. The powers also demanded that 
the Yugoslav troops be withdrawn from northern Albania, under threat of 
economic sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant. 788 
The declaration also acknowledged that the 1913-14 northern commission had 
been interrupted by the war and had not completed its operations. It therefore 
established a further boundary commission to determine the boundary in those 
areas not yet investigated, and to delimit the boundary in loco. This lasted for 
four years (1922-26). As with all First World War boundary commissions (and in 
contrast to those in Albania before the war), it received detailed instructions 
regarding protocol, procedure and membership. 789 The delimitation commission, 
consisting of members of the three European great powers, began its work in 
March 1922, the decision having been taken to delay its start until the 
conclusion of the Albanian winter. Like the 1913-14 commissions, it had an 
ethnic or national remit, but great power interests were again protected. All its 
protocols were to be submitted to the great (Principal Allied) powers for their 
788 Barros, Corfu Incident, p. 19; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 175-6, 
789 On boundary commissions after the First World War see S. B. Jones, Boundary-Making: A 
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1945) esp. pp. 229-39. 
354 
approval. Unlike the pre-war commissions, the 1922-26 delimitation commission 
was empowered to take advisers from the states on either side of the frontiers, 
and to consider requests from the Albanian, Greek and Yugoslav 
governments. 790 
The commission arrived in Albania after holding preliminary meetings in Paris 
and Florence. Once in Albania, the Italian delegate, General Enricou Tellini, 
proposed, and the ambassadors in Paris agreed, that he and the Italian 
topographers would delimit the southern boundary with Greece, whilst the 
British and French delegates would supervise the northern one with 
Yugoslavia. 791 With the Italians having secured an agreement about the 
northern Adriatic with the Yugoslavs, their interest turned again to focusing 
upon southern Albania. This was clearly to protect Italian interests in southern 
Albania, but, in light of the far tighter directives and the different nature of the 
commission, this in itself should not have produced many problems. The 
representatives considering the northern sections of the frontier proceeded 
slowly and cautiously. They encountered no real problems because most 
Yugoslav troops had grudgingly retreated from their advanced positions. By 
contrast, the difficulties faced by the representatives considering the southern 
boundary were greater then those faced by either of the two pre-war 
commissions. The Greeks felt that Tellini was prejudiced against them and 
partial to the Albanian viewpoint. A crisis was provoked when Tellini and four 
other members of the Italian commission were murdered at a border town 
situated in Greek territory. The Italian fleet responded by occupying Corfu 
island. As Barros has shown, this episode illustrated the inherent weakness of 
790 Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 175-6; Swire, Albania, p. 364. 
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the League. Despite pressure from the smaller powers, the French sought to 
find a diplomatic solution in the Conference of Ambassadors (which continued 
until 1931), and outside the League. 792 Although it delayed the workings of the 
commission and made the Italians, especially, hostile to the Greeks, this 
incident does not appear to have altered the final settlement. 793 
Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated a further tactic deployed by the Albanian nationalists 
in their activities within the great power system. It illustrated how they used an 
international organisation (the League of Nations) in their attempt to elude or 
defeat the policies of the great power states when the policies of the latter ran 
contrary to the national ambitions of the smaller `state'. In so doing, the 
Albanians used one of the most effective techniques available to small states: 
they appealed to the rights of justice and international law. The Albanians also 
improved the chances of the survival of their state by pursuing a moderate and 
non-provocative policy. To secure acceptance of Albania as an independent 
and sovereign state, the Tirana government modified its objectives. It resolved 
to compromise on the ethnic ideal of a majority Albanian-speaking population 
defined state, in order to secure others goals, namely internal stability, 
defensive or strategic frontiers and international recognition. Rather than hold 
out for the ultimate, ethnic, but unachievable goal, they made the realistic 
decision to opt for a more limited but possible version of the Albanian state, 
within the constraints of the international system in which they operated. In so 
doing, and, as Rothstein argues regarding other questions, they were able to 
appear stronger and more unified. They appeared to represent a coherent 
792 Barros, Corfu Incident, pp. 304,307. 
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national state without substantial dissident minorities, and they were attempting 
to secure non-irredentist neighbours. 794 They were also pursuing more 
pragmatic policies, and were functioning in a similar manner to other states 
within the system. 
However, the Albanians still placed too much faith in the importance of the 
League of Nations in international affairs, as they had likewise placed too much 
trust in the intentions of great power statesmen. In practice, the `new diplomacy' 
of the League operated only marginally differently to the `old diplomacy' of the 
concert. Such a view was typical of many small states. Throughout the Paris 
peace negotiations, the underlying assumption was that states would 
henceforth follow disinterested foreign policies, motivated only by community 
interests, and that, as a result, the settlements would represent a `final and 
permanent solution' to national questions in eastern Europe. 795 The rejection of 
the League by the Senate in the United States led the European great powers 
to re-examine their policies towards the League. In the end, the League Council 
could be no more effective than the great powers allowed it to be, and in any 
case they continued to sit simultaneously in the Ambassadorial Conference in 
Paris. As Barros has argued, British representatives patronised the League only 
in so far as it could supplement their more established modes of negotiation. 
Geo-political interests therefore remained central to international decision- 
making. 796 The principle of self-determination was never going to be applied 
fairly to the Albanian question, because the territory the Albanians claimed was 
of strategic importance to a variety of victorious states, and the British had 
794 Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, pp. 194-5; Also at Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 14; Vital, 
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promised this territory to them in the Pact of London. Likewise, self- 
determination was completely disregarded for the defeated Bulgarians. As one 
commentator recorded, using Philip Noel-Baker's famous categorisation of 
British policy-makers, `on the international plain and vis-ä-vis small states all 
British diplomats were hawks'. 797 
This chapter has also showed that, in the course of 1921, British policy towards 
the Albanian question became more sympathetic. This decision was the product 
of a reassessment of British strategic interests in the Adriatic and the Balkans. 
Albanian activities, such as their anti-Italian stance, which made a `large 
independent Albania' less threatening to British naval interests, the increased 
political stability inside Albania and the revised boundary claims, all contributed 
to this. But events extraneous to Albanian activities were more important, most 
notably changes resulting from domestic developments in Greece. It now 
helped British policy, and also Italian, to bolster the fledgling Albanian state. 
Admittedly the great powers pursued a two-pronged approach: by the secret 
annex to the 9 November 1921 memorandum, they somewhat curtailed the 
independence and sovereignty of the new state that the memorandum had 
supposedly endorsed publicly. In so doing, they ensured that geo-political, 
above all Italian, interests in Albania were protected in the event that the 
Albanian state proved too weak and fragile for existence, or susceptible to 
foreign (Greek or Yugoslav) hostility, aggression or intrigue. 
Therefore, by 1921 the great powers had acquiesced in the re-establishment of 
an independent Albania within the borders of 1913, thereby excluding many 
797 League of Nations, Complaints of Macedonia, pp. 12,22-3. 
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Albanian speakers, but the Albanian problem had not been solved. With the 
exception of a period during the Second World War (1939-1944), Albania has 
remained independent ever since and its boundaries, except in that same 
period, have remained unchanged. On the other hand, Albania has remained 
one of the weakest and most isolated states in the European international 
system. In the short term, it was already possible to identify problems. Albania 
in 1926 was very different from the Albania of 1921, when its boundary 
commission was formed. There had been numerous changes of government. 
The Regency had been replaced and Ahmet Zogu had instituted a successful 
coup d''etat, with himself proclaimed first President (1925) and later King Zog 
(1928)-Albania's, and Europe's, first and only Muslim king. The great power 
delay in recognising Albania, and in determining its boundaries, had contributed 
to the political instability and rivalry that once again resurfaced, in a manner 
similar to 1914, but this time with even more profound implications. It aided the 
fall of the Delvina cabinet and destabilised the Regency, helped the rise of Zogu 
and, thus, in the longer term, jeopardised Albanian democracy. 798 External 
factors were also once more divisive, with the traditional Italo-Yugoslav rivalry a 
particularly negative force against the consolidation of the Albanian state. The 
Yugoslavs were dissatisfied with the 9 November 1921 declaration, by which 
they had been forced to remove their military forces, and the Italians had 
acquired a privileged position. Both the Italian and Yugoslav governments 
continued to pursue policies of penetration into Albania, and their leaders tried 
to create clients in political, economic and scientific circles. Despite its success 
in utilising the League to support it in 1920 and 1921, the Albanian small state, 
like the other small states in central and eastern Europe, proved less effective 
798 For details of Albanian problems in the inter-war period see for example Pearson, Albania, I, 
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during the period of peace that followed. When the Italians, under Mussolini, 
finally invaded Albania, on 7 April 1939, no assistance was offered to it by the 
British or French governments, despite the guarantees made in 1921. In the 
end these guarantees, like those to Czechoslovakia, were practically worthless. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A house divided against itself cannot stand. A dismembered 
nation cannot live, it must fight for unification or die. '799 
The Independence and Frontiers of Albania 
This thesis has explained the establishment of an independent Albanian state 
by 1921, and the settlement of its boundaries by 1926. Chapter One explored 
the emergence of an Albanian nationalism based on the spoken language, 
diplomatic attempts by Albanian patriots to have such an identity accepted by 
the great power concert, and military efforts to prevent partition by rival Balkan 
states. Chapter Two detailed the great power deliberations in 1913 on what 
would be meant by `Albania', their acceptance of language as the basis of 
ethnicity and statehood, and the persistent sacrifice of this criterion to other, 
power-political objectives. Chapter Three showed the difficulties of sustaining 
the independence of a small state in practice, particularly without help or 
support from the great powers, and when little nascent national sentiment 
existed. Chapter Four considered the reasons for, and the implications of, the 
decision of the Entente powers to rescind Albanian independence, and to 
envisage partition of the state between Italy, Greece and Serbia. Chapter Five 
illustrated the ascendancy of counter-national forces, and the subsequent 
revival of an Albanian ethnic nationalism, during the First World War; together 
with attempts by the great powers to foster and control this for their own geo- 
political purposes. Chapters Six and Seven showed how, at the Paris Peace 
Conference, the principle of self-determination was initially supposed not to 
apply to the Albanian question, but how President Wilson then secured the 
799 H. Nicolson quoted in League of Nations, Complaints of Macedonia, p. 23. 
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reinstatement of an ethnically-based settlement for Albania, by March 1920. 
Chapter Eight explored the reasons for the Albanian nationalists abandoning 
their dependence on the great powers, and the ultimate success, in this 
instance at least, of a small-state nationalism, applying both diplomatic and 
military means against its rivals, whether small states or great powers. Chapter 
Nine explored how the Albanians used a third tactic (working through 
international organisations) to bring about a satisfactory resolution of the 
question of their independence, but had to moderate their ethnic ambitions in 
order to secure that great-power endorsement which was essential to their 
success. 
(i) Processes by which Albania became independent 
This thesis has identified three phases by which the question of Albanian 
independence was resolved. In the first phase (1912-14), the idea of Albanian 
independence was first mooted and accepted, in the second (1914-19), the 
experiment was undone, and, in the third, Albania's representatives had to 
campaign for it once more, and were eventually successful by 1921. 
The thesis has also identified two main theatres in which independence had to 
be achieved: the national or domestic area, and the international or external 
one. The relative importance of these two depended to a large extent upon the 
point in the cycle of the great power system at which these developments 
occurred. As the cycle changed, the priorities and interests of the great powers 
shifted, and this in turn altered the relative strength and importance of the 
contribution made by the small-state actors of the Albanian national process. 
Thus, following points of crisis at which the power-relativities of the international 
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system were shifting, the Albanians, like the other small states, although not 
always able to play off one power against another, were able to make 
considerable advances in their national programme. By contrast, when the 
international system was relatively stable, and the great powers could use the 
Albanian question for their own purposes, then home-grown Albanian factors 
were less productive, and international ones were more significant. 
In the international arena, which has been the primary focus of this study, five 
supplementary processes were identified, four of which were diplomatic, and 
the fifth military. On the diplomatic side, there was the `old' or closed diplomacy 
of the Conference of Ambassadors of 1912-13; the secret diplomacy that 
resulted in the Pact of London; the Paris Peace Conference and the subsequent 
Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, supposedly the `new diplomacy' of the 
Wilsonian era, but with a marked tendency to the continuation of old-diplomacy 
tendencies; and the activities within the League of Nations, which were closer to 
the ideals of the new diplomacy. These international processes were of course 
influenced by national considerations, such as the decision to convene the 
Ambassadors' Conference in London; they also had an impact upon national 
forces, such as the resurgence of Albanian nationalism that led up to the 
Congress of Lushnje. There was, as we have seen, a complicated interaction 
and interplay between these various forces. 
(ii) Explaining Albania's geographical limits 
Lord Curzon once said that, `as a branch of the science of government, frontier 
policy is of the first practical importance and has a more profound effect upon 
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the peace and warfare of nations than any other factor, political or economic'. 800 
The decisions made regarding the delimitation of Albanian boundaries in 1912- 
14, and again in 1919-21, and applied by 1926, were supposed to be based on 
ethnic principles: it was, in short, deemed that those areas where Albanian was 
the majority spoken language should become part of the newly independent 
Albanian state. This was in line with the contemporary view that equated 
nationality with ethnicity, and ethnicity with language. In practice, however, the 
great powers, the small Christian Balkan states, and, by 1920, even the Tirana 
government itself, had alternative priorities and interests (strategic, geographic, 
economic and even historical) that needed protection in the boundary 
settlement. For all the great powers, even those supposedly disinterested, geo- 
political interests overrode sentiments about nationality or the rhetoric of 
morality. Albanian claims for a truly `ethnic' or `national' settlement proved far 
too radical and ambitious for the great power representatives, especially in the 
light of their own interests, the rival claims of other small Balkan states and the 
potential instability within the international system that such a change would 
have produced. 
For the great power representatives, in particular the British, the boundaries 
represented a reasonable compromise between considerations of nationality, 
geography, economic expediency and strategic security. In the Kosovo and 
Monastir vilayets, the boundaries undoubtedly fell far short of nationalistic 
hopes on both sides, but in practice this does not seem to have been a 
particular liability. The introduction of a wider set of factors in addition to 
ethnicity (such as a larger consideration of the factors determining nationality, 
800 Curzon quoted in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 3. 
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geographical features, strategic concerns and economic interests), rather than 
limiting Albanian nationality and the extent of its independence, can be seen 
instead as promoting Albanian self-determination and a realistic application of 
the nationality principle. The Albania thus created was much more 
homogeneous, without significant dissident minorities or other ethnic groups, as 
would have been incorporated (at least without a population exchange) had the 
borders been extended in the north, south and east. 801 There is every reason to 
suppose therefore that, if, after 1914 and again after 1926, the independent 
Albanian state so defined had been sufficiently supported by the great powers 
(with adequate funding, military backing and without the internal and foreign 
intrigue) the new Albanian `nation' could have solidified, unified and 
strengthened itself, and developed into a modern and fully functioning small 
state in the international system. This conclusion supports Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen's finding that the introduction of other factors (a wider consideration of 
nationality, geographic features, strategic concerns, economic interests), which 
seem at first sight to compromise the concepts of ethnicity and self- 
determination, can in fact be a `healthy corrective'. They can supplement the 
understanding of ethnicity when it becomes a `straitjacket' too narrowly defined, 
as in the case of a definition based solely on language. Admittedly, these 
theoretical ideas were far from the thoughts of international statesmen at the 
time, but the practical outcomes studied here do suggest that there is much 
plausibility to Hylland Eriksen's theorizing. 802 
801 See Appendix G, p. 416 for an indication of the extent of the Albanian-speakers left outside 
the independent Albanian state. For further details see Guy, 'Fixing the Frontiers', pp. 41-3 and 
Guy, `Linguistic Boundaries and Geo-political Interests', forthcoming. 
Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 161-2. 
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In 1920, the Tirana government resolved to accept the 1913-14 `partition' in 
order to secure international recognition, promote stability in Albania and foster 
goodwill with its neighbours. Its decision had a fourth advantage, albeit one that 
none of the great powers or Albanian representatives at the time, or the 
Albanians since, appear to have appreciated. In the unlikely event of its having 
secured the Kosovan plain, Albania would have been placed in a much weaker 
position militarily, and would have been more vulnerable to a Yugoslav invasion, 
and vice versa. As the logistical difficulties of the Serbian retreat in the winter of 
1915-16 had illustrated, the mountains of northern Albania formed a more 
effective barrier to the passage of troops, and thus a more defensible frontier for 
both sides, than any possible line further to the north and east in Kosovo. 803 
(iii) The role and importance of international as opposed to national factors 
The thesis has shown that, in the question of Albanian independence, both 
national and international influences and factors were important, and also that 
the criticisms of the modernist school are hardly applicable in the Albanian 
case. It has also illustrated that the role of small states, including newly aspiring 
ones, in the international system is greater than the theoretical literature on 
international relations allows for, and therefore indicates that further study on 
this question is required. Despite being an example of small-state nationalism, 
Albania was not a mere supplicant. At particular points, the Albanians 
themselves made significant and decisive contributions to the settlement of the 
Albanian question. They were able successfully to make use of the unusual 
political climates (1912 in the Balkans, post-1918 in Europe) that destabilised 
803 For details of the difficulties the mountains caused to the Serbian retreat see for example 
Fryer, Destruction of Serbia, esp. pp. 49-125; for an indication of the practical problems involved 
in determining Albanian boundaries see Conclusion, pp. 373-4. 
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the respective balances of power and strengthened the position of small states, 
including themselves, relative to other more powerful states. After the First 
World War, it took the Albanians longer than some other small states to 
capitalise on this opportunity, because they were weaker and smaller than 
those other small states with which they were in competition, and were 
themselves as yet far from united. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, 
although a small state may be more effective in the great power system than its 
size and position would initially suggest, in the Albanian case this happy 
situation was usually of limited duration, and came about only because it was in 
the interest of one or other of the great powers to exploit it. The initiatives of the 
Tirana government in 1920 only proved so successful because of the Italian 
pre-occupation with Yugoslav questions, which the Consulta had determined as 
being, for the moment, strategically more important. It is also important to note 
that, at certain points, such as the radicalism of their presentations at the Paris 
Peace Conference, Albanian national efforts could actually be detrimental to the 
national cause, the success of which would depend on the attitude of the great- 
power representatives. This consideration also points to the need for further 
study of the interplay of the various roles and influences of small states in the 
great-power system. 
Sir Edward Grey asserted that, in the settlement of the Albanian question in 
1913, `the primary thing was to preserve agreement between the powers'. 804 His 
comment could equally be applied to the discussions during and after the First 
World War. Although the Albanian nationalists and others made important and 
timely contributions, and there was some room for a settlement based on ethnic 
804 Grey quoted in Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 258. 
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and national principles, geo-political interests were persistently more important, 
and the powers, even in the supposedly `international' decisions of the League, 
were able to maintain their hegemony: this is well illustrated by their separate, 
and secret, resolution giving Italy the right to intervene in Albania, which undid 
much of the value of Albania's admission into the League and international 
great power guarantee. Therefore, rather than ignoring these `international' 
influences, theorists of nationalism, and especially of the nationalism of small 
states, would be well advised to incorporate the contribution made by such 
influences, if their theories are to be applicable to the real world. 
The motives of the great-power representatives were, naturally enough, both 
varied and variable. Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that they were 
less concerned with the Albanian question per se, except for certain relatively 
junior individuals such as Brigadier-General Phillips-that is, with the desire to 
create a practical, viable, and ethnographically distinct and independent 
Albania-than with protecting their own direct and indirect interests. Their 
policies may also have indirectly served the interest of the small state, but this 
was not their primary concern in determining their chosen course. Great power 
representatives were realistic not idealistic. They determined policy according to 
their own interests, and anticipated advantages rather than morality or 
sentiment. For example, British policy on the Albanian question seems to fit well 
the theory of defensive realism. 805 The British intended to maintain what they 
saw as the balance of power in Europe, and to maintain British naval 
supremacy. Albania's strategic location on the Adriatic and in the Balkans was, 
805 For further discussion of the reasons for, and implications of, offensive and defensive 
realistic practices in the great power system see for example H. M. Scott, `Paul W. Schroeder's 
International System: The View from Vienna', International History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 663- 
80, esp. pp. 666-8 and Rendell, 'Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe', pp. 523-40. 
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although perhaps only of indirect interest to Britain, still a matter for concern, 
because it had the potential to impact on these important direct interests. British 
policy thus set out to ensure that the declining Ottoman and Hapsburg empires 
would not be replaced by a dominant Russia, and, after 1918, by a dominant 
Italy, in the Balkans, the Adriatic and the eastern Mediterranean. British policy- 
makers thus sought to bolster those states, whether great powers or small 
states, that they viewed as the best instruments for achieving these objectives 
at any particular point. To achieve these goals, they were prepared to work with 
other states and compromise other lesser objectives. When an independent 
Albania would help achieve these goals, as in 1912-13 and again in 1921, 
British policy was generally supportive; whereas when an independent Albania 
was perceived as compromising these goals, as in 1919, it was opposed. In 
1919, Foreign Office support shifted to the Yugoslav and Greek small-state 
nationalisms, as it was then considered that these states would provide a better 
counterbalance to the 'Italians. By comparison, the Italians persistently, and 
most notably in the London Pact, pursued offensive-realist practices in pursuit 
of their goals. At the 1912-13 conferences, they were prepared to work with the 
Austrians and other powers, but this soon gave way to more aggressive 
tendencies. They returned to a theoretically less aggressive stance only in 
1919, when the high degree of opposition to their ambitions from stronger great 
powers became manifest. For the Consulta, Italian policy goals were naturally 
always paramount. They had clearly resurfaced by 1921, although to be 
accomplished by different means, when they managed to secure approval for 
their plan to circumvent the idea of a fully sovereign Albanian state, and thereby 
safeguard their interests. 
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The Balkan small states, as R. W. Seton-Watson and Farrar have pointed out 
(although it is obvious enough), also operated within a Balkan small-states 
system, which functioned in a similar manner to the larger European great- 
power system. Their ambitions, rivalries and actions were not so much about 
national or ethnic goals, as about their strength and security in their relations 
with one another, and also with the great powers. 806 Again, realist tendencies 
can be seen to have predominated throughout-most obviously in their various 
decisions about entry into the First World War. By 1920, the Tirana government 
appears to have been acting in a similar manner to these other small states, in 
seeking to secure its position in the Balkan states system. 
(iv) Early twentieth-century criteria for statehood and the role of language in 
shaping views about Albania's ethnic or `national' frontiers 
For great-power policy makers in early twentieth century Europe, nationality 
would appear to have been synonymous with language and ethnicity. It has 
generally been supposed that these ideas were at their pinnacle in the period 
after the First World War, and were most cogently articulated by President 
Wilson. In reality, as this study has demonstrated, European great-power 
representatives had already adopted 1919 Wilsonian-style self-determination in 
their discussions regarding the establishment of an `ethnographic' and `mother- 
tongue' Albanian state well before 1914. The phraseology may have differed but 
the rhetoric was very similar: the idea being for all Albanian speakers to live in 
an independent Albanian state. Thus we see that the consideration of the 
Albanian question before the First World War produced major developments in 
how great powers thought about small states, and in having what was, in effect, 
806 See for example R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of Roumania from Roman Times to the 
Completion of Unity (Cambridge, 1934), p. 438; Also at Farrar, `Aggression versus Apathy', p. 
269. 
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the German `primordial' model applied to such nationalisms. During the First 
World War, these ideas were canvassed more widely (though of course not 
applied in practice to Albania), and the Paris Peace Conference accepted 
language as the major indicator of nationality. However, in the case of Albania, 
and for the reasons already given, in the initial discussions of 1919, the 
connection was not made with those earlier considerations of the Albanian 
question, which had been based on similar principles of nationality, or with the 
problems that had been posed by using a language-based definition of 
nationality. 
Briefly stated, the theory was that each linguistically-distinct group had the right 
to self-determination and, if it so desired, its own state, with its political 
boundaries corresponding to its linguistic ones. In practice, however, there were 
many difficulties in applying such theories, in particular in an area like south- 
eastern Europe. By 1913, the southern Albanian boundary commission had 
already recognised the inadequacy of using language to determine nationality 
and, in turn, national boundaries. In reality, in the Balkans and other areas, 
nationalities often overlapped and intermingled, and many people spoke more 
than one language, contrary to the simplistic assumption of the time that each 
nationality was a coterminous bounded entity which could be neatly delimited in 
linguistic maps. 807 Nevertheless, throughout this period (and when it suited their 
purposes), great-power policy makers persisted in advocating an `ethnic' 
settlement of statehood and boundaries, based on the language principle. This 
was in spite of its having been recognised as an inadequate criterion for this 
purpose during consideration of the Albanian and other questions. In addition, 
807 For similar ideas see Verdery, `Ethnicity', p. 40 and Sharp, `Genie', p. 23. 
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self-determination was deemed to apply only to a select group of small-state 
nationalities, most of which were located in eastern Europe, and all of which 
were pre-determined by the great powers as suitable for inclusion. Chapters Six 
and Seven showed how the great powers resisted (even theoretically) applying 
these ideas to the Albanian question in 1919, because it was not in their own 
interests to do so. 
Meanwhile, policy makers in small states and interested great powers took a 
more diverse approach to the ethnic basis of states. Some of the Albanian ideas 
appear similar to the theories articulated by great power statesmen and officials, 
especially their insistence on oral as opposed to written language. The policy 
makers in other small states took an alternative view that was largely dependent 
upon their own interests. For the Greeks, for instance, religion remained the 
prime indicator of nationality. At Paris in 1919, they refused to consider the 
language test, and instead pointed to the large number of prominent Greeks 
who were `Albanian' by `descent', but regarded as `Greek' by `religion'. 808 In 
short, there remained much confusion and inconsistency over the criteria for 
determining nationality, and this left politicians in both great and small states 
free to shape their attitudes according to what was most expedient. 
Concluding Remarks: the role of ethnicity in national frontier making 
There has been considerable debate on what role ethnicity should play in 
defining national boundaries (particularly where ethnicity is defined in narrow 
linguistic terms), and how far the `primordial' model of national identity can be 
applied. Gellner and Hylland Eriksen, for instance, have been particularly critical 
808 Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, p. 860; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 
255-6. 
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of the viability of using ethnicity as a basis for nationality and statehood, 
considering it too vague and ambiguous. They argue that, not only should a 
wider range of ethnic factors be used (for instance religion, beliefs, customs and 
kinship), but that other factors (such as historical, economic and strategic ones) 
all contribute to national self-identification. The consideration of only one or a 
limited number of factors, therefore, tends to produce only a limited and artificial 
definition of nationality. 809 Rogers Brubaker and Oliver Zimmer have gone 
further, and contend that even the civic-ethnic division in definitions of 
nationhood is too constricting and that it too needs refining. 810 Elsewhere, 
Duijzings has argued that `identity' is a much better indication of identification 
and self-determination, because it is more fluid than the narrow concept of 
ethnicity. In his study on Kosova, he contends that Balkan peoples often have 
more than one identity and that allegiances change over time, and he points 
particularly to the past religious conversions and re-conversions of large 
sections of the population. 811 Others go further, asserting that the very process 
of making boundaries itself reinforces or creates differences, especially in areas 
of ethnically mixed populations. Brubaker calls this process `ethnic unmixing'. 812 
This is what seems to have occurred in the case of Kosova. 
In practical terms too, there were genuine problems in producing national or 
ethnographic frontiers in the early twentieth century. Besides the problems in 
applying the criteria of language decided upon, there were other difficulties, 
often of a severely practical nature. The great-power representatives, in 
809 Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 1-4,161-2; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 
pp. 534. 
0 0. Zimmer, `Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards a process-orientated 
approach to national identity', Nations and Nationalism, 9 (2003), pp. 173-93; R. Brubaker, 
Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). 
811 Duijzings, Religion and Politics, pp. 13-9. 
812 R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe (Cambridge, 1996), p. 204; Verdery, `Ethnicity', p. 47. 
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particular the boundary commissioners between 1912 and 1914, often had only 
rudimentary knowledge and expertise, and they lacked resources. The 
ethnographic information and the maps available to them showed huge 
variations, largely determined by political or national preconceptions, and they 
rarely indicated either the distribution or the density of the population. 813 The 
mountainous terrain, coupled with the time of year, made it difficult to produce 
new maps. It was therefore difficult in practice to refine the broad 
determinations of the 1913 Ambassadorial Conference into more sophisticated 
ethnographic findings; and it is also clear that not all of the great-power 
representatives were fully committed to their task. 814 Taken together, these 
problems made a sincere, dispassionate and non-political determination of the 
Albanian frontiers unattainable. The attempts more generally after 1918 to 
produce ethnographic frontiers elsewhere, especially using boundary 
commissions, also came up against similar problems to those that arose in 
Albania before and after the First World War. The idea that there were tidy 
ethnographic frontiers just waiting to be determined by boundary commissioners 
from the great powers hardly survived these practical experiences on the 
ground. 
Nevertheless, whatever the practical problems of frontier-making in detail may 
have been, it remains clear that they were minor in comparison to the 
alternative priorities and criteria (strategic, political, economic and indeed 
cultural) which all the decision-makers had to consider. None of the great-power 
representatives were entirely committed to the ethnic or national objectives that 
they proclaimed, especially when these came into conflict with their own geo- 
813 Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 316-7. 
814 Doughty-Wylie, 2 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287/46121; Attachment in Doughty-Wylie, 5 Oct. 1913, 
FO 421/287/46428. 
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political interests. To be critical of their actions is to be critical of the system in 
which they operated, and of the real world of international politics, and that is 
not the business of the historian. If policy-makers in the past were to be 
effective, then they had to be realistic and pragmatic, or cease to be policy- 
makers. In the practical world of power politics, great-power representatives 
have always acted to preserve the perceived and paramount interests of their 
state, regardless of ideology, rhetoric, idealism or the latest fashionable remedy 
for the wrongs of the world (whether ethnic solutions, concern for the rights of 
small nations, support for supra-national organisations, or even action on 
climate change). As we have seen, ethnicity as the basis for state-building was 
used, and would be used, only in so far as it coincided with, supported and 
reinforced the larger policy objectives of the interested great powers. In these 
transactions, there were many competing influences and priorities, and ethnicity 
or the national principle was not the only one that was compromised. All such 
decisions were the outcome of a balancing process in which a wide range of 
priorities had to be considered. To give just one instance from the period under 
review: when the Russian government agreed to the establishment of an 
independent Albania in 1912, it thereby accepted Austria's scheme of denying 
Serbia an outlet to the sea on the Adriatic coast; this was widely perceived to be 
contrary to long-term Russian strategic interests, but it was nevertheless 
accepted for overriding considerations of short-term expediency. Russian 
officials could not, in 1912-13, support the interests of their Serbian client-state 
without risking a war for which Russia was as yet unprepared, and without 
alienating the support of its power-political partners, France and especially 
Britain. These great-power calculations, wholly extraneous to the merits of the 
Albanian case, were largely instrumental in securing the initial creation of an 
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independent state of Albania. In November 1919, at the Peace Conference of 
Paris, Sir Eyre Crowe responded to the suggestion that ethnic considerations 
should always take precedence over strategic ones, and his comment will stand 
as a fitting epitaph for this study. He stated that `in preparing the treaties, they 
had to make compromises on all points', and enquired: `Why maintain that in 
this question particularly principles were sacred? '815 Whatever Wilsonian 
rhetoric and the principle of the self-determination of peoples might propose, 
expediency dictated otherwise. 
815 Crowe, Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 1 Nov. 1919, DBFP, It, no. 141. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
The places mentioned have various spellings, both in Balkan languages and 
others. The spellings of place names used in the thesis are those most 
commonly used by the British Foreign Office at the time, except where common 
usage dictates otherwise. Listed below are the names, with some alternatives, 
of places that appear regularly in the text. 
Used in Thesis Other Spellings (include) 
Towns 
Alessio Lezhe, Lezha 
Argyrocastro Gjirokaster, Argyrokastro, Gjinokaster, 
Argirocastro 
Cavaya Cavaia 
Cettinje Cetinje, Cettigne 
Chimara Chimarra, Himara, Himare 
Delvino Delvine, Delvina 
Dibra Der, Debar, Debra 
Djakova Gjakove, Jakova, Dakovica, Gjakova, 
Djakovica 
Durazzo Durres 
Fiume Rijeka 
Ipek Peja, Pec, Peje, Petch, Ipeku, Petsh 
Janina Jöannina, Yannina, Yanina, Ioannina, 
Yanya, Yaninia 
Kalkandelen Tetove, Tetovo 
Kolonia Kolonje, Kolonja 
Koritza Koritsa, Korce, Korcha, Kortcha, Korystza, 
Corizza 
Kruja Croya, Kruje 
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Used in Thesis Other Spellings (include) 
Leskoviki Leskovik, Leskovikki, Leskovici 
Luma Liouma, Ljuma 
Monastir Bitola, Bitolj, Bitolya 
Nish Nis 
Podgorica Podgorice, Titograd, Podgoritza 
Pogradec Podgradetz, Pogradets, Pogradek 
Pola Pula 
Prishtina Prishtine, Pristina, Pristina 
Prizrend Pirzerin, Prizren, Prisrend, Prisen 
Salonika Thessaloniki, Thessalonika, Selänik 
San Giovanni Shengjin 
di Medua 
Santa Quaranta Sarande, Saranda, Santi Quaranta 
Scutari Shkoder, Shkodra, Skutari, Skadar 
Spalato Split 
Tepelena Tepedenleli, Tepeleni, Tepelen 
Tirana Tirane 
Uskub Usküb, Skoplje, Skopje, Scopia 
Valona Vlore, Vlora, Vallona, Avlona 
Voskopoja Voskopoje, Moskhopolis, Moschopolis 
Zara Zadar 
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Used in Thesis Other Spellings (include) 
Rivers, Lakes, Regions, and Geographical Features 
(Some regions are named after one of the main towns. Where this is the case, 
for example Monastir, please see list above. ) 
Boyana Bojane, Bojana, Buene 
Chameria cameri, Tsamouria, Chamouria, cameria, 
Ciamouria, Chimarra, Chamuria 
Decani Decani, Decan, Decani 
Drin Drina, Drini 
Gusinje Gussinie, Gusinj, Gussinje, Gusinge 
Kefalu Kephali 
Kosovo* Kosova, Kosove, Kosmet, Kosovo i Metohija, 
Kossovo 
Novi Bazar Novi Pazar, Yeni-Pazar 
Ochrida Ochrid, Ohrid, Ohrit 
Plava Plave 
Saseno Sazen, Sasseno 
Skumbi Shkumbi, Shkumbin, Shkumbini, Shkumbi 
Stylos Phtelia, Stilo 
Vermosh Vermoc, Vermoshi 
Voyussa Vijose, Vojussa, Viosa 
* For explanation of the special use of both Kosovo and Kosova in the text, please see Note on 
Spellings, p. 13. 
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Used in Thesis Other Spellings (include) 
Countries and Peop/es 
Albania Albanie, Shgiperia 
Albanians Arnauts, Illyrians, Thraco-Illyrians, Thracians 
Kosova* Kosovo, Kosove, Kosmet, Kosovo i Metohija, Kossovo 
Vlachs Aroumanians, Kutzo-Vlachs 
* For explanation of the special use of both Kosovo and Kosova in the text, please see Note on 
Spellings, p. 13. 
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A SELECTIVE WHO'S WHO816 
Baron Carlo Aliotti 
Aliotti was Envoy Extraordinaire and Minister Plenipotentiary to Albania 
in 1914, having previously been Italian Consul General in Corsica. He 
remained in Albania after the outbreak of the First World War, and 
helped draft the Albanian clauses of the 1915 Pact of London. In 1920, 
he was one of the Italian negotiators who failed to secure an agreement 
from the Tirana government for Italian retention of Valona. He later 
served as Italian Minister to China and then the United States. 
Anglo-Albanian Society 
This was established in London in 1912 by Edith Durham and Aubrey 
Herbert, with the aim of gaining great power support for the Albanians, 
and recognition for the newly independent state. It has remained 
intermittently active to the present day and is now known as the Anglo- 
Albanian Association. Executive officials have included Lord Lamington, 
Dayrell Oakley-Hill, Julian Amery, Harry Hodgkinson and Dervish Duma. 
The current President is Noel Malcolm. 
Captain Jim Barnes 
He was a member of the Anglo-Albanian Society and had travelled 
extensively in Albania. He worked in the Political Intelligence Department 
during the Paris Peace Conference. 
816 This is based on a variety of sources including: R. Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Kosova 
(Lanham Maryland, Toronto, Oxford, 2004); R. Hutchings, Historical Dictionary of Albania 
(Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, Oxford, 1966); R. Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 
Maryland, Toronto, Oxford, 2004): The list is primarily ordered by surname, but this is not 
always possible due to the construction of some Albanian names. It has unfortunately not been 
possible to locate a date of birth and/or death for all the individuals included in the list and some 
other biographical details are incomplete. 
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Count Alexander Benckendorff (1849-1917) 
He was Russian Ambassador to Britain from 1903-1917, having 
succeeded his father in the post, and proved influential in establishing 
the Anglo-Russian Entente (1907). He died in office before the outbreak 
of the February revolution, in 1917. 
Constantine Bilinski (d. 1913) 
Senior Austrian delegate on the 1913 southern Albanian boundary 
commission, and previously Consul in Janina, where he had been 
subject to much criticism for his anti-Greek views. His death in November 
1913, whilst delaying the commission, eventually made a compromise on 
the southern Albanian boundary easier to facilitate. 
Isa bey Boletin (Boletini) (1864-1916) 
Boletin was one of the great Kosovan freedom fighters. Although he 
initially supported the Young Turks, he participated in various resistance 
activities, often in collusion with the Serbs, during the first Balkan war. He 
was a member of Ismail Kemal's provisional government, and his troops 
defended Wilhelm of Wied until his departure from Albania in September 
1914. He fought with the Serbs in the First World War and was later 
interned in Podgorica, where he is said to have been killed in a shootout. 
Bishop Luigj (Luigi) Bumci (1872 -1945) 
He was the nephew of the Albanian writer Pashko Vasa and an important 
political and Catholic leader, and became Bishop of Alessio in 1912. He 
was the Catholic representative to the Paris Peace Conference and in 
the High Regency. He participated in the December 1921 coup d'etat, 
but was himself removed from office by Zogu's coup (1924). He then 
withdrew from politics and retired into ecclesiastical life. 
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Paul Cambon (1843-1924) 
Cambon was French Ambassador to Britain from 1898-1920, having 
previously been Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire for a short term. As 
Ambassador in London, he most notably helped negotiate the Entente 
Cordiale in 1904. 
Sir Fairfax Cartwright (1857-1928) 
He was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Britain in 
Vienna from 1908 until his retirement, in November 1913, He had 
previously served in Munich, Stuttgart and Madrid. 
Captain (later Colonel) Fortunato Castoldi 
Castoldi was junior Italian delegate on the 1912 southern Albanian 
boundary commission, Charge d'Affaires to Albania during the Wied 
administration and a representative to the Greek Committee during the 
Paris Peace Conference. In 1920, he became Italian Commissioner to 
Albania. He tended to be both anti-Austrian and anti-Greek, but this did 
not prove popular with the Albanians. 
Lord Robert Cecil MP (1864-1958) 
Cecil was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs (May 1915) and Minister for the Blockade (February-July 1918) in 
Lloyd George's war cabinet. In July 1918, he became Assistant 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but resigned in January 1919 to 
become a South African delegate to the Paris Peace Conference and 
later the League of Nations. As South African delegate to the League of 
Nations, he championed the Albanian national cause and managed to 
secure Albanian admission to the League. 
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George Russell Clerk, from 1917 Sir (1874-1951) 
Clerk served as acting first secretary in the Ottoman Empire from 1910- 
1912, when he returned to the post of clerk in the Foreign Office, and 
became a senior clerk in 1913. In 1919 he became private secretary to 
Lord Curzon, when the later was acting Foreign Secretary. He continued 
to have an illustrious career, holding a variety of positions in the 
Diplomatic service. He became an important diplomatic figure in the 
building of the `New Europe', being involved in strengthening British ties 
with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Turkey. 
Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo (Komiteti Mbrojta Kombetare e 
Kosoves) 
The Committee was founded on 1 May 1918 with the aim of promoting 
Kosovan interests in the eyes of the great powers. The Committee 
considered that other Albanian representatives were not doing this. It 
also sought to foster an uprising in Kosovo against Serbian rule under its 
leaders, who included Hoxhe Kadriu, Hasan Prishtina, Bajram Curri and 
Avni Rystemi. In November 1918, it moved its headquarters to Scutari to 
help facilitate military and political action. On 6 March 1919, the 
Committee called for a general uprising in Kosovo. This led to a large- 
scale revolt at Drenica, involving some 10,000 rebels, but the uprising 
was brutally crushed by Yugoslav forces as an example to other ethnic 
minorities within the new state. 
Sir Eyre Crowe (1864-1925) 
Crowe was a career civil servant. He held a variety of positions in the 
British Foreign Office, rising to Permanent Under-Secretary of State (in 
November 1920). At the Paris Peace Conference, he was a Minister 
384 
Plenipotentiary and became the head of the British delegation after the 
departure of Lloyd George and Balfour. He sat on the Greek Committee, 
and was one of the British representatives most resistant to Albania's 
demands for self-determination. 
Bajram Curri (1862-1925) 
Originally from Djakova, he was a founder of the second League of 
Prizrend (1899-1900), was actively involved in the insurgency against the 
Balkan states and Young Turks (1912-13) and helped found the Kosovan 
Committee in 1918. Following the Congress of Lushnje (January 1920), 
he became Minister without Portfolio and assisted in the Congress's 
activities in suppressing the Essadists. His opposition to Zogu resulted in 
him committing suicide to avoid capture during a siege in March 1925. 
Christo Anastas Dako (1878 -1941) 
Dako was an Albanian-American journalist. He vied with Fan Noli for 
leadership of Vatra, becoming its president in 1913 and editor of its 
publications, including the weekly Dielli (The Sun). In 1919, he wrote a 
history of Albania, Albania: The Master Key to the Near East, which 
detailed Albanian origins as far back as the Illyrians. 
Clive Day (1875-1951) 
Day was a college professor and writer of economic history. He was 
Chief of the Balkan Division in the American Commission to Negotiate 
Peace in Paris (1918-19), in which capacity he sat on the Greek 
Committee. 
Suleiman bey Delvina 
He was Prime Minister of the Albanian government following the Lushnje 
Congress until November 1920, when he was replaced by lljaz bey 
385 
Vrioni. He was influential in developing the policies that secured the 
Italian withdrawal and Albania's admission to the League of Nations, but 
little else seems known about him. 
Prenk Bib Doda (Bibe Doda) (1858-1919) 
In 1876 he inherited the hereditary title of Kapidan (captain) of Mirdita, a 
predominantly Catholic area in north-western Albania. Having played an 
active role in the League of Prizrend (1878-1881), he was exiled to 
Anatolia, only to return to Mirdita in 1908, after the Young Turk 
revolution. Although he never left Mirdita, he served as Vice-President in 
Ismail Kemal's provisional government, and despite having some hope of 
acceding to the Albanian throne, he remained loyal to Wilhelm, whom he 
served as Minister of Public Works and for a short time as Foreign 
Minister. After the First World War, he served as Deputy Prime Minister 
in the government of Turkhan Pasha. Whilst serving as Deputy Prime 
Minister he was assassinated as part of a blood-feud. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Doughty-Wylie (1968-1915) 
Doughty-Wylie was British representative and chairman of the southern 
Albanian boundary commission. Before that he was Consul at Addis 
Ababa (1909-1912), and Director of the British Red Cross in the Ottoman 
Empire during the Balkan Wars. After the commission, he joined the 
Anglo-Albanian Society and became an advocate of the Albanian cause, 
although his reports seem to indicate that he took his role in the 
commission seriously. He died on 26 April 1915, the same day as the 
London Pact was signed, while leading a charge at Gallipoli, for which he 
was awarded the Victoria Cross. 
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Nexhip (Nexip) Draga 
Draga belonged to an influential Muslim family and was elected to the 
Ottoman parliament in 1908. He soon became distanced from the Young 
Turks. During the first Balkan war, he declared, with Hasan Prishtina, 
that Albanians would fight for the territorial integrity of Albanian lands 
rather than for the Ottoman Empire. On 18 December 1912, he was 
elected, in Uskub, as head of the Muslim Party (ZhemUet) to the 
Yugoslav parliament in Belgrade, from where he led the Kosovan 
Albanian deputies. 
M. Edith Durham (1863 -1944) 
Edith Durham was a traveller, writer and journalist who specialised in 
Balkan affairs and wrote a number of important works including Twenty 
Years of Balkan Tangle (1920), High Albania (1909), and The Struggle 
for Scutari (1914). Initially a supporter of Slav nationalism, her 
sympathies turned towards the Albanians following her first visit there in 
1909. In 1912 she founded the Anglo-Albanian Society with Aubrey 
Herbert and became its secretary. Despite being unable to visit Albania 
after 1921, for health reasons, she continued to campaign on Albanian 
issues until her death. She is believed to have written over eight hundred 
letters on Albanian issues. 
Akif Pasha Elbasani 
He came from a prominent Bektashi family and played an active role in 
many Albanian nationalist activities. He was the Minister of the Interior in 
Prince Wilhelm's government after Essad Pasha's exile, and never 
resigned the post even after Wilhelm had left Albania. In 1915, he was 
387 
influential in establishing the National 
Commission of Initiative. 
Sir Francis Elliot (1857-1948) 
Congress through Zogu's 
Elliot was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of 
Hellenes from November 1903 until the dethronement of King 
Constantine. It is often suggested that he developed Hellophile views 
during his long service in Athens. 
Pandeli Evangjeli (Vangjeli) (1858-1949) 
He was born in Koritza to an Orthodox family, but spent most of his early 
years amongst the Albanian community in Bucharest. In 1907, he formed 
the Committee for the Freedom of Albania. He returned to Albania after 
1914 and became Prefect for Koritza. In 1920 he took part in the 
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference under the government of 
Suleiman bey Delvina. He became a Member of Parliament in 1921, then 
Foreign Minister, and briefly served as Prime Minister at the head of a 
short-lived liberal government. In 1925, he was made President of the 
Senate and thus Zogu's deputy. He served as Prime Minister from 1930 
to 1935, and as Parliamentary President during the last years of Zogu's 
reign. 
Harry Eyres (1856-1944) 
He served in Constantinople, Beirut and Damascus. After his retirement 
in December 1914, he was employed in special service at Corfu and 
Janina, and in 1920 in Albania. In January 1921 he became British 
Consul without exequatus in Albania, residing at Durazzo. 
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Naim Frasheri (1846-1900) 
The Albanian romantic poet who, along with his brothers Sami and 
Abdyl, was a prominent figure in the Albanian national renaissance 
(Rilindja Kombetare). He came from a notable Bektashi family in the 
Permeti district, and served as an Ottoman official in Santa Quaranta, 
Berat and Janina. In 1882, he became head of censorship in 
Constantinople. He wrote twenty-four major works (fifteen in Albanian, 
four in Turkish, two in Greek, and one in Persian) and translated the 
works of other writers. He was especially well known for his patriotic and 
lyrical poems, including the epic poem The History of Skanderbeg 
(Bucharest, 1898), which retold a dramatised and embellished life of 
Skanderbeg. 
Colonel Edward Granet (b. 1858) 
Granet was British delegate on the northern Albanian boundary 
commission (July-December 1913 and April-August 1914). He had 
previously (1911-1914) been Military Attache to the British embassy at 
Rome, and the Legation at Berne. In March 1915, he was temporarily 
raised to Brigadier-General. 
Captain Duncan Heaton-Armstrong (1886-1969) 
Heaton-Armstrong became Wilhelm of Wied's private secretary in 1913, 
having taken part in a European-wide competition for the position. In 
August 1914, he escorted Wilhelm's children back to Neuwied and 
became the first British prisoner of war. He was interned for the rest of 
the war. 
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Colonel Sir Aubrey Herbert MP (1880 -1923) 
Herbert was half-brother of the fifth Earl of Caernarvon, who would later 
fund the opening of Tutankhamen's tomb. He was the founder and first 
president of the Anglo-Albanian Society in 1912, and was elected MP for 
Somerset South in November 1911. He died in 1923 aged only 43. His 
widow then donated his extensive book collection (in excess of 10,000 
volumes) to found the Albanian National Library in Tirana. He is believed 
to be the inspiration for the legendary John Buchan character 
Greenmantle. 
Count Guglielmo Imperiali (1858-1944) 
Imperiali was Italian Ambassador in Constantinople from 1904 to 1910, 
and then in London from 1910 to 1920. In London, he played a significant 
role in bringing Italy into the First World War and negotiating the Pact of 
London (1915). 
Dr. Douglas Johnson 
Dr. Johnson was the most influential American advisor to Wilson on 
Albanian and Balkan questions at the Paris Peace Conference. After he 
left the Conference (June 1919), to return to teaching at Columbia 
University, the Americans had no experts on Albanian or Bulgarian 
questions. Even after his departure, he was kept well informed of the 
diplomatic exchanges, and he continued to prepare memoranda for the 
State Department. 
Hoxhe Kadriu (1878-1925) (Also known as Kadri Lutfulla Prishtina) 
Having spent some years in prison for political activities, Kadriu worked 
as a lawyer, professor of law and, finally, as a banker. Following 
Albanian independence, he moved to Scutari (1914), where he continued 
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to work as a lawyer. In 1918, he helped establish the Kosovo Committee 
and, after the Congress of Lushnje, he became Minister of Justice and 
then Deputy Speaker in the Albanian parliament. 
Ismail Kemal (Qemal) bey Vlora (1844-1919) 
Ismail Kemal was an important character in the Albanian national 
movement, having served as a deputy in the Ottoman parliament. He led 
the initiatives to gain international recognition of Albania as a separate 
political entity in 1912, and on 28 November 1912, at the national 
congress in Valona, he proclaimed Albania independent. He became 
President of the provisional government, which transferred its authority to 
the international control commission in January 1914. He then left 
Albania, never to return. 
Faik Konitza (Konica) (1875-1942) 
He was an influential Albanian-American whose support of writers, 
especially in his literary review Albania, became a focal point for 
Albanian writers living abroad, especially in the United States. Although 
he wrote little himself, he had a major impact on the development of 
Albanian culture and writing. He stressed the need for a more `western' 
culture in Albania, and the need to create a unified literary language. It is 
believed that his version of written Tosk was adopted at the 1908 
Monastir Congress. 
Mehmed (Mehmet, Mehemid) bey Konitza (1875-1942) 
He was a member of the Albanian delegation to the St. James 
Conference (1912-13), and afterwards Albanian representative to Britain. 
He was a member of the Durazzo delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference, and was Foreign Minister in both the Durazzo and Tirana 
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governments. During the First World War, he was one of the Albanian 
nationalists most active in bringing Albanian issues to the notice of the 
great powers. 
Leon Krajewsky 
Krajewsky was of Polish descent, and persistently pro-Slav in his actions. 
He was the French representative on the international commission of 
control (1913-14), having been French Consul at Cettinje before the first 
Balkan war. In the First World War, he became personal representative 
to Essad Pasha, and he served as the French technical expert on the 
Greek committee in 1919. 
Auguste Kral 
Kral was the Austrian representative on the international control 
commission in Albania, and was involved in much of the intrigue and 
rivalry with the Italians. Following the Austrian occupation of Albania in 
1916, he was appointed Civil Administrator. 
Harry Lamb, from 1919 Sir (1857-1948) 
He served as Consul-General at Salonika from 1907 until 1913, when he 
was appointed British representative on the international control 
commission in Albania. He worked at the Foreign Office from October 
1914 until November 1915, when he was placed in charge of the British 
Adriatic Mission. In January 1920, he was appointed chief political officer 
attached to the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, and soon 
became Assistant High Commissioner. 
A. W. Allen Leeper (1887-1935) 
Leeper entered the Foreign Office in 1918 and was attached to the 
South-eastern European section of the PID, where he helped draft policy 
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on Albania. Amongst other accomplishments, he was first secretary to 
Vienna 1924-28, and counsellor in the Foreign Office in 1933. 
Mufid bey Libohova (Libhova) (1876-1927) 
He was a member of the Albanian cabinet nine times between 1912 and 
1927, and he held positions that included Justice Minister, Minister of the 
Interior and Finance Minister. He was Foreign Minister in the 1913-14 
provisional government, and was selected as Albanian delegate on the 
international control commission. He was one of the representatives of 
the Durazzo government who agreed in 1919 to the decision that the 
government would be subordinate to a civil Italian Commissioner. This 
proved very unpopular and helped facilitate the formation of the Lushnje 
Congress. 
Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky (1860-1922) 
Lichnowsky was Political Division Counsellor in the Wilhelmstrasse 
responsible for appointments. He later served as German Ambassador to 
London from 1912-14, but proved unpopular with officials in the 
Wilhelmstrasse for working too closely with his British colleagues and 
advocating against support for Austria-Hungary. 
Baron Giacomo de Martino 
De Martino was personal Italian representative to Wilhelm of Wied in 
1914. He 'led the Italian negotiators in the Greek Committee at the Paris 
Peace Conference, and in 1920 became Italian Ambassador to London, 
and later to Washington. 
Count Albert von Mensdorff (1861-1945) 
Mensdorff entered the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic service in 1886. In 
1889 he was transferred to London, where from 1904 to 1914 he served 
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intermittently as Ambassador. He made use of his personal friendship 
with the British sovereigns, and family relations in the British court, to 
develop friendly relationships between the British and Austrian 
governments. During the First World War, he was involved in several 
unsuccessful initiatives to bring about peace. 
Dr. Sidney Mezes (1863-1931) 
Mezes was an American academic chosen by President Wilson to head 
the Inquiry. He had previously been President of the University of Texas 
(1908-14) and in 1917 was the President of the College of the City of 
New York (1914-27). During the Paris Peace Conference, he served as 
the senior American delegate on the Co-ordinating Committee. 
Professor William Monroe 
A Professor at the State Normal School of New Jersey, he was selected 
by Wilson to form part of his Inquiry team in 1917. His responsibility was 
the investigations concerning Albania, and also Serbia. He was not an 
expert in Albanian or even Balkan politics. His main credentials were that 
he had published a series of travelogues on Europe, the Balkans and the 
Near East. 
Sir Arthur Nicolson, and from July 1916 Lord Carnock (1849-1928) 
Arthur Nicolson was the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (1910-16), having previously seen service in 
Constantinople, Bulgaria, Hungary, St Petersburg and elsewhere. 
Harold Nicolson (1886 -1968) 
Harold was Arthur Nico'ison's son. He initially followed in his father's 
footsteps and entered the diplomatic service in 1909. In 1918 he was 
attached to the British peace delegation in the South-eastern European 
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section of the PID, where he was one of the officials responsible for 
drafting British policy regarding Greece, including Albania, and he served 
as technical expert on the Greek Committee. He later decided that 
diplomatic life was not for him. Having left the service, he wrote a number 
of informative and interesting books, including Peacemaking 1919 
(1933). 
Bishop Fan (Theofan) S. Noli (1882-1965) 
Noli was an Albanian Orthodox bishop and politician from Boston, 
Massachusettes, where he was active in Vatra, and he became their 
representative to the Albanian parliament. He served as Albanian 
representative to the League of Nations, and briefly as Prime Minister 
and Regent of Albania in 1924. He was responsible for establishing the 
independent Orthodox Albanian Church, in 1923. 
Nikola Pasic (Pasitch, Pachitch) (1845-1926) 
Pasc was an influential Serbian, and later Yugoslav, politician, whose 
career spanned almost forty years. He was Mayor of Belgrade twice 
(1890-91 and 1897), Prime Minister of Serbia on a number of occasions 
(1891-92,1904-05,1906-08,1909-11,1912-18) and Prime Minister of 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-19,1921-24, 
1924-26). He was head of the Yugoslav delegation to the Peace 
Conference in 1919. 
Colonel Phillips (later Brigadier-General) 
Phillips was the British governor of Scutari 1913-14 and head of the 
international squadron stationed there from April 1913 until September 
1914. He returned to Albania in 1918 as leader of the British battalion 
stationed at Scutari in the international administration. His pronounced 
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pro-Albanian sympathies led to much criticism of him by members of the 
Foreign Office and other governments. 
Hasan bey Prishtina (1873-1933) 
Prishtina was a tribal chieftain from Kosovo, who initially supported the 
Young Turks and was elected to the Ottoman Parliament in 1908, but, 
together with all other Albanian delegates, he lost his position in 1912. 
Subsequently, he was a persistent and major proponent of the Albanian 
cause, and particularly vocal on issues pertaining to Kosovo. He also 
formulated the autonomy demands known as `The Fourteen Points of 
Hasan Prishtina'. He served as Minister of Education in Ismail Kemal's 
Provisional Government, and as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in 
Wilhelm of Wied's cabinet, and he later helped set up the Kosovo 
Committee. He became a member of the Albanian parliament for Dibra 
region (the town itself being part of Serbia), took part in a coup d'etat and 
served as Prime Minister for five days (7-12 December 1921). 
Thereafter, he headed uprisings against Zogu in Albania, and was 
assassinated by an agent of Zogu in 1933. 
Sir Rennell Rodd, from 1933 Baron Rennell (1858-1941) 
Rodd was British Ambassador in Rome from 1909-19, having previously 
served in Paris, Berlin, Oslo and Stockholm. He was influential in getting 
the Italians to sign the Pact of London in 1915. He left the diplomatic 
service in 1919 but nonetheless served on a British mission to Egypt 
(1920) and as British Delegate to the League of Nations (1921-23). 
Avni Rystemi (Rustemi) 
Rystemi was a member of the Committee for the Defence of the Nation 
and, whilst a student in Paris, he murdered Essad Pasha. He served only 
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six months imprisonment for his `political crime'. He then returned to 
Albania as an associate of Zogu, but he soon became a vocal opponent 
of his former colleague. 
Skanderbeg (Skenderbeg, Skenderbeu, Iskender Bey) or Georgi Castrioti 
(Gjergj Kastrioti) (1405-1468) 
Skanderbeg was a medieval Albanian national hero, who succeeded in 
defeating the Ottoman Turks in a series of battles over two decades. His 
efforts are often considered responsible for stopping the spread of Islam 
into western and central Europe. Although a Christian, he was known to 
all Albanians by his Muslim name of Skanderbeg. His family flag (a 
double black-headed eagle on a red background) became the Albanian 
national flag. 
Stephanos Skouloudis (1838-1928) 
Skouloudis had a long and illustrious career in Greek politics, and was 
Prime Minister for a short time in October 1915. During his tenure he 
issued the proclamation re-uniting northern Epirus with Greece. 
General Enricou Tellini (d. 1923) 
Tellini was the Italian delegate on the 1922-26 Albanian boundary 
commission whose murder in 1923, whilst in Greek territory, sparked the 
Corfu incident. 
Essad bey Pasha (Pacha) Toptani (1863-1920) 
Essad was an unscrupulous but influential bey who dominated much of 
central Albania from his base around Durazzo and Tirana. He had a 
controversial career in Albanian affairs, and was frequently opposed by 
Albanian nationalists. Much of their opposition stemmed from his 
surrender, to the Montenegrins (allegedly for a bribe), of the garrison that 
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he was controlling at Scutari, in April 1913. In October 1913, he 
established the Senate for Central Albania, a rival regime to the 
provisional government, and in 1914 he became the Interior Minister 
under Prince Wilhelm, although he coveted the throne himself. He was 
exiled from Albania under suspicion of plotting against Wilhelm. He 
returned to Albania after the start of the First World War with Serbian 
assistance, but left again with the Austro-Bulgarian invasion, to become 
the `President of Albania in exile', a title that he was still promulgating at 
the Paris Peace Conference. He was assassinated in Paris by Avni 
Ryste mi. 
Dr Mihal Tourtoulis (Turtullis) 
Tourtoulis had a long and extensive involvement in the Albanian national 
movement. In 1914, he was selected as Minister of Public Instruction and 
Health in Wilhelm of Wied's cabinet. He played an active role in the 
Durazzo and Tirana governments, represented both at the Paris Peace 
Conference and was selected as the Orthodox representative on the 
Albanian High Council of Regency. He was renowned for his anti-Italian 
views, and was one of the few Albanians never to accept the idea of an 
Italian mandate for Albania. 
Ante Trumbic (1864-1938) 
Trumbic was the Croatian national leader and a moderate reformer in the 
Austrian lower house. After the July Crisis in 1914, he fled to exile in Italy 
and tried unsuccessfully to build Allied support for South Slav unity. He 
established the so-called `Yugoslav Committee' in 1915, and worked 
from London to persuade Pasic of his scheme. He became Foreign 
Minister of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, and a 
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representative to the Paris Peace Conference. He resigned from that 
post on 22 November 1920 having agreed the Rapallo Treaty, which 
settled the Yugoslav-Italian boundary. He thereafter worked to protect 
minority rights, especially Croat ones, in the new state. 
Turkhan (Touran) bey Pasha 
Turkhan was Prime Minister in Wied's government, and then Prime 
Minister and leader of Durazzo government's delegation to the Peace 
Conference in Paris. He does not seem to have been particularly 
nationalistic and was much criticised for being pro-Italian. He had 
previously enjoyed an illustrious career in the Ottoman diplomatic corps, 
and was Ambassador to St. Petersburg (1908-13). 
Vatra (literally trans. `Hearth') 
This was the Pan Albanian-American Association that operated out of 
Boston, Massachusetts. It proved to be one of the most influential voices 
of Albanian nationalism, and it produced the Albanian newspaper Dielli 
(The Sun) to promote its cause. Important members included Fan Noli 
and Mehmed Konitza. 
Iljas bey Vrioni 
Vrioni became Albanian Prime Minister in November 1920. Whilst in 
office, he was responsible for planning the Albanian appeal to the 
League of Nations in 1921, for a settlement of Albanian boundaries and 
the removal of Yugoslav forces. 
General Willem de Weer (Veer) (b. 1857) 
General de Weer led the detachment of fifteen Dutch officers from the 3rd 
regiment of Field Artillery, Dutch Army, which was stationed in Albania to 
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train the gendarmerie in 1913-14. He tended to work closely with the 
Austrians and to oppose the Italians. 
Wilhelm of Wied (Wilhelm zu Wied) (1876-1945) 
Wilhelm was the German Lutheran prince who was chosen by the great 
powers to lead the short-lived Albanian Kingdom (March-September 
1914). He was the third son of the Prince of Neuwied, had previously 
been a captain in the German army and his aunt was the Queen of 
Romania, who had pressed his candidature for the throne. In 1914, he 
decided to fight for Germany in the First World War, despite being under 
no obligation to do so, as head of state of a neutral country. This decision 
was unpopular with many Albanians, and was one of the reasons why 
they resolved that he should not be their head of state after the war. 
Ahmet bey Zogu (King Zog, Zogou, Skanderbeg III, Ahmet Zogolli) (1895-1961) 
After the death of his father, Zogu became head of the Muslim Mati clan 
in 1911, when he was only sixteen. During the First World War, he 
initially supported the Austrians and spent much time in Vienna, and he 
returned to Albania only in 1919. In 1920, he became Interior Minister in 
the Tirana government and played a key role in ridding Albania of its 
foreign occupiers the same year. He was Prime Minister of Albania 
between 1922 and 1924, and President of Albania between 1925 and 
1928 following a coup d'etat, in which he proclaimed himself King Zog. 
He thus became Europe's first and only Muslim king, although, as he had 
no blood right to the throne, he was shunned by many other sovereigns. 
Although he had received support from Mussolini throughout his career, 
Zogu was deposed on 7 April 1939, following the Italian invasion. He 
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went into exile, first in Egypt, then Britain, then the United States and 
finally settled in France, where he eventually died. 
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APPENDIX A: 
The Ottoman Vilayets, including Kosovo, and the Newly 
Independent State of Kosova817 
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APPENDIX B: 
Austro-Italian and Russian Proposals, 
Albanian Claims and the Agreed Boundaries818 
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APPENDIX C: 
The Florence Protocol (17 December 1913)$19 
Description of the frontier line: 
The frontier starts from point C (on the Austrian map, hill 1738 north-east of 
MANDRA NIKOLICA) where the southern frontier of kaza KORITZA joins the 
summit of GRAMMOS. It goes towards the south following the summit of 
GRAMMOS as far as MAVRI PETRA, from there it passes the hills 2536 and 
2019 and reaches GOLO. From there, after following the river alongside hill 
1740, it passes between the villages of RADATI and KURSAKA, it goes towards 
the hill found to the north-east of KUKESI from where it goes downhill in order 
to reach the SARANDAPOROS. 
It follows the river until it reaches its mouth in the VOJUSSA from where it 
continues to the top of mount TUMBA, passing between the villages of 
ZIPALICA and MESSARIA and over hills 956 and 2000. 
From the top of mount TUMBA the frontier goes towards the west over hill 1621 
passing to the north of ZIRMAZES. 
From there it follows the river to the hilltop which is found to the north-east of 
the village of EPISKOPI (previously annexed according to the information on 
the map) from there it goes towards the south keeping to the ridge between 
RADATI, which is in Albania, and GAIDOHOR, which is in Greece. It falls into 
the ZRINOS valley, crosses the river and climbs the hill above KAKAVIA, a 
village which is in Albania. It follows this new river, leaving VALTISTA and 
819 `Annex to the Official Report of the Fifteenth Session' [trans. from the French by D. Guy], 
SAC minutes, 17 Dec. 1913, F093/1/36: Also at F0881/10355X, p. 78 
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KASTANIANI in Greece and KOSSOVIQA in Albania and reaches MURGANA, 
hill 2124. 
From there it reaches STUGARA, and then VERTOP and hill 750, leaving 
JANIARI and VERVA in Albania. It passes over hills 1014,675 and 839 and 
goes towards the north-east, leaving KONISPOLI in Albania. It follows the 
summit of hills STILO, ORBA and finally reaches hill 254 before turning south 
and reaching PHTELIA bay. 
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APPENDIX D: 
Selected Extracts from the Pact of London (26 April 1915)820 
ARTICLE 1: 
A military convention shall be immediately concluded between the General 
Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. This convention shall settle the 
minimum number of military forces to be employed by Russia against Austria- 
Hungary in order to prevent that Power from concentrating all its strength 
against Italy, in the event of Russia deciding to direct her principal effort against 
Germany. 
ARTICLE 2: 
On her part, Italy undertakes to use her entire resources for the purpose of 
waging war jointly with France, Great Britain and Russia against all their 
enemies. 
ARTICLE 3: 
The French and British fleets shall render active and permanent assistance to 
Italy. 
ARTICLE 4: 
Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with 
its geographical and natural frontier, as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorizia 
and Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero and including Volosca and the 
Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, as well as the small islands of Plaknik, 
820 Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons (Parliamentary Papers, 1920), Cmd. 671, VII, 2- 
7. 
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Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli, San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica, and the 
neighbouring islets. 
ARTICLE 5: 
Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present 
administrative boundaries. 
ARTICLE 6: 
Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Saseno and 
surrounding territory. 
ARTICLE 7: 
Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits 
specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the central portion 
of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised 
State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania 
between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. 
ARTICLE 8: 
Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is 
at present occupying. 
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ARTICLE 9: 
Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognise that... in the 
event of total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just 
share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia. 
ARTICLE 11: 
Italy shall receive a share of any eventual war indemnity corresponding to their 
efforts and her sacrifices. 
ARTICLE 13: 
In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in 
Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy 
may claim some equitable compensation. 
ARTICLE 14: 
Great Britain undertakes to facilitate the immediate conclusion, under equitable 
conditions, of a loan of at least 50,000,000 pounds. 
ARTICLE 16: 
The present arrangement shall be held secret. 
[On 3 May 1915 the Italian government denounced the Triple Alliance and 
signed a naval agreement with the Entente powers on 10 May 1915. On 23 May 
1915 Italy mobilised and declared war on Austria-Hungary and severed 
diplomatic relations with Germany (24 May 1915), but did not declare war on 
Germany until 28 August 1916. ] 
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APPENDIX E: 
Wilson's Fourteen Points 
(delivered in a Joint Session of Congress, 8 January 1918) 
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no 
private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed 
always frankly and in the public view. 
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike 
in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by 
international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 
Ill. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the 
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations 
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national agreements will be 
reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle, that in determining all 
such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must 
have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to 
be determined. 
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VI. The evacuation of all 'Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions 
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other 
nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed 
opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development 
and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free 
nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, 
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The 
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be 
the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as 
distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish 
sympathy. 
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, 
without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all 
other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore 
confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and 
determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this 
healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever 
impaired. 
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and 
the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, 
which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be 
righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of 
all. 
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IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality. 
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to 
see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to 
autonomous development. 
XI. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories 
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations 
of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel 
along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and 
international guarantees of the political and economic independence and 
territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. 
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be 
permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees. 
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assure 
a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international 
covenant. 
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XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 
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APPENDIX F: 
Draft Mandate for Albania (9 December 1919)821 
The United States, British and French Governments desire to recognise the 
independence of the Albanian State. They consider that the State of Albania will 
require, to the extent indicated in paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, `the administrative advice and assistance' of one of the 
Great Powers. For this task Italy, by her geographical situation and economic 
capacity, is primarily indicated. 
The United States, British and French Governments are anxious, therefore, to 
entrust to Italy a Mandate over the State of Albania under the conditions implied 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. They consider that these conditions 
should form the basis of Italy's acceptance of this Mandate and should be 
embodied in a Convention to be concluded between the Italian Government and 
the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The headings 
of such a Convention would be the following: - 
(1) Albania is recognised as an independent State within the frontiers 
indicated in the body of the covering memorandum. Nothing in these 
stipulations shall, however, prevent the Albanian State from 
negotiation with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State such regional 
rectifications as may be in accord with local ethnographic and 
economic requirements. 
(2) The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government shall have the right to construct 
and operate railways through Northern Albania north of parallel 41 ° 
821 Document 2, Crowe to Curzon, 2 Dec., DBFP, IV, no. 152. 
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15', and otherwise to enjoy full privileges of international transport 
across Northern Albania. 
(3) The right to control the development of the Boyana River is to be 
vested in the Council of the League of Nations with power to delegate 
the work to either Italy or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State under proper 
restrictions. It is assumed for this purpose that Montenegro will form 
part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. 
(4) A Commission shall forthwith be established consisting of a 
representative of the Italian Government, a representative of the 
League of Nations and a representative of the Albanian State who 
shall be designated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 
fort he purpose of elaborating (a) the terms of the Mandate to be 
entrusted to Italy over Albania, and (b) the organic law of the future 
State of Albania. This Commission shall terminate its labours within 
five months of the signature of this Convention and will address a 
report thereon with the necessary recommendations to the Council of 
the League of Nations. The final decision as to the terms of the 
Mandate and the organic law shall be made by the Council of the 
League acting by majority vote. 
(5) The Commission foreshadowed in the above paragraph shall base its 
deliberations not only on the consideration above outline but also on 
the following principles: - 
(a) The freedom of conscience and the free and outward exercise of 
all forms of worship, the complete liberty in education and 
linguistic matters of all the inhabitants of the State of Albania. 
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(b) The organisation, in so far as may be compatible with the 
traditions of the country and the exercise of efficient 
administration, of legislative and administrative bodies 
representing all sections of the population. 
(c) Prevention of the exploitation of the country or its colonisation in a 
manner liable to militate against the interests of the native 
inhabitants. Under this heading would be included any 
recommendation which the Commission might make as to 
improvements in the existing system of land tenure. 
(d) The eventual creation of a local gendarmerie, the senior officers 
of which may be nationals of the Mandatory Power. The 
Mandatory Power shall have the right for a period of two years 
form the date on which the Mandate is conferred, and pending the 
organisation of the native gendarmerie, to maintain armed forces 
in the country. After that period the State of Albania shall be 
permanently demilitarised, and no Power shall be allowed to 
maintain regular forces in the country without the sanction of the 
Council of the League of Nations. 
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APPENDIX G: 
A Modest Interpretation of the Albanian Speakers Excluded 
from the Independent Albania Created 1912-21822 
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